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ABSTRACT
After examining how far Rule of Law applied in the Indo-Pakistan 
sub-continent in the Ibghul Period, the thesis traces the history of 
the exercise of emergency powers from the early days of the East 
India Company, when martial law was proclaimed in the event of war 
or insurrection* After 1861 the ordinance-making power of the
Governor-General, which oould he used to enact legislation specially 
directed to meet the difficulties created by most kinds of crisis, 
resulted in a large volume of emergency legislation during the second 
(quarter of the present century* The thesis also deals with the 
power of certification of Bills conferred by the Government of India 
Act, 1919 and continued by the Constitution Act of 1935* Emergency 
legislation during the two world wars is analysed with a view to 
estimating how far it affected civil liberties* Public security 
measures during the dominion period in India and Pakistan are also 
dealt with*
While setting out the emergency provisions' in the Constitution 
of India, their inherent weaknesses which may tend to create a 
dictatorship are mentioned* The Indian provisions are compared with 
the emergency provisions in the Pakistan Constitution of 1956* The 
events and conditions which led to the abrogation of the latter 
Constitution and the establishment of a military dictatorship are 
set out*
The history of emergency powers in Ceylon is traced from the
-3-
days of the British conquest of the island, passing in review the 
proclamation of martial law on various occasions, The Public 
Security Ordinance, 1947* and its several amendments culminating in 
the amending .Act of 1959* it is pointed out, may eclipse democratic 
freedoms for the minorities in the island.
The concluding chapter deals in the main with some suggestions 
which might help to stabilise the democratic institutions set up in 
the South Asian states*
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CHAPTER I
TETRQWGTIOE
The expression 'Emergency Powers* connotes the powers, over 
and above those recognised as existing when the ship of state is 
proceeding on an even lceel in fair weather, available to a 
government in times of crisis* Formerly 'crisisf in this connexion 
was generally assumed to be limited to war, insurrection and riots, 
but as the conception of the duties of the state has been enlarged, 
and as the technique of the revolutionary has improved, the concept 
of 'crisis' has been enlarged to include any serious threat to the 
safety of the state, and its social and economic stability, so that 
it is no longer unusual to find constitutions which confer emergency 
powers on government to deal with dangerous or difficult situations 
in peace time* Thus, for instance, the (British) Emergency Powers 
Act, 1920, was intended to meet threats to essential public services 
and was brought into operation during the coal strike of 1921, 
another sectional strike of 1924, the general strike of 1926 and 
the dock strike of 1948* The (British) Supplies and Services 
(Transitional Powers) Act, 1945» sought to provide the government 
with extraordinary powers to deal with the transition from a nation 
in arms fighting for its existence to the peace-time welfare state 
after the Second World War* New powers were again conferred upon 
the governments to meet an economic crisis by the Supplies and 
Services (Essential Powers) Act, 1947* which gave carte blanche to
the government to ensure that nthe whole resources of the community 
are available for use and are used in a manner best calculated to 
serve the interests of the community11. It is clear from all this 
that the meaning of 'crisisr or ' emergencyr in the present context 
has been extended to cover any situation deemed dangerous to the 
welfare of the public.
Ihere has been a corresponding change in the nature of 
emergency powers. Ihereas formerly they consisted mainly in enhanced 
powers to employ force, they now include powers to legislate by 
executive decree, to curtail basic freedoms, to conscript the wealth 
and talents of the people and, in federal states, the concentration 
of the powers of regional governments at the centre.
In the following pages it is proposed to attempt a study of 
emergency powers in the states of Southern Asia, the nature of these 
powers, the circumstances in which they may be invoked and the 
control of public authorities who exercise such powers. It is also 
proposed to deal with the tendencies envisaged by the exercise of 
these powers in the administration of law and order with a view to 
finding out whether the democratic principle is in danger of 
subversion in a democratic state during a period of emergency and 
whether any safeguards against the possible encroachment of 
totalitarianism could be adopted without seriously interfering with 
the exercise of suoh powers when circumstances demand such exercise*
As the legal systems of the states of Southern Asia are, in 
varying degrees, based on the common law, it will be helpful to an
-9-
appreciation of the subject to make occasional comparisons with the
law of emergency in other common law countries* If emergency porters
prove a threat to civil liberties in oountries of which democracy is
a well-established product, they cannot be innocuous in states where
democracy in its modern connotation as accepted in the west, is not
yet fully acclimatised and where public opinion is neither
sufficiently educated nor developed to withstand incursions into
human rights, **For if they do these things in a green tree, what
shall he done in the dry?"^
It has been said that’in the eternal dispute between government
(2)
and liberty, crisis means more government and less liberty*1*
One is at times confronted with the vision of a military dictator, 
in the name of emergency, attempting the role of a universal 
Providence, as happens in Pakistan at the moment, and the Chief 
Justice of a Supreme Court straining all his intellectual nerves to
u K
justify the role* If bad cases made bad law, emergencies may make
(3)worse1*# Hence the importance of a study of emergency powers in
the states of South Asia where,, with a singular exception, democracy, 
under the stress of emergencies real or otherwise, tends to be 
controlled or guided and in the long run, probably subverted* Even 
in the case of the exception that is India, it is often contended, 
that it is a facade of democracy n°t the reality that exists*
It is hoped that the suggestions made in the last chapter, if
111 St. Luke, XXIII, 31. :
(2) 0. I* Carr, Concerning English Administrative Law* page 92*
(3) idem, page §'5*
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accepted and acted upon, may postpone, and possibly prevent the 
subversion of the democratic principle in the South Asian states.
It may be conceded, but not without regret, that the parliamentary 
system of government is not "one of universal validity**, ^  but that 
is no reason to abandon in despair the democratic experiment started 
in this region, before the finality of a decision is freely reached 
against it by the people concerned* The course of democracy, like
that of love, has never run smooth, and it is to restrain the 
growing hindrances to its smooth running that the suggestions 
regarding the subject of this thesis are made at its conclusion.
(4) P# Griffiths, Democracy under Strain in South Asia, Asian Review, 
April 1959t page 101.
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CHAPBBE II
EMERGENCY POWERS IN q?HE INDO-PAKISTAN SUB- C ONIINENI BE TREES
1600 and 1861
i* Rule of Law In the Moghul Period.
British rule in India, according to the Joint Committee on
Indian Constitutional Reforms which reported to the Parliament of
(l)the United Kingdom in 1934? trestablished the rule of law1*.
Prom the context it would seem that the Committee used the phrase
*rule of law1 in the sense in which it is normally used by English
lawyers* In that sense it means fra state of affairs in which the^e
are legal barriers to governmental arbitrariness, and legal safeguards
to )
for the protection of the individual**# ^Stripped of all
technicalities1*, writes Hayek, f*this (rule of law) means that 
government in all its actions is bound by rules fixed and announced 
beforehand — rules which make it possible to foresee with fair 
certainty how the authority will use its coercive powers in given 
circumstances, and to plan onefs individual affairs on the basis
(3)of this knowledge1**
Rule of law, in the sense indicated above, cannot be said to 
have flourished in the Moghul empire or in the contemporaneous 
princely states* In all these States, the rulers were practically
(1) Joint Committee on Indian, Constitutional Reforms, Report, 1934* 
Volume I, Part I, page 3*
(2) W. Friedmann, Law and Social Change in Contemporary Britain* 
page 282*
(3) F* A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, page 54*
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absolute, notwithstanding that a B&islim prince was, in theory, 
obliged to abide by the Sharia in the governance of his country, and 
a Hindu prince was, in theory, under the law laid down in the 
Pharmasastra* In practice the obligation© imposed by their religions 
did not deter the Indian princes from generally acting as they thought 
fit* In the Moghul empire and in the Indian princely states there 
was no legal sanction for the prince’s transgressions of the divine 
law, and the wrath of God, as in most human lives, was an 
ineffective ban on waywardness* Many of the princes were enlightened 
for their time and most accepted in some matters, at some times or 
in some circumstances, the limitations on their absolute discretion 
imposed by the divine laws to which they were subject. Theirs was 
government of laws and yet of men, with a strong accent on the 
human element* Unlike an administrator in a democratic society, the 
Indian ruler of the Jfcghul period could, if he chose, act 
arbitrarily up to the point of provoking successful rebellion* It 
was the absence of legal sanctions against arbitrary behaviour which 
differentiated the rule of the Ifcghuls and the Indian princes from the 
system ultimately developed by the British and taken over by the 
Indian Republic*
-13-
ii* Common Law in the British Indian Settlements
The mercantile successes of some of the European powers in the 
15 th and l6th centuries inspired a group of London merchants to form 
into a company to trade with the East. It was called the London 
East India Company* On December 31> 1600, Queen Elizabeth granted 
them a charter empowering the Governor and the Company to make 
reasonable laws for the good government of the Company and for the 
better advancement and continuance of their trade and to provide such 
Pains and penalties by imprisonment or fine as might seem to them 
necessary* The laws and penalties were to be reasonable and not to 
be repugnant to the laws, statutes and customs of England* James I 
renewed the same powers by his charter granted in 1609* It was with 
these powers and limitations that the English traders came to India 
and set up a factory at Surat* In 1612 Captain Best secured from 
the Moghul Emperor an imperial decree granting permission to the 
English to trade there on payment of a customs duty* The Company 
secured its next territorial foothold in 1639 at Madras when Francis 
Day built Fort St. George* In 1662 Bombay was given by Portugal to 
Charles II as part of the dowry of Catherine de Braganza. The King 
turned it over to the Company. The third leg of the tripod on which 
England built up her system of administration in India was obtained 
in I69O when Job Gharnock and his followers established a permanent 
settlement in Calcutta*
The treaty between Captain Best and the Moghul Governor at Surat 
stipulated that nin all questions, wrongs and injuries that shall be
. *  -14-
off ©red to the British and to their nation, they do receive from the
judges and those that he in authority speedy justice”. ^  But the 
personal character of the lav/ of India and the nature of many of its 
principles and penalties made it impossible for men of a different 
culture and habits of thought to adopt it, and in 1615 Sir Thomas Roe 
managed to secure from the Moghul Emperor certain facilities for the 
English inoluding the right to be governed by their ov/n lav/s, to have
disputes settled by their own tribunals, but disputes between an
Englishman on the one hand and a Hindu or Muslim on the other were to
(2)
be settled by established local authorities* ^European Christians
have usually been allowed by the indulgence or weakness of the 
potentates of these countries to retain the use of their laws and 
their factories have for many purposes been treated as part of the 
territory of the sovereign from whose dominions they camel Thus,
though the English factories v/ere part of the dominion of the Moghul 
Emperor, their own law (in so far as the merchants v/ho exercised 
judicial functions knew it) was administered in the settlements? it 
was, at least, administered according to current English notions of 
justice and fair play* An alien residing in and carrying on trade 
in one of these settlements was held to take his temporary national 
character, *'not from the Moghul dominion, but from the British 
possessions11 (4)
'l) MS. India House Records*
^5 M* P. Jain, Outlines of Indian Legal History* page 4*
3 } A* G* of Bengal v* Ranee Swarnamayee Bosses* (l863j 9 M*I.A.
391 at page 429*
(4) Cowell, History and Constitution of the Courts and Legislative 
Authorities in India, page 10*
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In 1765 the Company obtained from the Moghul Emperor who had 
fallen on evil days, the grant of the diwani over Bengal, Strictly 
speaking, this was the right to administer the revenue of Bengal, 
which carried with it the duty of administering civil justice, while 
uiaamat, or right administer criminal justice remained with 
the naib nagim. a minister of the Nawab, in theory a feudatory of 
the Emperor. In practice, the inconvenience of separating these 
powers proved so grave that the Company encroached upon and 
ultimately usurped the power to administer criminal justice.
As Lord Brougham saids- * ' the settlement of the Company in
Bengal was affected by leave of a regularly established government, 
in possession of the country, invested with the rights of sovereignty 
and exercising its powers? ... by permission of that government, 
Calcutta was founded and the factory fortified, in a district 
purchased from the owners of the soil, by permission of that 
government, and held under it, by the Company, as subjects owing 
obedience, as tenants rendering rents and even as officers exercising, 
by delegation, a part of its administrative authority. At what 
precise time and by what steps, they exchanged the character of the 
subjects for that of Sovereign or rather, acquired by themselves, 
or with the help of the Crown, the right of sovereignty, cannot be 
ascertained, the sovereignty has long since been vested in the 
Crown. ft(5)
(5) Mayor of Lyons v. East India. Company (I8 3 6) I.M.I.A. 2J2 at 
273-274*
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In these circumstances, it became necessary, even "before the 
Company could claim dominion over any part of India that the Crown 
should grant to them certain legislative and judicial powers to be 
exercised by them over the English servants of the Company and such 
Indian settlers as placed themselves under their protection*
Pox^  each voyage the Crown used to grant to the 'General* or 
Commander of the fleet the right to inflict punishment for capital 
offences and to enforce 'martial law*. The royal grant of December 
1 49 1615, provided that in cases involving capital offences a verdic 
must be found by a jury*
In February l6l6, Gregory Lellington was tried under martial 
law (that is, military law)^^ on board ship off Swally Road, and 
executed* The charge was that he had murdered one Henry Barton, 
Englishman, "in or near the town of Surat in the dominion of the
f j )
Moghul*’* Kayew ' considers this the earliest trial on record in th 
history of British administration of justice in India,
James I on Febx’uary 4* 1623» empowered the East India Company 
to issue commissions to any of its Presidents and his Council to 
'’chastise, correct and punish all and every subject of us, our heir 
and successors, employed by the Company", The death penalty could
(6) In the records relating to the East India Company, in the 17th 
and 18th centuries, we find the expression 'martial law' used 
in the sense of military law as well as in its strict modern 
sense. As was pointed out by Coekburn, C.J,, in his charge to 
the grand jury in Rex v* Helson and Brand, ((I867) Special 
Reports, 99^100), martial law in its modern sense was confused 
with military law until after the time of Blackstone.
(7 ) J* I, ICaye, History of the Administration of the East India 
Company» page 66,
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be inflicted only for mutiny or other felony, after trial by a jury 
of twelve or more Englishmen. In spite of this grant of power, the 
Company in 1624 applied to the King for authority to punish their 
servants abroad by martial law as well as by municipal lav/. The 
petition for this increase of authority was probably necessitated 
by the fact that the Englishmen, whenever they could, without
( Q )
manifest danger, took the law into their own hands' . nAmong 
themselves justice was administered in criminal cases by virtue of 
a ICing*s Commission under the Great Seal, which empowered the 
Commissions to punish and execute offenders by martial law."^^
Charles II by his charter granted in l66l empowered the Governo 
and Council of each factory uto judge all persons belonging to the 
Company or living under them, in all causes, civil and criminal, 
according to the laws of England and to execute judgement accordingly 
This general provision placed judicial power in the hands of the 
executive and restricted the law to be administered to that in force 
in England* According to Rankin,^^ the first provision for
the exercise of judicial powers by the East India Company was made 
by the charter of Charles II and its responsibility for the 
administration of lav/ in India was confined until 1765 to the 
factories of the Company and their branches*
(8) Kaye, op. cit. page 6 5.
(9) Kaye, op. cit. pages 65-6 6.
(1 6) Eawcett, The ffirst Century of British Justice in India.
Introduction, xix.
(11) Kankin, Background to Indian Lav/, page 1.
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The provisions of the Charter of l66l were interpreted as
applicable only to the European servants of the Company. The Englis
Crown nat this time clearly had no jurisdiction over native subjects
of the Moghul and the Charter was admitted to apply to the European
(1 ?)servants of the Company.”'
The Charter of August 95 while giving full powers to
the Company to make peace and war with any of the nations of Asia,
Africa and America within the Charter limits, empowered them to raise
such military forces as seemed necessary and to execute martial lav/
for the defence of their forts, places and plantations against
foreign invasions or domestic insurrection or rebellion* James II
on April 2, 1686 authorised the Company to appoint admirals and other
naval officers in their ships within the charter limits. The
officers were given the power to raise naval forces and exercise,
within their ships on the other side of Good Hope, martial law for
the defence of their ships when engaged in open hostility with other
nations. William III*s Charter of 1698 gave the Company the right
to appoint generals and other officers for their forces on sea and
on land, to raise forces and to exercise martial law in time of war
or open hostility. The Company had complained of its lack of
authority to keep its military forces in proper order and it may be 1
this renewed recognition of existing authority was not wholly
(13)
satisfactory to them' '
The royal charter of September 2 4, 1726, provided for the
(12) A. G. of Bengal v. Ranee Swarnamayee Dos see (I863) 9 M.I.A* 
591 at 430*
(13) A. E, Keiths A Constitutional History of India, 18-19*
establishment at Madras, Fort William and Bombay, of civil and
criminal courts that derived their authority f ro m  the King, instead
of the Company. The charter recites that a representation was made
by the Company that there was "a great want'1 at these places of a
proper and competent power and authority "for the speedy and effectua
administering of justice in civil causes, and for the trying and
punishing of capital and other criminal offences and misdemeanours* 11
Thus was introduced into each Presidency town a Mayor* s Court, not a
court of the Company as there had been in Madras since 1687, but a
court of the ICing of England, "though exercising its authority in a
land to which the King of England had no claim to sovereignty".^^ 
’That the law intended to be applied by these courts was the law of
England is clear enough from the terms of the charter though this is
not expressly stated5 and it has long been accepted doctrine that
this charter introduced into the Presidency towns the law of England
(15)both common and statute law ** as it stood in 1726*' • It was
observed by the Privy Council in Attorney General of Bengal v. Ranee 
Swarnamayee Bossee^ ^  that "the English law, civil and criminal, 
has been usually considered to have been made applicable to natives, 
within the limits of Calcutta, in the year 1726, by the charter 
13th George X, Neither that nor the subsequent charters expressly 
declare that the English law shall be so applied, but it seems to 
have been held to be the necessary consequence of t he provisions 
contained in them". But English law in its entirety was not
(14) Rankin, Background to Indian haw» page 1.
(15} Rankin, loc. cit.
(16) (1863) 9 M.I.A. 391 at 430-31.
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introduced into India* 'The acts of the power which.....introduced
the English laws generally show that it was introduced, not in all
its branches * Notwithstanding the extent to which the laws have
been introduced, it is allowed on all hands that many parts of them
(17)
are still unknown in our Indian dominions", J It was observed by
(18) (19)Lord Brougham'1 ' that Freeman v, Fairlie* ^"only decided that the
estate in land and tenants of a British subject in Calcutta was of
such a nature as to descend to him according to the English law of
succession - that it was freehold of inheritance". It is true that
this conclusion was reached by the adoption of a larger position that
the English law had been introduced into the settlement; but whateves
went beyond the point of the land being freehold of inheritance
was obiter and cannot be said to have been decided.
The Charter of George II granted in 1755 expressly provided
that the Mayor*s courts were not to try actions between Indians,
unless both parties consented to stibmit the dispute for determination
by the Mayor*s courts. The principle of this provision, which does
not seem to have been adopted in Bombay, formed the basis of Warren
Hastings’s 'plan* of 1772 when the Company decided to "stand forth...
as diwan" under the grant of 17^ 5 f^om the Moghul Emperor* The plai
provided that Hindus and Muslims were to be governed by their own
personal laws in "suits regarding inheritance, marriage, and caste
——PTI1. ■ uBHtg *— * !' IM 'I Jl J II.■ U MW l |IWHIW W « » — r tl |l lU l l|l|JIW WIi»Wl.l I II > ■■■ I » " 1 1 1 »■■■ 1 1 1 ii ■■■ ■ ! * <  ...... ......  »"  ■ < m m r I
(17) Mayor of Lyons v. Bast India Company (1836) I. M.I.A. 175
i r ® : ------------— ----------—
(18) Ibid.
(19) (1828) I .M.I.A. 305,
(20) Lord Brougham in Mayor of Lyons v. East India Company (1836)
I M.I.A. 275 at 282,
and other religious usages and institutions".
The Regulating Act of 1775 provided that it was lawful for the 
Governor-General and Council "to make and issue such rules, 
ordinances and regulations, for the good order and civil government" 
of the United Company’s settlements - "as shall "be deemed just and 
reasonable (such rules, ordinances and regulations not being 
repugnant to the laws of the realm) and to set, impose, inflict and 
levy reasonable fines and forfeitures fox’ the breach or non-observanc 
of such rules, ordinances and regulations".
Section 60 of the Regulation of July 5> 1781, made by the 
Governor-General and Council provided that^in all cases within the 
jurisdiction of the Mofussil Uiwani Adalats, for which no specific 
directions are hereby given the respective judges thereof do act 
according to justice, equity and good conscience". Similarly, 
Section 95 laid down that !In all cases, for which no specific 
directions are hereby given, the judge of the Sadar Diwani Adalat 
do act according to justice, equity and good conscience".
The directions first given in Regulation II of 1772 to apply 
the personal law in matter of "inheritance, marriage, caste, and, 
other religious usages and institutions" remained in force, 
"succession" being added to the list. The ruler of "justice, equity 
and good conscience" justified the application of the personal law 
in family and religious matters not enumerated in the Regulations 
and even in matters of contract. , The Hindu law was applied in 
adoption, guardianship, joint family, partition , gift and wills.
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The Muslim law of divorce, gifts and pre-emption was adopted "by
the courts* Customs of the community and locality of the parties
were also souces from which the judges borrowed principles of law.
When English judges trained in common law were appointed to the
High Courts and later to the lower courts 1 justice, equity and good
conscience" came to he interpreted to mean principles of English
(21}law when apposite* In Yax^ den Seth Sam v* 3uuokpathyv ' Lord 
Kingsdown delivering the opinion of the Judicial Gommittee of the 
Privy Council observed that though English law was not obligatory 
upon the courts in the mofussil, they ought, in proceeding according 
to justice, equity and good conscience, to be governed by the 
principles of English law, applicable to a similar state of 
circumstances, Iwentyfive years later in 1887 Lord Hobhouse stated 
that equity and good conscience had been "generally interpreted to 
mean the rules of English law if found applicable to Indian society 
and circumstances''/22)
(21} (1862) 9 M.I.A. 507*
(22) Waghela Rajsanjl v, Shekh Masludin, (1887) 14* Indian Appeals 
87 at page 96 *
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iii. Company*s Lav/s
As a special charter was granted for the administration of 
Bombay and a set of laws framed by the East India Company under the 
charter, the island requires separate discussion.
"Bombay was the first place in India where British justice was 
administered to native inhabitants by a Special Court of Judicature^
When the island was given over to the Company in September 1668, 
it had already been under British rule for three and a half years.
It had previously been under Portuguese rule for over a century and 
quarter, (that is, from its cession by the Sultan of Gujerat in 
1534) and- Portuguese laws and customs had,been firmly established.
In his report of December 2 3, 1665, Humprey Cooke, the Governor, 
wrote? 'tyhe Portxigalls on the Maine and neighbouring places in these 
parts, have some lands on this Island, and many inhabitants heere, 
have lands ther, so that I have been forced (to excuse a confusion) 
to settle the civil law among them in this Island, the which hath 
hugely pleased boath partyss among ourselves is martial law, ahd
^ fp A  0-0*0 *| ^
for religion, liberty of conscience is given to all.1 v 7 
a conflict of laws, Cooke allowed the Portuguese Civil law to eontim
to govern the Portuguese and other non-English inhabitants of the
island* He appointed a Justice of the Peace to inquire into all
causes with the bailiff and to report to Cooke, who gave the final
decision.
(1) C. Pawcett, Ihe First Century of British Justice in India, page
(2) quoted by S. A. Khan, Anglo-Indian Negotiations relating to
Bombay, 1660-77» page 4^ 7.
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Martial law regulations adapted from the set issued hy
Peterborough for the garrison of Tangier were enforced in Bombay in
the first years of the island under the direct control of the Crown.
As the island was threatened by the hostility of Aurangzeb and
Shivaji and also by the Portuguese and the Dutch, and as military
protection was the chief concern of the government, martial law
regulations which could be enforced under conditions akin to war were
(3)considered necessary.' ' Judicial arrangements were comparatively 
easy to make in tbs Bombay of those days, as the island, unlike 
Port William, did not derive law from two sources. Apart from the 
extensive use of military law which Cooke had instituted, the 
Portuguese laws continued until they were abolished by proclamation 
in 1672*
The regula/fcions issued by Lord Peterborough for the garrison of 
Tangier were based on those of Essex and Fairfax in the Civil War of 
1642-49* This explains their extreme severity,for Cromwell, 
according to Macaulay, subjected his soldiers to a discipline more 
rigid than had ever been known in England.
Sir George Oxenden, President of Surat, who visited Bombay in
1669 doubted the validity of enforcing the laws and ordinances of war
in time of peace, especially because the laws had not been formally 
issued by the King, He wrote that "the Articles are not allowable 
by the Common law of England, which wee must answer to, should wee
■ wmnftlMf—*— i Mil fc ii i ii iMM—toM ■nil nW|i mwi— amlH wwW*—*" ' —1    1 m Indira——mM 1 I 1 ■iw iiwimli i —
(3) A. B, Keith, A Constitutional History of India, page 31*
(4 ) 0. Fawcett, The First Century of British Justice, page 10.
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("be) called to account'. ^
The provision of the Charter of 1668 under which Bombay was 
transferred to the Company limited the Company’s powers of enacting 
laws, not only by requiring them to be "consonant to reason, and 
not repugnant or contrary to " "the laws of England, but also by 
prescribing that they should be ’as near as may be agreeable to’ such 
laws. The Charter also provided that the courts and their* 
proceedings should be "like unto those that are established and used 
in this our realm of England."
In February 1670 laws enacted by the Company under the charter 
were brought from England by Gerald Aungier and published in Portugues 
and Konkani. They were drafted by Thomas Papillon, Sir Josiah 
Child’s rival, and by the Company’s solicitor and revised by the 
Court of Committees and the Solicitor General* Section 6 deals with
military discipline and prevention of insurrection. The death
penalty was laid down for mutiny, sedition, rebellion or insurrectic 
Other offences were not so seriously treated. Even a soldier who
slept at his post could only be sentenced to a fine not exceeding two
months’ pay and corporal punishment. Offences were to be tried by 
the Governor and Council or by jury, not by Courts martial. The 
mildness of the lav/s evoked complaints in the island and it was 
decided by the President and the Council to have recourse to the 
articles of war whenever considered necessary.
(5) Surat letter of June 21, 1669, Factory Records. Bombay, Volume 
page 76.
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'The spirit of even-handed and temperate justice that animated 
the Laws does credit to the Company? hut they had grave defects, 
due mainly to their being drafted without reference to the special 
circumstances of Bombay and without the advantage of the prior 
consultation that was at first contemplated."^^
Though the articles of war generally superseded in practice 
the Company’s laws, there were exceptional occasions when offences 
were tried by the Governor and Council with a jury. For instance, 
in 1674* Captain Shaxton, the deputy governor, was tried for 
complicity in the mutiny of his soldiers in accordance with the laws 
of the Company. When he alleged that the court consisted mainly of 
interested parties, the matter was merely referred to the Company* 
But the soldiers concerned in the mutiny were tried by courts martial* 
It was argued that by mutiny they had renounced the Company’s laws. 
This interpretation was against the spirit of Clause (iii) of Section 
which provides that "if any captain, or officers or soldiers or 
mariners that have entertained themselves with the Company’s service 
raise sedition or make or abet any mutiny, such captain, officer, 
soldier or max*iner, being thereof convicted by a jury shall be 
sentenced to suffer death and to forfeit and lose all his estate to 
the use of the Company". Captain Shaxton and Ensign Kennedy were 
prosecuted under Clause (v) of Section 6 of the Company’s laws and 
tried by a jury, as required under the Clause in cases of 
insurrection* The interpretation of renouncing the Company’s laws
(6) Fawcett, op* cit. page 17*
by mutiny does not seem to have been extended to them. This
difference must have been due to Aungier’s adopting the line of least
resistance in the enforcement of the Company1s laws.
It is already seen that the Company was in favour of having
recourse to common lav/ principles even in cases of mutiny by soldiers.
(7)But Sir Josiah Child, a few years later, asserted that under the 
charters of 1685 and 1686 Bombay was to be governed by martial law 
and so much of the civil law^^ as was suitable to Indian conditions. 
He believed that common law and English statutes of a general 
character were quite unsuited to India. In a letter written to 
Bombay on July 28, 1686 by the Company, guided by Sir Josiah, occurs 
the followings
(q )
"And by his present Majesty’s charterw/ and the last charter
of our late s o v e r e i g n , y o u  are to govern our people there, being
subject to us under His Majesty*by the law martial and the civil law,
(11)which is only proper to India"*'1 } Again on February 3» 1687, the 
Company sent similar instructions to the President and Council at 
Surats "We do enjoin you, according to His Majesty’s last charter 
to govern the soldiers and the people of that island, as well English 
as others, by martial law, and that jurisdiction lately establishedj 
of the Admiralty, for trying controversies between party and party, 
in a summary way, and according to the usage of the civil law,
(7) Governor of the Company.
(8) that is, Homan law*
(9) The Charter of 1686 granted by James II.
(10) The Charter of 1683 granted by Charles II.
(11) Letter Books in the Factory Records, Volume 8, page 168.
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which only is proper for India, the common law of England "being 
peculiar to this Kingdom, and not adopted in any kind to the 
government of India, and the nature of these people, as we have
(12
formerly writ to you and have found hy long and useful experience".' 
The directions contained in the letters of the directors, in Sir 
Josiah1 s view, had the binding force of law. .*3*
The Charter of 168? required that cases should be adjudged 
"according to equity and good conscience and according to the laws 
and customs of merchants*" The cases were not always to be tried in 
a summary way, but upon "due examination and proof", and by 
"summary way or otherwise" as the Court in its discretion might 
determine *
As Sir Josiah was in favour of *martial law1 being used for the
(15)government of colonies like St* Helena' '  * and Bombay, he had books <
*Laws Martial* sent out to these places. Sir John Wyborne who was
appointed Deputy Governor of Bombay was commissioned to try by martial
law at St* Helena, on his way to Bombay, the planters and others
concerned in Keigwin*s rebellion of 1685-84*
Sir John Wyborne, who was also Judge Advocate, besides being 
Deputy Governor, had a predilection for !martial law1, probably 
because of his experiences at Tangier. He remonstrated against the 
order of Sir John Child, the Governor, for the retrial by the Court
12) id, page 265*
13) I** the Company*s despatch of May 6, 1685, to St. Helena it was 
stateds "We have His Majesty* s Commission to govern our 
plantations by martial law, which is absolutely necessary in 
such remote places", (Letter Books in the Factory Records, 
Volume 7, page 458)
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of Judicature, of one Robert Clarke, who had killed the gunman1 s
mate of the Phoenix in a quarrel. Wyborne had reasonable grounds
for his objection? as Clarice was a soldier, h© should be deemed to
have been properly tried when tried by a court martial. In a letter
sent by Wyborne and his Council, to Sir John Child, it was pointed
that "Sir Josiah Child is wholly for governing by martial lav/, and
has been at a great deal of trouble to obtain it in times past and
now write to that purpose
Courts martial were held during Siddi Yakub1s invasion of Bombay
in 1689-90# It is unlikely that martial law was ever entirely
dispensed with as there was the prime necessity of keeping discipline
in the garrison. It was resorted to in 1691 as fche Factory Records
(15)of Surat indicate.
In spite of Sir Josiah1 s predilections for!martial law1, the
Company1s charter for a corporation for Madras, issued in 1688, unde^
his guidance recites as the motive for its issue that "the Company had
found by experience and the practice of other European nations in
India that the malting and establishing of corporations in cities and
towns that are grown exceeding populous tends more to the well-
governing of such populous places, and to the increase of trade, tha:
the oonstant use of the law martial in trivial concerns" His love
for *martial law1 seems to have been counterbalanced by his
admiration for the Butch system of government, which it was thought
(14) quoted in Fawcett, op. cit* page 114 #
(15) Volume 93? page 41*
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desirable to imitate. The reference to 1 other "European nations1 
was mainly to the Butch, Still, the qualification, !in trivial 
concerns1 deserves notice.
The Gompany*s laws were superseded "by the Charter of 1726 
which established the Mayorfs Courts in the Presidency towns,
(16) As early e,s May 1687 when Surat ceased to be one, Bombay had 
been made a Presidency,
-31-
iv* Insurrections and Martial Law
(1)
In his concurring opinion in Duncan v» Kahanamoku* / Chief
Justice Stone of the United States Supreme Court observed^that
’’martial law is the exercise of the power which resides in the
executive hranch of the government to preserve order and insure the
public safety in times of emergency, when other branches of the
government are unable to function, or their functioning would itself
threaten the public safety*, *,,.It is a law of necessity to be
prescribed and administered by the executive power”* Its true
character is emphasised by Weiner when he describes it as ’’the public
( 2 ^  \law of necessity”; ' "Necessity calls it forth, necessity justifies
its existence, and necessity meastires the extent and degree to which
( 3 )it may be employed”*v ' Martial law can exist only to the extent 
which military necessity may require * When it is absolutely 
imperative for the maintenance of public safety and good order, 
ordinary legal processes can be superseded and military tribunals
( i
authorised to exercise the jurisdiction normally vested in the courts'. 
In times of extreme emergency such as an invasion, insurrection, or
catastrophic natural disaster, the circumstances may warrant the
administration of martial law.
The circumstances in India until the Company1s possessions were
taken over by the Crown in 1858 necessitated the declaration of martiaj
m  327 U.S. 304 at 335 (194-6)
(2) Weiner. A Practical Manual of Martial Law, page 16* 
m  Ibid.
(4; B* Schwarts, The Supreme Court, page 286.
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law on a number of occasions. There were hostile powers like the 
Mahrattas threatening the safety and public order of the possessions? 
further the people in these possessions were inclined to rise in 
rebellion owing to some grievance or other. It was therefore thought 
expedient to give a statutory basis to the administration of martial 
law in India* and in 1804 the Bengal State Offences Regulation 
(Regulation X of 1804) was passed,
Its main provisions were that, during the existence of any war 
in which the government might be engaged as well as during the 
existence of open rebellion against the authority of the government, 
the Oovernor-General in Council might suspend the functions of the 
ordinary courts and might establish martial law and direct the 
immediate trial by court martial of all persons owing allegiance to 
the British government in India who should be taken in arms in open 
hostility to the government or in the act of opposing its authority 
by force of arms, or in the actual commission of any overt act of 
rebellion against the State, or in the act of openly aiding and 
abetting the enemies of the British government,
This regulation was supplemented, for reasons of public 
security, by Bengal Regulation III of 1818 which provided for 
preventive detention of individuals against whom there might not be 
"sufficient ground to institute any judicial proceeding" ox* when such 
proceeding might be "unadvisable or improper". The preamble recited 
reasons of state, embracing the due maintenance of the alliances 
formed by the British government with foreign powers, the 
preservation of tranquillity in the territories of native princes
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entitled to its protection and the security of the British dominions
from foreign hostility and from internal commotion as the ground for
such detention, " without any immediate view to ulterior proceedings
of a judicial nature", by means of a warrant of commitment under the
authority of the Governor-General,
This regulation, too, v/as necessitated by the many wars with
the Indian princes engaged in by the British government during the
period. The unwritten lav/ or constitution "would admit of a
relaxation of the rules securing private rights in times of public
distress or danger, ne quid detriinenti capiat respublica. An Act
for the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act in such times is no
violation of the Constitution," observed Horman, J., of the Supreme
(5)Court, Calcutta, in re Amir Khan;^/
As has been said before, martial law was proclaimed on a number
(6)of occasions between 1817 and 1858' , After the administration of
martial law in Cuttack in 1818, the Home Government in England wrote 
to the authorities in India, "We earnestly hope that the power of 
administering martial law.... will be exercised with as much 
forbearance as circumstances will admit of. Moderation and clemency 
would be becoming in all cases, but they are more particularly 
incumbent upon us, in one where we fear there are good grounds for 
believing that the affections of the people may have been alienated
(5) (1870) 6 Bengal L. S. 592.
(6) In Cuttack in 1817-1818, in Vizagapatam and in Palkonda in 1852; 
in Kimedi in 1855? in Gumeur in 1855 s Sevantwadi in 1844*
in various places in 1857*
-*34~
from our government by maladministration and that they may have been
goaded by suffering to resistance J
The Privy Council in Elphinstone v. Berdachund 8^  ^ indicated
the relevancy of martial law in relation to a state of war.
Reversing the decision of the Supreme Court of Bombay, the Privy
Council allowed the appeal of Elphinstone with regard to a seizure
of treasure from Poona, Lord Tenterton observing; !*We think that
the proper character of the transaction was that of hostile
seizure made if not flagrante, yet no&um cessante bello. regard
being had both to the time, the place and the person, and
consequently that the municipal court had no jurisdiction to adjudge
upon the subject".
During the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857, for a considerable time and
over a large extent of territory, all civil courts were necessarily
suspended in consequence of the act of the rebels* Ho authority othes
than the military was in existence and it had to act immediately and
summarily for the sake of self-preservation. On June 9* 1857,
martial law was proclaimed in the Divisions of Varanasi (Benaras) and
Allahabad. While the forces were engaged in fighting, everyone who
appeared to belong to, or to be siding with, the rebels was dealt
( 9 )v/ith as an enemy.v / When once there was an end of the fighting, 
civilians were attached to the army for the purpose of dealing with
(7) Parliamentary Papers 1851-52, Volume XI, Paper 755 - lil 
App. Ho.8, page 58*
(8) 1830 Knapp P.C. 316*
(9) Mayn©, Criminal Law of India, IV Mition, Part II, page 109*
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those whose guilt admitted of a doubt. The State Offences Act,
1857j (XI of 1857) empowered the executive to proclaim any district 
which was, or had been, in a state of rebellion and to issue a 
commission for the trial of the rebels for any offence against the 
State or for murder, arson, robbery or any other serious crime agains 
person or property. The proceedings were to be summary and without 
appeal? but no sentence was to be passed except such as was authorised 
by law for the offence *
After the Mutiny and the administration of martial law during the 
period, there was for nearly sixty years no insurrection of 
consequence necessitating martial rule.
(10) ibid.
CHAPTER III
EMSRGMGY POWERS FROM 1861 TO 1937
i„ Qrdinance-making Power of the Governor-General*
In the course of his speech in the House of Commons
introducing the India Councils Bill, l86ls Sir Charles Wood said,
"The Bill also gives power to the Governor-General in Gases of
emergency to pass an ordinance having the force of law for a
limited period. Questions might anise about the Arms Act or the
press, as to which it would he very Injudicious that delay should
occur? and we, therefore, propose to empower the Governor—General
on his own authority to pass an ordinance having the force of law,
to continue for a period of six months, unless disallowed by the
(l)Secretary of State or superseded by an Act of the legislature."
The Marquis of Balhousie believed that emergencies would not 
be infrequent in India 0 In his reply to the farewell address 
presented to him on his departure from Calcutta he said, "Ho prudent 
man, having any knowledge of Eastern affairs, would even venture 
to predict a prolonged continuation of peace in India. We have 
learnt by hard experience, how a difference with a native power, 
which seems at first to be but a little doud, no bigger than a 
man fs hand, may rapidly darken and swell into a. storm of war, 
involving the whole empire in its gloom. We have lately seen how 
in the very midst of us insurrection may rise like an exhalation
(l) Speech on June 6, 1861*
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from the earth, and how cruel violence, worse than the excesses 
of war, may be suddenly committed by men who to the. very day in 
which they broke out in the frenay of blood, have been regarded as
a simple, harmless, timid race-, not by the Government alone, but
even by those who knew them best, who are dwelling among them and
were their earliest victims. «(2) The same opinion was expressed
by him in the fourth paragraph of his minute of February 28, I856.
Wood probably shared Lord Lalhousie's view. Further he felt 
the need far. conferring greater powers on the Governor-General,
"the supreme authority in Indiaf. who is responsible for the peace, 
security and good government of that vast territory". He was
of the opinion that the legislative council of the Governor™General 
had exceeded its powers, that "it had become- a sort of debating 
society or petty Parliament"^ and that "it was certainly a great 
mistake that a body of twelve members should have been established
(5)with all the forms and functions of a Parliament".
As early as December 23, 1854, Wood had expressed his view of 
the position of the Governor-General in his letter to Lord Dalhousies 
"I look upon all the Councils, Secretaries etc. as so many machines 
for lightening the labour of the Govemor-General and for doing what 
I may call the mechanical work of the government. I have made him 
more absolute than he was in the Executive Council and I do net wish
(2) quoted in Andrew Crawford, Remarks on the Indian Army, page 3.
(3) Wood’s dispatch of August 9? 1861.
(4 ) Wood^s speech in the House of Commons on June 6, 1861.
(5) Ibid.
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to make the Executive Council a body which does more than aid him 
in administrating (sic)* the Legislative Council in law-making”* ^  
Wood was evidently referring to the Charter Act of 1853* But Lord 
Canning in 1861 was not too happy with the situation* On January 
26* 1861* he wrote to Wood, "The fault of the present Constitution 
of Council is the waste of labour and the delays that it entails*
(7)This has been mitigated of late* but not so much as it might be”* 
Canningfs complaint regarding delays was generally met by Section 8 
of the India Councils Act* 1861* which empowered the Governor-Genera 
to make rules and orders for the more convenient transaction of 
business in the Executive Council« An emergency was another 
situation which could not brook delay* Wood who had strong views 
about the position of the Governor-General* as indicated in his 
letter cited above* thought it prudent to grant the Governor-General 
statutory powers to deal with an emergency* Section 23 of the 
India Comicils Act* 1861* was therefore enacted* The Section reads 
"Notwithstanding anything in this Act contained* it shall be lawful 
for the Governor-General* in cases of emergency* to make and 
promulgate* from time to time* ordinances for the peace and good 
government of the said territories or of any part thereof* subject* 
however* to the restrictions contained in the last preceding
6) Letter to Lord Dalhousie* December 23* 1854*
7) Letter to Sir Charles Wood* January 26* 1861* (emphasis supplie
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( 8 )section^ and every such ordinance shall have like force of lav/ 
with a law or regulation made by the Governor-General in Council* 
as by this Act provided* for the space of not more than six months 
from its promulgation* unless the disallowance of such ordinance 
by Her Majesty shall be earlier signified to the Governor-General 
by the Secretary of State for India in Council* or unless such 
ordinance shall be controlled or superseded by some law or regulation 
made by the Governor-General in Council at a meeting for the purpose 
of making laws and regulations as by this Act provided"*
The Secretary of State for India knew that the Governor—General 
was being given very wide powers under this Section. That is why 
he exhorted the Governor—General to use them only on urgent 
occasions* YsTood’s dispatch to the Governor-General sent with the 
India Councils Act sets down certain conditions for the exercise 
of these powers* "By Section 23 the Governor-General of India is 
vested with a new and extraordinary power of making and promulgating 
ordinances in cases of emergency on his own authority. It is due 
to the supreme authority in India* who is responsible for the peace* 
security and good government of that vast territory* that he should
(8) Section 22 s Govern or-General in Council shall have power* ..to 
make laws and regulations* *♦ provided a lw a y s that the said 
Governor-General in Council shall not have the power of making 
any laws or regulations wxch***ma$‘ affect the authority of 
Parliament or the Constitution and rights of the East India 
Company* or any part of the unwritten laws or Constitution of 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland* whereon may 
depend in any degree the allegiance of any person to the Crown 
of the United Kingdom, or the sovereignty or the dominion of 
the Crown over any part of the said territories*
be armed with this power, but it is to be called into action only 
on urgent occasions, the reasons for a resort to it should always 
be recorded, and, these together with the ordinance itself should 
be submitted without loss of time, for the consideration of Her
(9)Majestyfs government*
Till 1914 the ordinance-maIcing power was not frequently used* 
Between 1861 and 1914? which was a period of comparative 
tranquillity seven ordinances only were promulgated* The declaratio: 
of the First World War in 1914 was followed by the promulgation of 
a number of ordinances* Between 1914 and 1918 twenty seven 
ordinances were issued* They were mainly war measures and many
of them dealt with currency and exchange* Of the ordinances issued 
in 1919 and 1920, six dealt with law and order, five of them being 
in connexion with the administration of martial law in the Panjab* 
Between 1921 and 1935? that is, after the inauguration of the 
Mmtagu-Chemsford Reforms and before the passing of the Constitution 
Act of 1935? as many as fiftytwo ordinances were issued* As 
political agitation was continuous and public tranquillity was 
frequently in danger during these years, it is not surprising that 
most of the ordinances dealt with law and order. While Government 
regarded them as absolutely essential for the proper discharge of 
its functions, non-official opinion generally questioned their 
necessity*
(9) Wood’s dispatch of August 9? 1861*
(10) Some of them under Section 72 of the Government of India Act, 
I915l which is substantially the same as Section 23 of Indian 
Councils Act, 1861*
We shall proceed to take note of a few of the ordinances 
issued by the Governor-General between 1861 and 1935»
The first ordinance under Section 23 of India Councils Act, 
1861, was promulgated on December 27? 1861* It was to prohibit 
the export of saltpetre except in British vessels bound for the ports 
of London or Liverpool* The urgency of the measure was indicated 
by the citation in the Ordinance that "Information haw reached the 
Governor—General by public telegraph that the exportation of saltpeti 
from the United Kingdom has been interdicted by royal proclamation"* 
It was therefore thought expedient that the exportation of saltpetre 
from India except in British vessels bound for the ports of London 
or Liverpool should be prohibited*
On January 3? 1862, a second Ordinance regarding saltpetre 
was promulgated as instructions from the Secretary of State Y/ere 
received to take immediate measures for preventing the exportation 
of salt petre from India, except in British vessels botmd for the 
ports, of the United Kingdom, and to cause any saltpetre which 
previously to the receipt and contrary to the conditions of the 
instructions might have been placed on board ships still in port 
to be relanded* The Ordinance provided for relanding of such 
saltpetre and also empowered any Customs House Officer to seize 
without warrant saltpetre liable to confiscation under the Ordinance* 
The Ordinance of October 4, 1869, promulgated by Lord Mayo 
from Simla, provided for the removal of the Angor Valley from the 
jurisdiction of civil and criminal courts and the control of officer
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of revenue constituted by the Rules, Regulations and Acts in force 
in the territories under the control of the Lieutenant Governor of 
the Panjab* The administration of justice and superintendence of 
the settlement and realisation of public revenue of the valley was, 
by this Ordinance, vested in officers to be appointed by the 
Lieutenant Governor*
The object of this Ordinance was to substitute in the Angar 
Valley, presumably then a backward area, a less sophisticated 
form of administration than that prevailing in the Panjab generally, 
and this would seem to have been regarded as an urgent matter* 
Government being at Simla at the time, an immediate session of the 
Legislative Council was, not possible* After the return to the 
plains, this Ordinance was replaced by an Act of the Legislative
(n)
Council*
The same day another Ordinance was issued with a view to 
increasing the price of salt in the Presidency of Madras and the 
duty, on salt in the Presidency of Bombay* The preamble recites that 
wthe financial condition of British India requires an immediate 
enhancement of the price of salt manufactured and sold in the 
P residency of Fort St* George and of the duty leviable on salt 
manufactured in or imported into the Presidency of Bombay"* It 
further says that "pending the re-assembly in Calcutta of the Coundil 
of the Governor-General for the purpose of making laws and regulation!
(11) The itagor Valley Act, I87O (III of I87O)
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it is expedient*1 to effect such. an enhancement "by an ordinance*
In this case again urgent action seems to have heen necessary* 
The Ordinance of February 29? 1876? was promulgated by Lord 
Nox'thbroolc to empoYrer the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal to px*ohibit 
dramatic performances* which were scandalous* defamatory* seditiou 
obscene or otherwise prejudicial to the public interest* "pending 
the consideration and enactment by the Governor-General in Council 
of a law conferring such power"*
The Ordinance conferred considerable powers on the Magistrates* 
including Magistrates of Police*
Section 1 providedi "Whenever the Lieutenant Governor of 
Bengal is of opinion that any play* pantomime* or other drama 
performed or about to be ps rformed is
(a) of a scandalous or defamatory nature or 
(b) likely to excite feelings of disaffection to the Government 
established by law in British India* or
(c) likely to deprave or corrupt persons present at such 
performance or
(d) otherwise prejudicial to the interests of the public,
the said Lieutenant Governor* or such officer as he may generally 
or specifically empower in this behalf may by order prohibit such 
performance*
Any act in disobedience of such order would be punishable with 
imprisonment for three months or vd-th fine or with both# Even 
a spectator at such a performance would be subject to the same penalt
If Section 1 granted wide powers to the Lieutenant Governor, 
with untrammelled power of delegation to "such officer as he may 
generally or specifically empower in this behalf11, Section 5 
provided that "if any Magistrate has reason to believe that any 
house, room or place is used, or is about to be used, for any 
performance prohibited under the Ordinance, he may, by his v/arrant, 
authorise any officer of police to enter with such assistance as 
may be requisite, by night or by day, and by force, if necessary, 
any such house, room, or place, and to take into custody all persons 
whom he finds therein, and to seize all scenery, dresses and other 
articles found therein and reasonably suspected to have been used, 
or to be intended to be used, for the purpose of such performance"* 
Section 6 of the Ordinance provided that "No conviction under 
this Ordinance shall bar a prosecution under Section 124 A (Sedition) 
or Section 294 (Obscene acts and songs) of the Indian Penal Code"*
It is doubtful whether there was any urgency to necessitate 
the promulgation of this Ordinance* It was issued from Calcutta 
on February 29, 1876, an& was to remain in force till May 31, 1876* 
On March 14, the Dramatic Performances Bill, in substantially the 
same terms as the Ordinance, but extending to the whole of India, 
was introduced in the Legislative Council by the Honourable 
Ml% Hobhouse* It was not passed until December 6, 1876, although 
the Ordinance expired on May 31, which suggests that the members 
of the Council were not convinced of the urgency of the measure, or 
hesitated to pass a measure which inter alia violated the English
(12)  
Common law princix^ le? *a man may not be put twice in peril for
Tl2j~~ Section.6 of the Ordinance and Section 9 of the Act*
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the same offence"*
That the Honourable Mr* Hobhouse had to speak for his Bill 
on three different occasions before it could be passed also suggests 
that the members of the legislative council did not feel the 
urgency of the measure In the same way as the Governor™General did* 
When the Bill was finally considered on December 6, 1876, that is, 
about nine months after its introduction on larch 14, the Honourable 
Me* Hobhouse, in answer to some of the objections raised, said, 
"There were many cases in which prevention was worth all the 
punishment in the world* That was particularly true in times of 
excitement, and in cases where the play was of a seditious character 
If the performance took place a few times, the mischief was done,
(X
and it Y/as a poor satisfaction to punish the offenders afterwards"* 
The Regulation of Meetings Ordinance, 1907, issued 011 May 11,
(14)
I9O7, from Simla, recites that "an emergency has risen which makes it 
necessary to regulate the holding of meetings in the provinces of 
Eastern Bengal and Assam and of the Panjab". Section 2 provided 
that the Ordinance extended to the Provinces of Eastern Bengal and 
Assam and of the Fanjab", but shall only come into operation in 
such areas (called proclaimed areas) as the Lieutenant Governor of 
each province respectively may from time to time notify in the local 
official gazette"*
It was provided that District Superintendent of Police should 
be given at least seven daysf notice if a meeting for the discussion
(13)" quoted in W. R, Donogh, The History and Lav/ o£ Sedition  ^pagel<
(14) A similar recital is common in -later ordinances*
of public or political matters was sought to he held in a proclaimed
area* Under the Ordinance, the District Magistrate could, at any
time by an order in writing, prohibit any meeting in a proclaimed
area if In his opinion such a meeting was likely to promote sedition
or disaffection or to cause a disturbance of the public tranquillity.
A- meeting prohibited would be deemed an unlawful assembly within the
meaning of Chapter VIII of Indian Penal Code and Chapter IS of the
Code of Criminal Procedure. The partition of Bengal for the
creation of the province of East Bengal and Assam caused widespread
anger among Bengalis and caused agitation, often of a violent
nature^for its revocation. The situation doubtless appeared to the "
Central Government to be sufficiently serious to justify urgent actios
The Bengal Cotton Gambling Ordinance, 1912, was promulgated
from Delhi on December 13, 1912, by Lord Hardinge* It sought, to
prohibit the practice of cotton gambling^^) in the Presidency of
Fort William. The Ordinance brought cotton gambling under the
purview of Howrah Offences Act, 1857? Calcutta Police Act, 1866,
and Bengal Public Gambling Act, 1867, as amended by the Bengal Rain
Gambling Act, 1897*
Gambling in futures from time to time in different parts of
India was indulged in to such an extent as to alarm the authorities,
who doubtless had good reasons for regarding immediate action as 
necessary case5e
(15) Wagering on a number to be arrived at by a manipulation of
figures showing rates for the sale of cotton or other marketable 
commodity.
This brings to an end the list of ordinances promulgated 
before the War of 1914—1918# Leaving the emergency legislation 
during the First World War and the martial law Ordinances of 1919- 
1921 to be dealt, with in ^ later section5, we shall notice some of 
the Ordinances issued after the inauguration of the Mbntagu^Chemsford 
Reforms*
The Bengal Ordinance, 1924? empowered the local government 
to have persons alleged to be terrorists to be tried by Special 
Commissioners® The accused were granted the right of appeal against 
convictions by these Special Cotirts, and sentence of death required 
confirmation by the High Court* The local government was 
authorised to control the movements of suspected persons by requiring 
that they should notify their residence or any change of residence 
or report themselves to the police. Any such person could be 
arrested without warrant and be detained in prison without trial* 
Cases of persons detained in custody were to be submitted for scrutiny 
to two judges who had to go by ex parte evidence untested by cross™ 
examination* Wide powers of search were given to the police, who 
could arrest without wrarrant any person against whom any reasonable 
suspicion existed® No suits or prosecutions or other proceedings 
were to be against any person for anything done or intended to be 
done in good faith under the provisions of this Ordinance*
Legislation of this lcind was usually passed since 1924? when the 
volume of violent crime suddenly increased and when the public showed 
reluctance to help the police* In such a situation urgent action
was generally justified*
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The Bengal Emergency Powers Ordinance, 1931, authorised certai: 
officers of the local government to require any person sus£>ected 
to he acting or about to act in a manner prejudicial to the public 
safety or peace to give an account of his identity and movements, 
and to arrest and detain him for twentyfour hours for the purpose 
of obtaining and verifying his statements® The local government 
was empowered to take, possession of any land or building to be 
utilised as quarters or offices for public servants, and for other 
purposes. Wide powers of search were granted to police officers* 
Provision was made for the imposition of collective fines on the 
people in disturbed areas. There were to be special judges, special 
magistrates and special tribunals to facilitate speedy and effective 
trials. Special tribunals were empowered to pass any sentence and 
confirmation of death sentence by the High Court was not required 
under the Ordinance, though, under general law, a death sentence 
pronounced by a. sessions judge sitting with a. jury required such 
confirmation* The Special Magistrates were to follow the summary 
procedure of trial and could pass sentences other than those of 
death or transportation or imprisonment for seven years*
lil/here a young person under sixteen years was convicted of an 
offence under this Ordinance or of an offence which in the opinion 
of the court had been committed in furtherance of a movement 
prejudicial to the public safety or peace, and such young person 
was sentenced to fine, the court could order the parent or guardian 
to pay the fine, or in default suffer imprisonment*
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Attempt to murder was made a. capital offence*
Wide rule-making powers were given to the local government and 
its executives under this Ordinance* Obviously, in the view of 
the Central Government the Ordinance was justified by the prevailing 
danger to the public peace*
The Emergency Powers Ordinance, 1932, unlike the two Ordinances 
noticed above, extended to the whole of British India# It 
empowered any authorised officer of government, if satisfied that 
there were reasonable grounds for believing that a person acted or 
was about to act in a manner prejudicial to the public safety or peace* 
to arrest such person without warrant* The person so arrested could 
be detained in prison for fifteen days or, under the special orders 
of the local government, for a longer period, subject to a 
maximum of two months* Local officers were given the power to 
control the movements of suspected persons, to take possession of 
private buildings, to prohibit access to certain places, and to 
control the supply of commodities in general use* There was 
provision for the imposition of collective fines* The jurisdiction 
of the courts was barred in respect of complaints against any officer 
acting or purporting to act in good faith*
Between November 1931 and the first week of January 1932, 
several ordinances Y/ere issued in quick succession to meet the 
second Civil Disobedience. Movement in the country* These, on the 
eve of their expiry, were renewed by a consolidated Ordinance, The 
Special Powers Ordinance, 1932* In vieYr of the extension of the
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Governor-General*s legislative powers by the Government of India Act, 
h935? would seem doubtful whether this was within the 
constitutional powers of the Governor-General? but Mr* (later Sir) 
Harry Haig? the Home Member defending this procedure urged; uAs 
the period of their expiry approached? it became evident that we 
were in no position to discard the weapons with which the civil 
disobedience movement was being fought* Accordingly at the end 
of June? (1932) the Governor-General issued a new: consolidated 
ordinance* ^
This procedure of renewal was severely criticised in the 
Assembly* It wg,s contended that the renewal of an Ordinance was 
against the spirit? if not the letter? of Section 72 of the 
Government of India Act* It was also pointed out that the procedure 
was an affront to the Assembly which ought to have been approached 
with an appropriate Bill if the Government considered the continuance 
of the provisions of the Ordinances necessary* Sir Abdur Rahim 
put it forcibly when he said? ff,,Emergencyf must be understood in 
its ordinary English sense* That is to say? if the ordinary body? 
whose function and responsibility is to enact laws? is not meeting 
at the time and is not available in order to enact the necessary la?/ 
to meet a particular emergency, then and then alone His Excellency 
the Governor-General? in order to save the situation? can pass an 
appropriate ordinance* It is not therefore? the intention of the 
Government of India Act that while there is every opportunity for the
(16) Lo A* Debates* 1932 Vol* V page 1127*
Government of India to bring a proper Bill before the Assembly? the
Governor-General should pass an ordinance to take the place of a
(l?)regular enactment” *
In this connection? the words ”for the space of not more than
six months from its promulgation”? in Section 72 of the Government
of India Act deserve consideration* An ordinance may be declared
to be in force for a shorter period? but it must not remain in force
for more than six months* The exact period Y/ill depend on the
circumstances? but six months? it would seem? was considered by
the Parliament of the United Kingdom a long enough period for a
situation of emergency to pass or to enable an Act to be passed by
the Legislature if that were thought necessary. The Section also
provides that the Ordinance ”may be controlled or superseded by
!,an Act of the legislature”* This obviously contemplates that?
when it is necessary to continue? beyond six months? the period of
validity of the provisions of an ordinance? they must be re-enacted 
fa
by^legislature. If it is conceded that? at the conclusion of the 
period of six months? an ordinance may be promulgated a second time? 
there is no reason Y/hy it should not be renewed a third or a fourth 
time* If this practice were followed? it v/ould involve the total 
eclipse of the Indian Legislature in the fields covered by the
(17) L. A. Debates? 1932? Vol. V page 1572* In the course of
the criticism of the renewal? Mr. B. R. Puri (ibid pages 1389- 
1390) cited the procedure followed by Lord Irwin in regard to 
the Press Ordinance of 1930 which Y/as placed before the 
Legislature in the form of a Bill vAien it assembled after the 
promulgation of the Ordinance. This? it was submitted? Y/as 
the proper- procedure.
Ordinances. The Constitution permitted the promulgation of 
ordinances where subject matter covered the whole field within the 
power of the Central Legislature.
In reply to the criticism of Government for not holding a 
special session of the Assembly on the resumption of the Civil 
Disobedience Movement, in order to pass an Act incorporating the 
Ordinances3 Sir George Rainy replied that such a procedure would 
involve loss of time and that the Government was busy dealing with 
the situation in the country and it could not waste time on 
discussion in the legislature. He added that the attitude of the 
legislature was known to be hostile. As Sir Hugh Cocke pxit it,
”1 think it is obvious that it is impossible for this Government, 
as it is constituted at present, to expect the powers they require 
from this H o u s e I t  should, however, be noted that in the 
event of the legislature rejecting a Bill in the same terms as an 
expiring ordinance, the Governor^General could, under Section 67(B) 
of the Constitution Act, certify the Bill as essential to the 
safety, tranquillity, or interest of India, and it would then 
be deemed to have been passed by the legislature*
Government presumably did not pursue this course because it 
anticipated that, if a Bill were introduced in the legislature, 
there would be delay before it was disposed of, and that the 
discussion and rejection of the Bill would result in more intense and
(18) L* A. Debates, 1932, Volume I pages 282-85#
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widespread hostility to Government than would he provoked hy the 
promulgation of a new ordinance in the same terms* Its action can 
only he justified* if at all, hy the compelling necessity of 
the situation*
The Constitution Act seems to have contemplated the use of 
the ordinance-making power only ■qrhen the circumstances called for 
immediate action and it was not practicable to summon the legislature 
and present a Bill for its consideration* It did not contemplate 
the use of this power to circumvent the will of the legislature, 
a matter provided for in Section 6 7(B)* By acting as it did in 
regard to the Special Powers Ordinance, 1932, it was hound to 
evoke the criticism that the Government was determined to abrogate 
the powers of the legislature. Bor is this an isolated instance 
of Government1 s determination to secure powers which the legislature 
would he unwilling to grant hy use of the ordinance-making power*
During the period under review twelve ordinances were 
promulgated when the legislature was in session and five Y/ere issued 
immediately before or after a session* Besides these, a number 
of ordinances giving very wide poY/ers to the executive were issued 
hy Lord Willingdon during the periods between the close of the 
Special November Session in 1931 and the commencement of the Winter. 
Session in January, 1932, and the close of the latter and the
As
commencement of the Simla Session 1932.
Even a hostile critic of the o r din an c e—m ale in g power of the 
Governor™General might he inclined to approve the first Currency 
Ordinance of 1931, because there was no time to seek the cooperation
of the legislature* As Sir George Schuster said, Government had
only an interval of ninety minutes betvfeen the receipt of the news
(1 9)
from England and the opening of the Exchange Market In 1935
the Finance Bill was not passed before the end of March, so the 
promulgation of Ordinances Bos* 1 and II of 1935 became necessary, 
as., without them, certain sources of revenue would not have been 
available to Government during the year*
The Kashmir State (Protection against Disorders) Ordinance, 
1931, was issued on the day the legislature met for its special 
session. This Ordinance empowered District Magistrates in the 
Panjab to prevent assemblies of men from proceeding from British 
India to Jammu and Kashmir and promoting disorders there* As the 
delay of a day or two in the circumstances 'would not have made any 
serious difference in the situation, the appropriate procedure 
would have been the introduction of a Bill in the Legislature.
A. large number of ordinances were promulgated immediately 
before or after a session of the Legislature. The Public Safety 
Ordinance, 1929? which was mainly intended to provide against 
Communist propaganda in the country, was Issued on the day the 
Assembly was prorogued. It was issued in exceptional circumstances. 
A Public Safety Bill frto check the dissimination in British India 
from other countries of certain forms of propaganda.1* and for this 
purpose, to provide for the removal of certain persons from British
(19) L. A. Debates, 26 September, 1931*-
India- and for the seizure and control of money or other- valuables
received from outside British India, for the furtherance of subversive
activities or doctrines in the country, had been introduced in the
Legislature, but further consideration of the Bill after the report
of the Select Committee had been refused by the President of the
Assembly on the ground that a debate on the Bill was impossible
without "extensive discussion" of most of the matters which Yrere
then sub .iudiee in the Meerut Case in which thirtyone persons were
charged with conspiracy to overthrow* the government. He suggested
two ways out of the difficulty, either to postpone further
consideration of the Bill until the conclusion of the case, or to
withdraw the case* Government thought that the law was urgently
(20)
needed, and was not prepared to wait until the conclusion of
the case, nor was it prepared to withdraw, the case in order to 
enable it to proceed with the Bill. The only alternative therefore 
was the promulgation of an Ordinance*
The Unauthorised Hewssheets. and newspapers Ordinance, 1930, 
was issued five days before the commencement of a session and the 
Foreign Relations Ordinance, 1931? wasjpromulgated four days, after 
the conclusion of a session of the Assembly. The first Ordinance 
empowered District Magistrates to authorise persons to publish 
news^heete* It further enabled Magistrates to seize and destroy
(20) "I conceive that it has become imperative for government to 
obtain the povers proposed in the Public Safety Bill vfithout 
delay0, declared Lord Irwin in his address to the members of 
the Legislature on April 12, 1929* (Legislative Assembly
Debates, I929, Vol* III, 2995*)
unauthorised news-sheets and nev.rspapers and also to seize and forfeit 
undeclared presses producing unauthorised news-sheets and newspapers. 
In regard to this Ordinance? there would probably have been no 
serious harm if legislation were delayed for a week* The Foreign 
Relations Ordinance was intended to provide against the publication 
and circulation of statements likely to promote unfriendly relations 
between His Majesty fs government and the governments of foreign 
states* It declared such publication and circulation punishable? 
and provided that any publication containing such matter as 
described could be forfeited or detained in course of transmission 
through the post^ It is not clear how in four days an emergency 
developed in regard to foreign relations*
The Governor-General was the sole judge of whether conditions
existed which justified the promulgation of an Ordinance* This was
(21)laid down by the Privy Council in Bharat Singh v. King-Emperor*
On May 1? 1930? Lord Irwin promulgated the Lahore Conspiracy Case 
Ordinance (Ho* III of 1930) which provided for the transfer of the 
Lahore Conspiracy Case from the magistrate holding the preliminary 
inquiry to a tribunal of three High Court Judges to be nominated by 
the Chief Justice of Lahore* While the trial was pending before 
this tribunal? an application was made on behalf of Res Raj? one 
of the accused? for a writ of habeas corpus under Sections 49*d and
(21) (1931) 58. I. A. 169.
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(pp)
56I A of the Criminal Procedure Code* The application was
heard hy a Divisional Bench of the Lahore High Court, consisting
of Broadway and Bhide, Broadway, J*, held that the court
had no jurisdiction to consider whether "there was a state of
emergency* ”It seems to me}1 observed the learned judge, ’’that
it was the intention of the framers of the Act to leave it to the
Governor-General to decide, as a pure act of administration,
whether a state of emergency existed which called for an ordinance an<
that his decision 011 that point is, and was intended to be, final
(23)and not liable to consideration by the courts11*
Bhide, J0, on the other hand, held that the court had
jurisdiction* ’’There is nothing in the language of Section 72”,
he observed,"to indicate that the Governor-Generalfs opinion *«« is
(24.)to be taken as final” ”If, for instance”, he said, ”it is
found that an Ordinance was promulgated in the absence of any 
emergency whatever or for a purpose wholly unconnected with the 
peace and good government of the country** * * ** can it be maintained 
that a court of law has no power to declare the Ordinance to be 
invalid? I think the answer to this question must clearly be in 
the negative”* Bhide, 1*, was evidently (and wrongly)
(22) Section 56I A providess ’’Nothing in this Code shall be deemed 
to limit or affect the inherent power of the High Court to 
make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any 
order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of 
any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice”*
(23) Pes Raj v* The Crown, (1931) f°L*R* 12 Lahore 26 at 35*
(24) id* 40. v ' '
(25) id. 42-43.
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reducing the Governor-GeneralTs Ordinance to the position of a
regulation made, under an Act of Parliament* On the facts of the
case, however, he held that the conditions necessary for the
promulgation of an ordinance were satisfied* The application was,
therefore, refused*
The trial terminated in the conviction of the accused, and
Bhagat Singh was one of those sentenced to death* He and some
others applied to the Privy Council for special leave to appeal*
Special leave was not granted, and Viscount Dunedin, who delivered
the judgement of the Board observeds ftThe petitioners ask this
Board to find that a state of emergency did not exist* That raises
directly the question who is to be the judge of whether a state of
emergency exists* A state of emergency is something that does not
permit of any exact definition* It connotes a state of matters
calling for drastic action which is to be judged as such by someone*
It is more than obvious that that someone must be the Governor-General
and he alone* Any other view would render utterly inept the whole
provision. Emergency demands immediate action, and that action
( )
is prescribed to be taken by the Governor-General”*
”It was next said”, continued Viscount Dunedin, ”that the 
Ordinance did not conduce to the peace and good government of British 
India. The same remark applies. The Governor-General is also 
the judge of that* The pov/er given by Section 72 is an absolute
(26) Bhagat Singh v* Kin^-Emperor (1931) 1*A* 169 at 171-2*
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power, without any limits prescribed, except only that it cannot 
do what the Indian legislature would he unable to do, although it 
is made clear that it is only to be used in extreme cases of necessity
(27)
when the good government of India demands it**. Eis Lordship
added that it was not even incumbent upon the Governor-General to 
give the reasons which induced him to promulgate an Ordinance*
The Privy Coimcil thus conclusively decided that, under the 
Government of India Act* the Governor-General alone was the judge 
of the existence of an emergency and of the necessity of an ordinance 
for the peace and good government of British India:* With great 
respect to Bhide, J*, it may be submitted that the ordinance—making 
power of the Governor^-General is not analogous to the power of 
subordinate legislation* As was held in Queen v* Bur ah, the 
powers of legislative authorities set up by a Constitution Act are* 
except in so far as they are limited by the Act* of the same kind 
and extent as those of Parliament itself* The ordinance-making 
power was, and was intended to be* on a par with the legislative 
powers of the Indian legislature. The Governor-General could, 
therefore, by means of an ordinance, confer upon subordinate 
authorities the power of subsidiary legislation. In fact, many 
ordinances gave them very wide rule-making powers*
(29)The ordinance-making pov/er was indeed an "absolute power0 • 
Referring to this power. Lord Reading observed that on his
(27; .id.'.' 172. ■
(2 8) (1878) 3 A.C. 889.
(29) Bhagat Singh v. ICin,g~Emperori (1931) I. A. 169 at 172.
appointment as Governor-General he was almost staggered to find that 
he "had the power to issue an edict* *. * * .which could override the 
law of the land and every statute passed in the land, which had 
the force of a statute and could not he discussed in the Assembly 
or in the legislature unless (he) chose to allow' it*"
(30) Speech in the House of Lords on the motion for the
appointment of a Joint Select Committee on the Y/hite Paper 
on Constitutional Reforms, 1933* H* L* Debates, April 6, 1933* 
Vol* 87* Cal« 424-425o
-.61 —
ii Emergency Legislation during the ’.First World War
If ordinances under Section 23 of Indian Councils Act, 1861 
were not infrequent during times of peace, they were understandably 
more frequent during times of war. War broke out between Great 
Britain and Germany on August 4* 19U» a proclamation of the 
state of war was issued by the Governor-General the next day*
This was followed by a number of ordinances and legislative 
enactments necessitated by the state of war* Between August 7 
and November 30 of 19^4 no less than nine ordinances were issued.
As they were of temporary duration, due to expire within six months 
of the date of their promulgation, they were re-enacted in a 
consolidating Act on January 2 , 19 5^* This Emergency Legislation 
Continuance Act, 1915 kept the provisions of these nine ordinances 
in force for the duration of the war and for a period of six months 
after the termination of hostilities*
The object of the first ordinance, the Indian Naval and 
Military News (Emergency) Ordinance, 19^ 4* was to secure control 
of the press during the war* It prohibited the publication of 
any information about movements or disposition of troops, ships, 
aircraft, or war material or the strategic schemes of the naval 
or military authorities or of any measures undertaken for the 
defence of the British Empire.
The Impressment of Vessels Ordinance, issued on August 1 4* 
1914, authorised the Governor-General in Council to empower any 
gaaetted officer of the Indian Marine Service to impress temporarily
for the service of His Majesty’ ■ vessels in any specified port.
The Foreigners Ordinance of August 20, 19^4 enabled the
exercise of more effective control over foreigners in British
India. Under this Ordinance, the Governor-General in Council
could by order, prohibit, regulate or restrict the entry of
foreigners into, and their departure from, British India, and also
regulate and restrict the liberty of foreigners residing in the
country. Section 11 of the Ordinance prevented any order under
the Ordinance being called in question in any court. In a case
(1)that arose out of an internment orderv /it was held by the Calcutta 
High Court that the Governor-General in Council had the power to
oust the jurisdiction of the courts and that Section 11 of Ordinance
III of 1914, which was later embodied in the Emergency Legislation 
Continuance Act, 19^ 5> (l o f 19^ 5) and which sought to oust the 
jurisdiction of the courts did not offend against Section 22 of
the Indian Councils Act, 1 S 6 1 A c t  I of 1915> the court said,
was not xiltra vires f,and this Court has no jurisdiction to call in
question the orders that have been passed thereundern* The Court
further observed, that it was for the Governor-General in Council 
to be satisfied on the materials before him and that the court
could not call for materials to examine them.
(1) In re Jewa Hathoo and others,(1916) I.L.R. 44 Cal. 459*
(2) See footnote (8) in Chapter III, Section i.
The foreigners (Amendment) Ordinance, issued aboutnsix weeks 
later, provided that foreigners residing in British India were 
prohibited from carrying on trade or business or from dealing 
with any property except under conditions or restrictions imposed 
by the Governor-General in Council. The power of prohibition or 
restriction which could be exercised on foreigners was extended by 
this amendment to any company or association of which any member 
or officer was a foreigner. By a second amending ordinance, this 
was further extended to cover companies and associations of which 
a foreigner was on August 5, 19^ 4* a member or officer.
The Indian Volunteers Ordinance, 19M> provided that the 
members of any corps of volunteers called out for actual military 
service would be subject to military law and that the Army Act 
Y/ould apply to them.
Provision was made in the Ingress into India Ordinance, 1914> 
which was to be deemed to be a part of the foreigners Ordinance 
of the same year, for the control of persons entering British 
India in order to protect the State from the prosecution of any 
purpose prejudicial to its safety, interests or tranquillity.
This Ordinance was made applicable to persons, not being 
foreigners (as defined in the Foreigners Ordinance) who entered 
British India. This was intended not to prohibit entry, but to 
control the persons in the interests of the security of the State.
The Commercial Intercourse with Enemies Ordinance (ho. VI of 
1914) prohibited financial and other dealings with any state at
war with His Majesty and provided for the punishment of persons
contravening any proclamation or order in Council of Hid Majesty
relating to trade, commercial intercourse or other dealings with
His Majesty1s enemies during the continuance of the war*
( 3)In Padgett v, Jamshetji Hormusji,w/ which arose out of this 
Ordinance and the Hostile Foreigners Trading Order issued under it, 
it was held that the existence of a state of war between the 
respective countries of the debtor and creditor suspended the 
accrual of interest when it would ordinarily be recoverable as 
damages, and not as substantive part of the debt, the reason being 
that a party should not be called upon to pay damages for retaining 
money which it was his duty to withhold* The accrual of interest
was equally suspended, even when the alien enemy creditor remained
in the country of the debtor, until the debtor had actual notice 
that the principal could safely be paid without the possibility 
of its enuring for the benefit of the enemy during the continuance 
of hostilities*
In Hooper v* King Emperor the accused, a trader in Madras 
dealing in tobacco, cabled on 28th July 19^4 to one Rupell, a 
German residing in Germany, for certain bales of tobacco*
Complying with this order, Rupell sent some bales of tobacco to
(3) (1916} I.L.R. 41 Bom. 390.
(4 ) (1916) I*L.R. 40 Mad* 34.
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certain agents of the accused at Amsterdam about the end of
September 19^4 and these agents again shipped the bales on
October 7* ^9^4 k^e agents of the accused in London, Having
received the bales before the 14th of October, 19"H> London
agent re shipped them to the accused who received them in Madras
between 21st and 26th November, The accused wrote two letters
on November 26, 1914> to a neutral subject in Holland and
another to an enemy in Germany, requesting them to secure for him
his merchandise in wermany, The Royal proclamation prohibiting
trade with the enemy was made on 9th September *19^4- and the
Commercial Intercourse with Enemies Ordinance to the same effect
was issued on October 14> 19^4* On these facts, it was held that
the accused was guilty of attempt to trade with the enemy, even
if the goods in the enemy*s country became his own before the
outbreak of the war or even if there were no goods of his share
at the time he wrote the letters.
In view of the proclamation prohibiting trading with the
enemy, the tender of shipping documents by an enemy alien in
Germany to a tradesman in Bombay in regard to a contract of sale
effected on July 17 > 19^  4 > waa held to be not a valid tender,
Acceptance of and payment against such documents would be a
(6)violation of the proclamation, x '
(*5*5 Nissim Isaac Bekhoi^  vl Ha.ji Sultanali Shastary, 09151 
I.l.R. 40 Bom. 11,
(6) Ibid.
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In Siikhlal Ghandanmuil v, I he Eastern Bank Ltd
defendants shipped certain goods "before the outbreak of war to 
London firms in enemy vessels destined untimately to enemy ports* 
These goods were covered by bills of exchange drawn in Calcutta 
on these firms with their addresses given in the bills as London, 
They were then discounted with and endorsed to the plaintiffs in 
Calcutta, The bills of exchange reached London, one on the day 
war v/as declared and the others on a subsequent date, The 
endorsees presented the bills for acceptance. They were returned 
dishonoured by the dravjees. It was held that any further step 
in the performance of the contract after the outbreak of the war 
was rendered impossible and that the acceptance of the bills by 
the drawees would have amounted to a trading in goods destined 
for enemy ports and would come within the meaning of the royal 
proclamation and therefore the drawees were under no obligation 
to the drawers to accept the bills. It was also held that the 
further performance of the contract having become impossible and 
there being no- obligation on the drawees to accept, the plaintiffs 
were not bound to give notice of dishonour*
In Textile Manufacturing’ Company Ltd v* Solomon Brothers, ^
the defendants were a German joint-stock company incorporated in
(7) (1918)(8) (1915)
I.L.R. 46 Cal. 584. 
I.L.E. 40 Bom, 570,
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Hanover, having a branch in Bombay under the sole management of 
a German citizen* By a contract in writing dated 18th February 
1914, the defendants agreed to buy from the plaintiffs the total 
quantity of waste produced in the plaintiffdi mills during the 
year ending J1st December 19H &t the respective prices specified 
in the contract, The defendants deposited with the plaintiff 
fo Government Promissory Notes of the face value of Bs 2,200 to 
be retained by the plaintiffs against the fulfilment of the 
contract* On the 18th August 1914> that is, a fortnight after 
the declaration of war between Great Britain and Germany, the 
plaintiffs wrote to the defendants asking them to take delivery 
of the waste under the contract. On the 22nd August the 
defendant company replied that owing to the existing political 
situation, the defendants were not allowed to do business in 
India and requested the plaintiffs to keep the delivery of waste 
standing over until business was allowed to be resumed* On 5th 
September, the manager of the defendant company was interned as 
an alien enemy, and the defendants' local business ceased for all 
practical purposes. On November 11th, the plaintiffs again 
asked the defendants to take delivery of the waste, the defendants 
replying that they were unable to arrange for further delivery 
until the declaration of peace. On November 14th, the Hostile 
Foreigners Trading Order was issued by which an hostile foreigner 
or firm was prohibited from carrying on or engaging in any trade
or business in British India except under a licence issued by or 
under the authority of the Governor-General in Council, subject 
to such conditions, restrictions or supervisions as the Governor- 
General in Council might direct* On December 3^ d, again the 
plaintiffs called upon the defendants to comply with their notice 
of November 11th on or before 8th Dedember and subsequently 
extended the time for taking delivery until 16th December. The 
defendants replied on the 18th December referring to the internment 
of their manager and claiming that under Section 5^(2) o f the 
Indian Contract Act, they were relieved from performing their part 
of the contract. On February 8 , 1915* the defendants obtained 
a licence limited to the winding up and liquidation of their local 
business under government supervision* On 16th February, the 
plaintiffs informed the defendants that they had sold the waste 
of which the defendants had been under contract to take delivery 
at a loss of Rs 4 270~13 -0 and after deducting the value of the 
deposit demanded payment of Rs 2074”^3-2. On 11th March, the 
plaintiffs filed a suit to recover the sum of Rs 4270-13-2 from 
the defendants and for a declaration that the plaintiffs were 
entitled to retain the 3|f/£ Government Promissory Notes and to set 
off their value In part satisfaction of the amount claimed. The 
defendants pleaded
(i) illegality of contract on the outbreak of the war
(ii) impossibility of performance
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and
(iii) waiver on the part of the plaintiffs granting 
extension of time of performance until 16th 
December 19^4*
It was held that
(i) the contract became illegal on the outbreak of war 
and was dissolved on 4th August, 19^4
(ii) that it had become impossible for the defendants to 
perform their part of the contract, owing to the 
subsequent events arising from a state of war,
(iii) that, assuming that it only became so after 14th
(o)
November, 1914* plaintiffs gave the defendants
further time for taking delivery until 16th December 
and so waived any breach committed before that date
and
(ir) that the defendants were entitled to a return of their
deposit under Section 65 of the Indian Contract Act*
The ninth and last ordinance of 1914» the Articles of Commerce 
Ordinance, was necessitated by the hoarding of articles of commerce 
by various persons during the war. It empowered the Governor- 
General in Council and each local government to require any person 
to make a return giving particulars of any article of commerce of
(9) The’date of the Hostile Foreigners Trading Order,
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which he was owner* The Ordinance also empowered the same 
authorities to make a declaration that any article of commerce 
was being unreasonably withheld from the m a r k e t A f t e r  such 
declaration had been made, the same authorities could authorise 
any person to take possession of any supplies of the article 
covered by the declaration, on paying the owner such compensation 
as might be determined by agreement between the person so 
empowered and the owner of such supplies, or, in default of 
agreement, on payment or tender of payment of such compensation 
as the person so empowered considered reasonable* The last 
section of the Ordinance bai’red the jurisdiction of the courts 
in respect of any order or award made under the Ordinance.
In May 5* an ordinance to provide special protection of 
the interests of Indian soldiers serving under war conditions 
in civil and revenue litigation was promulgated. In September 
of the same year, an Act on the lines of the Ordinance was passed. 
It provided for postponement of proceedings against a soldier on 
active service if it was necessary in the interests of justice, 
and also for the setting aside, in certain circumstances, of
(10) In March 19^ 7 * ^ e Governor-General in Council declared by
notification that napthaline was being unreasonably withheld 
in the presidencies of Calcutta and Bombay. The government 
of Bihar and Orissa made a similar declaration in regard to 
mica in 19^7 an& the government of the Panjab In respect of 
straw of wheat, barley and grain in 1$H9 *
decrees and orders passed against such soldiers*
The Defence of India Ordinance, 1915 (No* III of 1915) was
intended to extend the powers conferred hy the Defence of India
(Criminal Law Amendment) Act, 1915* was issued on November 10,
1915* and was later incorporated in the Defence of India (Amendment)
(11)Act passed on February 1 5, 1916*' '
The Import and Export of Goods Ordinance, 1916? sought to 
prohibit or restrict, by notification of the Govexmor-General in 
Council in any way specified in the notification, the import or 
export of goods from or to any country or place.
The Enemy Trading Ordinance, 1916 , was intended to supplement 
the provisions of the Enemy Trading Act, 1915* which provided 
facilities for payment to a public authority of certain moneys, 
the payment of which was prohibited by a Proclamation or Order 
of His Majesty relating to commercial intercourse with alien 
enemies, and which made certain provisions as to dealings with 
foreigners. The Ordinance was promulgated in order to prohibit 
or control trading by hostile foreigners and hostile firms. The 
Governor^General in Council could, under the Ordinance, make an 
order prohibiting any hostile firm from carrying on business except 
for the purposes and subject to the conditions specified in the
(11) The Act is discussed below*
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order. He could also require by order a hostile firm to be
wound up, Such an order would have the effect of a winding up
order made by a court under the Indian Company*s Act, 1915* It
was also provided that if a contract entered into before or during
the wax' or a transfer of property made during the war with or by
a hostile foreigner or firm was injurious to the public interest,
the Governor-General in Council could by order cancel or determine
such contract or declare such transfer to be void.
On account of the extraordinary financial situation created
by the war, Indian Paper Currency (Amendment) Ordinances were
issued in 1915* twice in 1916, in 1917* aad in 191s, increasing
progressively the amount for which currency notes could be issued
by the Governor-General in Council against Treasury Bills* The
Indian Paper Currency Ordinance issued in April, 1918, declared
that silver held on behalf of the Secretary of State for India
or the Governor-General in Council, might, if so held, in the
U,S.A0 or if in the course of transmission from there, be deemed
part of the reserve referred to in Section 19 of the Paper Currency
(1 2)Act, 1910* There wex’e also passed three temporary Amendment
Acts dvtring the period amending the Act of 1910.
The Registration Ordinance, issued on February 2, 1917*
was to provide for the registration of certain European British
"(T2) Section T§~ 'The whole amount of" currency notes at any time in 
circulation shall not exceed the total amount represented by 
the sovereigns, half-sovereigns, rupees, half-rupees and gold 
bullion, and the sum expended in the purchase of the silver 
bullion and securities, which are for the time being held by 
the Secretary of State for India in Council and by the Governor- 
General in Council as a reserve to provide for the satisfaction 
and discharge of the said notes "
subjects resident in India. Every male European British subject 
between sixteen and fifty years of age, was required to register 
himself with the registration authority contemplated by the Ordinance 
This Ordinance was kept in force during the continuance of the war 
and for six months thereafter by Section 18 of the Indian Defence 
Force Act, I917 (No. Ill of 1917).
The Foreigners (Trial by Court Martial) Ordinance, 19^ 6* 
enabled the Governor-General in Council to direct that a foreigner 
charged with any offence against the Defence of India Rules should 
be tried by courts martial. The foreigner would be proceeded 
against and dealt with as if he were a person subject to military 
law under the Army Act* This ordinance was replaced by the 
Foreigners (Trial by Court Martial) Act, 1916 (No. Ill of 1916),
The Gold (import) Ordinance, 19^7, empowered the government 
to take possession of gold imported to British India on payment 
of a stipulated compensation* The Silver (import) Ordinance,
1917? issued a few days later, made similar provision in regard 
to imported silver.
The Treaty of Peace Ordinance, 1920, the Treaty of Peace 
(Austria) Ordinance, 1920, and the Treaty of Peace (Hungary) 
Ordinance, 1921, were promulgated to give effect to the provisions 
of the treaties concluded after the war, They also prohibited 
the payment of enemy debts and barred legal proceedings for their 
recovery* They charged enemy property in India with the
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payment of the amounts due in respect of claims by British 
nationals in India.
Besides the Ordinaneesnotiosdabove, a number of Acts to meet 
situations created by the war were passed. Some of them, such 
as the Emergency Legislation Continuance Act, 1915* and the Enemy 
Trading Act, 1916* were intended to continue in force the provisions 
of certain ordinances already promulgated. Others covered new 
ground and dealt with such matters as the speedy trial of certain 
offences and the constitution of an Indian Defence Force.
The Defence of India (Criminal Law Amendment) Act, 1915*
was passed in order to secure the public safety and the defence
of British India and to effect the speedy trial of certain offences.
It was provided that the Governor-General in Council could make rule
Mfor the purpose of securing the public safety and the defence of
British India and as to the powers and duties of public servants
(13)and other persons in furtherance of that purpose** / In
addition to public safety and defence, the statute empowered the 
central executive to make rules on twelve enumerated subjects, to 
which six more were added by the Defence of India (Amendment) Act, 
1916. These eighteen subjects included
(i) communicating with the enemy
(ii) safety of His Majesty*s forces
(1 3) Section 2.
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(ill) spread of false reports or reports likely to cause
disaffection or to prejudice relations with 
foreign powers
(iv) safety of railways, ports, dockyards etc.
(v) taking possession of any property for naval or
military purposes
(vi) possession of explosives, arms and other munitions 
of war
(vii) prevention of any attempt to dissuade persons from 
entering the defence services of His Majesty
(viii) talcing possession for the purpose of the Governor- 
General in Council any industrial concern and 
requiring any such concern to place at the disposal 
of the government its output or to work it in 
accordance with the directions of the government
(ix) regulating the possession and manufacture of articles 
which could he utilised in the prosecution of the war
and
(x) regulating the sailings of British Steamers from 
any port in British India.
I he government was authorised to make rules
(i) f,to empower any civil or military authority where,
in the opinion of such authority, there are 
reasonable grounds for suspecting that any person
has acted, is acting or is about to act in a manner 
prejudicial to the public safety, to direct that 
such person shall not enter, reside or remain in 
any area specified in writing by such authority or 
that such person shall reside or remain in any area 
so specified, or that he shall conduct himself in 
such manner or abstain from such acts, or take such 
order with any property in his possession or under 
his control, as such authority may direct11
and search any place if such authority has reason to 
believe that such place is being used for any purpose 
prejudicial to the public safety or to the defence 
of British India and to sieae anything found there 
which he has reason to believe is being used for 
any such p u r p o s e J
(iii) nto provide for the arrest of persons contravening
or reasonably suspected of contravening any rule 
made under this Section and prescribing the duties 
of public servants and other persons in regard to
(ii) nto empower any civil or military authority to enter
such arrests
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(iv) ,! to prescribe the duties of public servants and
other persons as to preventing any contravention of
rules made under this Section, and to prohibit any
attempt to screen persons contravening any such rule
(17)from punishmentUK J
and
(v) "otherwise to prevent assistance being given to the 
enemy or the successful prosecution of the war 
being endangered’1,
Local Governments were empowered to direct that any person 
accused of an offence in violation of any x x ile made under Section 
2 or accused of any offence punishable with death, transportation 
or imprisonment for a term extending to seven years, or of 
criminal conspiracy to commit or of abetting, or of attempting to 
commit or abet, any such offence, whether the offence was 
committed before or after the commencement of the Act should be 
tried by three Commissioners appointed under the Act, Two of 
the commissioners, were required to be persons who had served as 
Sessions Judges for at least three years or persons qualified for 
appointment to the High Coiirt or legal practitioners of ten years 
standing.
(17)
(1 8)
Section 2 
Section 2
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The Commissioners could take cognisance of offences without
the accused being committed to them for trial and were to follow
the procedure for the trial of warrant cases by Magistrates,
except that they were only required to make a memorandum of the
substance of the evidence. Their judgement was to be final and
conclusive? they could pass any sentence authorised by law and no
order of confirmation was necessary in the case of any sentence
passed by them. They could admit as evidence the statement of any
person recorded by a Magistrate, if such person was dead or could
not be found or was incapable of giving evidence, if they considered
that such death or disappearance or incapacity was caused in the
interests of the accused.
To obviate the necessity of passing an Act of Indemnity
after the war, Section 11 enacted that .^o order under this Act
shall be called in question in any court and no suit, prosecution
or other legal proceedings shall lie against any person for
anything which is in good faith done or intended to be done
(19)under this Act". v
(19) In the absence of this statutory provision the position
would have been as follows?- "After the war is over, persons 
may be made liable, civilly and criminally, for any acts 
which they are proved to have done in excess of what was 
reasonably required by the necessities of the case,- unless 
these acts have in the meantime been covered by an Act of 
Indemnity" it was observed in Hex v, Allen (1921) 2 Ir,R.
241 264 : ' ,
In Parana s war Ahir v, The Hmperor Patna High Court
held that Section 22 of the India Councils Act, 1861, read with 
Section 9 o f the High Court Act was wide enough to empower the 
Governor-General in Council to create new tribunals as contemplated 
by Section 4 of the Defence of India Act* It was held by the
the High Court had no jurisdiction to superintend the proceedings 
of Commissioners appointed under the Act*
I he Madras High Court held that Rules framed under Section 
2 of the Defence of India Act, must be read as part of that 
Section, and were effective from the date of their publication; 
they were not dependent on the remainder of the Act being brought 
into operation* xt was held(^^ accordingly, that a person
in the Presidency of Madras, who, in contravention of the rules, 
dissuaded another from entering into His Majesty*s military service, 
was guilty of an offence, though the remainder of the Act had not 
been brought into operation in the Province* In the absence of 
a notification creating special tribunals for the trial of offences 
under the Defence of India Act, such offences were triable by the 
ordinary magisterial courts of the countx'y in the manner provided 
in the Criminal Procedure Code as *offences against other laws*
same High Court in fiheonandan Prasad Singh v King Smperor^ ^ that
20) A*I*R* 1918 Patna 155
21) A.I.E. 1918 Patna 103
22) KandaswamiPillai v. Emperor (191 8) I.L.R. 42 Mad* 69.
(23) Ibid,
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within Schedule II of the Code/24^
The object of the Indian Bills of Exchange Act, 19^6, as 
amended by the Indian Bills of Exchange (Amendment) Act, 19^ 7? 
was to condone delay, caused by the war in the presentment of a 
bill of exchange payable outside British India, and to remedy the 
situation created by loss of a bill through enemy action* It was 
provided that delay should be excused, notwithstanding the provisions 
of the Negotiable Instruments Act and, in the case of loss of a 
bill, the court could allow proof of the bill being given by means 
of a copy of it certified by a notary public, and pass a decree 
accordingly.
The Indian Defence Force Act, 1917> created the Indian Defence 
Force and made provision for the compulsory enrolment of certain 
European British subjects in the Force. Male European British 
subjects between the years of eighteen and fortyone were deemed to be 
enrolled for general military service and those between sixteen and 
eighteen and those between fortyone and fifty for local military 
service. The Indian Defence Force (Foreign Service) Amendment Act, 
1918, made it obligatory for any person enrolled for general 
military service to serve within or without the limits of British 
India* The Indian Defence Force (Further Amendment) Act,
( 24) Ibid.
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provided that any European British subject above fifty years could
( 25)offer himself, and presumably herself,N ' for enrolment for 
general or local military service*
The Indian Transfer of Ships Restriction Act, 19^ 7> was 
passed to prevent the transfer of any interest in a British ship, 
to a foreign-controlied company or person without the previous 
consent of the Governor-General in Council*
The Indian Company*s (Foreign Interests) Act, 1918, 
prohibited the alteration, except with the consent of the Governor- 
General in Council, of articles of association of a company 
designed to i*estriot the interests which might be held or powers 
which might be exercised by foreign members of the company* It 
also enacted that a resolution for the voluntary winding up of a 
company declared by notification to be one with restrictive 
provisions would be of no effect unless the Governor-General in 
Council authorised or ratified it*
The Cotton Cloth Act, 1918* was passed in order to encourage 
and maintain the cheap supply of cotton cloth manufactured in 
India to the poor classes of the community. Under this Act, 
Controllers with powers to make orders in respect of dealings in 
cotton cloth were to be appointed# A Controller would be assisted
(2 5) Section 2 referred to ,!any European British subjectn, 
which, unless qualified, would include females.
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by an Advisory Committee in the performance of hi's duties# 'The 
local government could fix the price at which standard cloth should 
be sold to the public* It was made obligatory to obtain a licence 
from the government before any person could sell standard cloth*
If the Cotton Cloth Act was intended to protect the interests 
of the poor in the difficult situation created by the war, the 
Excess Profits Duty Act, 19^9* meant to tax the profiteers who
had done well out of the war* It provided that where the profits
of a business, not being one of those exoepted under the Act, 
exceeded the standard profits, a duty of an amount equal to fifty 
percent of that excess should be levied* The amount of the duty, 
however, was not to exceed such sum as would reduce the profits in 
the accounting period below thirty thousand rupees. It was also 
pi'ovided that where the profits of any business in the accounting 
period were chargeable to excess profits duty and to super-tax, 
one of them, which exceeded the other in amount, only would be 
charged*
Apart from these and other Acts, a large number of 
notifications were issued under the Acts* Because of the
extraordinary situation created by the war, some of them dealt
with such details of every day life as the supply of salt and 
kerosene oil* One of them, issued in August 1910* provided for 
the control of the supply of grass throughout the Presidency of 
Bombay.
The notifications and orders issued under the Indian (Foreign
Jurisdiction) Order in Counoil, 1902, the Foreigners Ordinance,
1914j other ordinances were numerous, A few of them
delegated certain powers of the Governor~General in Council to the 
local government or the military authorities. Some of them granted 
special powers to certain officers, as was done under the Foreigners1 
Ordinance, 19^4* Certain officers were authorised by the Ordinance 
to grant permits for the entry and departure of foreigners,
The delegation of wide powers to subordinate authorities 
and the assurance of immunity from legal proceedings for acts done 
in good faith by its delegates no doubt seemed to the Indian 
Government to be justified by the extraordinary circumstances 
created by the war. The interference with the daily lives of the 
Indian people which this legislation caused would have been more 
readily endured if the officials who created it had been less 
heavily protected from being called to account by the indemnities 
in this legislation.
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iii. The Rowlatt Act
There had been revolutionary movements in Bengal for quite a
long time before the First World War? in other parts of India also
the activities of revolutionaries had been a source of constant
anxiety to the Government of India during the war. A Committee
was therefore appointed, at the end of 19^ 7* with Mr, Justice
Rowlatt, a Judge of the King*s Bench Division in the United Kingdom,
as Chairman to investigate the extent of the revolutionary activities
(1)and to recommend legislation to deal with them. Their report v / 
gave a full account of the subversive activities in the country.
It left no doubt about the widespread character of the movements 
and about the difficulties of obtaining the conviction of accused 
persons under the ordinary law, owing to intimidation of witnesses 
and juries. The Committee found that the Defence of India Act had 
been effective in dealing with revolutionary activities, because 
under its provisions restrictions could be imposed upon persons 
implicated in revolutionary propaganda and conspiracy without 
bringing them to trial. They apprehended a recrudescence of 
revolutionary crime when that Act lapsed after the end of the war 
and therefore recommended that the provisions of the Act which had 
been found effective should be added to the criminal law. The main 
raeastires suggested were the trial of cases of revolutionary crime by 
three Judges without juries and the conferring upon Provincial 
governments of power to intern persons concerned in subversive
(1 )  6md. 9190/1918.
MW Q
movements. ,fSuch measures must always be distasteful to an
Englishman, but they cannot be considered extreme in the light of
the extent of the conspiracies, or of the fact that the ordinary
people were so terrified by the revolutionaries that they dared not
( 2}
give evidence against them".' *
Two Bills were introduced to give effect to the proposals*
One was intended to deal with the immediate result of the lapse of 
the Defence of India Act and the other to strengthen the ordinary 
law* The former was passed, but never iised, while the other 
was never passed,
The Anarchical and Revolutionary Crimes Act, 1919, commonly 
called the Rowlatt Act, after the Chairman of the Sedition Committee, 
authorised the Government to exercise certain emergency powers to 
deal with anarchical and revolutionary movements. It supplemented 
the ordinary criminal law and specified in a schedule the offences 
brought under its pur vie vr. They included# *■*
(i) certain offences against the State such as waging war, 
conspiring to overthrow the government etc.
(ii) certain offences of violence against person and property 
in connexion with movements endangering the security of 
the State such as sedition, rioting with deadly weapons, 
murder, robbery, dacoity, damaging roads, and bridges, 
house breaking, criminal intimidation and
(2) P. Griffiths, The British Impact on India* page 381#
(iii) certain offences connected with the use of explosives and 
arms, provided that such offences were associated with 
anarchical and revolutionary movements. Any attempt or 
conspiracy to commit or any abetment of any of these 
offences was also included in the schedule.
The Act was to extend to the whole of British India and was
to continue in force for three years from the date of the
termination of the war,
The Act was divided into five parts, each enabling the
Government of India to give to the local governments certain special
powers, according to the nature and seriousness of the revolutionary 
activities in the area concerned,
Under Part I, in any Province in which the Government of India 
had notified the need for speedy trials owing to the prevalence of 
anarchical and revolutionary offences, if the local government had 
evidence that any person had committed any offence listed in the 
schedule and thought that such a person should be given a special 
trial, they could lay before the Chief Justice of the High Court a 
written statement of their accusation with full details, a copy of 
it being required to be given to the accused* The Chief Justice 
would then nominate three High Court Judges to try the accused.
The usual delay caused by the preliminary inquiry before a Magistrate 
was thus sought to be avoided. There was to be no jury, for it 
was thought that juries were liable to be terrorised and were not 
impartial and reliable in the circumstances. There was to be no 
appeal to a higher court, for the special tribunal consisted of
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three High Court Judges,
The trial could he conducted in accordance with the ordinary 
criminal procedure, excepted for certain changes made by the Act. 
Section 18 provided that if any person killed or otherwise prevented 
a witness from giving evidence, the statement of such a witness 
previously taken down before a Magistrate or before the Court itself 
could be given as evidence* The court could, prohibit or restrict 
the publication of its proceedings. The accused could, if he so 
desired, give evidence himself and if he did, he was liable to 
cross-examination. When a charge wa,s framed, the accused was 
entitled to ask for an adjournment of the trial up to fourteen days. 
The court was not bound to adjourn any trial for any purpose, subject 
to the above provision, unless such adjournment was, in its opinion, 
necessary in the interests of justice* All these procedural 
arrangements were intended to meet the difficulties arising from the 
terrorisation of jurors and witnesses, the delays of the ordinary 
procedure, and the problem of procuring reliable evidence *
Part II dealt with certain measures to be adopted by the local 
governments to prevent the commission of revolutionary crimes*
This part was to come into force in any area specified by the 
Governor-General in Council In a notification declaring that he was 
satisfied that revolutionary or anarchical movements likely to lead 
to the commission of scheduled offences were being extensively 
promoted in the whole or any part of British India. The local 
government could then take the foliovri.ng action against any person 
who, in its opinion was actively concerned in such movements. It
could place qll the materials in its possession relating to his case
before a judicial officer qualified for appointment to a High Court
for his opinion. If after considering his opinion, the provincial
government was satisfied that action under the provisions of this
Act was necessary, it could order that the person concerned should
executed a bond undertaking not to commit within a period of one year
any of the scheduled offences? It could also order him to remain
in any specified place or area, or to refrain from acts liable to
disturb the public peace, or prejudicial to the public safety, or
to inform it of any change in his address, or to report himself at
certain definite intervals to the police. As soon as the government
passed any order of the kind indicated above, an inquiry into the
case was to be held in camera by an investigating authority,
consisting of three persons, of whom two should be persons who had
held judicial office not below that of a District Judge and the third.
a non-official* The government should lay before the authority a,
written statement of the facts of the ca3e with its reasons for making
the order* The authority should in every case allow the person
against whom the order was made to appear before it, explain to him
what he was charged with, hear any explanation he might offer and
make any further investigation necessary in the circumstances. In
conducting their investigation, they were not bound to observe the
( *)
rules of the law of evidence, v ' that is, the authority could take 
into account hearsay statements and written statements of persons not 
present and such other data as in their opinion, were best suited
**»■■■ mi iHijn-» 'i P ^ h h i h i ' H " 1  ........—' 1 iH im w  iiii.tn iim .'ii *' » i . m i  m .. . . . . * . .  i mum "w  « ^ M ln g * M ii*  ■ w in ' ............* n—i nmnri i n * I. 1J  r r u p
(3) Section 26(3)
«89~
to elicit the facts of the case* The person whose C3.se was "being 
investigated v*as not given the right, under the Act, to he 
represented by a pleader; nor was the provincial government 
entitled to be so represented. On completing their inquiry, the 
authority would report to the government the conclusions they 
reached, together with their reasons. After receiving the report, 
the government could confirm, alter or cancel its previous order, 
but it was obliged to publish the conclusions reached by the 
authority and give a copy of the order to the person concerned.
An order thus passed would not remain in force for more than a year 
from the date of the original order. It could be renewed for 
another year; if so, the person concerned had the right to make 
a representation to the government and the investigating authority 
would make a further inquiry regarding the representation made.
It was thought that the provisions of this Part would enable 
the government to watch, restrain, and forestall revolutionary 
activities, which though dangerous in themselves, had not yet 
resulted in any specific acts of violence.
Part III, which provided, among other things, for 
detention without trial, could be brought into force in any area, 
specified in a notification issued by the Governor-General in 
Council when satisfied that in that area anarchical and 
revolutionary movements were being promoted and scheduled offences 
in connexion with such movements were prevalent to such an 
extent as to endanger public safety. ’{Jnder this Part if the 
local government was satisfied that any person was concerned
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in a scheduled offence, it could place, as under Part II, all the 
materials in its possession relating to his case before a judicial 
officer and after considering his opinion, it could not only make 
any of the orders authorised by Part II but also further direct, by 
order in writing, the arrest of any such person without warrant, 
and his confinement in any place (not being that part of the prison 
used for the imprisonment of convicted criminals) and the search of 
any place used by such person for any purpose in furtherance of 
anarchical or revolutionary movements* A person arrested under this 
provision should not be detained for more than seven days without a 
further order from the government and in no case should such a person 
be kept in custody, pending an order of confinement, for more than 
fifteen days* Where an order of confinement was passed, the 
provisions of Part II in regard to inquiry by an investigating 
authority would apply and the order would remain in force for one year 
only, unless it was extended for another year, in which case the 
person concerned could make a representation to the Government and 
a further inquiry would be made*
Part IV treated of the extension of the provisions of the Act 
to such persons as had already been dealt with under the Defence of 
India Act, 19*15? an& other similar wartime measures,
Part V contained some details regarding the application of a 
few provisions of the Act in certain circumstances* It also 
contained a provision that no order under this Act should be called 
in question in any court of law* It was also stated in this Part 
that all powers given by this Act were in addition to and not in
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derogation of any other powers conferred by or under any enactment* 
The Rowlatt Act was the occasion of much unrest in India.
It was passed to counteract 1 anarchical and revolutionary crimef. 
This phrase in the Act has been interpreted to mean "conspiracies, 
propaganda and agitations with the object of overthrowing the 
government, upsetting established order, and interfering with the 
administration of the laws"*^^
It was a measure intended to be used in an emergency and 
directed against a particularly dangerous class of offenders. It 
was repealed in 1922*
(4) E. V, RieU, The Rowlatt Act* page 4*
iv* Martial Law Ordinances
The agitation against the Howlatt Act, when passive resistance
was tacked to it, led to serious riots in Calcutta, Bombay and
Delhi* These were put down with the help of the military with the
loss of a few lives in each instance* But a similar situation in
the Panjab appeared to necessitate the declaration of martial law*
The Lieutenant-Governor of the Panjab stated that there was open
rebellion in Lahore and other places and in some of them, he said,
(l)there was to be found Hanarchy in its naked and deadly aspect!l*
On April 14* 1919 the Martial Law Ordinance, 1919 was
promulgated by Lord Chelmsford, bringing Lahore and Amritsar under
martial law from the midnight between the 15th a&d the 16th April
on the ground that the Governor-General was satisfied of the
existence of a state of open rebellion against the authority of the
(la)government in certain parts of the Province of the Panjab*
According to the Ordinance, every trial held under the
(2)Bengal State Offences Regulation of I8O4 ,' * instead of being held 
by courts martial should be held by a Commission of three persons
(1) Quoted in Ihm&y, The Present Situation With Special Reference 
to the Panjab Disturbances* page ■ 82. • -
(la) A resolution of the Governor-General in Council of April 14* 
1919> statedt "The offences which have occurred in Delhi, 
Calcutta, Bombay and Lahore have one common feature - the. 
unprovoked attempt of violent and unruly mobs to hamper or 
obstruct those charged with the duty of maintaining order in 
public places11 - quoted by Rundy, in The Present Situation With 
Special Reference to the Panjab Disturbances*
(2) It was extended to the Panjab in 1872* - -
appointed by the local government* Two of them should he persons 
who had served as Sessions Judges or were qualified to he 
appointed Judges of a High Court* The Commission should follow 
in all matters the procedure regulating trials by Courts Martial 
prescribed hy the Indian Army Act, 1911* The local government 
could, however, direct the Commission to follow the procedure 
prescribed for a Summary General Courts Martial under the Act, if 
such procedure was considered necessary in the interests of public 
safety* The finding and sentence of a Commission were not to he 
subject to confirmation hy any authority. Section 7 gave 
retrospective operation to the Ordinance in that it stated that the 
provisions of the Ordinance would apply to persons who were charged 
with offences committed on or after 13th April, 1919*
The Martial Law (Extension) Ordinance, 1919? issued on 16th 
April, extended the application of the previous Ordinance to the 
district of Gujranwala#
(3)Another Ordinance issued two days later, empowered any 
court martial or a Commission appointed under the Martial Lav/ 
Ordinance, 1919? to sentence a person, when convicted, to 
transportation for life, or for any period not less than ten years 
or to rigorous imprisonment for a term between seven and fourteen 
years. A. convicted person would not he liable to forfeiture of 
property, unless the Court or the Commission directed such 
forfeiture.
(3) Martial Law (Sentences) Ordinance, 1919*
Martial Lav/ (Further Extension) Ordinance, 1919? issued on
21st April, gave further retrospective effect to the first 
(3a)Ordinance* By this Ordinance, the local government was
enabled to direct a Commission to try any person charged with any 
offence committed on or after 30th March, 1919*
Martial Law (Trials Continuance) Ordinance, 1919? provided 
for the continuance and completion of trials pending before the 
Commissioners appointed under the first Martial Law Ordinance, 
though martial law had ceased to operate and the order suspending 
the functions of the ordinary criminal courts had been cancelled* 
In the category of pending trials were included trials for which
(4)an order had been made convening a Commission*
Bug&a and others v* The Emperor^^ arose out of these
Ordinances* Bugga was arrested on the 12th April and the
other appellants in the case on subsequent dates. Bone of
them was taken in arms or in the act of committing the offences
alleged against them* On 13th April the Governor-General in
Council, acting under the Bengal State Offences Regulation,
which was extended to the Panjab by the Panjab Laws Act, 1872,
made an order whereby he suspended the function of the ordinary
(6)criminal courts within the districts of Lahore and Amritsar,
(3a) Martial Law Ordinance (No*I of 1919)
(4 ) Explanation under Section 2 of the Ordinance*
(5) I*L*R* (1919) 1. Lahore 326*
(6) Later extended to those of Gujranwala and Gujrat
as regards the trial of persons for offences such as Bugga and 
others were charged with and established martial law within those 
districts, and by the same order he directed the immediate trial 
by court martial of all such persons. On 14th April, the 
Governor-General promulgated the Martial Law Ordinance(No *1 
19*19) providing that every trial in the above mentioned districts, 
instead of being tried by a court martial, should be tried by a 
Commission of three persons appointed by the local government *
The provisions of the Ordinance were to apply to all the persons 
referred to in the Regulations who were charged with any of the 
offences therein described committed on or after 15th April,1919*
By the Martial Law (Further Extension) Ordinance (Bo IV of 19*19)* 
issued on 21st April, the Commissioners were empowered to try any 
person charged with offences committed after 30th March 1919* 
Section 65 of the Government of India Act, 1915* while giving the 
Governor-General in Council a general power to make laws for 
British India, enacted by subsection (2) that he should not be able 
to make any law affecting the authority of Parliament or any part 
of the unwritten law or Constitution of the United Kingdom whereon 
might depend in any degree the allegiance of any person to the 
Crown of the United Kingdom or affecting the Sovereignity or 
dominion of the Crown over any part of British India, and by sub­
section (3) enacted that he should have no power "without the 
previous approval of the Secretary of State in Council to make 
any law empowering any Court other than a High Court to sentence
to the punishment of death any of His Majesty's subjects horn 
in Europe or the children of such subjects or abolishing any 
court'1* The aPP©Hants who were natives of India, were at 
the trial charged with offences under the Penal Code and some of 
them were sentenced to death. The Lahore High Court held that 
Ordinance Ho* IV could not be construed as intended only to extend 
the operation of Ordinance I to offences committed before 13th 
April, but not earlier than 30th March and therefore did not 
apply only to persons taken in the act of committing any of the 
offences specified in Regulation X of I8O4 * It was clearly 
stated in the recital introducing the Ordinance that its operation 
was not confined to the persons and offences described in the 
earlier Ordinance* It was also held by the High Court (and
invalid by reason of Subsection (2) of Section 65 of the Government 
of India Act, 1915? &s affecting the unwritten laws or the 
Constitution on which depended the allegiance of His Majesty's 
subjects in India. That Subsection did not prevent the Government 
of India from passing a law which might modify or affect a rule 
of the Constitution or of the common law upon the observation 
of which some person might conceive or allege that his allegiance 
depended* It referred only to laws which directly affected
later by the Privy Council too^a )^ that Ordinance IV was not 
(6a) (1920) 47 I. A. 128
i|W< ^  y *M*
the allegiance of the subjects to the Crown, as by a transfer or 
qualification of the allegiance or by a modification of the oblig­
ations thereby imposed. Ordinance IV of 1919 > if ft was repug­
nant to Subsection (3) of Section 65 of the Government of India 
Act, so far as British born subjects were concerned, was, under 
Section 2 of the Government of India Act, 1916^^, void to the 
extent of that repugnancy, but not otherwise.
In Kalinath Roy v,King E m p e r o r the appellant, editor of 
the tribune1 published at Lahore, was convicted by a Court of 
Commissioners sitting at Lahore under the Martial Law Ordinance 
I of 1919 of an offence under Section 124A of the Indian Penal 
Code, namely, of having by written words excited or attempted to 
excite disaffection towards His Majesty or the Government estab­
lished by law in British India* The order of the Lieutenant- 
Governor made under Ordinance IV of 1919^^) did not name the 
accused who were to be tried by the Commissioners, but applied to 
"all persons charged with offences connected with the recent dis­
turbances1'* The Privy Council held that the validity of the 
ordinance being established by the decision of the Board in Bugga 
v* King Emperor, the Commissions Couri had jurisdicti#*,
(7) "A law made by any authority in British India and repugnant
to any provision of this or any other Act of Parliament shall, 
to the extent of that repugnancy, but not otherwise, be void". 
Section 2,
(7a) (1920) 48 I.A. 9 6,
(7b) Martial Law (Further Extension Ordinance)
(7c) (1920) 47 I.A. 128.
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although the order of the Lieutenant-Governor did not mention 
the names of the accused persons and that the court having applied 
the right principles of law in considering whether an offence under 
Section 124A had been committed, no interference with the conclusions 
was called for*
It was contended by many Indian lawyers and politicians that 
there was no concerted action on the part of the people to over­
throw the government and that there was no open rebellion to 
justify the declaration of martial law(8)
It would seem that there were better grounds for the declar­
ation of martial law in the district of Malabar in the Presidency 
of Madras in 1921*
A tenancy movement was started in Malabar in 1919 as a 
result of the increase in rent and the eviction of peasants from 
their holdings by the landlords. When the movement was in its 
height, the Khilafat movement came into existence, «po win over 
the Moplah peasants who formed more than three quarters of the 
Muslim population of Malabar, the Khilafat movement in the district 
lent its support to the tenancy movement* When peasant unions 
were formed and tenancy meetings were held, Section 14^ of the
(8 ) The Times Literary Supplement of October 17* 19"*79 reviewing 
Nundy*s “Present Situationft (cited above) wrote: He,(contrasts
the putting down of serious riots in Calcutta, Bombay and Delhi 
by the aid of the military, and not without loss of life, but 
without any declaration of martial law, with the severe main­
tenance for some time of such laws in Lahore, and gives histor­
ical instances to show that in this country the supersession 
of the ordinary law for military rule has not been adopted 
save with great reluctance and as a last re sort1 *
Criminal Procedure Code' ^was enforced and meetings were forcibly-
dispersed by the police* As the police turned to violence, the
people thought of retaliation and prepared themselves for an armed
rising* A Mopiah religious leader, in the meantime, proclaimed
himself the head of an independent state and announced his intent-
(9a)ion of driving away the British* J A number of Moplahs support­
ed him.
On 20th August 1921 a mosque was besieged and forcibly enter­
ed, under orders of the District Magistrate, by the police and the 
military to arrest a few leaders of the tenancy movement. A 
fight between the government forces and the peasants who had assemb­
led near the mosque ensued. The next day martial law was declared* 
A regiment from Burma and a Gurkha regiment were soon sent to 
Malabar. Fights continued until the end of November, when the 
rising was quelled.
The Martial Law Ordinance, 1921, issued on 26th August 1921 
provided for the administration of four taluks of Malabar by a 
military commander who waa empowered to make regulations for the 
public safety and the restoration and maintenance of public order*
He could authorise a Magistrate or a military officer of seven 
years* service to make and issue martial law orders* Summary
(9 ) Discussed below.
(9a) Unni Hayar, My Malabar page
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courts of criminal jurisdiction could be constituted and they 
would follow, in all trials of serious offences, the procedure laid 
down in the Criminal Procedure Code for the trial of warrant cases* 
They were not required to frame a formal charge or to record more 
than a memorandum of evidence* ho offence which was punishable 
with imprisonment for more than five years could be tried by a 
summary court. Though an accused before a summary court was 
given the right to be defended by a legal practitioner, the court 
might not grant an adjournment if it thought that an adjournment 
would cause unreasonable delay in the disposal of the case*
There was to be no appeal fi’om an oi’der or sentence of a summary 
court and no court had jurisdiction of any kind in respect of any 
px*oceedings in such a c'ourt. Ordinary criminal courts were 
empowered to try any offence in respect of which the military 
commander made such a direction to the court as also any offence 
against a x’egulation or martial law order which was not triable 
by a summary court.
Martial Law (Supplementary) Ordinance (No III of 1921) made 
provision for the constitxition of Special Tribunals consisting of 
three persons, One of them should be a person who had acted or 
was acting as a High Court Judge and the other two should be 
persons who had exercised the powers of a Sessions Judge for at 
least two years. A Special Tribunal could try any offence conn­
ected with the events which necessitated the enforcement and
-101-
continuance of martial law* It was for the local government to 
decide whether an offence was so connected* A Special Tribunal 
could take cognizance of offences without the accused being committed 
to it for trial and should follow the procedure for the trial of 
warrant cases by Magistrates* The local government, however, was 
allowed to make rules providing for the procedure of special trib­
unals* In the case of a sentence of death, transportation for 
life or for imprisonment for ten years or more, an appeal would li« 
to the High Court*
The Martial Law (Military Courts) Ordinance, 1$21 enabled 
the military commander and any officer whom he authorised in this 
behalf to convene a military court in order to try certain offences 
specified in the Ordinance* A military court should be constituted 
in the same manner and would exercise the same powers and follow 
the same procedure as a summary General C ourt Martial convened 
under the Indian Army Act, 1911, except that a Magistrate of the 
First Class or a Sessions Judge could be appointed as a member of 
the court and a memorandum of evidence given at the trial and the 
statement, if any, made by the accused were required to be recorded* 
The finding and sentence of a Military Court were to be confirmed 
by the convening officer, and a sentence of death was required to 
be reserved forjsonfirmation by the General Officer Commanding 
the District* Subject to the special provisions noticed above, the 
rules of procedure for the military courts would be the same as 
those for the summary courts under the Martial Law Ordinance, 1921.
The Martial Law ('Special Magistrates) Ordinance (No Y of 1921) 
enabled the local government to invest any Magistrate of the First 
Class who had exercised the powers of such k Magistrate for at least 
two years and who had been authorised to exercise the powers of a 
summary court under the Martial Law Ordinance, 1921 , with the powers 
of a Special Magistrate who could try any offence as the local 
government or an officer empowered in this behalf might direct, 
except offences unconnected with the events which led to the dec­
laration and continuance of martial law and offences punishable 
with death. Whether an offence was connected with such events 
would be determined by $ Special Magistrate. He should follow 
the procedure laid down for the trial of cases by a Special Tribunal. 
A sentence of transportation or of imprisonment for more than two 
years passed by a Special Magistrate was subject to appeal to a 
Special tribunal.
The Ordinance was not meant to be in derogation of the power 
of the Military Commander to direct that an offence should be 
tried by a Military Court.
The local government was allowed to appoint places outside 
the area in which martial law was in force, at which any Summary 
Court or Special Magistrate might sit for the trial of offences. 
(Section 10).
The provision last mentioned was probably made owing to the 
fact that the Government of India took note of the common law rule
that there was no right at all to hold a military court except in
(10)the martial law area* In Hex v» Allen it was held that civil
courts had no jurisdiction durante hello to interfere with the 
decision of a military court sitting in a martial law area? even 
where a capital sentence had "been pronounced and Y/as about to he 
executed for an offence not punishable Capitally under the ordinary 
criminal law* King v* Strickland, following Rex v» Allen
held that when a state of war still existed in a martial law area* 
the civil courts had no jurisdiction durante hello to interfere with 
the decision of a military court sitting therein*
(lg).......
In re ICochunni Play a Hayar., Kumar aswami Sastri, J * ,
observed, obiter9 that a summary court appointed under the Martial 
Law Ordinance could not try offences committed outside the martial 
lav/ area or hold court outside such area* The High Court had power, 
apart from Section 491 o f the Criminal Procedure Code, to issue a 
writ of habeas corpus? and Section 16 of Ordinance Ho® II of 1921^^ 
Y/hich excluded the interference of other courts did not refer to 
such general jurisdiction and the High Cotirt could issue such writ 
if the summary court acted without jurisdiction*
In Govindan Hayar and another v» Emperor  ^ a case which
*10) (1921) 2 IyvR* 241*
11) (I92I) 2 Ir.R. 317*
12) A0I0R* (1922) Madras; 215*
,13) Martial Law Ordinance, 1921* 
14) A*I.R* (1922) Madras 499*
arose from the Martial Law Ordinance, 1921, a petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus was made by two persons undergoing imprisonment 
for alleged participation in the Moplah rebellion* They were 
tried outside the martial lav/ area by a Summary Court constituted 
under the Ordinance* The Madras High Gourt held in that case that
there was no right at all to hold a summary court except in the
martial law area and the jurisdiction of such a court was local* 
Outside the area the ordinary rules of law would prevail and there 
was nothing in the Ordinance to prevent the High Court from inter­
fering with the decision of any court outside that area purporting
(15)to exercise a criminal jurisdiction which it did not possess*' ' 
The Malabar (Restoration of Order) Ordinance, 1922 (Ho I of
1922) was promulgated to provide for the speedy trial of certain
offences committed during the period when martial law was in force 
or arising out of the circumstances which necessitated the enforce­
ment of martial law, and for the restoration and maintenance of 
order in the district# The Local Government was authorised to 
make regulations for the protection of law-abiding citizens and 
for the restoration and maintenance of order* It could make rules
(15} In the course of the judgement the court referred to the 
provision made in the later ordinance (.No V of 1921) 
enabling the local government to appoint any place outside 
the martial law area to hold sittings of courts constituted 
under the Martial Law Ordinance*
for the control and distribution of foodstuffs and for the pro-
( 16}hibition of the export of foodstuffs from the scheduled area*
The Ordinance provided for the setting up of the following 
classes of courts
(i) Summary Courts
(ii) Courts of Special Magistrates
(iii) Courts of Special Judges
The Local Government might empower any Magistrate to exercise 
the powers of a summary court* Any Magistrate who had exercised 
the powers of a Magistrate of the First Class for two years could 
be appointed as a Special Magistrate, and any officer who had 
exercised the powers of a Sessions Judge for two years could be 
a Special Judge*
These courts were precluded from trying as an offence any 
act which was an offence by reason only of the fact that it 
constituted a contravention of a regulation or martial law order 
made under the Martial Law Ordinance, 1921,
The Summary Courts were not to try offences punishable with 
death, transportation, and with imprisonment for more than five 
years* They could not pass a sentence of imprisonment for more 
than two years or of fine exceeding one thousand rupees*
Special Magistrates were authorised to try any offences
(16) Falavanad, Pojmani, Ernad and Calicut*
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other than those punishable with death and might pass any sentence
which a Magistrate specially empowered under Section 30 of the
Criminal Procedure Code could pass*
A Special Judge could try any offence connected with the
disturbances and pass any sentence authorised by law.
These courts were to follow the procedure prescribed for the
trial of warrant cases, except that they were not required to
record more than a memorandum of the evidence* In the trial of
offences punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding
one year, they could follow the procedure for the summary trial of
cases in which an appeal lay*
Appeals from the judgements of Summary Courts and from those
of Special Magistrates lay, with a few exceptions, to the Court of
Special Judges* If a Special Magistrate passed a sentence of
imprisonment for more than four years or of transportation, the
High Court alone was entitled to entertain an appeal. In the
case of appeals from the judgement of a Special Judge, rules in
regard to appeals from the court of a Sessions Judge would apply.
The powers of revision and reference conferred on courts
under the Code of Criminal Procedure would be exercisable in respect
of proceedings before courts constituted under the Ordinance*
By the Malabar (Restoration of Order) Amendment Ordinance,
1922, Summary Courts were given power to try cases punishable with
(17)imprisonment for a term not exceeding seven years* x '
(17) Under the Malabar (Restoration of Order) Ordinance, the
upper limit was five years*
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The Malabar (Completion of trials) Ordinance, 1922, was 
promulgated to make provision for the trial of persons whose trial 
had commended before or who were ^ waiting trial by the courts con­
stituted under the Malabar (Restoration of Order) Ordinance and 
for the disposal of appeals pending under the provisions of that 
Ordinance. Any court constituted under the Malabar (Restoration 
of Order) Ordinance could complete the trial of any person whose 
trial had commenced prior to the expiry of that Ordinance and also 
try any person who prior to such expiry had been arrested 
and was awaiting trial under the provisions of that Ordinance.
These courts were barred from trying offences which were offences 
only by reason of the provisions of the Martial Law Ordinance,
1921, the Martial Law (Military Courts) Ordinance, 1921 or the 
Malabar (Restoration of Order) Ordinance, 1922* The right of 
appeal granted under the Malabar (Restoration of Order) Ordinance, 
19 21, continued under this Ordinance as if the expiry of the former 
did not take place•
After a lull of nine years, martial law was declared in 1950 
in two places, first at Sholapur and then at Peshawar.
Riots took place at Sholapur in May, 1950 following the 
arrest of Mahatma Gandhi on the of the month* When some 
persons were arrested in connection with the riots, the mob 
obstructed the movement of police lorries on the road and threw 
stones at the police* The police fired, wounding a number of
people. The crowd thereupon attacked a police station and 
killed two police constables and an Excise Inspector. They drew 
the police force out of the town by a feint and burnt the court 
buildings. On the 8th a company of soldiers arrived* Ho more 
outrages took place. Further military assistance arrived on the 
12th« In the evening of the same day, the military took charge 
of the town from the civil authorities and proclaimed martial law* 
The next day certain martial law x’egulations were issued. On the 
15th the Sholapur Martial Law Ordinance, 1950 (IV of 1950) to 
provide for the pi’oclamation of martial law at Sholapur was 
promulgated and published in the Gazette of India, and on the 18th 
it was proclaimed at Sholapur. Sholapur continued to be under 
martial law for about seven weeks. On June 30, 1950 the Ordinance 
was withdrawn*
Under the Ordinance, the Commander-in-chief or General Officer 
Comiaanding-in-Chief was authorised to appoint one or more Military 
Commanders who could make regulations for the public safety and 
the restoration and maintenance of order and as to the powers and 
duties of military officers and others in furtherance of this 
purpose. The Military Commander could empower any Magistrate 
or any military officer of seven years service, not below the 
rank of Captain, to issue martial law orders for supplementing 
the regulations*
A number of offences were created by the Ordinance. Ho
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(18 }person was to communicate with the enemy,' or, with the intention 
of communicating it to the enemy, collect or publish any information 
prejudicial to the restoration and maintenance of order, Any 
person who assisted, relieved, concealed or harboured any enemy 
was liable to be punished with imprisonment for ten years. Ordinary 
criminal courts could deal with offences punishable under the 
Ordinance and civil courts could also continue to function in the 
administration area provided they, in the exercise of their juris­
diction, did not interfere with the x*egulations and martial law 
orders issued under the Ordinance,
The Ordinance also gave ex post facto validity to regulations, 
orders and sentences passed before the proclamation of the Ordinance 
on or after 12th May by any officer in the exercise of military 
control. Section 12 by way of indemnity, protected from legal 
proceedings any person who acted under the Ordinance or in the 
exercise of military control on or after 12th May, for the purpose 
of providing for the public safety or the restoration or mainte­
nance of order. The proviso to the section stated that "nothing 
in the section shall prevent the institution of proceedings by or 
oxa behalf of the Government against any person in respect of any 
matter where such person has not acted in good faith and a reason­
able belief that his action was necessary for the aforementioned 
purposes".
(18) Enemy included mutineers, rebels and rioters against whom
operations were being carried out by military or police forces.
-110-
TJnder the martial law regulations issued, anyone committing
an act likely to he interpreted as meaning that the person was
performing or intending to perform the duties of constituted
authority was liable to ten years imprisonment and fine*
Anyone who knew or had reason to believe that his relative or
dependent had joined or was about to join persons actively engaged
in the disturbances and failed to give information to the police
could be sentenced to five years imprisonment and fine*
( 19)In a case' 'that came up before the Bombay High Court, the
question of the necessity for declaring martial law at Sholapur
was discussed by the learned Judges* '*The court is bound when
its jurisdiction is invoked11, it was held in Rexfp *Brien)v. Military
Governor( )  **to decide whether or not there exists a state of war
or armed rebellion,** The issue.,,is whether there is or is not
that deliberate, organised resistance by force and arms to the laws
and operations of the lawful government, amounting to war or armed
rebellion, which justifies what is sometimes called martial law11,
( 21 )Channappa and others v»Hmperorv 'was a habeas corpus applic­
ation by the relatives of seventeen persons who were under detention 
after having been Convicted and sentenced by the military authorities 
at Sholapur between 14th and 18th May, 1950*
(19) Ch&nnappa v*Bmperor (1951) A.I.R* Bom*57*
(20) (1924) 1 1r.R. 52, 38.
(21) (1931) A.I.H. Bom.57.
Section 11 of the Sholapur Martial Law Ordinance had validated 
all sentences passed by any officer acting in the exercise of 
military control between the 12th and the 18th May as if they were 
sentences passed under the ordinance* So the question whether 
martial law was properly proclaimed on the 12th May did not arise 
in deciding the petition in habeas corpus, because all that the 
courts could do was to give effect to the Ordinance which^un&er 
law, had the same force and effect as an Act of the Indian 
legislature *
Beaumont, C .J*, observed that in his view it was not necessary 
to determine whether the declaration of martial law on 12th May 
was justified, for on 15th May the Governor-General at Simla 
issued an Ordinance reciting that an emergency had arisen in 
Sholapur which made it necessary to provide for the proclamation 
of martial law in the town of Sholapur and its vicinity* The 
Ordinance seemed to have introduced a modified form of martial law, 
the trial of offences was not left to the will of the Military 
Commander, but was to be held by the ordinary criminal courts*
The state of martial law, he further observed, was not to determine 
with the necessity for it, but was to continue until brought to an 
end by a notification in the Gazette of India*
Referring to the necessity for the declaration of martial 
law, the learned Chief Justice said, MAs by the law of England 
whieh applies in India, the Crown is not above the law, the Crovjn 
can only declare martial law in cases of absolute necessity, and
when the necessity ends, noinnal legal conditions are automatically 
restored* "Where martial law has been declared it is competent for 
the courts — and is indeed the duty of the courts if called upon — 
after the restoration of normal conditions to decide whether and to 
what extent martial law was justified*
,fJ?he question whether an emergency exists or not is one of 
fact which the courts can inquire into* But in as much as the 
Governor-General is the person who must, in the first instance, 
decide whether or not there is an emergency upon which he ought to 
act, and in as much as he may frequently have information which in 
the public interests he may be unwilling to disclose, and which no 
court can compel him to disclose, I think all that the courts can 
do is to inquire whether there is evidence upon which the Governor- 
General may reasonably conclude that an emergency exists. If that 
question be answered in the affirmative, there is an end of the 
matter!f*
ladgavkar, J*, who, in his judgement referred to a number of 
cases which arose out of the administration of martial law in the 
British Commonwealth was emphatic in pointing out the weakness which 
lay in deciding important issues like the promulgation of a martial 
law ordinance on the report of the man on the spot# Martial law 
was declared by the local authorities at Sholapur and the military 
took charge before the Ordinance was passed* It was therefore the 
District Magistrate and not the Governor—General, who decided 
whether there was an emergency.
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flThe man on the spot", the learned Judge observed,'Vay 
exaggerate a riot with sticks into an armed insurrection, and 
disobedience of his own orders into a rebellion* Parliament has 
not, as far as X know, ordained that the existence of the laws and 
the working of the courts should cease on the ipse dixit and at 
the will of the man on the spot whether District Magistrate,
mamlatdar or police patil* or that excesses or breach of peace,
arson or even murder on the part of a small minority of the pop­
ulation should justify the man on the spot into exaggerating dis­
affection into rebellion or riot into an armed insurrection and 
abdicating himself in favour of the military with the abolition of 
the ordinary law. Such a state is not the first stage in the
supression of any disorder but the last resort of the civil power",
The single allegation that an ordei' under Section 144 of the
(22)Criminal Procedure Code, 'was not obeyed did not, in the learned 
Judge*s opinion, suffice to establish the plea of necessity, which 
the law demanded as justifying the proclamation of martial law*
He was not satisfied as to why military aid did not alone suffice, 
without the handing over of charge by the civil authorities to the
( 23)military, "which in law makes all the difference possible *. *
22 J Discussed below* See next section*
2 3) Channappa v.Emperor A*I.R* (1931) Bom*57*
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It is submitted that it was not possible for the Governor** 
General in Simla to act except on the information received from 
the man on the spot. As was pointed out by Blackwell, J., in the 
same case, the Governor-General Mmust obviously act promptly and may 
sometimes have to make up his mind on information which may afterwards 
be found to be erroneousn.
The District Magistrate in this case submitted that the unarmed 
police were disorganised and many of them did not report for duty for 
days, There were only about sixty armed police to deal with a 
disturbed city of 120,000 inhabitants and four other places in the 
district. The Deputy*Inspector of Police informed him that no 
police assistance could be sent from other districts* Hence he had 
to hand over charge of the situation to the military authorities 
with the approval of the Provincial Government»
Counsel for the Grown pointed out that the military might 
not be willing to come to the aid of the civil authorities unless 
they were given charge of the situation. The District Magistrate 
in his affidavit stated that military orders prohibited the use of 
the troops in place of police or for patrolling the city.
Assuming that, in spite of the rule laid down in Phillips v . 
gyre^^) the military authorities refused, except on their own terms, 
to aid the civil authority, the District Magistrate was obviously
(24a) Ibid,
(24b) (1870) 6 Q.B. 1.
obliged to accept military aid on these terms,as it was incumbent 
on him to see that the situation did not deteriorate* In R.v. 
Pinne2^ 4°) it was stated that a public officer was expected to 
"assemble a sufficient force for suppressing the riot and preventing 
the mischief 77hich occurred"* He was required "to make such use 
of the force which was obtained and also of his own personal exertion 
to prevent mischief, as might reasonably have been expected from 
a firm and honest man".^2^^
It is conceivable that the military authorities might, as 
suggested by the Counsel, refuse aid unless given charge of the 
situation. After the Jallianwala B&gh incident in which General 
Dyerfs conduct was severely criticised, the military authorities 
in India v/ere not too eager to come to the aid of the civil 
authorities in putting down disturbances.
By 1930 the Red Shirt Movement under Abdul Gaffar Khan had 
spread widely in the Horth Ir/est Frontier Province. The contempt 
for governmental authorities which the leaders of the movement 
inspired contributed largely to Greate disaffection and prepared
(25)the ground for a conflict* ' ' The gravest disturbance took place
in Peshawar in April 1930* The city was practically under the 
control of the mob. The police were withdrawn and the troops
f24c} (1632) 5 0 P 254*
(24a) Ibid.
(2 5) J. Campbell Ker, "Subversive Movements" in Political India.
1832^1932 Edited by Sir J. Gumming^, (1932) page 244*
were sent to reoccupy the city*
When discontent about the lack of local self government and 
the failure to associate the Frontier Province with the Canal 
Colonies established for the Panjab was still smouldering, a 
formidable incursion of Afridi tribesmen from beyond the frontier 
into Peshawar took place in August*
Though the discontented inhabitants gave every assistance 
within their means to the intruders who posed as liberators and v/ith 
a remarkable degree of discipline refrained from looting, the
local authorities succeeded in clearing the district of all tribes 
men by August 11th. But the Government of India along with Pears, 
the Chief Commissioner,considered that ordinary civil powers were 
insufficient to deal with the serious situation which, according 
to them, still- existed in the district and secured the Secretary 
of State*s approval to the promulgation of martial law* On August 
16, the district of Peshawar was placed under martial law* The 
crisis produced by the Afridi incursion had by this time passed 
and it is unusual to declare martial law as a deterrent against 
the possible renewal of danger. Lord Irwin, the Governor-General 
decided to act on the advice of Pears who Y/as emphatic that the 
worst was not over and that the Afridis had v/ithdrawn only to 
collect reinforcements from other tribes. After the declaration
(26) S. Gopal, The Viceroyalty of Lord Irwin* (1957) pnge 83*
of martial law, no danger of a sufficiently serious nature 
developed to justify it. In fact it was administered only in 
Peshawar subdivision though proclaimed throughout the district, 
and it was administered writh moderation. Ho special courts were 
set up but martial law was in force for five months until it was 
abrogated on January 24? 1931* During these five months twentyone 
men were convicted under martial law regulations, but the maximum 
punishment awarded was rigorous imprisonment for three months*
This was interpreted by the government as indicating their 
moderation and by their opponents as proof that there had been no 
need for the declaration of martial law.
It may be that the news of the proclamation of martial law 
acted as an effective deterrent and tended to prevent the Afridis 
from making further incursions, so that the necessity for a strict 
administration of martial law did not arise. The fact that 
martial law remained in force for about five months, in spite of 
the absence of serious disturbances may have been due to the Chief 
Commissioner^ apprehension of renewed incursions of the tribesmen. 
If the Chief Commissioner, in making his report, gave undue 
consideration to the necessity of maintaining public order and 
tranquillity it would be difficult for the Governor-General to come 
to a decision against the counsel of the man on the spot, Vi/hom he 
would naturally trust to give an objective report on the local 
situation.
(27) S. Gopal, The Viceroyalty of Lord Irwin, page 83.
The Martial Law Ordinance, 1930? (Ho*VIII of 1930) which 
consisted of 43 Sections, was divided into two parts, the first 
dealing with the proclamation and enforcement of martial law and 
the second v/ith the Special Courts created by it*
Under the Ordinance the General Officer Commanding, Northern 
Command, who was appointed as the chief administering authority 
of martial law under the Ordinance, and who could delegate his 
powers to any one of his choice, was authorised to provide for the 
public safety and the restoration of peace and order and as to the 
power and duties of administrators, military officers and other 
persons in furtherance of that purpose. He could make regulations, 
for the whole martial law area and the administrators under him 
could make regulations for the administration areas to which they 
were aPP°f^ted. An Administrator could empower any Magistrate 
or military officer of seven years* service, not below the rank 
of Captain, to make martial law orders in any part of the 
administration area for the purpose of aupplementing the regulations.
The same kind of acts declared offences by the Sholapur 
Martial Law Ordinance were so declared under this Ordinance also*
The same jurisdiction as was granted under the Sholapur Martial 
Law Ordinance was granted to the civil courts. Ordinary criminal 
courts were empowered to try offences against a regulation or 
martial law order with the exception of those which were to be 
tried by the special courts created by the Ordinance. Regulations 
and orders made before the. proclamation of martial law and after the
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date notified as the date on which the emergency arose were 
validated. Sentences passed by officers exercising military 
control during the above period were also validated.
The Ordinance created five classes of Special Courts. They 
were: (i) Special Tribunals
(ii) Special Judges
(iii) Special Magistrates
(iv) Summary Courts and
(v) Military Courts
The Special Tribunals were to consist of three persons, one 
of whom should have acted or was acting as a High Court Judge and 
the other two should have acted as Sessions Judges for at least two 
years. They should in general follow the procedure prescribed 
for the trial of warrant cases by Magistrates, but should make a 
memorandum of the evidence of the witnesses and were not bound to 
adjourn the trial for any purpose, unless such adjournment vras 
considered by them to be necessary in the interests of justice. 
Appeal lay if sentences of death, transportation or imprisonment 
for ten years or more were passed by the Tribunals*
Special Judges could be appointed by the Local Government 
from among persons who had been Sessions Judges for at least two 
years* They should follovf the same procedure as the Special 
Tribunals. Sentences of death, transportation and imprisonment 
for five years or more were appealable.
Any Magistrate of the First Class who had exercised povfers
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in that capacity for two years could he appointed as a Special
Magistrate* Special Magistrates could he empowered to try any
offence not punishable with death. They could follow the same
procedure as prescribed for the Special Tribunals. They could
pass any sentence which a Magistrate specially empowered under
(08)Section 30 of the Criminal Procedure Codev ' was enabled to pass. 
If they passed a sentence of transportation or imprisonment for 
more than two years, appeal lay to the Special Tribunal.
An Administrator could empower an7 Magistrate to exercise 
the powers of a Summary Court which could try offences other than 
those punishable with imprisonment for more than five years, but 
could not pass a sentence of imprisonment for a term exceeding two 
years or of fine exceeding one thousand rupees. It should follow 
the procedure laid down for the trial of warrant cases but was not 
required to record more than a memorandum of evidence, or to frame 
a formal charge. If the offence was one punishable with 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year, it could follow the 
procedure for the summary trial of cases in which an appeal lay*
The Administrator or any Officer, not below the rank of a 
Field Officer authorised by him in this behalf could direct that 
certain offences should be tried by a Military Court convened by 
him, if the exigencies of the situation, in his opinion, required
7*28] 1fThe Court of a Magistrate, specially empov/ered under Section 
30, may pass any sentence authorised by lav/ except a sentence 
of death or of transportation for a term exceeding seven 
years or imprisonment for a term exceeding seven years" 
(Section 34 of the Criminal Procedure Code as it stood before 
its amendment in 1955)
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the adoption of such a course for restoring and maintaining order*
A Military Court was to he constituted in the same manner and
should follow the same procedure as a Summary General Court Martial
convened under the Indian Army Act, except that a Magistrate of the
First Glass or a Sessions Judge could he appointed a member of the
Military Court and that a memorandum of the evidence and the
statement, if any, of the accused should be recorded* The
finding and sentence of a Military Court were subject to confirmation
by the convening officer; a sentence of death was required to be
reserved for confirmation by the General Officer Conunanding^in-Chief*
This was the last occasion when martial law was proclaimed
in India during the period under review* We may mention in passing
that it was proclaimed in certain parts of Sind in 1942* The
(29)Hurst terrorised whole districts, committing murder, sabotage 
and dacoity, to such an extent that the civil authorities found it 
difficult to cox^ e with the situation. A special force of troops 
was sent to the area to aid the civil authorities in restoring order. 
The Military Commander was instructed to take all necessary steps 
to restore civil security and ordex* with all possible speed* To 
this end, he proclaimed martial law which enabled summary justice 
to be enforced by Special Courts against the Hurs* Complete 
control of the civil administration was given over to the Military 
Commander who could have the advice and assistance of the civil
(29) "A. criminal tribe of Sind and the neighbouring states"
The Indian Annual Register, 1942, Vo1*1, page 265.
authorities in the area, concerned. ^ 0)
This proclamation was made under the common law rule which
justified the repelling of force by force* Martial law continued
in force for eleven months, from June 1, 1942 to May 31, 1943*
The Martial Law (indemnity) Ordinance, 1943 (XVIII of 1943)
indemnified all servants of the Crown as well as persons who acted
under orders of the servants of the Crown for any act done in the
martial law area in order to maintain or restore order or to carry
into effect any regulation, order or direction issued hy the
martial lav/ authority provided that the act was done in good faith
and in the reasonable "belief that uit was necessary for the purpose
intended to be served thereby11. All orders for the seizure and
destruction of property made by martial law authority were confirmed
and all s entences passed, including those passed for offences
committed before the martial law period, by the martial law courts.
during the period were validated, whether the courts sat within
or outside the martial law area*
This modern practice of proclaiming and enforcing martial law
without resort to legislation which was successfully carried out in
(3l)Sindh seems to have inspired Article 34 o f the Constitution of
India which makes provision for the passing of an Act of Indemnity
(32)by the Parliament in respect of acts done under martial law*
(30) Ibid*
(31) A. Gledhill, Fundamental Rights in India, pages 122-123
(32) For a discussion of -Article 34? see infra. Chapter VI*
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v# Other Statutory Provisions
Between 1861 and 1916 the Ordinances of the Governor-General 
were promulgated under Section 23 of the Indian Councils Act, 1861. 
Section 23 of the Act of 1861 , with some verbal alterations made 
in the main to suit the circumstances caused by the creation of the 
Legislative Council under the Minto-Morley Reforms, was incorporated 
in Section 72 of the Government of India Act, 1915,^^ which reads 
as follows*
”72. The Governor-General may, in cases of emergency, make 
and promulgate Ordinances for the peace and good government of 
British India or any part thereof, and any Ordinance so made shall,
for the space of not more than six months from its promulgation,
have the like force of law as an Act passed by the Governor-General 
in Legislative Council; but the power of making Ordinances under 
this Section is subject to the like restrictions as the power of the 
Governor-General in Legislative Council to make laws; and any 
Ordinance made under this Section is subject to the like disallowance 
as an Act passed by the Governor-General in Legislative Council, 
and may be controlled or superseded by such an Act,"
The Government of India Act, 1919? reenacted the same emergency
(2)provision' / with the substitution of the words '^Indian legislature1 
for the words 1 Governor-General in Legislative Council1, I t  also
(1) it was a consolidating measure repealing and re-enacting the
numerous Parliamentary statutes relating to the admiMstration 
of British India which had been passed between the years 1770 
and 1912,
(2) Section 72 of the Government of India Act,
(3) This was necessitated by the Mont ague-Che 1ms ford Reforms 
introduced by the Act.
introduced a new emergency power to be exercised by the Governor- 
General in the event of the rejection of a Bill by the Indian 
Legislature. Section 67B of the Government of India Act provided 
that when either chamber of the legislature failed to pass a Bill as 
recommended by the Governor-General, he could, whether consented 
to or not by the other chamber, certify that the passage of the Bill 
was essential for the safety, tranquillity or interests of British 
India or any part thereof and on his signature it could become law 
with the same force and effect as an Act passed by the Indian 
Legislature. Such an Act was required to be laid before both Houses 
of Parliament before it received His Majesty’s assent. But a 
proviso to Subsection (2) of the Section stated that "where in the 
opinion of the Governor-General a state of emergency exists which 
justifies such action, the Governor-General may direct that any 
such Act shall come into operation forthwith, and thereupon the Act 
shall have such force and effect as aforesaid, subject, however, 
to disallowance by His Majesty in Council,
Xa)  In "relation to the power granted under this Section, Mr. Montague 
explained in the Parliaments "It is not any measure which affect j 
the interests; it is a measure which the Viceroy can say is 
essential. He does not now, as he used to do, pass that 
lesgislation by means of .... the ’official block’; he passes it 
frankly as an executive order of his Government" (H.C. Debates, 
December 4? ^9^9)* The Montague-Che 1msford Report contrasted 
this power with the ordinance-malting power and stated that the 
latter "merely provides, however, a means of issuing decrees 
after private discussion in the Executive Council, and without 
opportunities for public debate or criticism; and normally it 
should be used only in rare emergencies (paragraph 276). The 
present power provides a means, for use 6n special occasions, of 
placing on the statute book, after full publicity and discussion 
permanent measures to which the majority of members in the 
Legislative Assembly may be unwilling to assent, (ibid). It was 
therefore proposed to create a Council of State with a clear
Government majority, which was expected to help the Governor- 
General in legislation in matters which he regarded as essential.
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Section 72E of the Government of India Act granted similar 
powers of certification to the Governor of a Province* In the event 
of a Governors Legislative Council not passing a Bill relating to a 
reserved subject, that is, a subject which was under the control of 
the Governor in his executive council, he could certify that the 
passage of the Bill was essential for the discharge of his 
responsibility for the subject and on his signature it would become 
an Act of the local legislature. In such a case the Governor-General 
to whom a copy of the Act would be sent was to reserve it for His 
Majesty*s assent. But if the Governor-General considered that an 
emergency existed which justified such action, he could signify his 
assent to the Act, instead of reserving it for the signification of 
His Majesty*s pleasure, subject to disallowance by His Majesty in 
Oouncil* Acts passed by certification were to be laid before each 
House of Parliament.
A number of Bills were certified under Section 67B and many of 
them were brought into immediate operation under the proviso to the 
Section. A few of those brought into immediate effect are noticed 
below.
I he Pinance Bill of 19^5 was passed by the Legislative Assembly 
with one important amendment. It reduced the salt tax from Rupees 2-8 
to Rupees 1-4 Per maund* When the amended Bill was laid before the 
Oouncil of State, the Governor-General recommended to the Council 
the restoration of the figure to Rupees 2-8-0. The Council passed 
the Bill as recommended. The Governor-General now recommended to the
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Legislative Assembly that it should pass the Bill in the form in 
which it had been passed by the Oouncil of State * The Assembly 
debated it again; but did not comply v/ith the recommendation. The 
Governor-General thereupon certified that the passage of the Bill v/as 
essential for the interests of British India and signified his assent 
to the Bill, as passed by the Oouncil of State. As he was of 
opinion that a state of emergency existed which justified such action, 
he brought the Act into immediate operation. In his dispatch of 
April 4? ^9 3^) to the Secretary of State, the Governor-General set 
out the reasons for this certification pointing out specially that 
the balancing of the budget was his primary consideration. ,'The 
Assembly11, he wrote, "was unable to agree on the adoption of any 
alternative form of taxation which would secure the amount required. 
Nevertheless it rejected the proposal for the enhancement of the 
salt tax. It was in these circumstances that it became my duty to 
certify the measure11. But it was considered in some quarters as 
"a strained use of a legal authority11 . All things considered,
the certification, even though desirable, could not be said to have 
been essential in the interests of British India,
The Finance Bill of 1924 also Y/as certified in the same way.
On March 17 j ^924> the motion for the consideration of the Finance 
Bill in the Legislative Assembly was lost by 60 votes against 57*
The next day the Governor-General recommended the passage of the Bill
(5) Speech of Mr, Charles Roberts on July ^923j in the House 
of Commons,
(6) A. B , Rudra, The Viceroy and Governor-General of India, page 206
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in a slightly modified form* But leave to introduce the Bill was 
refused* The Bill was therefore taken to the Council of State whioh 
passed it in the modified form as recommended by the Governor-General, 
After signifying his assent, the Act was brought into force 
immediately* In this case, the opposition to the Bill was almost 
wholly political* The unqualified rejection of the Finance Bill, 
both in its original and modified forms, in the third Y/eek of March, 
made it absolutely necessary for the Governor-General to exercise his 
power of certification and bring the Act into immediate operation* 
Before the expiry of the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment 
Ordinance (l of 1924) a Bill v/as sought to be introduced in the 
Bengal Legislative Council incorporating those provisions of the 
Ordinance which were within the competence of the Provincial 
Legislature, When leave to introduce the Bill was refused by the 
Council, it was certified by the Governor and after being laid before 
Parliament, it was brought into operation. Those provisions which 
were beyond the competence of the Provincial Legislature xvere 
embodied in the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment (Supplementary) Bill, 
1925, placed before the Central Legislature* The Bill was strongly 
opposed in the Assembly which rejected such clauses as those which 
provided for the detention of arrested persons outside the Province 
and for the suspension of the right to habeas corpus in certain cases. 
The Home Member declined to move the passage of the amended Bill.
The Governor-General sent a message to the Assembly recommending it 
to pass the Bill in its original form. When the Assembly refused 
to pass it, it was recommended to the Council of State which
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immediately passed it* The Governor-General certified that the
passage of the hill was essential and gave his assent to it. The
Act was brought into operation immediately. As the Bengal Ordinance
was about to expire, and there was no time to go through the normal
procedure the Governor-General held that there was a state of
emergency justifying such action.
The Finance Bill of 1931 also had to be certified by the
Governor-General. fThe only courses open to me", wrote Lord Irwin,
the Governor-General, "were to submit to the rejection of my
recommendation, which meant accepting an unbalanced Budget or to use
(7)my powers of certification".He preferred the latter course.
The Assembly amended the Bill in respect of the proposal for income 
tax. To avoid a deadlock between the Assembly and the Government, 
Lord Irwin held an informal conference at the Viceregal Lodge.
Though it was attended by the leaders of the Parties in the Assembly 
and the Members of the Government, no compromise was reached. The 
next day, that is, March 26, 1931» Lord Irwin made a conciliatory 
recommendation to the Assembly, urging the acceptance of an 
amendment in the income tax schedule which would reduce the yield 
therefrom by one crore? while leaving a securely balanced Budget, 
by effecting the postponement by a year of certain schemes for 
military equipment. The Amendment in the income tax schedule was 
moved on behalf of the Government, but was defeated. The Governor- 
General then recommended the Bill with the amended income tax 
schedule to the Council of State which passed it on 30th March. The
(7) Governor-General*s Despatch to the Secretary of State, No.2 2, 
dated April 2, 1931* H.C, Papers. No. 109 of 1931*
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same day he assented to the Bill and directed that the Act should he 
"brought into force immediately. 'While the Government thought that 
the Budget must "be "balanced at all costs and therefore considered 
that increased taxation was necessary, the members of the Opposition 
maintained that the balancing ought to be done not only by increased 
taxation but also by judicious retrenchment*
On September 29 of the same year, a Bill to supplement and 
extend the Finance Act which was brought into force by certification 
by Lord Irwin was introduced in a special session of the Assembly.
The Bill departed from the established convention in that it fixed 
the rates of taxation for eighteen months ahead instead of a year.
It provided for further taxation and proposed that the Finance Act, 
1931 j should be in operation till March 31 * 1933* The Assembly was 
annoyed at the introduction of a second taxation Bill in the same 
session and it amended the Bill reducing the estimated yield by about 
four crores. The Governor ^General, Lord Willingdon, like Lord 
Irwin before him, in vain held an informal conference with the 
representatives of all the parties and groups in the Assembly, He
then recommended the Bill in a slightly modified form to the Assembly 
which defeated the motion for its passage. The Governor-General 
certified that the passing of the Bill was essential for the interests 
of British India and v/hen passed by the Council of State, assented 
to it. The Act thus made was directed to come into force forthYfith* 
The Government was, no doubt, faced with a serious financial crisis* 
This was evident from the proposal for a voluntary reduction in the
salary of the Governor-General and the members of the Executive
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Council and from the suggestion made to effect a temporary cut in the 
salaries of Government servants, except those in receipt of a certain 
minimum salary* But the imposition of new taxes within a few months 
after the certification of the Finance Bill in March was resented by 
the elected Members who felt that there was further soope for 
retrenchment•
We may notice in passing that the Finance Bills of 1936 and 
1937 which were amended by the Assembly and the Finance Bill of 1938 
which was thrown out as a political gesture at the consideration 
stage were certified by the Governor-General,
Over and above these emergency powers conferred by the United 
Kingdom Parliament on the government of India, the Indian 
Legislature also conferred powers of an emergency character on the 
government *
/ 0 \
Section 518 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1872, was 
enacted to provide experienced magistrates with summary powers to 
meet local emergencies. This Section with amendments reappeared 
in the Codes of 1882 and 1898. As the Code of 1898, v/ith amendments, 
is still in force in India it is only necessary to deal with 
Section 144 of the Code of 1898, which gives the ultimate form of 
the provision.
To enable him to deal temporarily with urgent cases of nuisance
(8) This corresponded to Section 62 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1861. But its emergency character was taken on 
in the Code of 1872.
—131*™
or apprehended danger, whenever it appears to a District Magistrate,
Subdlvisional Magistrate, or other Magistrate of the first or second
( 9 )class specially empowered under the Section^ ' that immediate 
prevention or abatement of a public nuisanoe or speedy action to 
prevent an apprehended danger to the public is desirable, he can 
issue a written order setting forth the material facts of the case 
and served as a summons, directing any person to abstain from a 
certain act or to take specified order with certain property in his 
possession or under his management* Such a direction can be given 
to prevent obstruction, annoyance or injury to any person lawfully 
employed, danger to human life, health or safety, disturbance of 
the public tranquillity, or riot or affray* In cases of emergency 
the order can be passed ex Pajrte» it can either be directed to a 
person individually or to the public generally when present in a 
particiilar place. The Magistrate can rescind or alter the order 
either suo motu or on the application of a person aggrieved, On 
receipt of the application, the person is entitled to be heard.
If the application is rejected, the reason for the rejection must 
be recorded. An order under this Section will remain in force for 
two months only? but in special cases it can be continued longer by 
a notification by the Provincial Government*
The Section applies to cases where temporary orders in the 
nature of things would be appropriate and would afford a reasonably 
adequate relief in the circumstances of the case.
(9) The Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1923> excluded
Magistrates of the third class from the exercise of the powers 
under this Section.
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The power conferred upon a Magistrate under this section is an 
extraordinary power and he should resort to it only when he is satisfy
that other powers with which he is entrusted are insufficient to deal
with the situation/10  ^ In Kamini Mohan Das Gupta v« Harendra Kumar 
(11)Sarkar' , it was held, that the existence of circumstances
showing the necessity of immediate action is a condition precedent
to the Magistrate^ exercising the powers conferred by this Section.
The question whether there is an emergency is prim a facie for the
Magistrate and it has heen held that the High Court will not lightly 
(12)interfere.' ' The Section is not limited in its operation to cases
of possiblejgeneral breach of the peace, but contemplates also cases
(13)of interference with individual rights. '
A Magistrate can pass only restrictive orders under this Section 
preventing a person from doing a certain, that is, a definite act.
The Section confers no power on him to pass a positive or mandatory
. n j (14) This cannot beorder directing a party to do particular acts.' '
evaded by framing what is substantially an order to perform a certain
act in a negative grammatical form. A magistrate can not order a
person to abstain from residing in the place in which he was residing
at the time of the order, for this is, in effect, an order to
(15)leave that place.'
(10) Sundaram Chetti v. The Queen, (1882) I.L.R. 6 Madras 203.
Ml) J W T T ) I.L.R. 38 Calcutta 876.
12) Emperor v* G. V. Mawlankar, (1930) I.L.R* 50 Bombay 322.
v13) Rashid Allidina v. Jiwandas Khemji, (194 2) I.L.R. 1 Cal. 4 8 8.
(14) Emperor v. B. N» Sasmal. (1930)iTl .R. 58 Calcutta 1037?
S. C. Mukhnty v* L. L. Pal Chaudhury (1935) 39 C.'W.N. 1053#
(15) T hah in Ba Thaung v* Ring Emperor (1934) I.L.R. 12 Ran. 283#
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A proceeding under this Section has been held to he a judicial
/ ^ /T \
proceeding,^ ' so that a magistrate is immune from proceedings
instituted by the person to whom his order is addressed, if his
proceeding is irregular*
Every order issued under this Section expires at the end of
two months, and the Magistrate cannot revive or resuscitate his
(17^order from time to timev 1 unless it can be justified by
circumstances which have supervened since the original order; these
must be set out in the subsequent order, and be prima facie
sufficient to justify the subsequent o r d e r T M i e  grant of what in
effect is an order for a perpetual injunction is entirely beyond the
(19}Magistrate^ powers.v ' But the Provincial Government may perpetuate 
it for any length of time. In Emperor v. Bhure where the
Provincial Government extended an order of a Magistrate forbidding 
the passage of processions along particular streets in a certain town 
until such order should be cancelled by notification, it was held 
that the Provincial Government was competent thhs to extend the 
Magistrate^ order.
Prom 1872 to 1923 si ban was placed upon the High Courtrs power 
of revision with regard to proceedings under this Section. But by 
the repeal of Section 435(3) "by the Code of Criminal Procedure 
(Amendment) Act, 1923, the High Court has been enabled to deal on
(16) Govinda Ram Marwari v. Basanti Lai Marwar! (1927) I.L.R*
7 Patna 269*
(17) Govinda Chetti v. Ferumal Chetti (1913) I.L.R. 38 Madras 489*
(18) Ibid.
09) Bradley v* Jameson (1882) I.L.R.’ 8 Calcutta 580.
(20) (1923) I.L.'r . 45 Allahabad 526.
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revisi°n with an order issued under it. In P, T, Chandra v. The 
(21)Emperorx / it was held that the propriety of the order as well as 
its legality can he considered hy the High Court in revision. It 
was observed in the same case that the power conferred by this Section 
is a discretionary one and being large and extraordinary, it should 
be used sparingly and only where all the conditions prescribed are 
strictly fulfilled.
The Indian Post Office Act, 1898, enacted an emergency provisio; 
granting the Government power to intercept postal articles* Section 
26 of the Act, as amended in 1912, provided that on the occurrence 
of any public emergency or in the interests of public safety or 
tranquillity, the Governor-General in Oouncil or the Local 
Government or any officer specially authorised in this behalf could, 
by an order in writing, direct that any article in course of 
transmission by post should be intercepted or detained or disposed 
of in such manner as the authority issuing the order might direct,
A certificate from the Governor-General in Council or the Local 
Government was to be conclusive proof whether there Y/as an emergency 
or whether any act done under the Section was in the interest of 
public safety or tranquillity.
A similar provision with regard to telegraph messages was 
already in the Statute Book. Under Section 5 of the Indian 
Telegraph Act, 1885* it was also provided that on the occurrence of 
any public emergency or in the interests of public safety, the
(2 1 )  (1942) I . L . R .  Lahore 510.
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Government could take temporary possession of any telegraph 
established, maintained or worked by any licensed person.
Another emergency measure was enacted with the passing of the 
Criminal Law Amendment Act (XIV of 1908) which provided for the more 
speedy trial of certain offences and for the prohibition of 
associations dangerous to the public peace. Part I of the Act
introduced a special procedure for the triaiof offences under the
1
following sections of the Indian Penal Codes Section 121 (Waging 
war or attempting to wage war or abetting the waging of war against 
the Queen), Section 121A (Conspiracy to commit any of the offences 
punishable under Section 121), Section 122 (Collecting men, arms 
or ammunition or otherwise preparing to wage war with the intention 
of either waging or being prepared to wage war against the Queen), 
Section 125 (Concealing the existence of a design to wage war against 
the Queen with intent to facilitate the design), Section 124 
(Assaulting or ovex’awing Governor-General, Governor etc, with intent 
to compel or restrain the exercise of any lawful power), Section 151 
(abetting mutiny, or attempting to seduce a soldier, sailor or 
airman from his duty), Section 152 (abetment of mutiny if mutiny is 
committed in consequence of the abetment) and Section 148 (rioting 
armed with deadly weapons).
Section 4 of the Act provided that "the accused shall not be 
present during an inquiry made by a Magistrate, unless the Magistrate 
so directs, nor shall he be represented by a pleader during such an 
inquiry, nor shall any person have any right of access to the Court 
of the Magistrate while he is holding such inquiry”„ No person was
36^
to be released on bail if there appeared to be sufficient grounds for
further inquiry into the guilt of such person. Evidence of any
witness taken by a Magistrate in proceedings before him could be
treated as evidence at the trial if the witness was dead or could not
be prodticed and if the High Court had reason to believe that his death
or absence had been caused in the interests of the accused, The
trial was to be before a Special Bench of three judges of the High
Court, without any jury. The Special Bench was required to apply
the provisions of Chapter XX(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
which lays down the procedure to be followed in sessions trials,
with such modifications as were rendered necessary by the absence of
a jury or assessors*
Part II empowered the Governor-General in Council to declare
an association unlawful if, in his opinion, tha;b association
interfered, or had as its object interference with the administration
of the law or v/ith the maintenance of lav/ and order or if it
constituted a danger to the public peace. Membership of such an
association was punishable by imprisonment for six months, with or
without fine, while management or assistance to the management was
punishable by imprisonment for three years, with or without fine.
The Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1951 > “was passed to
provide for the better control of the Press and of unauthorised news
sheets and newspapers in view of the spread of the terrorist
movement in the country, the increasing number of crimes committed
in pursuance of such movement and the encouragement given by some 
sections of the Press to the movement* It r^as stated in the objects
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and reasons that it was ”the practice of a section of the Press to 
give direct or indirect incitement to crimes of violence and in 
particular to encourage crimes of a terrorist character by eulogy of 
those guilty of such crimes”. The Act was to be in force in the 
first instance for one year only, but the Governor-General in Council 
was empowered to extend its duration for two years, by two 
consecutive annual extensions. The Act provided for control of the 
Press, not by the usual continental method of prohibiting publication 
except after approval by a censor, but by the equally effective 
British method of requiring' heavy deposits from owners of printing 
presses and publishers of newspapers and by the forfeiture of such 
deposits and the confiscation of such presses under executive orders,
The Act, as amended in 1932, was intended to provide ”for
( 22)the better control of the press” J .
Section 3 provided that any person keeping a printing press 
might be required to deposit with a District Magistrate or Chief 
Presidency Magistrate an amount not exceeding one thousand rupees, 
Under Section 4 fk® security could be declared forfeit by the 
Provincial Government, if it appeared to that Government that the 
press was being used for the purpose of printing or publishing any 
newspaper or other document which incited or encouraged the 
commission of any cognizable offence involving violence or expressed
(22) The words within quotation marks v/ere substituted for the words 
”against the publication of matter inciting to or encouraging 
murder or violence” by the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1932,
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approval of any such offence or person who was alleged to have 
committed such offence* If the deposit had not already been paid, 
the press itself could be forfeited in the sam£circumstances* The 
Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1932, which amended the Section included 
a wider variety of circumstances in which forfeiture could be effected 
as where the doc\iment printed or published tended directly or 
indirectly, among other things, ”to bring into hatred or contempt Hi 
Majesty or the government established by law in British India or the 
administration of justice in British India or any class or section of 
His Majesty1s subjects in British India or to excite disaffection 
towards His Majesty or the said government” or ”to promote feelings 
of enmity or hatred between different classes of His Majesty1s 
subjects” or to encourage or incite any person to interfere with the 
administration of the law or with the maintenance of law and order, 
or to commit any offence or to refuse or defer payment of any land 
revenue, tax, rate or cess or other dues or amount payable to 
government or any local authority, or any rent of agricultural land, 
or anything recoverable as arrears of, or along with, such rent.
When the security was declared forfeited, a further security 
was required to be deposited* If the press was again used for 
printing or publishing newspapers or other documents of the nature 
described in Section 4 it was provided under Section 6 that the 
further security so deposited and all copies of the publication could 
be forfeited to government. After the expiry of ten days from the 
issue of a notice of forfeiture of such further deposit, the 
declaration made in respect of such press under the Press and
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Kegistration of Books Act, 1867, would be deemed to be annulled. 
Similar provisions in regard to deposit and forfeiture were 
enacted under Sedtions 7> 8? 9 and 10 in relation to publishers of 
newspapers*
If a deposit was not made when so required by the Provincial 
Government or the Magistrate, the keeper of the press or the 
publisher of the newspaper, as the case might be, would be liable 
to punishment by fine not exceeding two thousand rupees or by simple 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or by both*
Section 15 empowered the Magistrate to authorise, by order in 
writing and '’subject to such conditions as he may think fit to impose” 
any person to publish news sheets from time to time. He could at 
anytime revoke such order, Newssheets and newspapers which were 
published without prior authorisation by Magistrate could, under 
Section 16, be seised and destroyed 011 the orders of a Magistrate 
not below the rank of a Magistrate of ttk first class. Section 17 
provided that presses producing unauthorised newssheets and newspapers 
could be seised and declared forfeit to the government.
Dissemination of such unauthorised newssheets and newspapers was 
declared a cognisable offence punishable by imprisonment for six 
months or with fine or with both.
It was provided under Section 23 that the keeper of a printing 
press or the publisher of a newspaper who had been ordered to deposit 
security or any person having an interest in any property in respect 
of which an order of forfeiture had been ma.de could within two months 
from the date of such order apply to the High Court to set aside such
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order and the High Court would deoide whether the newspaper or other 
document did or did not contain words, signs or visible representation 
of the nature described, in Section 4- Such application would be 
heard and determined by a Special Bench of the High Court composed 
of three Judges*
0 . (25) an application to setIn Mudaliar v* Secretary of Stated  '
aside two orders requiring the deposit of security In respect of a, 
printing press and a newspaper succeeded, as the coui't held that
"to find out whether the words tend to have a certain effect one must
look not merely to the words themselves, but also to the
circumstances under which they were published and the audience to
*, (24)
which they were addressed , The case arose out of a leading
article in an insignificant Tamil newspaper published from Rangoon, 
in which appeared certain militant and seditious words like "Be 
vigilant1* Let the grip be on the handle of the sword of Ahimsa 
(non-violence)* As soon as order is issued let us unsheath 
thirtythree crores of swords and lift them up," purporting to exhort 
the readers to support the political movement in India* Page, C*J*, 
said that he could not persuade himself tha,t the effect of the 
language used in the offending passages upon the few Tamils in Rangoon 
who might read the insignificant newspaper would be to induce them to 
commit any criminal act of violence* "Ho doubt", the learned Chief 
Justice observed, "the intention of the applicant in publishing this
(23) A*I*R* 1952 Rangoon 69*
(24) id. 72.
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article, and the language in which it is couched is incriminatory
and seditious, hut talcing all the dircumstances into account, and
bearing in mind the occasion upon which the words were used, the
place where they were published, the context in which they appear
and the persons to whom they are addressed, in my opinion, it cannot
fairly or reasonably be held that the words of which complaint is made
1incite to or encourage or tend to incite to or encourage the
commission of any offence of murder or any cognisable offence
involving violence1 or otherwise within the ambit of Section 4(1) of
(25)
the Act"* ' Gunliffe, J*, also was of the view that the intention
of the writer of the article was frankly seditious, but His Lordship 
said that the nature of his offence, unlike many criminal offences, 
did not rest on intention, but on the effect produced on the minds 
of others* The learned Judge, therefore, while concurring with 
the Chief Justice in allowing the application, remarked that "it is 
no fault of his (the applicants) that he escapes the provisions of 
the Statute " J 26'
(27)In Ran a Shankar Tewari v, Statex ' which arose from an alleged 
breach of Section 15* it was observed by the Allahabad High Court in 
regard to the absolute discretion granted to the District Magistrate 
whose decision to grant or refuse a permit was not subject to reviews 
"Absence of review, judicial or otherwise, of executive discretion
(25) ibid,
(26) ibid.
(27) A.I.R. (1954) Allahabad 562. Though these observations were 
made in relation to the Section vis-a-vis Article 19(2) of the
Constitution of India, the point about review of executive 
discretion deserves attention*
is undoubtedly not an exceptional feature of a statute and a 
restriction may not be said to be unreasonable solely because no 
provision is made for review* But the absence of a provision for 
review is certainly a factor to be taken into consideration in 
deciding whether a restriction is reasonable or not’1*
This Act was repealed in 195*1 *by the Press (Objectionable 
Matters) Act (No.56 of 1951)*
The Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 (commonly known as the 
Ordinance Act) was intended to supplement the criminal law, by 
reproducing in the form of amendments to existing Acts certain 
provisions of the Special Powei’s Ordinance (X of 1952) and including 
provisions against associations dangerous to the public peace, and 
against certain forms of intimidation and provisions to secure greater 
control of the Press* It sought to amend the Press Act of 195*1 &*id 
also to amend temporarily the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908.
,5The Civil Disobedience Movement, (it was stated in the objects and 
reasons) had made it necessary to supplement the Criminal Law by means 
of certain ordinances* The Special Powers Ordinance which combines 
the powers taken by the earlier Ordinances lapses on 29th December 
1932...*.• In the absence of certain of the powers at present existing 
it is not difficult to start or revive subversive movements*f! The 
Act sought to penalise the dissemination of the contents of 
proscribed documents and made picketing a penal offence. It 
empowered the Local Government to take possession of places used for 
the purposes of an unlawful association and to forfeit the funds of 
such association* The jurisdiction of the courts was barred in
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cases of such taking possession or forfeiture* It authorised the 
Government to order his parent or guardian to pay the fine imposed 
on a yotxng person*
The Bengal Criminal Law (Supplementary) Act, 1952, was passed 
following the attempt to murder the Governor of Bengal* It 
empowered the Local Government to direct any person to he committed 
to custody in any jail in British India? in effect the Government 
of Bengal was given power to put any person in a jail outside Bengal, 
The Act also provided that the powers conferred hy Section 491 of the 
Code of Criminal Procedure should not be exercised in respect of any 
person arrested, committed to or detained in custody under the Act* 
During the Civil Disobedience Movement of 1950, a no-*rent and 
no«*revenue campaign had been vigorously preached as a political 
measure by Congress adherents in certain districts of the United 
Provinces. According to a statement issued by the Government of the 
United Provinces, ncrops attached on judicial decrees were forcibly 
removed? there were many cases of intimidation, either by violence 
or by social boycott directed against tenants who paid rent, Allahabad 
district reported cases of the burning of crops of tenants who had 
paid up their dues.^*^ The Unlawful Instigation Ordinance, 1952, 
was therefore promulgated. It provided against instigation to the 
illegal refusal of the payment of notified liabilities to the 
Government* In the same year, under Section 5 of the United
(28) Statement issued on December 14? 1951? paragraph 5*
iI
!
i
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Provinces Special Powers Act, 1952, it was made penal for a person
to instigate a class of persons not to pay dues recoverable as
arrears of 1and revenue,
In 1935 Lord Willingdon, the Governor-General, passed by
certification under 67-B of the Constitution Act of 1919 a Criminal
Law Amendment Act, which removed the temporary character of the
(29)
Amendment Act of 1932 and made permanent certain provisions of
the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931? affecting the Press 
and Registration of Books Act, 1867* The Governor-General was of 
the opinion that the Act was essential for the Interests of British 
India because of the threat of civil disobedience, terrorism, 
communism and communal hatred* As to communism, he was satisfied 
that it formed% very real, though possibly not an immediate, 
menace to the peace of the country1 *
The same year the Parliament of the United Kingdom passed the 
Government of India Act, 1935? which virtually repealed the earlier 
Constitution Acts*^^ In the next chapter we shall notice the 
emergency provisions made in the new Act*
(29) It was to expire 011 18 December, 1935*
(30) The Preamble and Subsection (1) of Section 47 (which dealt with 
the short title) of the 1919 Act, and Section 6 (Transfer of 
India stock by deed) and Section 8 (Short title, commencement, 
and construction) of the Amendment Act, 19^ 6, were retained*
To many critics, the preservation of the smile of the Cheshire 
cat after its disappearance seemed to be the best parallel to 
this retention of the Preamble* (See Keith, Constituti0nal 
History of India, page 316)
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CHAPTER IV
EMERGENCY POWERS UNDER THE GOVERNMENT OP INDIA ACT, 1935 
i« General Features of the Act
The general features envisaged by the Government of India Act?
1935? were
(i) The Union of British Indian Provinces with the Princely States 
in a Federation?
(ii) A considerable degree of autonomy and responsible government in 
the Provinces.
(iii) A measure of responsibility at the Centre.
(iv) The theory of Indo-British partnership in Government and also 
in trade.
(v) Safeguards in the form of special responsibilities and a reserve 
of discretionary power assigned to the Governor-General and the Provincial 
Governor.
The assent of the Ruler was a pre-requisite of a Princely State
(l)acceding to the Federation? while the statute itself made the 
Governor!s Provinces units of the Federation by assigning to them powers 
previously vested in the Centre. **The transformation of the Provinces 
from their previous position as bodies subordinate to the Government of 
India into units in a Federation with direct devolution of their powers 
from Parliament is an accession to their status, while in the case of the
(l) No Princely State acceded to the Federation during the British period. 
On April 1? 1937 only the provincial part of the Act and the parts 
distributing powers were brought into operation.
Rulers of the States? the powers ceded to the Federation to legislate
(2)within their states is a derogation from their authority1*. The 
union of disparate elements? the Provinces with their democratic 
institutions and the Princely States with their autocratic governments? 
appeared incongruous.
The Act made a division of legislative powers between the Central 
Government and the Provinces? giving three elaborate lists of subjects*
(1 ) The Federal Legislative List
(ii) The Provincial Legislative List
(iii) The Concurrent Legislative List
An Act passed by the Federal Legislature on a subject in the third 
list would normally prevail over a Provincial Act on the same subject? 
but the latter would be valid? if it were reserved for and assented to 
by the Govern or-General. Powers not enumerated 011 the lists would be 
assigned by the Governor-Genei*al? as occasion arose? either to the Federal 
or to the Provincial Legislature*
To facilitate effective legislation in emergencies? the Act provided 
that the Centre could? with the previous consent of the Provincial 
Governors? legislate on Provincial subjects to give effect to treaties 
and international agreements? but on the treaty or agreement ceasing to 
have effect? a Provincial Legislature might repeal such provisions of
(2 ) N. Raja Gopala Aiyangar? The Government of India Act, 1935? 
Introduction? page Xlll.
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the legislation as were within its legislative power*
The Act established a Federal Court with original and appellate 
jurisdiction over the Provinces as well as the Indian States*
The Provincial autonomy introduced by the Act meant 
(i ) the possession by the Provincial Executive and Legislature of 
exclusive authority within the Province in specified spheres in respect 
of which they were generally free from control by the Central Executive 
and Legislaturej
(ii) responsibility of the Provincial Ministers to the Provincial 
Legislature in regard to matters within the provincial sphere*
The measure of responsibility contemplated for the Centre was 
strictly limited, because defence and external affairs were reserved 
subjects and army expenditure which amounted to eighty per cent of the 
Federal revenues v/ere outside the purview of ministerial and legislative 
control* As A. B* Keith puts it, 1!In the Federal Government also the 
semblance of responsible government is presented. But the reality is 
lacking, for the powers in defence and external affairs necessarily, 
as matters stand, given to the Governor-General limit vitally the 
scope of ministerial activity, and the measure of representation given 
to the rulers of the Indian States negatives any possibility of even the 
beginnings of democratic control*'.^^
(3 ) quoted in Raja Gopala Aiyangar, 
op. cit., pages X m  - XIV.
V/ith a view to promoting Indo-British partnership in trade any 
legislation discriminating against Companies incorporated in the United 
Kingdom but trading in India was forbidden under the Act, so long as the 
Government of the United Kingdom refrained from discriminating against 
Indian Companies trading in the United Kingdom.
One important feature of the Constitution Act was the provision 
made for elaborate safeguards. They fall, in the main, under two 
categories. One was the denial of legislative power to the Indian 
legislatures in regard to a number of subjects. The other was the grant 
of reserve powers to the Governor-^ General and the Provincial Governors 
to override their ministers and legislatures in certain circumstances.
In the following section we shall notice their reserve powers and 
special responsibilities.
ii* Special He800113113111 ties and Reserve Powers of the 
Governor-General and the Provincial Governors.
Relations with the princely states except in so far as they
covered matters surrendered in the prince's Instruments of
Accession were dealt with hy the "Grown Representative", an
office held for so long as it existed by the Governor-General#
Defence, External Affairs, Ecclesiastical Affairs and the
administration of Tribal areas were subjects exclusively reserved
to the Governor-General to be administered in his discretion*^
The remaining Federal subjects were assigned to the Council of
Ministers* But even within these subjects which constituted the
ministerial field, in certain matters the GovernoiwGeneral had
special responsibilities, in the due discharge of which he was
(la)authorised to act in his individual judgement*
TIT Though in regard to reserved subjects he was not bound to
consult his Ministers, the Instrument of Instruction issued 
to the Gove^ rnozv-General in the name of the Crown in accordance 
with the /powers of the Act enjoined the Govern or-General to 
encourage the practice of joint consultation between his 
counsellors and ministers even in these matters*
(la) The words "individual judgement" are used in relation to
actions by the Governor-General in his individual judgement 
in the ordinary sense of the word within the ambit in which 
normally he would be acting on the advice of his Ministers*
The words "in his discretion" are used where the Governor- 
General is.acting on his own judgement outside the ministerial 
field* Putting it differently, the words "individual 
judgement" are used in respect of powers within the area in 
which normally in ordinary times the Governor-General would 
be acting on the advice of his Ministers. The words "in 
his discretion" ar® used in respect of pavers and functions 
outside the ministerial field* (G* U* Joshi, The Hew 
Constitution of India, page 128) When acting "in his 
discretion" the Governor-General was obliged to.consult his 
Ministers. When acting in his individual judgement he was not*
These matters included
(i) The prevention of any grave menace to the peace or 
tranquillity of India or any part thereof,
(ii) the safeguarding of the financial stability and credits 
of the Federal Government,
(iii) the safeguarding the legitimate interests of minorities,
(iv) the protection of the rights of public servants, past 
and present, and their dependants,
(v) prevention of discriminatory action against British 
or Burmese goods,
(vi) the protection of the rights of Indian States and 
their rulers,
(vii) the securing that the due discharge of his functions
with respect to matters in which he was required to act 
in his discretion or to exercise his individual 
judgement was not prejudiced or impeded by any course
of action talcen with respect to any other matter*
In so far as any special responsibility of the Governor- 
General was involved, he was required to exercise his individual
judgement as to the action to be taken in the performance of his
functions*
The Act did not restrict the Governor-Generalfs special 
responsibility for the prevention of any grave menace to the 
peace to cases in which the menace arose from subversive movements
(2)or activities tending to crimes of violence*
(2) Eddy and Lawton, India‘s llew Constitution, page 38,
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The imposition of special responsibilities entailed the 
grant of special powers to the Governor-General, Apart from a 
number of administrative powers like making appointments in the 
Defence Department, summoning and proroguing the Federal 
Legislature and dissolving the Federal Assembly, he was given 
Y/ide powers of legislation* In certain matters he had negative 
power of legislation, in that he could not only withhold assent 
to & "Sill passed by the legislature or reserve it for His 
Majesty*s consideration, but also refuse sanction for the intro­
duction of any Bill or amendment in respect of such matters*
For instance, the previous sanction of the GovernorvGeneral, in 
his discretion, was required for the introduction of a Bill which
(i) repealed, amended, or was repugnant to any provision 
of any Act of Parliament extending to British India 
which the Indian Legislature was competent to repeal 
or amend,
(ii) repealed, amended or was repugnant to any Governor,. 
General*s or Governor*s Act, or any ordinance promul­
gated in his discretion by the Governor-General or
a Governor
(ill) affected matters in which the Governor-General was
required by or under the Act to act in his discretionf
(iv) enlarged the appellate jurisdiction of the Federal 
Court or related to a number of other specified 
matters*
The Governor*General was given positive powers of legis­
lation by ordinance and by Act* The former was of two kinds*
(i) An Ordinance could be issued on the advice of the 
Council of Ministers at a time when the Legislature 
was not in session and immediate action was consid­
ered necessary. Such an ordinance would expire 
after six weeks from the re-assembly of the Legis­
lature unless revoked earlier by resolutions of both 
Chambers, or by the Governor-General himself^ on 
ministerial advice. (Section 42)
(ii) An Ordinance could be promulgated by the Governor- 
General in his discretion* If at any time the 
Governor-General was satisfied that circumstances 
existed which rendered it necessary for him to take 
immediate action for enabling him satisfactorily to 
discharge his functions in respect of which he was 
required to act in his discretion or in the exercise 
of his individual judgement, he could promulgate an 
ordinance* Such an ordinance could continue in 
operation for six months only, unless extended by a 
subsequent ordinance for a further period not exceed­
ing six months* (3) (Section 43)
(3) I» re Valyuddin AIR 1950 MAD. 3^4
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Apart from this power of temporary legislation, the 
Governor,.General was empowered to enact, in his discretion, perm­
anent laws known as Governor-General1s Acts* If it appeared to 
the Governor-General that for the satisfactory discharge of his 
functions in his discretion or individual judgement, it was 
essential that provision should be made by legislation, he might 
by message to the Legislature explain the circumstances which 
rendered legislation essential and either
(i) enact forthwith, as a Governor-General1s Act, a Bill 
containing such provisions as he considered necessary; 
or
(ii) attach to his message a draft of the Bill which he 
considered necessary.
Y/here the latter course was adopted, he could, after the 
expiration of one month, enact the Bill as a Governor-General*s 
Act, either in the form of the draft proposed by him to the 
Chambers or with such amendments as he deemed necessary, after 
taking into consideration the suggestions of either Chamber, if 
any, in regard to the Bill* A Governor-General* s Act was to have 
the same force and effect as an Act of the Federal Legislature*
It could be disallowed by the Crown* (Section 44) Every 
Governor-General *s Act was to be communicated to the Secretary 
of State and laid by him before each House of
Parliament(3a) It must be noted that this power of enacting
permanent laws is exercisable only in the field of his functions 
where he was required to act in his discretion or in his indi­
vidual judgement. (4)
With the reservation of certain departments to the Governor- 
General and with the special responsibilities enjoined on him, 
the grant of powers of legislation contemplated in Section 43 
and 44 was probably inevitable*
The Governor of a Bxovince, like the Govenor,General, had 
certain special responsibilities and reserve powers under the Act* 
The Constitution Act sought to ensure that law and order 
were withdrawn from the field of party politics and interference 
by members of the party in pov/er in the legislature* (5)
(3a) From the events that led to the setting up of the Select 
Committee on Statutory Instruments (as it is now called) 
in the t[K>, it could be seen how ineffective this control 
would be. In 1946 the Home Secretary apologetically 
explained to the House of Commons that twenty three sets 
of regulations extending over a period of three years had 
by mistake never been laid as required* See also Report 
on Indian Constitutional Reforms by Montagu and Chemsford 
in which they said, '‘Parliament may sometimes be a sleepy 
guardian of Indian interests*... If resentment has been 
felt in India that there has been a tendency on occasions 
to treat Viceroys of India as 1 agents* of the British 
Government, it is fair to add that there have been periods 
when Viceroys have almost regarded Secretaries of State as 
the convenient mouthpiece of their policy in Parliament. 
(1925 Impression, page 33)-
(4) His powers of legislation in cases of emergency will be 
discussed in the next section.
(5) Ven&oba Rao, The Indian Constitution, page 63.
Among some provisions made to that end, a few special respon­
sibilities were imposed on the Governor* They included the 
prevention of grave menace to the peace or tranquil/ity of the 
province, the protection of the interests of the minorities, of 
the rights of the civil servants and their dependants, and of 
the Indian States and their rulers and the execution of the 
Governor-Generalfe orders or directions under Part Vl(^) of the 
Act* In matters for which he had a special responsibility he 
was required to act in his individual judgement, that is, he 
was not obliged to consult his Ministers. His functions in 
these matters would chiefly be exercised through officers acting 
under his orders* In matters for which he had no special 
responsibility, he was expected to act in his discretion, that 
is, he was obliged to consult his Ministers, but was not bound 
to follow their advice. In the discretionary field were incl­
uded matters like the choice and dismissal of Ministers, 
summoning, proroguing and dissolving the Legislature, assent 
and reservation of Bills, and measures to deal with terrorism* 
His functions in the field would normally be exercised through 
his Ministers* If, in his opinion, terrorist activities en­
dangered the peace of the Province, he could direct, with a 
view to preventing such activities, that any of his functions 
should be exercised in his discretion. Though he was obliged
( 6 ) Part VI deals with administrative relations between the 
Centre and the Provinces*
t-i 1 56—
to obey any direction received from the Governor-General in 
accordance with the provision of Part VI (Administrative 
RelationsY/hether a particular matter was one in which he 
should act in his discretion or exercise his individual judge­
ment was a question for him to decide in his discretion* Every 
Secretary of the Government was therefore obliged to inform his 
Minister and every Minister the Governor of any matter likely to 
involve the Governor*s special responsibilities*
For the effective execution of these responsibilities, 
the Governor was given a reserve of legislative power* He was 
authorised to promulgate ordinances and enact Acts in the 
circumstances, in which, the Governor-General could, mutatis 
mutandis, exercise these powers* But he could not, without 
instructions from the Governor-General in his discretion, 
promulgate an ordinance in the ministerial field, if a Bill 
containing the same provisions would have required the previous 
sanction of the Governor-General for its introduction, or if he 
would have thought it necessary to reserve a Bill having the 
same provisions for the consideration of the Governor-General. 
The promulgation of ordinances by the Governor in respect of 
matters in which he was required to exercise his discretion or 
individual judgement, required the concurrence of the Governor- 
General in his discretion. If the Govenor considered it im­
practicable to obtain in time such concurrence he could dispense
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with it, hut in that case the Governor,General might, in his 
discretion, direct the Governor to withdraw the ordinance* 
Similarly the enactment of a Governor's Act required the concur­
rence of the Governor,General in his discretion.
Moreover, the Governor had a negative power of legislation. 
It was provided that no Bill which repealed, amended or was 
repugnant to a Governorfs Act or any ordinance promulgated by the 
Governor in his discretion, or which repealed, amended or affected 
any Act relating to the Police Force could be introduced in the 
Provincial Legislature without the previous sanction of the 
Governor, (7 )
The scheme of these provisions was that in matters in 
which the Governor had to act in his discretion or individual 
judgement, he was to be under the control of the Governor.General 
and that in similar matters the latter was considered to be under 
the control of the Secretary of State, Thus in regard to these 
matters, there was forged an indirect chain of responsibility 
running from the Provincial Governor and ending in Whitehall.
(7) This provision was in addition to the requirement about the
previous sanction of the Governor-General for the introduction 
of Bills in the Provincial Legislature on some specified 
subjects.
Apart from the G-overnor-GeneralJs power in the Constitution Act of
1919 to certify Bills as essential to the discharge of his special
responsibilities, whereupon they were deemed to have been passed by the 
' (l)legislature and his power to promulgate Ordinances in cases of
(2 )emergency , which were kept alive until the establishment of the 
Federation by the provisions in the ninth schedule of the Act of 1939? 
and the power granted to the Governor-General and the Governors to 
promulgate Ordinances and enact Acts under the latter Act, other emergency 
provisions were incorporated in the last--named Constitution Act- As the 
Act envisaged autonomy for the Provinces, some emergency powers were 
granted to the Provincial Governor, in addition to those granted to the 
Governor-General *
The Act contemplated three types of emergencies
(3 )(i ) V/ar or internal disturbance threatening the security of India
(ii) Breakdown of the Constitutional machinery in the Centre or the
. (4 )Provinces
(5)(ii'i) Terrorist activities endangering the peace of a Province
Section 102 provided that if the Governor-General had in his 
discretion declared by Proclamation that a grave emergency existed 
whereby the security of India was threatened, whether by war or
Cl) Section 67 - B
(2 ) Section 72
(3 ) Section 102
(4 ) Sections 45 and 93
(5 ) Section 57
internal disturbance, the Federal Legislature was to have power to 
make laws for a Province with respect to any of the matters enumerated 
in the Provincial Legislative List* But no Bill or amendment for these 
purposes was to be introduced or moved without the previous sanction 
of the Governor-General* Before giving his sanction the Governor- 
General was to satisfy himself that the provisions proposed was a 
proper provision in view of the nature of the emergency*
A Provincial Legislature could continue to exercise its 
legislative functions despite the proclamation of a state of emergency* 
If, however, any provision of a Provincial law was found to be 
repugnant to any provision of a Federal lav/ which the Federal Legislature 
had power to make during the continuance of the emergency, the Federal 
law, whether passed before or after the Provincial law, was to 
prevail, and the Provincial lav; to the extent of the repugnancy, but 
so long only as the Federal lav/ continued to have effect, was to be 
unenforceable *
A Proclamation of Emergency was to be communicated forthwith 
to the Secretary of State and laid before him before each House of 
Parliament. It would cease to operate at the expiration of six months, 
unless before the expiration of that period it had been approved by 
Resolution of both Houses of Parliament*
A Proclamation of Emergency could be revoked by a subsequent 
Proclamation*
A law made by the Federal Legislature which that Legislature 
would not but for the issue of the Proclamation of Emergency have
"been competent to make would cease to have effect on the 
expiration of six months after the Proclamation had ceased to 
operate, except as respect things done or omitted to he done 
before the expiration of that period.
Section 102 only dealt with a state of emergency in which 
the security of India was threatened either as a result of war or 
of internal disturbance* In order to overcome the inherent defect 
in a federal constitution, the difficulty of dealing comprehensively 
with urgent matters resulting from a grave emergency, the Centre 
was given the right to take over for the necessary time the 
legislative field allotted to the Provinces*(6)
The intention in enacting this Section was “to give the Federal
Legislature and in consequence the Governor-General for the purposes
of his personal legislative power extensive powers on the lines of
(7)the English Defence of the Realm .Act1’* '
The emergency power under this Section was not limited to 
defence in the. sense of repelling external aggression! it covered 
internal disturbance also* But the internal disturbance, 
according to the J* P. C. Report, “should be defined in terms 
which will ensure that for this purpose it must be comparable in
(6) Parliamentary Debates* Volume 299* Gal* 1935*
(7 ) J* P. C. Report, paragraph 238*
gravity to the repelling of external aggression*^
Further-, Section 126(5) empowered the Governor-General, 
acting in his discretion, to issue orders to the Governor of a 
Province as to the manner in which the executive authority 
thereof was to he exercised for the purpose of preventing any 
grave menace to the peace or tranquillity of India or any part 
thereof.
(8) ihid* "We recognise", the Committee reported, "that the
inclusion of internal disturbance.....*among the circumstances, 
which in an emergency, will enable the Governor-General to 
confer upon himself, or upon the Federal Legislature, as 
the case may be, the pov/er to invade the exclusively 
provincial sphere and override provincial legislation within 
that sphere may be criticised as a derogation from the general 
plan of provincial autonomy which we advocate\ but in the 
absence of such power we could not regard the Governor—General 
as adequately armed to discharge the ultimate responsibility 
v/hich rests upon him for the peace and tranquillity of the 
whole of India. (Paragraph 238).
The Pakistan Constitution of 195^ specifically conferred 
the exercise of this pov/er to an "internal disturbance beyond 
the power of the Provincial Government to control"*
(Article 191(1))
(8a) Orders under this Section were issued to the Governors of
United Provinces and Pihar in 1933 when the Congress ministries 
in these. Provinces insisted on the release of political 
prisoners. The ministers resigned, when, under the orders, 
the release was refused*
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Section 45 provided for discretionary government in ca;se 
of failure of the Constitutional machinery in the Federation 
and Section 93 made similar provisions for such failure in the 
Provinces. Under Section 45? if at any time the Governor- 
General, in his discretion, was satisfied that a situation 
had arisen in v/hich the Government of the Federation could not 
be carried on according to the provisions of the Act, he might 
by proclamation, declare that M s  functions would;io such extent 
as specified in the Proclamation he exercised by him in Ms 
discretion and assume to Mmself all or any of the powers vested 
in or exercisable by any Federal body or authority, except the 
Federal Court. A Proclamation made under this Section might 
contain such incidental and consequential provisions, as might 
appear to the Governor-General to be necessary or desirable for 
giving effect to it, including provisions for suspending in 
whole or in part the operation of any provisions of the 
Constitution relating to any Federal body. The Governor-General, 
however, was not enabled to suspend, either in whole or in part, 
the operation of any provision of the Act relating to the Federal 
Court. When such a Proclamation was issued, it was to be 
communicated to the Secretary of State and laid by M m  before 
each House of Parliament and unless it was a Proclamation revoking 
a previous Proclamation, (9 ) it would cease to operate at the
(9 ) One Proclamation could be revoked or varied by another.
Section 45 (2 )
expiration of six months. It was provided, however, that if and so 
often as a resolution approving the continuance in force of such a 
Proclamation was passed by both Houses of Parliament, the Proclamation, 
unless revoked, was to continue in force for a further period of twelve 
months from the date on which it would otherwise have ceased to operate.
If at any time the Government of the Federation had for a continuous 
period of three years been carried on under such a Proclamation, then, 
at the expiration of such a period, the Proclamation would cease to 
have effect and the Government of the Federation was to be carried on 
according to the other provision? of the Act, subject to any amendment 
of it which Parliament might make. If the Governors General, by a 
Proclamation under this Section, assumed to himself any power of the 
Federal Legislature to make laws, any law made by him in the exercise 
of that power would continue to have effect for two years after the 
revocation or expiration of the Proclamation, unless sooner repealed 
or re-enacted by the appropriate Legislature *
Under this Section, in the event of a breakdown in the machinery 
of the Federal Legislature: or the Federal Council of Ministers, the 
Governor-Gereral could, to such extent as he would declare, supersede 
the Ministry or supersede the Legislature and the Ministry*
Where the Governor-General assumed to himself, under the provisions 
of this Section, the powers of the Federal Legislature, bis legislative 
powers would be subject to the same limitation as those of the Federal 
Legislature and the validity of the laws passed by him could be challenged 
in Courts.
Section 93 provided that the Governor of a Province could issue 
Proclamations in the event of a failure of Constitutional machinery in 
the Province on practically the same terms as the Governor^ General (lO).
Ho Proclamation under this Section could, however, he made by the 
Governor without the concurrence of the Governor^General.
In 1939 Proclamations under Section 93 were issued in seven Provinces. 
In pursuance of its policy of resisting the utilisation of Indians and 
India's resources in what it called Britain's wars and by reason of the 
failure of the British Government to assure India's independence at the 
end of the war and to take immediate steps to transfer power at the 
Centre to elected Ministers, the Indian National Congress called on 
Congress Ministries to resign as a first step in non-co-operation with 
the war. (ll) In all the Congress provinces, except Assam^  the local
(10) UIn the event of a breakdown of the Constitutional machinery, the
Governor . is not bound to take over the whole Government of the 
Province and administer it himself on his own undivided responsibility 
The intention is to provide also for the possibility of a partial 
breakdown and to enable the Governor to take over part only of the 
machinery of government, leaving the reminder to function according 
to the ordinary lav/. Then the Governor might, if the breakdown were 
in the legislative machinery of the Province alone, still carry on 
the government with the aid of his Ministers, if they we re willing
to support him? v/e are speaking of course of such a case as the
refusal of the Legislature to function at all, and not merely of 
lesser conflicts or disputes between it and the Governor "(j. P. C. 
Report, paragraph 109).
(11) M. R. Masani in Indiafs Constitution at Work by C. Y. Chintamani and
M. R. Masani, Page 158.
Assembly passed a resolution, endorsing the Congress attitude to war 
and the ministries thereafter resigned. The Madras Cabinet was the 
first to tender its resignation. The Governor, unable to find an 
alternative ministry, issued a Proclamation under Section 93, stating7
that the Government of the Province could not be carried on in 
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and that he had 
therefore assumed to himself all powers vested in the Provincial 
Legislature- He appointed three members of the Civil Service to act 
as his advisers. A similar process was gone through in six other 
Provinces. In Assam, the Congress Coalition Ministry resigned, but 
an alternative Ministry was formed. In the Punjab, Bengal and Sind 
alone provincial auntonomy continued to function.
Section 57 provided for a state of emergency arising from a 
threat to peace and tranquillity in a Province due to terrorist activities. 
If it appeared to the Governor of a Province that the peace and 
tranquillity of the Province was endangered by the operation of any 
person committing or conspiring, preparing or attempting to commit, 
crimes of violence which, in the opinion of the Governor, were intended 
to overt hr ow the government as by law established, he could direct that, 
for the purpose of combating such operations, his functions, to such 
extent as might be specified in the direction, would be exercised by him 
in his discretion, and until otherwise provided by a subsequent direction, 
those functions should to that extent be exercised by him accordingly.
In such circumstances, he was authorised to appoint, in his 
discretion, an official as a temporary member of th© Legislator© to act
as his mouthpiece in that body, and any official so appointed had 
the same powers and rights, other than the right to vote, as an 
elected member-
This section "contemplates a situation arising not so serious 
as that envisaged in Section 93 where provision is made for the 
contingency of a breakdown in the Constitution where the Parliamentary 
system can no longer continue in operation- In such a case therefore 
it is only necessary to take over one department or two without
(l3 )bringirgto an end the whole machinery of Provincial Government".
The powers given to the Governor of a Province under this Section,
it may be noted, were in addition to his powers in relation to his
special responsibility for the prevention of any grave menace to the
(l4 )
peace and tranquillity of the Province.
In 1939 Lord Linlithgow, the Governor-General, was anxious that
the Government of India should be vested with special powers in the
event of wax for the purpose of co-ordinating the activities of the
(15)Central and Provincial Governments.
(12) Thus the principle adopted in the Federal Centre that where there 
was a reserved department, the Governor-General would have his 
Counsellor to take part in the discussions in the Legislature 
affecting such department, was extended to the provincial field.
(1 3) Raja Gopala Aiyangar, The Government of India Act* 1955 ^ Page 82-
(1 4) The following remarks in The Economists October 17th, 1953, made 
in another context, deserve notice in this connexion- f,In theory, 
the Governor’s reserve powers exist for the purpose of preserving 
good government if the local politicians prove intractable. If 
colonial experience has shown anything, it is that the reserve 
powers of the Governor cannot be brought down to the level of the 
market place- As a weapon behind closed doors they are/useful 
deterrant, but they cannot be brought into the open without 
gibing agitators the opportunity of using them as a whipping-boy 
for working up hate-"
(l5*) 7- P. Me non, The Transfer of Power in India., Page 59-
An amending Act to the Constitution Act of 1935 was therefore passed 
by the U* K. Parliament. The Government of India (Amendment) Act?
1939, empowered the Central Government not only to give directions 
to a Province as to the manner in which its executive authority should 
be exercised., but also to make laws conferring executive authority
in respect of provincial subjects on the Central Government and its
... (16)officers.
By the India and Burma (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1940 which
amended certain provisions of the Goyernment of India Act, 1935, it
was provided that Ordinances under Section 72 of the Government of
India Act would continue to have effect beyond the period of six
(l7)months from their promulgation. It was further provided that
ordinances could be issued affecting the Army Act, the Air Porce Act, 
and the Naval Discipline Act, notwithstanding the provision in 
Section 72 that the power of making ordinances was subject to the same
(is)restrictions as the power of the Indian legislature to make laws. 
Section 111 of the Act of 1935 which exempted certain British subjects 
from certain Indian lav/s was not to apply to any Ordinance made during 
the period when the above provisions were in force.
(16) The C ongress protested against this amending Act 1which strikes 
at the very basis of provincial autonomy and renders it a farce 
in case of wax1. - quoted in V. P. Menon, ibid, Page 59*
(1 7) Section 1 (3 )
(is) Section 1 (3 ) (a).
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The India (Proclamation of Emergency) Act, 194-6, amended Section 
102 of the Government of India Act, 1935, which enabled the Central 
legislature, when a proclamation of emergency was in force, to make laws 
for a Province with respect to any matters enumerated in the Provincial 
list by providing under Section 1 that the Central legislature could 
!*make any laws, whether or not for a Province or any part thereof, with 
respect to any matter not enumerated in any of the lists in the Seventh 
Schedule
The Act was to be deemed to have come into operation on the 
commencement of the Provincial Part of the Constitution Act.
The Act also provided that where before the passing of this Act 
a High Court had given a judgement or made a firaL order in any civil 
proceedings involving a question as to the validity of any law passed 
in India, any party to the proceedings might, within ninety days from 
the passing of the Act, apply for a review of the proceedings in the 
light of the provisions of the Act and the High Court or the Federal Court 
where an appeal had been decided by that Court, was to review the proceedings 
accordingly.
The India (Central Government and legislature) Act, 1946, further 
amended Section 102 of the Constitution Act of 1935. Section 5 of the 
Act provided that a law made by the Indian legislature whether before or 
after the passing of this Act during the continuance in force of a 
proclamation of emergency, being a law which that legislature would not, 
but for the issue of such a proclamation, have been competent to make,
would not cease to have effect on the expiry of six months after the. 
proclamation had ceased to operate, except to the extent to which 
the Central Legislature would not, hut for the issue of the 
proclamation, have been competent to malce it*
Under the Act, during the period of one year beginning with 
the date on which the proclamation of emergency in force at the 
passing of the Act ceased to operate or, if the Governor-General 
by public notification so directed, during the period of two years 
beginning with that date, the Indian Legislature was enabled to 
make laws with respect to trade, commerce and unemployment and also 
laws providing for the continuance of the powers of requisitioning 
of land in a Province and of compulsory acquisition of land directly 
and without interposition of any Province* The period during 
which these powers might be exercised by the Central Legislature 
could be extended from time to time by a resolution of both Houses 
of Parliament for a further period of twelve months, but it was 
not to continue for more than five years from the date on which 
the proclamation of emergency ceased to operate*
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iv. Defence of India Act and Rules
On the outbreak of the Second World War, the Governor-General 
declared under Section 102 of the Government of India Act, 1935* that 
a grave emergency existed whereby the security of India was threatened, 
with the result that the power to legislate on subjects in the 
Provincial list also was vested in the Centre, Having been thus 
enabled to make laws for the whole of British India, the Governor- 
General, by virtue of his power to issue ordinances in cases of 
emergency under Section J2 in the ninth schedule of the Act, 
promulgated the Defence of India Ordinance (Ordinance Ho. V of 1939). 
This Ordinance was later placed before the Central Legislature and 
enacted as the Defence of India Act, 1939#
The Act was to remain in force during the continuance of the 
war and for a period of six months thereafter. By Section 2(1) of 
the Act the Central Government was empowered to make such rules as 
appeared to it to be necessary or expedient for securing the defence 
of British India, the public safety, the maintenance of public 
order or the efficient prosecution of the war, or for maintaining 
supplies and services essential to the life of the community.
Section 2(2) provided that without prejudice to the generality of the 
powers conferred by Subsection (1), the rules could provide for, or 
could empower any authority to make orders providing for, all or any 
of the matters enumerated in the Subsection? which were enumerated 
under thirtyfive heads, covering every conceivable aspect of the 
life of the citizen.^^ Subsection 4 and 5 enabled the Central and
(1) M. C. Setalvad, War and Civil Liberties, page 47.
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the Provincial Governments to delegate to any officer or authority 
subordinate to them any power or duty conferred or imposed upon these 
Governments. Section 3 provided that any order made under 
Section 2 should be valid and enforceable notwithstanding that it 
was inconsistent with any enactment.*, other than the Defence of 
India Act, A number of Acts were temporarily amended by Sections 5 
and 6 for the purpose of enhancing penalties for certain offences*
Section 8 enabled the Provincial Governments to set up Special 
Tribunals, consisting of three members, to try offences under rules 
made under Section 2 or punishable with death, transportation or 
imprisonment for a term extending to seven years. The Special 
Tribunals could take cognizance of offences without the accused being 
committed to it for trial. (Section 10) It was not necessary for 
the Special Tribunal to take down the evidence at length in writing, 
it was only required to cause a memorandum of the substance of the 
depositions of witnesses to be taken down in the English language.
It could, if it considered necessary for the safety of the State, 
exclude the public fx^ om its proceedings. (Section 11) Ho appeal lay 
from the sentence of a Special Tribunal, except when the sentence was 
one of death, or transportation for life or of imprisonment for a 
term extending to ten years* Ho court had any authority to revise 
an order made or sentence passed by a Special Tribunal or to make an 
order in the nature of habeas corpus under Section 491 of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure, or to exercise any jurisdiction in respect of the 
proceedings of a Special Tribunal. It was provided by Section 14 
that save as otherwise expressly provided by or under the Act, the
ordinary criminal and civil courts would continue to exercise
jurisdiction* ^ ^
Section 16(1) provided that no order made in exercise of any
power conferred by or under the Act was to he called in question in
any court. Section 17 conferred an indemnity in respect of acts
“in good faith done or intended to he done in pursuance of the Act
or any rules made t here tinderfl - by barring prosecution or other legal
proceeding against any person for such acts.
Section 19 made provision for payment of compensation for
compulsory acquisition for public purposes of any land or industrial
or commercial undertaking or any interest in them, the amount of
compensation to be fixed by agreement or by the award of an arbitrator.
(3)In Mherenduv Putt Ma.jumdar v* ICing Fmpex*or ' ' the validity 
of the Defence of India Act was challenged. It was held by the 
Federal Court that by virtue of the transitory provision in Section 
316 of the Constitution Act, the then existing Indian Legislature 
was treated for the purposes of the statute as the Federal Legislature 
and that the Defence of India Act was, therefore, not ultra vires 
on the ground only that it was enacted by the Indian Legislature.
(2) This provision in effect enabled the Government in exercise of 
its power of making rules under the Act to deprive the criminal 
and civil courts of their ordinary jurisdiction,
( 3 ) 1942 F.C.H* 38.
(4 ) Section 316. s*The powers conferred by the provisions of this 
Act for the time being in force on the Federal Legislature shall 
be exercisable by the Indian Legislature and accordingly 
references in those provisions to the Federal Legislature shall 
be construed as references to the Indian Legislature and laws
of the Indian Legislature......“
( 5)The Rules made under the Defence of India Ordinance, 1939
( 6 )formed a large code covering all aspects of the life of the citizen. '
(7)Two of the rules x y deserve special attention as they were widely 
made use of by the Executive and were a source of continuous litigation.
Rule 26 provided that the Central or the Provincial Government 
could make an order directing that a particular person be detained if 
it were satisfied that, with a view to preventing him from acting 
in any manner prejudicial to the efficient prosecution of war, to the 
defence of British India or ,to the public order, it was necessary to 
do so* The same authorities were also empowered, under similar 
conditions, to impose a number of other restrictions on the liberty 
of the person and movements of the citizen.
Rule 81 enabled the Central and Provincial Governments, so far 
as it appeared to be necessary or expedient, for securing the 
defence of British India or the efficient prosecution of the war, ox~ 
for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the 
community, to make ordex^ s on a number of specified matters, such as 
the regulation or prohibition of the “production, treatment, keeping,
(5) The Ordinance was x*epeated in the Defence of India Act, 1939*
All rules, notifications and orders made under the Ordinance 
were kept alive by Section 21 of the Act*
(6) On February 12, 1943? & member of the Legislative Assembly
asked whether the Government were aware that the Defence of India 
Rules had superseded the Indian Penal Code and the Criminal 
Procedure Code. Another member followed the question with the 
quer5rs “Are they aware that even for restitution of conjugal 
rights, the Defence of India Rules have been used?" (quoted
in Indian Annual Register* 1943* Volume I, 149)
(7) Rules ''"and 8f. --- -
storage, movement, transport, distribution, disposal,
acquisition, use or consumption'1 and the control of selling prices
of articles or things of any description whatsoever and the prohibiting
or withholding from sale of articles generally or to specified
persons or classes of persons*
As we have seen, Section 2 of the Defence of India Act
empowered the Central Government to make rules which appeared to it
necessary or expedient for securing the d efence of British India,
the public safety, the maintenance of public order, or the efficient
prosecution of war or for maintaining supplies and services essential
to the life of the community. The rules made under the Section also
authorised the Government to make orders and exercise powers for
these purposes* I he words used in the Section were a x'eproduction
with a little alteration of the language used in the British
Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1939 * But the legislative power
of the Indian legislature, unlike that of the Parliament of the
United Kingdom, was limited to the items mentioned in the Legislative
Lists in the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935*
These lists did not mention * defence of British India*, as a head
( g )
of legislation v * It was, therefore, contended that, in the
(e) His Majesty may by Order in Council make such Regulations as 
appear to him to be necessary or expedient "for securing the 
public safety, the defence of the realm, the maintenance of 
public order, and the efficient prosecution of the war in which 
His Majesty may be engaged and for maintaining supplies and 
services essential to the life of the community*" (Section 1(1) 
of the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1939* 2 and 3 George 6.
(9) The Canadian and Australian Constitutional Acts, it may be noted, 
do mention defence as a subject of legislation*
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absence of the relevant legislative power, the Act was ultra vires 
and the rules made under it were invalid* But the federal Court in 
Keshav lalpade v* Emperor held that, notwithstanding the absence
of the head ^defence of British India*, in the lists, entries in the 
Legislative Lists could be found which would justify legislation on 
most matters covered by the general words of Section 2(1) of the Act 
as well as by the precise provisions set out in Subsection (2) with 
its thirtyfive paragraphs. The court observed,
l!fPhe draftsman of Section 2(1) appears to have adopted the 
language of the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1959» which has been 
passed by Parliament, not altogether happily, seeing, that with the 
possible exception of *the maintenance of public order*, none of the 
purposes which he has set out are to be found under the same
(11)description among the matters comprised in the Legislative Lists*• '
In this case, an authorised petition writer on the Insolvency 
Side of the Bombay High Court was detained under Rule 26 by the 
Government of Bombay* Ihe order recited that the Government was 
satisfied that it was necessary to make a n order of detention against 
him with a view to preventing him *from acting in a manner prejudicial 
to the defence of British India, the public safety, the maintenance 
of public order and the efficient prosecution of the war* • He 
instituted habeas corpus proceedings in the High Court of Bombay, but 
the High Court refused to interfere, basing their decision on
(10) (1943) 6 F.L.J. 28.
(1 1 ) Keshav Talpade v .  Bmpsror, (1943) 6 F . l . J ,  28, 36 -37 .
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Liversidge v* Andersonv '  9 Talpade therefore appealed to the 
Rederal Court*
Rule 26 made under Section 2(2) empowered the Government, if 
it was satisfied with respect to any particular person that, with a 
view to preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the 
defence of British India, the public policy, the maintenance of 
public order and the efficient prosecution of the war, it was 
necessary to detain him, to make an order that such person be detained* 
The rule was made in exercise of the power in Section 2(2) of the Act, 
which provided that the rules made for the general purposes mentioned 
in Subsection (1) might provide for, or might empower any authority 
to make orders providing for nthe apprehension and detention in custody 
of any person reasonably suspected of bein# of hostile origins or 
having acted, acting or being about to act in a manner prejudicial
(13)
to the public safety or interest or to the defence of British India*
It was contended on behalf of the appellant that Rule 26 was not 
within the rule-malting power conferred by the Act, because, while 
the rule-making power contemplated the detention of a person who was 
1reasonably suspected* of the various matters mentioned in Section 2(2), 
Rule 26 as framed enabled the Government to detain a person if it was
(12) (194s) A*CI* 206* It held that the subjective satisfaction of
the Home Secretary in regard to the hostile associations of a 
person was sufficient to justify an order of detention against 
him under the Snglish Regulation 18-B, and the court would not 
enquire into the sufficiency or the cogency of the material upon 
which his satisfaction was based*
(15) Section 2(2) (x)
* satisfied* that his detention was necessary for the reasons mentioned 
in it* The court considered whether the words Reasonably suspected* 
in the Act implied the existence of suspicions for which there was 
reasonable justification and whether the words in Rule 26 indicated 
that Hhere must be suspicions which are reasonable in fact and not 
merely suspicions which some as yet unspecified person or authority 
might regard as unreasonable11. The court considered Liversidge v» 
Anderson and pointed out that there was an essential difference between 
the language of the English Regulation 18-B and that of Rule 26,
Gwyer, C.J*, delivering the opinion of the court observed,
Rhere is nothing in the Act to prevent these powers being 
vested in any person or body, however insignificant or subordinate*
It is one thing to confer a power to make a regulation empowering the 
Home Secretary to detain any person if he thinks it expedient to do so 
for a number of specified reasons5 it is another thing altogether to 
confer a similar power on any person whom the Central Government may 
by rule choose to select, or to whom the Central Government may by 
rule give pov/ers for the purpose
The court further observed that they might take judicial notice 
of the fact that the number of persons detained in India, compared 
to those in the United Kingdom, was very large, and it was difficult 
to suppose that the Governor-General in Council or the Governors with 
their advisors had always been able to give their personal attention 
to each case 5 so that the consideration of the facts must have been 
left in very many instances, to put it no higher, to officials,
Keshav T&lpaAe The Emperor, (1943) F.L.J. 28, at page 4 2*
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( 1 5 )sometimes no doubt highly placed, but not necessarily so*
Though the point was not decided, the court thought that in the 
circumstances, notwithstanding the decision in Liversidge v* Anderson 
the more natural interpretation of the words used in the rule-making 
power was that there must be suspicions which were reasonable in fact 
and not such as the authority making the order might regard as 
reasonable* The Court held that Rule 26 as framed went beyond the 
rule-making power in Section 2(2) and was therefore invalid. The 
court observed*
nWe need hardly point out the divergence between Rule 26 and 
paragraph (x) of Section 2(2) of the Act, which is clearly intended 
to be the authority for making the rule. Tlie Act authorises the 
making of a rule for the detention of persons reasonably suspected of 
certain things? the rule would enable the Central Government or any 
Provincial Government to detain a person about whom it need have no 
suspicions, reasonable or unreasonable, that he has acted, is 
acting or is about to act in any prejudicial manner at all. The 
Government has only to be satisfied that with a view to preventing him 
from acting in a particular way it is necessary to detain him.
(15) ibid, page 43* I** King ISmperor v. Shibnath Baner.ji (1945)
72 I*A* 241, the Privy Council held that it was not necessary 
that the Governor should be personably satisfied as to 
necessity of a person*s detention under Defence Rule 26; such 
a matter should be dealt with, like other executive matters, 
in accordance with the rules under Section 59 
Constitution Act* The satisfaction of a subordinate officer 
(which included a minister) was sufficienti9 and the burden was 
on the detenu to establish that there was no satisfaction*
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The Government may come to the conclusion that it would he wiser to
take no risks, and may therefore subject a person to preventive
detention against whom there is no evidence or reasonable suspicion
of past or present prejudicial acts or of any actual intention of
acting prejudicially; and Rule 26 gives it power to do so.....
There is no power to detain a person because the Govexuiment thinks that
he may do something hereafter or because it may think that he is a
man likely to do it; he must be a person about whom suspicions of
(17 )the kind mentioned in the paragraph are reasonably entertained"*'
The Crown tried to base its case on the wider rule-making power
(18contained in Section 2(1) ' ' * but this contention was however 
rejected by the court on the ground that it was not permissible to 
call in aid the more general words in that subsection in order to 
justify a rule which so plainly overstepped the limits of the specific
/ \ (1 9)power granted under sx\b section (2),'
Allowing the appeal, the court saids
"We do not know the evidence which persuaded the Government of 
Bombay that it was necessary to prevent the appellant from acting in 
a manner prejudicial to the defence of British India, the public
T V S ? -of. Brutus * s argument in Shakespeare1 s "Julius Caesar "t 
And since the quarrel
Will bear no colour for the thing he is,
Fashion it thus; that what he is, augmented,
Would run to these and these extremities?
And therefore think him as a serpent*s egg,
Which, hatched, would, as his kind, grow mischievous, 
And kill him in the shell,
II. i. 28-34.
(17) Keshav Talnade v, Fmperor, (1943) F,L.J, 28, at pages 43-44.
(18) 'The Central Government m a y...... make such rules as appear to it
to be necessary, ♦. ,for securing the defence of India..."
(19) This decision was overruled by the Privy Council in Fmperor v. 
Shibnath Banerji (I945) VIII F.L.J, 222,
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safety, the maintenance of public order and the efficient prosecution
of the war; hut we may he forgiven for wondering whether a person who
is described as an authorised petition writer on the Insolvency Side
of the Bombay High Court was really as dangerous a character as the
recital of all these four grounds in the order of detention suggests^20 ^
The order does nothing to remove the apprehension that we have already
expressed that in many cases the persons in whom this grave power is
vested may have had no opportunity of applying their minds to the facts
( 21 'Iof every case which comes before them11*' }
This decision of the Federal Court was deemed to have created 
an emergency and the Defence of India (Amendment) Ordinance, 1$>43 
(Ho .XIV of 1945) was promulgated. It substituted a new clause for 
Clause (x) of Seetion2(2) of the Defence of India Act, 1939.
Section 2 of the Ordinance stated that for the said clause "the 
following clause shall be substituted, and shall be deemed always to 
have been substituted, namely*-
rr(x) the apprehension and detention in custody of any person 
whom the authority empowered by the rules to apprehend or detain as 
the case may be suspects on grounds appearing to such authority to be 
reasonable. of being of hostile origin, or of having acted, acting, 
being about to act, or being likely to act in a manner prejudicial 
to the public safety or interest, the defence of British India, the
(20) The order recited that his detention was necessary to prevent him 
from acting to the prejudice of the defence of India, the public 
safety, the maintenance of public order, and the efficient 
prosecution of the war*
(21) Keshav Talpade v. Emperor, (1945) 6 F.L.J* 28, 45*46•
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maintenance of public order, His Majesty*s relations with foreign 
powers or Indian States, the maintenance of peaceful conditions in 
tribal areas, or the efficient prosecution of the war, or with
respect to whom such authority is satisfied that his apprehension and 
detention are necessary for the purpose of preventing him from acting 
in any such prejudicial manner, the prohibition of such person from 
entering or residing or remaining in any area, and the compelling of 
such person to reside and remain in any area, or to do or abstain 
from do ing anyt hing;H
Section 3 stated* llFor the removal of doubts it is hereby
enacted that no order heretofore made against any person under rule 26
of the Defence of India Rules shall be deemed to be invalid or shall
be Galled in question on the ground merely that the said rule purported
to confer powers in excess of the powers that might at the time the
said rule was made be lawfully conferred by a rule made or deemed to
have been made under Section 2 of the Defence of India Act, 1939,f*
(2 2)In King Emperor v. Shibnath Banerjee and others, ' the Federal
n * i iwi— 'h hi ii^  mm i i i  11 toii i ii r 1 i n ■ i b ii iliin n n m n im r t r r r t n rllli m fr jtttthim —
Court observed that, whether Section 2 of the Ordinance was valid
or not, Section 3 was certainly not invalid or ultra vires, as it was 
within the Ordinance-making powers of the Governor-General, The 
court further held that it was a condition precedent for the valid 
exercise of the power of detention conferred by rule 26 that the 
Provincial Government should have applied its mind and become satisfied 
that such detention was necessary for preventing the person concerned
(2 2 ) (1943) 6 F .L .J .  page 151.
from acting in a prejudicial manner. The court, therefore, found 
that the orders of detention made in pursuance of a general order that 
if the police recommended detention of any person under rule 26, such 
a person might he detained, were invalid. A majority of the court 
(Spens, C.J., dissenting) also held that Provincial Government in 
rule 26 meant the Governor acting with or without the advice of his 
ministers; and therefore delegation of the powers of the Provincial 
Governor under the Defence of India Act could he made only under the 
provisions of Section 2(5) (23) of the Act, and in the absence of a 
delegation so made, the authority to be satisfied under rule 26 was 
the Governor himself.
When the matter was taken up in appeal to the Privy Council,
( 25)it held, as pointed out earlier, * that rule 26 of the Defence of 
India Rules was within the rule-making power conferred by Section 2(1) 
of the Defence of India Act. The function of subsection (2) was 
mainly illustrative; the rule-making power was conferred by 
subsection (1); subsection (2) could not be regarded as restrictive, 
for its opening words were 11 without prejudice to the generality of 
the powers conferred by subsection (l)...n The Judicial Committee 
also held that it was not necessary that the Governor should 
personally satisfy himself as to the matters set out in rule 26; that
(23) Section 2(5) nA Provincial Government may by order direct that 
any power or duty which by rule made under subsection (1)...,., 
shall,.....be exercised or discharged by any officer or authority, 
not being an officer or authority subordinate to the Central 
Government11*
(24) 1945 F.C.R. 195.
(25) See footnotes (15) an& 09)
the challenged orders of detention were regular and proper with the 
exception of two which were made in a routine manner* Their Lordships 
held that nothing in Section 59(2) 0f the Government of India
Act or Section 16 of the Defence of India Act, ousted the
jurisdiction of the court to investigate the validity of the orders 
of detention.
Some time after the judgement of the Federal Court in Shibnath 
Banerjee*s case, the Governor~General promulgated another Ordinance- 
making provision for preventive detention along with some related 
matters. The Restriction and Detention Ordinance, 1944 (ill of 1944) 
was an amending and consolidating Ordinance empowering the Central and 
Provincial Governments and any officer or authority to whom the Central 
Government or the Provincial Government might delegate its powers in 
this behalf to “restrict the movements and actions of, and to place 
in detention and detain certain persons, to regulate the exercise of 
these powers and the duration of orders made in such exercise, and 
to confirm the validity of the past exercise of such powers under rule 
26 of the Defence of India Rules'1,
Section 5(1) provided thats 'The Central Govex*nment or the
(26) Section 59(2) Orders and instruments made and executed in the 
name of the Governor shall be authenticated in such manner as 
may be specified in rules to be made by the Governor, and the 
validity of an order or instrument which is so authenticated 
shall not be called in question on the ground that it is not an 
order or instrument made or executed by the Governor,
(27) Section 1^1) op, cit,5 16(2) "Where an order purports to have
been made and signed by any authority in exercise of any power 
conferred by or under this Act, a court shall, within the 
meaning of the Evidence Act, 1872, presume that such order was 
so made by th&t authority, '*
-184-
Provincial Government, if satisfied with respect to any particular 
person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner 
prejudicial to the defence of British India, the public safety, 
the maintenance of public order, His Majesty*s relations with 
foreign powers or Indian States, the maintenance of peaceful 
conditions in Tribal Areas, or the efficient prosecution of the 
war it is necessary so to do, may make an order....
o>) directing that he be detained?
(c) directing that, except in so far as he may be permitted 
by the provisions of the order, or by such authority or 
person as may be specified therein, he shall not be in any 
such area or place in British India as may be specified
in the order;
(d) requiring him to reside or remain in such a. place or within 
such area in British India as may be specified in the order 
and if he is not already there to proceed to that place or 
area within such time as may be specified in the order;
(e) requiring him to notify his movements or to report himself 
or both to notify his movements and report himself in such 
manner at such time and to such authority or person as may 
be specified in the order?
(f) imposing upon him s\ich restrictions as may be specified in 
the order in respect of his employment or business, in 
respect of his association or communication with other 
persons, and in respect of his activities in relation to 
the dissemination of news or propagation of opinions?
•"* ”18 5*"*
(g) prohibiting or restricting the possession or use by him of
any such article or articles as may be specified in the order 
<*) otherwise regulating his conduct in such particular as may 
be specified in the order, ......
provided ......that no order shall be made by the Provincial
Government under Clause (C) of this Subsection directing that any 
person ordinarily resident in the Province shall not be in the 
ProvinceM. A person contravening an order was liable to 
punishment with imprisonment for five years, with or without fine.
Section 3(9) provided that any order made under the Section
*
would have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent with it 
contained in any Act, Ordinance or regulation other than this 
Ordinance, or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any such 
Act, ordinance or regulation.
Section 5(1) enabled the Central Government to delegate its 
powers and duties under the Ordinance to any officer or authority 
subordinate to it or to any Provincial Government. Subsection (2) 
conferred a like power of delegation on the Provincial Government.
Section 6 validated orders made under rule 26 of the Defence 
of India Rules. Section 6(1) stated* !,Ro order made before the 
commencement of the Ordinance under Rule 26 of the Defence of India 
Rules shall after such commencement be deemed to be invalid, or be 
called in question on the ground merely that the said rule purported 
to confer powers in excess of the powers that might at the time the 
said order was made be legally conferred by a rule made under 
Section 2 of the Defence of India Act, 1939,f* cancellation of
such an order by the order of a Competant Court, it was provided,
would not prevent the making, under the Ordinance, of a fresh
order to the same effect, as the order cancelled.
When an order of detention was made in respect of any person,
the authority making the order was required under Section 7 to
comnmnicate to the person affected the grounds 011 which the order
had been made and such other particulars as would be sufficient,
in the opinion of the authority, to enable him to make a
representation in writing against the order of the authority* When
the order was made by an officer or authority to whom the power of
making such an order was delegated, he was required to report the
fact to the Government to which he was subordinate, together with
the representation, if any, made by the person affected by the
order* An order of detention would have effect for six months
only from the date of making the order, but the Government or the
authority or officer subordinate to it could prolong its operation
for any length of time by half yearly extensions.
The jurisdiction of the courts was barred in regard to orders
made trader the Ordinance (Section 10)
The provisions requiring the person detained to be furnished
with the grounds of detention and affording him an opportunity for
making a representation were a pale shadow of the corresponding
provision in the English Regulation of 18-B, which itself was an
improvement made on Regulation 14-B issued during the First World
War, in deference to the observations of Lord Shaw in his
dissenting judgement in Rex v» Halliday Under the English
(28) (1917) A.C. 260*
-187-
Regulations the jurisdiction of the courts was not "barred, and 
under Regulation 18«B, even though the Home Secretary was enabled 
to detain any one whom he had reasonable cause to believe to be 
within specified categories of suspects, necessitating some exercise 
of control over him. Advisory Committees were set up and the detenu 
was given facilities to make his representations against detention 
before such committees after having received legal advice* The 
Home Secretary was bound to report to Parliament every month the 
number of persons detained and the number of cases in which he did 
not follow the recommendations of the Advisory Committee*
The provision in the Indian Ordinance giving the detenu an 
opportunity to make a representation proved ineffective in the case 
of a large number of persons under detention, because there was 
no provision enabling such person to obtain legal advice. Moreover, 
nothing more than the bare ground of detention had to be communicated 
to the detenu under the Ordinance end the right to put forward his 
case in these circumstances was almost illusory*
Though the Executive by means of this Ordinance sought to 
protect itself from control of its exercise of the power of 
preventive detention by the courts, the courts, as will now be 
indicated were reluctant to relinguish such pov/ers of control as 
the statute permitted, and endeavoured to prevent the statute 
completely denying to the citizen the right of personal liberty 
during the emergency.
This Ordinance was also challenged as ultra vires the Governor-
General, because in so far as it purported to aiithorise detention
of persons on the ground that they were likely to act in a manner 
prejudicial to the efficient prosecution of war, it was legislation 
relating to the prosecution of war, a subject which was not in the 
ambit of any of the lists in Schedule YII of the Constitution Act*
It was held by the Federal Court in B as ant a Chandra Chose v* King 
Emperor v x that the reference to Mthe efficient prosecution of 
the war11 in the Ordinance must be understood in the light of the 
circumstances in which the Ordinance came to be passed. Events in 
19 4 2 -1 9 4 49 of which the court could take judicial notice 
indicated that the efficient prosecution of the war y/as necessary for 
the defence of India. It could not therefore be said that 
prosecution of the war was not a matter of defence* It was further 
held that if, owing to different views being entertained about the 
formalities necessary for a valid order of detention, a fresh order 
of detention was passed in the place of an earlier one to remedy 
defects apparent in the latter, such a course would not justify 
an inference of fraud or abuse of power* The court also held that 
where an earlier order of detention was defective on merely formal 
grounds, there was nothing to preclude a proper order of detention 
being based on the pre-existing grounds themselves, especially in 
cases in which the sufficiency of the grounds could not be examined 
by the courts *
The Federal Court had held earlier that all that
(29) (1945) 8 ff.L.J. 40*
(30; Basanta Chandra Chose v* King Emperor, (1944) F.L.J* 203*
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(31 iSection 10 of the Ordinancev L did was to interdict the High Court 
from exercising in a certain class of cases the power or jurisdiction 
conferred on it by Section 491, Criminal Procedure Code, but that
it did not follow that the court could no longer consider the
validity of an order which on the face of it appeared or purported 
to have been passed under the Ordinance* Spens, C.J., who 
delivered the judgement of the court observeds 'The court is and 
will be still at liberty to investigate whether an order purporting 
to have been made under rule 26 and now deemed to be made under 
Ordinance III or a new order purporting to be made under Ordinance 
III was in fact validly made, in exactly the same way as immediately
before the promulgation of the Ordinance
s Under Rule 81 which provided for the general control of trade 
and industry, Provincial Governments passed numerous control orders 
which were so frequently amended that it was impossible for the 
ordinary citizen and by no means easy for lawyers to know what could 
legally be done at any moment, so that citizens frequently 
contravened the orders unintentionally* The courts were inclined 
to be charitable to those who thus contravened the orders out of 
ignorance or misunderstanding as they were couched in language which
(31) Section 10(1) "... *no court shall have power to make any
order under Section 49^  of "the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898,
(Y of 1898) in respect of any order made under or having effect 
under this Ordinance, or in respect of any person the subject 
of such an order"*
(32) Basanta Chandra Bose v« King Emperor, (1944) F»L,J0 203 ut 
page 212*
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it was not always easy even for a trained lawyer to understand* 
Although ignorant!a legis neminem excusat is a wellknown 
principle3 the Allahabad High Court observed in Pinanath v*
Emperor nevertheless there might be cases in which the rigour
of that maxim might be mitigated* When rules and orders with 
respect to the distribution of food grains had been made in quick 
succession, a sentence for infringement was reduced since the 
accused, an illiterate man, was unaware of an amendment forbidding 
him to apply for an identity card enabling him to draw Government 
food grains when provision had been made to enable him to satisfy 
his needs otherwise *
(35)In Roshan Lai v* Emperor a firm exported arhar from
United Provinces to Howrah in contravention of United Provinces 
Food Grains and Oil Seeds (Movement) Control Order* The railway 
dalal arranged the cartage of arhar to the railway station and 
procured waggons* The station master arranged for the waggons and 
the arhar was booked to Howrah* All the persons were under the 
genuine though mistaken impression that there was no restriction on 
the export of arhar* The partners of the firm were convicted under 
Defence Rule 81(4) read with Rule 122, the station master under 
Rule 81(4) and the railway dalal under Rule 81(4) read with Rule 121
(33) 'The interpretation of the circulars is becoming almost as
esoteric an art as the interpretation of statutes" C.K* Allen,
Law and Orders, page 219* The same was true of orders and 
notifications in India.
(34) A0I.R* 1946 Allahabad 11?.
(35) A.I.R, 1946 Allahabad 161.
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as an abettor of the offence. The High Court held that the 
partners of the firm and the station master were rightly convicted, 
hut the fact that the accused was under a genuine though mistaken 
impression that the export of arhar was not prohibited was an 
extenuating circumstance which could be taken into account in 
awarding sentence and that, as all the accused were labouring under 
a misapprehension, it was very doubtful whether the part played 
by the railway dalal really amounted to an abetment of what was 
done by the station master and the dalal should therefore be given 
the benefit of doubt and his conviction must be quashed.
In Srinivas Mall Bairoliya v. E m p e r o r Lord du Parcq 
delivering the opinion of the Privy Council observed that offences 
against Rule 81(2), which empowered Government to make price 
control orders, were not within^ the limited and exceptional class 
of offences which could be held to be committed without a guilty 
mind* Offences which are within that class are usually of a 
comparatively minor character and a person who was morally innocent 
of blame could not be held vicariously liable for a servant!s crime 
involving contravention of Rule 81(2) and so punishable "with 
imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years". The 
first appellant was the Salt Agent employed to supply salt to 
licensed retailers in a particular area; the second appellant the 
one who actually made the allotment to the retailers. They were jointly
(36) A.I.R. 1947 P.O. 135.
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charged with selling salt to three traders at more than the 
maximum price# The Board dismissed their appeal, holding the 
mens rea established*
In Muhammad Bashir y. Emperor it was held that offence
under Defence Rule 81(4) read with Rule 121 was committed by both 
proprietor and manager of a hotel when the latter, who was in 
exclusive management of the hotel sold refreshments to customers 
in contravention of a notification under Rule 81(2) prohibiting 
the sale of such articles after a certain hour at night* Following 
English decisions, an exception to the general rule that the master 
is not criminally liable for the acts of the servant was made as 
the notification prohibited the act absolutely and the servant in 
transgression committed it.
In Pratapmal Rikhabdas v* Emperor the accused(a shop
keeper;was found guilty of "black marketing", i*e* selling to one 
individual a large quantity of sugar in contravention of the Bombay 
Rationing Order issued under Rule 81(2)* The High Court observed 
that where the accused was guilty of a grave breach of the 
Rationing Regulations involving deliberate black marketing in times 
of food scarcity he committed a crime against society of a most 
despicable character as he was unlawfully enriching himself at the 
expense of his fellow citizens, especially the poorer ones who 
could not afford to pay the black market prices which were thus
(37) I*L,R* 1946 Bombay 173*
(38) (1946) I.L.R. Boob ay 1114.
95**
created and that such type of offence was a most contemptible 
crime and called for a deterrent sentence in all cases in which it 
was deliberately committed.
Rule 75 A deserves special notice as it substantially affected 
the right to property of the citizens*
Rule 75 -A-0 ) enabled the Central and Provincial Governments 
to requisition any property, movable or immovable, except property 
used for the purpose of religious worship and vessels and aircrafts 
registered in British India, if, in the opinion of the Government, 
it was necessary or expedient to do so for securing the defence of 
British India, the public safety, the maintenance of public order 
or the efficient prosecution of the war or ib r maintaining supplies 
and services essential to the life of the community*
Subrule (2) empowered the Government to use or deal with the 
property requisitioned in such manner as might appear to it to be 
expedient and also to acquire it if it decided to do so.
Subrule (4) provided that whenever the Central Government or 
the Provincial Government requisitioned or acquired any movable 
property, the owner thereof should be paid such compensation as 
that Government might determine*".
When Rule 75 A was challenged in the courts as being ultra 
vires the legislative powers of the Indian Legislature, although 
"compulsory acquisition of property" is item 9 on the Provincial 
List in the Constitution Act of 1955* &n& inasmuch as the greater
includes the less, this presumably includes "requisition", 
conflicting decisions were given by different High Courts. To
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mention only three, in Tan Bu r  Tain v. OoHector of Bombay.
the Bombay High Court held that the requisition of immovable 
property under Section 2(2) (XXTV) of the Defence of India Act and 
Rule 75 A of the Defence of India Rules, not being comprised in any 
of the three lists in Schedule VII, Government of India Act, the 
Central Legislature had no power to legislate with respect to the same, 
in the absence of a public notification by the Governor-General under 
Section 104, Government of India Act, even though there was a
proclamation of emergency by the Governor-General under Section 102(1). 
The decision was based on the view that a strict construction should 
be put on provisions of the Constitution Act curtailing the liberties 
of the subject* It is submitted that this principle, though 
relevant when interpreting the scope of a condition to which the 
exercise of legislative power is subject, is irrelevant in 
construing the scope of an item on the legislative lists, which 
should he construed generously/ 41 ^ In H. C. Gupta v. Mackertich 
John. '^2) ^  or^er was ma£e under Hule 75A requisitioning a certain 
building in which the respondent was carrying on a hotel business.
It was contended that the order amounted in effect to the 
requisitioning of the respondents undertaking and that such an
vernor-General may by public 
notification empower either the Federal Legislature or a 
Provincial Legislature to enact a law with respeot to any 
matter not enumerated in any of the Lists in the Seventh 
Schedule of this Act "
(41) Bhola Prasad v. King Emperor. (1942) F.C.R. 17»
United Provinces v, Mst Atjqa Begum, (1940) F.C.R. 110*
(42) A.I.R. 1946 Calcutta 140.
(39) A.I.R. 1946 Bombay 216 
M 1
order was not authorised by the rule# The Calcutta High Court
held that an order under Rule 75A requisitioning a building where
a hotel business was being carried on was not ultra vires* It
further held that though the requisitioning of the building might
interrupt and damage the respondents business for the time being,
the order Aid not amount to the requisitioning of the business and
that even assuming it to be otherwise, the requisitioning of an
undertaking was within the power conferred by Rule 75A# The court
observed that Rule 75A permitted the requisitioning of any property,
movable or immovable, and the requisitioning of a business
undertaking was covered by the rule.
The Madras High Court also held that Rule 75A was not ultra
vires the Government of India A ot.^^
In Municipal Board v. Allah Tala^ ^  it was observed that if
circumstances were found by the court to exist which not only
negatived the entire idea of good faith but established a position
wholly inconsistent with the same it could not be said that
acquisition made in the exercise of powers under Rule 75A could not
be questioned# A suit for a declaration that the property had been
wrongly acquired would not under such circumstances be barred either
by Section 16 or Section 17 of the Defence of India Act#
In Juggilal Kamlapat v. Collector of BomDari4i>)« it was held
(43) Venkata Subbier v. Emperor. A.I.R. 1945 Madras 104*
(44) 1951 A.I.J. 145.
(45) A.I.R# 1946 Bombay 280 , 286.
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that where a flat was requisitioned for the duration of war and six 
months thereaftery the order delegating the power to determine this 
term to the officer for wliose use the flat was requisitioned was not 
illegal* It was also held that an order by a Collector under 
Rule 75-11 requisitioning premises in occupation of a person 
carrying on business there was a judicial act over which the High 
Court could exercise jurisdiction by issuing a writ of certiorari 
or a writ of prohibition*
The question of compensation under Rule 75-1(4) provoked 
criticism in the courts and outside them* On the one hand it was 
maintained that some of the officers on whom the duty of assessment 
of compensation was laid could be corruptly induced to make an 
over-valuation* On the other hand it was said that it was unjust 
to leave the amount of compensation to be determined by Government 
in its discretion*
In fact* however f the courts provided a remedy against 
inadequate compensation*
In Province of Bengal v* Board of Trustees«^~6) a rule in 
regard to compensation was laid down by the Calcutta High Court*
A piece of land which the Board of Trustees for the Improvement of 
Calcutta had acquired for the express purpose of providing a park 
for the public was requisitioned by the Government under Rule 75A* 
The court held that the Board was entitled to get compensation for 
the park on the same basis as building sites* It observed that
(46) A.I.R. 1946 Calcutta 416.
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the effect of a requisition under the Defence of India Rules was 
to deprive the owner of his possession and that he must, therefore,
get the value of his possession* Looking at the matter from
another aspect, the court remarked that the requisitioning authority 
got the possession from the owner and became, so to say, a 
statutory tenant, and the basis of compensation must, therefore, 
be fair rent* Again in Collector of Darjeeling v* Mackertich*^*^ 
the court observed that compensation had to be assessed at the value 
of the claimant's possession, measured by the fair rent to be paid 
in respect of the premises* If the fair rent was capable of direct 
assessment the court had to proceed on that basis* Ordinarily the
rent which was being paid in respect of certain premises at any
point of time might be regarded as the fair rent payable for them*
In Afkab Raj v* Collector of Lahore. it was held that
the compensation to be paid in respect of land acquired for a certain 
period was to be determined in accordance with the amount of rent 
at which the plot of land could be let out by the owner acting on 
his own volition, and without compulsion*
In Province of West Bengal v* Ra.ia of Jhargram* ^ ^  it was 
laid down that if property was requisitioned for a limited period 
the requisitioning authority was bound to pay reasonable compensation 
for the period and that the basis of compensation was the amount of
47) (1951) 54 C*ff*ff. 853.
48) A.I.R. 1948 Lahore C*R* 55f 203.
49) A*I*R* 1955 Calcutta 392*
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fair rent* If property was compulsorily acquired, the 
compensation payable was the market prioe of the property together 
with claims admissible for costs of removal, severance etc* If 
at the time of derequisition it was found that damage had been done 
to the property during the period of requisition and the property 
was not in the same condition as it had been when requisitioned, 
the Government was liable for what is technically known as terminal 
damages*
(50)
In Union of India v* Ram Parehad it was held that the
principle on which market value for payment of compensation was to 
be assessed was not the principle on which a Rent Controller would 
assess standard rent for the property*
Clearly the trend of these decisions was that though the 
Defence Rules did not expressly provide for just compensation as 
was done by the English Defence Regulations, the courts were ready 
to order payment of fair and reasonable compensation*
i
Rule 129 provoked criticism from Indian lawyers on the ground | 
that it gave police officers unnecessary opportunities for abusing 
their powers* It provided that any police officer might arrest 
without warrant any person whom he reasonably suspected of acting, 
having acted or being about to act, in a manner prejudicial to 
the public safety or to the efficient prosecution of the war •
Subrule (2) required the police officer who made the arrest to 
report forthwith the fact of such arrest to the Provincial
(50) A.I.R* 1952 Panjab 116.
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Government and pending the receipt of the orders of the Provincial 
Government, he could commit the person arrested to custody. No 
person was to be detained in custody under the Subrule for a period 
exceeding fifteen days without the order of the Provincial 
Government and no person was to be detained in custody under the 
subrule for a period exceeding two months. Subrule 4 enacted that 
on receipt of any report under Subrule (2) the Provincial Government 
might make in exercise of any power conferred on it by any law for 
the time being in force such final order as to his detention, 
release, residence or any other matter concerning him as might 
appear to the Government in the circumstances of the case to be 
reasonable or necessary.
(51\
In Vimala Bhai Deshpande v. Grownw  very early one August
morning, an Advocate of the Nagpur High Court was arrested and 
taken to the police lock-up. Later he was taken to the lock-up 
in the compound of the District Magistrate to be interrogated in 
connexion with a dacoity which had taken place in Bombay. The 
arrest was made under Rule 129# On receipt of a report of the 
arrest, the Provincial Government directed that the person be 
detained for fifteen days. I he period of detention was sought to 
be extended by two subsequent orders from the Provincial Government 
for a period of fortyfive days. In the meantime, on an 
application by his wife, the detenu, who was not even given 
permission to consult his counsel, was released by the Nagpur High
(51) (1945) X.L.S. Hagpur 6.
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Court, The court observed that this case was a clear illustration
of malice in law# On appeal to the Privy Council, the decision
( 52}of the High Court was affirmed in Emperor v« Deahpande.w  * Their
Lordships of the Privy Council pointed out that, whereas a detention
order could he passed under Defence Rule 26 if Government was
satisfied that it was necessary, a police officer could only arrest
tinder Rule 129(1) if he was reasonably satisfied, and the burden
lay on him to show that his suspicions were reasonable. Clause 4
of Rule 129 did not enlarge the powers which Government possessed
to deal with a person arrested under Clause 1 • If the original
arrest order Clause 1 was invalid, because made without reasonable
grounds, Government had no power under Clause 4 to make an order
for the temporary custody of the person arrested.
In the Panjab one Teja Singh was arrested and detained in
custody under Rule 129, not because he had done anything
prejudicial to the public safety or the prosecution of the war,
but because he had had the misfortune to incur the displeasure of the
sub-inspector and the head constable of the local polioe station.
In habeas corpus proceedings, the Lahore High Court released the
(53)detenu, the court observing in the course of the judgement v 7 
that if there were evidence of any material on which the arresting 
officer could have based his suspicions, and in the absence of 
evidence of mala fides, the court would have held the arrest 
justified by Rule 129 and it would refuse to determine whether the
(52) A.I.R. 1946 R.C. 125.
(53) Teja Singh v. Emperor. A.I.R. (1945) Lahore 293*
material was or was not sufficient for the suspicion, but where there 
was no material at all and consequently there was no scope for any 
kind of suspicion, reasonable or unreasonable, the court was 
bound to hold that the case did not come within the scope of Rule 129 
and the arrest was made mala fide.
In Prabhakar Keg ho Tare v. Emperor dealing with Indian
defence regulations in general the Hagpur High Court observed that 
there was no substantial difference in meaning between the two
(55)phrases, *has reasonable cause to believe * and H s  satisfied1 x /
The court held that persons detained under Defence of India Act had
the right to move the High Court under Section 49^ of “th® Criminal
Procedure Code, and this was particularly necessary when arbitrary
powers were exercisable even by District Magistrates and Sub-
divisional Magistrates* Though the Provincial Government was
entitled to take all proper precautions in the matter of granting
interviews even to legal advisers, it had no power to shut a
detained person off altogether from reasonable and proper legal
advice; the Provincial Government had no power to prevent such
54} A.I.R* 1943 Nagpur 26.
55) The original British Defence Regulation 18B made by Order in 
Council gave the Secretary of State power to detain any
particular person "if satisfied   that it is necessary
to do so1'. Mr. Herbert Morrison, than in opposition, 
remarked.in Parliament, "I think that any Minister is capable 
of being wicked when he lias a body of regulations like this 
to administer". (quoted in C. K* Allen, Daw and Orders, 
page 413). In Liversidge v. Anderson, the House of Lords 
held that there was in ©ffedt no difference between the two 
expressions, *if satisfied1 and freasonable cause to believe
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issue a as bad faith or abuse of the Act from being tried in the
High Court in the ordinary way, if they were raised subject, of
course, to such reasonable safeguards as the Provincial Governments
might desire to have observed, that is to say, the trial, despite
all safeguards, must be according to canons of natural justice,
or according to the fundamental rules of practice necessary for the
due protection of persons and the safe administration of criminal
justice* Refusing all access, the court held, was an abuse of
power. "The history of liberty has largely been the history of
observance of procedural safe guards.
Another observation, indicative of the Allahabad High Court*s
concern for the liberty of the subject was made in Peare Lai v.
(57)Emperor.w  J As the Defence of India Act, it said, was a special
piece of legislation enacting a penal provision which made a serious
inroad into the right to personal liberty, its provisions should 
be strictly construed.
Benintende, the Chief of the Council of Ten, in Byron* s 
Marino Faliero. Doge of Venice, sayss 
.... ,f0n great emergencies
(58)The law must be remodelled or amended"v .
This sentiment was echoed by Lord Atkins "Amid the clash of arms 
the laws are not silent. They may be changed, but they speak the
same language in war as in peace (59)^
(56) per Frankfurter. J.» in McHabb v. United States tl945) 318
D.S. 352 at 347*
(57) A.I.R. 1944 Allahabad 168.
(58) Marino Paliero, V. i. 84-8 5.
(59) Dissenting judgement in Liversidge v. Anderson, (1942) A.C.244*
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v* Special Criminal Courts Ordinance
Though the Defence of India Act had provided for the constitution 
of Special Tribunals "vhich could follow a special procedure modifying 
the usual procedure of the courts, Special Tribunals were not set up* 
Instead an ordinance called Special Criminal Courts Ordinance (ll(2) of 
1942) was promulgated early in 1942 making provision for the setting 
up of special criminal courts of three classes, namely, Special Judges, 
Special Magistrates and Summary Courts* The Ordinance was to come into 
force in any Province only if the Provincial Government being satisfied 
of the existence of an emergency arising from a. hostile attack on India 
or on a country neighbouring on India or from the imminence of such an 
attack, by notification, declared it to be in force in the Province* 
(Section 1(3)).
A Special Judge was to be a person who had exercised for not less 
than two years the powers of a Sessions Judge or Assistant Sessions 
Judge* He was authorised to try ,fsuch offences or classes of offences, 
or such cases or classes of cases as the Provincial Government or a 
servant of the Crown empowered by the Provincial Government in this 
behalf, may, by general or special order in writing, direct’1* (Section 5)* 
He could take cognisance of offences without the accused being committed 
for trial and was to follow the procedure prescribed for the trial of 
warrant cases by Magistrates5 he was required ordinarily to record only 
a. memorandum of the substance of the evidence of the witnesses. A Court 
of the Special Judge was deemed under the Ordinance to be a Court of 
Session. A Special Judge could pass any sentence authorised by law*
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If any person was sentenced, to death, transportation for life or to 
imprisonment for seven years or more by a Spe cial Judge, the 
proceedings were to be reviev/ed by a High Court Judge specially 
nominated by the Provincial Government in this behalf.
Any Presidency Magistrate or Magistrate of the first class of 
two years service could be appointed a Special Magistrate. He could 
try ’’such offences or classes of offences, or cases or classes of 
cases” other than offenGes or cases involving offences punishable by 
death, as the Provincial Government or a servant of the Crown 
empowered in this behalf might direct (Section 10). The Special 
Magistrate was to follow the same procedure as the Special Judge and 
could pass any sentence except a sentence of death or of transportation 
or imprisonment for a term excee.ding seven years. If a Special 
Magistrate passed a sentence of transportation or imprisonment for a 
term exceeding two years an appeal would lie to the Court of a Special 
Judge•
The Provincial Government could empov/er any Magistrate to exercise 
the powers of a Summary Court vfhich would have power to try such offences 
or classes of offences, or such cases or classes of cases, as the 
District Magistrate or the Chief Presidency Magistrate or a servant of 
the Crown authorised in this behalf by the District Magistrate or the 
Chief Presidency Magistrate might direct. (Section 16) But no person 
was to be tried by a Summary Court for an offence punishable by impris­
onment for a term exceeding two years, unless it was one of the offences
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mentioned in 260 (i)?, '***' of the Criminal Procedure Code. A- Summary 
Court was required to follow the procedure for the trial of warrant 
cases, but it was not required to frame a formal charge or to record 
more than a memorandum of the evidence. In the trial of an offence 
punishable for a term not exceeding one year, it could follow the 
procedure for summary trial of cases in which an appeal would lie.
It could pass any sentence which might be passed by a Magistrate of 
the first class. Prom a Summary Court appeal lay in certain cases to 
a Chief Presidency Magistrate or a Special Magistrate or other 
Magistrate of the first class appointed by the District Magistrate to 
hear appeals.
The Special Courts could dispense with the attendance of 
refractory accused'and proceed with the trial in their absence. Such 
accused would be deemed not to plead guilty and could be represented 
by a pleader. The Special Courts might exclude the public generally 
or any particular persons from the Court buildings. They might order 
that the fine paid by a convicted person should be given to the person 
affected by the offence or as a reward to the person who had given 
information leading to the detection of the offence or to the conviction 
of the accused (Section 24 (2 )). Section 26 provided that "there shall, 
save as provided in this Ordinance, be no appeal from any order or
(1 ) These offences could be tried summarily under the ordinary law.
They included petty theft, for which the maximum punishment under 
the Indian Penal Code was three years imprisonment and fine.
sentence of a. Court constituted under this Ordinance and, save as 
aforesaid, no court shall have authority to revise such order or 
sentence, or to transfer any case from any such court, or to make 
any order under Section 491 of the Code or have any jurisdiction of 
any kind in respect of any proceedings of any such court”.
In the course of its brief existence the Ordinance was amended 
three times. The first amending Ordinance made strict provisions in 
regard to granting bail to the accused. One condition for granting 
it was that the court should be satisfied that there were reasonable 
grounds for believing that the ac°nsed was not guilty of the offence 
charged (Section 24 A(b))«
The second amending Ordinance amended Section 3 so that this 
extraordinary criminal procedure could be brought into operation in 
the event of there being ”any disorder within the Province”.
The third amending Ordinance provided that a Sessions Judge could 
transfer a case from one Special Judge to another at any stage of the 
proceedings. A District Magistrate was empowered to transfer a case 
in lilce manner from one Special Magistrate to another and neither the 
Special Judge nor the Special Magistrate to whom the case was 
transferred was bound to re*~summon or re-hear witnesses unless he 
considered that such a course was necessary in the interests of justice.
Benoari Lall Sharma and others who were tried by a Special 
Magistrate functioning under the Ordinance and sentenced to rigorous 
imprisonment for two years invoked the revisional jurisdiction of
the Calcutta High Court contending that the Ordinance was ultra vires,
that the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court was therefore not
excluded by Section 26 of the Ordinance and that the Special Magistrate
had no jurisdiction to try them* A special Bench of the High Court
declared that the provision in the Ordinance empowering a delegation
to the Provincial Government to decide the particular cases or classes
( P)of cases which should go for trial to the Special Courts was invalid! v ' 
and the decision of the High Court was affirmed by a majority of the 
Federal Court in Emperor v. Benoari Lall Sharma and others*
In that case it was pointed out on behalf of the Crown that the 
way in which the powers of the High Court had been dealt with, in the 
Ordinance was a question of policy with which the court was not concerned. 
The court? in reply? indicated that the circumstance that the impugned 
legislation was enacted by an Ordinance raised an important question.
It stated that though legislation by Ordinance had been given the same 
force and effect as ordinary legislation and though the ambit in regard 
to subject matter was the same in both? there were two important points 
of difference between the two. By the very terms of Section 72 in the 
Hinth Schedule, authorising the enactment of Ordinances, their operation
(2) Benoari Lall Sharma v. Emperor  ^ A.I.E. 1943 Calcutta 285*
(3) 1943 F.L.J. page 79*
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was limited to a period of six months and the Ordinances were
avowedly promulgated in the exercise of a special power granted to
meet an emergency. These two circumstances, the court said,
differentiated legislation by Ordinance from ordinary legislation*
and'afforded ground for doubting the applicability of the principle
(5)
of plenary powers lard down in The Queen v» Bur ahw  to Ordinances*
It was pointed out by the court that the very conception underlying 
the Ordinance—making power so closely associated it with the 
personal discretion of the Governor-General that the objection against 
delegation to subordinate executive authorities of any matter of 
principle as was attempted to be done in the Ordinance in question 
was quite serious* The court further observeds
"It has no doubt been always recognised that some authority in 
the State should be in a position to enact necessary measures to meet 
extraordinary contingencies* Section 72 of the Ninth Schedule makes 
ample provision for it! question is about the manner of exercising
that power. Before applying the analogy based on the English practice 
as to emergency legislation, certain differentiating circumstances 
should be borne in mind* In England even emergency legislation is 
Parliamentary legislation or Order in Council passed under the 
authority of Parliamentary Statute and it is always subject to 
Parliamentary control, including in the last resort the right to insist 
on the annulment or modification of the Order in Council or even the
(4 ) "Even now it is only temporary", the court pointed out, "though 
the particular limit has been removed", ibid, page 116. .
(5) 1878 A.C. 889*
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repeal or modification of the Statute itself* Under the Indian
Constitution the Legislature has no share in or control over the
making of an ordinance or the exercise of powers thereunder, nor
has it any voice in asking for its repeal or modification* Again,
anything like a serious excess in the use of special emergency
power’s will, under the English practice, he a matter which Parliament
can take note of when the time comes for passing the usual Indemnity
Act on the termination of the emergency* (See Dicey^ Law of the
Constitution, page 236 and Carrfs Administrative Law, pages 69 and 70).
That is not the position here, as the indemnity can he provided by an
ordinance* As against all this, the only safeguard provided in the
Indian Constitution is that the matter rests entirely upon the
responsibility of the Govern or-General. This only confirms the
argument against delegation of such responsibility, at least without
laying down in clear and definite terms the limits and conditions
governing the exercise by executive officers of powers conferred upon
(6)them by the Ordinance"*
As to the main contention against the Ordinance that it left to 
the Executive the sole power to decide which cases or classes of cases 
should be withdrawn from the purview of the ordinary courts and 
assigned for trial to the Special Courts, the courts observeds
"A comparative study of the Ordinances promulgated by the Governor- 
General during the last two decades will reveal a progressive diminution
(6) Emperor v* Benoari Lall Sharma, (1943) F.L.J* 79 at 117*
in the definiteness and completeness of the relevant legislative 
provision and a corresponding expansion of the limits of executive 
intervention in the determination of the forum and the procedure 
applicable. The- earlier Ordinances were limited to defined categories 
of crimes with reference to their nature, time, place or purpose and 
the choice of the forum even in such cases was left to the Governor 
or the Government to make. The practice has now been extended to all 
offences and the choice of the forum (with all its serioits consequences 
under the present Ordinance) has been entrusted to any servant of the 
Crown who may be authorised by the Provincial Government •
As we have already observed, the considerations and safeguards 
suggested in the foregoing passages may be no more than considerations 
of policy or expediency under the English Constitution. But under 
Constitutions like the Indian and the American, where the constitution­
ality of the legislation is examinable in a Court of law, these 
considerations are. In our opinion, an integral' and essential part 
of the limitation on the extent of delegation of responsibility by 
the legislature to the executive. In the present case, it is impossible 
to deny that the Ordinance-making authority has wholly evadgd the 
responsibility of laying down any rules or conditions or even enunciating 
the policy with reference to which cases are to be assigned to the 
ordinary Criminal Courts and to the Special Courts respectively and 
left the whole matter to the unguided and uncontrolled action of the 
executive authorities. This is not a criticism of the policy of the
law - as Counsel for the Crown would make It appear - but a
complaint that the law has laid down no policy or principle to
guide and control the exercise of the undefined powers entrusted
to the executive authorities by Sections 5, 10 and'16 of the Ordinance'1 •
(7)
But the minority judgement stated!
,!It is not for us to concern ourselves with the policy where 
the law is clear but to give effect to its provisions however injurious 
we may conceive the consequences to be’h (8 )
As a result of this decision of the Federal Court, a repealing 
Ordinance was promulgated® The Special Criminal Courts (Repeal)
Ordinance9 1943 (XIV of 1943)? while repealing the Ordinance of the 
previous year which constituted the Special Criminal Courts, confirmed 
sentences passed by a Special Judge, Special Magistrate or Summary 
Court as if they had been passed by a Sessions Judge, Assistant Sessions 
Judge or a Magistrate of the first class at a trial held in accordance 
with the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code® Such sentences 
were made subject to rights of appeal or revision, as the case might 
be, as under the Code- If they had been altered in the course of 
review or appeal under the provisions of the Ordinance of 1942, the 
altered sentence, it was provided, would be subject to appeal or revision. 
Cases pending before Special Courts were to be transferred to the 
ordinary Criminal Courts® An indemnity was granted to any Servant of
(7 ) ibid, page 118- 
(b) ibid, page 134-
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the Crown for any sentence passed or act done by him-, in the exercise
of any jurisdiction or power conferred upon him or purported to have
been conferred upon him by the Special Criminal Courts Ordinance-
Notwithstanding the repeal of fie Ordinance, the Executive
appealed to the Privy Council® (9) fheir lordships while recognising
that in view of the repeal the question raised before them was largely
academic thought that the better course would be to decide whether the
Special Courts Ordinance was invalid, ''especially as this may be of
assistance in deciding other questions which may arise thereafter as
to the validity of Ordinances made, in cases of emergency, by the
Governor General", under paragraph 72 of the Ninth Schedule*
Iheir lordships observed that an emergency might exist which
made it necessary to provide for the setting up of Special Criminal
Courts without requiring such courts to be actually set up forthwith
all over India, fhe Governor*.General might well have considered that,
in view of the existing emergency, it was necessary to have a scheme
for Special Courts drawn up and all ready for application if the
existing emergency was further aggravated* It was undoubtedly true
that the Governor,General, acting under paragraph 72 of the Ninth
Schedule , must himself discharge the duty there cast upon him and
could not transfer it to other authorities* But the Governor,General
had not delegated under Section 1 (3 ), his legislative powers at all*
(9 )^ l5TriS'~Emoeror vV Benoari LaIiShamar~ri946) F.lVjY 1* ~~
213
His powers in this respect in cases of emergency were as wide as 
the powers of the Indian Legislature which, in view of the 
proclamation under Section 102, had power to make laws for a Province 
in respect of matters which would otherwise he reserved to the 
Provincial Legislature* There could he no valid objection, in point 
of legality, to the Governor~General*s Ordinance taking the form that 
the actual setting up of Special Courts under the terms of the 
Ordinance should take place at the time and within the limits judged 
to he necessary hy the Provincial Government specially concerned*
This, according to their Lordships, was not delegated legislation at 
all. It was merely an example of the not uncommon legislative 
arrangement hy which the local application of the provision of a 
statute was determined hy the judgement of a local administrative 
hody as to its necessity. Their Lordships held that if he was 
satisfied of the existence of an emergency, the Governor-General under, 
paragraph 72 might repeal or alter the ordinary law as to the revisionary 
jurisdiction of the High Court, just as the Indian Legislature 
itself might do* The x^in^iple that legislation should enable an 
offender to know in advance before what court he would he brought if 
he was charged with a given crime, in their Lordships1 view, was a 
question of policy, not of lav/. There was nothing either in the written 
Constitution of India or underlying it, which debarred the executive 
authority, if specially authorised hy the statute or ordinance to do 
so, from giving directions after the accused had been arrested and 
charged with crime as to the choice of court which was to try him. The
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law-making authority in India, whether that authority was the 
Legislature or the Governor-General, like the Parliament of 
Westminster, could validly enact that the choice of the court 
should rest with an executive authority.
Viscount Simon, L.C., who delivered the opinion of the Council 
observed?
n». - *. o the question whether the Ordinance is intra vires or ultra 
vires does not depend on considerations of jurisprudence or policy*
It depends simply on examining the language of the Government of India 
Act and of comparing the legislative authority conferred on the 
Governor,General with the provisions of the Ordinance by which he is 
purporting to exercise that authority. It may be that, as a matter 
of wise and well-framed legislation it is better, if circumstances 
permit, to frame a statute in such a way that the offender may know 
in advance before what court he will be brought if he is charged with 
a given crimes but that is a question of policy, not of law* There 
is nothing of which their Lordships are aware in the Indian Constitution 
to render invalid a statute, whether passed by the Central Legislature 
or under the Governor^Generalfs emergency powers, which does not accord 
with this principle-..-.... Again and again, this Board has insisted 
that in construing enacted words we are not concerned with the policy 
Involved or with the results Injurious or otherwise, which may follow 
from giving effect to the language used11.
In the circumstances their Lordships held that the Ordinance was 
not ultra vires.
£*<2 I
A writer in the Lav/ Quarterly Reviews referring to the
judgement commented,, ’’IvSbst constitutional lawyers would sympathise with
the objections of the eminent judges in India to the provisions of the
Ordinance in question* Delegation of such powers to the Executive may
well he considered to he contrary to constitutional principles* An
appeal to constitutional principles frequently deters Parliament from
enacting some proposed provision of an Act of Parliament* Constitutional
principles are? however, only guides to the Legislature and not principles
of lav/* What the Legislature has enacted must under the British and also
(ll)
the Indian Constitutions he enforced hy the courts11* _________
(IQ) G*.'G*P* in .Law Quarterly Review^ 1945V VoI*63U .pages 123* 124*
(ll) Under Ir i sS' law,, emergency" Xogisl at ion and the setting up of special 
courts have heen held to he in conformity with the Constitution* Article 
28*3,(3) of the Constitution of Eire contains a wide provision for dealing 
with war or armed rebellion^ under it the Constitution cannot he invoiced 
to invalidate any law enacted hy the Oireachtas which is expressed to he 
for the purpose of securing ’’the public safety and the preservation of the 
State”, and anything purported to he done under such legislation cannot he 
challenged*. This Article was amended in 1939 so that the Legislature was 
ahle to make provision for the emergency created hyftSecond World War. In 
the exercise of this pcwer? Emergency Powers Acts were passed in 1939 
I94O and under the Emergency Powers Orders made under the Acts? military 
courts were set up to try certain specified offences* The jurisdiction, of 
these courts was challenged in In re KbGrath and Harte ((1941) I*R»68) and 
in The State (Walsh) v* Lennon "((1942) I * R *112)* In the first case' it was 
held that the reference to emergency in the long titles of these Acts 
sufficed to hring them within Article 28 of the Constitution so that the 
other articles of the Constitution could not he invoked to invalidate them* 
It was also held hy the Supreme Court that Section 3 of the Emergency 
Powers Act, 1940 which provided that the Government might hy order make 
provisions for the trial in a summary manner of any person alleged to have 
committed any offence specified in such order, authorised the Government 
to provide for the trial and punishment of persons, whether the offences 
were alleged to have heen committed before or after the-making of such • - 
order* In-the second case, four -accused persons were ordered to bejbrought 
before a military court established hy the Emergency Powers Order, 194^ to i 
he tried on a charge of murder* It was contended on their behalf that the 
Order was ultra vires as it directed that the military court which was to 
try the accused,—was-to try them together, and so precluded the court from 
exercising its discretion and control over its own procedure* It was held 
hy the Supreme Court that the Order was within the powers conferred hy the 
Constitution and the Emergency Powers Acts and could not he impugned*
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The validity of certain provisions of the repealing Ordinance 
(XIX of 1943) was challenged by Piarre Dusadh and others who had
been convicted by courts functioning tinder the Special Criminal Courts 
Ordinance, 1942*. Their contention was that the sentences which had 
already been passed by the Special Courts could not be validated by the 
new Ordinance* The Federal Court held that the repealing Ordinance 
conferred validity and full effectiveness on sentences passed by Special 
Courts which had functioned under the Special Criminal Courts Ordinance* 
It also held that the Special Criminal Courts (Repeal) Ordinance, 1943, 
was not ultra vires the Governor-General. The subject matter of the 
Ordinance was covered by the entry Administration of justice’ in List II 
and the entry ’criminal procedure ’ in List III and in promulgating the 
Ordinance, it Said, the Governor-General had not attempted to do 
indirectly what he could not do directly or to exercise judicial power 
in the guise of legislation* The Ordinance was also not invalidated.on 
the ground that the Governor-General had validated by retrospective 
legislation proceedings held in courts which were void for want of 
jurisdiction, as there was nothing in the Indian Constitution which 
precluded the Legislature from doing so* The court observed that the 
limitation in the American Constitution that the Legislature could not 
by retrospective legislation validate proceedings which bad been held in 
the courts, but which were void for want of jurisdiction was derived 
from the interpretation given by the American Courts to the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments vh ich provided against any person being ’’deprived 
of life, liberty or property without due process of law”. The position
(12) Piarre Dusadh and others v* King Emperor, (1944) F.C*R. 61*
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was different in India, the court said, as there was nothing in 
the Government of India Act, 1935> corresponding to so much of 
the Amendments as relate to deprivation of life or liberty, and 
even as to property it only required that such deprivation should 
be by “authority of law11* The sacredness of personal freedom 
remained in India, in the view of the court, only as a principle 
of private law, and executive interference with the liberty of 
the subject might be justified as much by legislation or statutory 
rule as by production of an order of court*
vi. Other Security Measures
During the war years the Government of India had to cope
with three special emergencies over and above the general continuing
peril consequent on being involved as a belligerent* One was the
assault of the Japanese armed forces upon its eastern gates;
of ex oj- (X,
another was the agitation which, though less hostile
fx
than it might have been, did not fail to act on the principle 
that EnglandA peril was India fs opportunity; and the third was 
the subversive activities of the Communists whose ideology was 
foreign to the rulers and most of the people of India and whose 
loyalties were to Russia, the most difficult of England’s allies*
To meet the situation, the Government passed a number of 
measures in addition to the Defence of India Act and the rules 
and orders made under it* Some of these measures were repetitions 
or adaptations of enactments passed during the First World War 
while others broke new ground as the whirligig of time had brought 
with it new conditions and attitudes in life* A few of them are 
noticed below*
The Registration Ordinance, 1939? requiring certain European 
British subjects to register themselves followed the lines of 
similar legislation during the First World War. The Requisitioning 
of Vessels Ordinance, 1939? and the Transfer of Aircraft and 
Vessels Restriction Ordinance, 1939? Rad also their counterpart in
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enactments made during the previous war. The Foreigners 
Ordinance, 1939? was a revised and enlarged version of the 
Foreigners Ordinance, 1914* It provided for the imposition of 
restrictions on the entry of foreigners into British India and 
for their internment, if necessary* It empowered the Central 
Government to order a foreigner not to depart from British India, 
or to depart only in such manner as might be prescribed. It 
prohibited a foreigner from changing his name while in British 
India. The penalty for contravention of orders made under the 
Ordinance by the Central Government or its delegates was imprison­
ment for a term extending to five years and fine* It conferred 
immunity from legal proceedings on any person for anything which 
was in good faith done or intended to be done under the Ordinance* 
Ordinances were promulgated in order to constitute a Civil
Pioneer Force,v * Women’s Auxiliary Corps,v ' and Eailway Air Raid
(3)Precautions Service.
The right enjoyed by certain members of the Police Forces 
to resign office on giving notice of their intention to resign 
was suspended by the Police (Resignation of Office) Ordinance, 1942* 
The Defence of India (Amendment) Ordinance, 1942 (XXIII of
(1) The Civil Pioneer Force Ordinance, 1942 Ot of 1942).
(2 ) The Women’s Auxiliary Corps Ordinance, 1942 (XIII of 1942)*
(3) The Railway Air Raid Precaution Service Ordinance, 1942 
(XXI of 1942).
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1942), amended the Defence of India Act, 1939? to make provision, 
among other things, for granting to the military and police forces 
of the Indian States and to the police force of the Crown 
Representative, while employed in British India, the same powers 
vested in, and the same legal protection enjoyed hy, His Majesty’s 
military and police forces in British India*
The Subversive Activities Ordinance, 1943? (XXXIF of 1943) 
provided that anyone who did any subversive act or printed or 
uttered any document containing subversive matter without lawful 
authority or excuse would be liable to punishment with 
transportation for life or with imprisonment for ten years and fine* 
Subversive act was defined ’’any act which is intended or is 
likely to cause disaffection among, or to prejudice, prevent or 
interfere with the discipline, health or training of, or the 
performance of their duties by, members of His Majesty’s naval, 
military or air forces or to induce or influence any member of 
His Majesty’s naval, military or air forces to fail in the 
performance of his duties as such, or to render any member of 
His Majesty’s naval, military or air forces incapable of 
efficiently performing his duties as such1’* Subversive 
matter meant ’’any matter, whether expressed in words, spoken 
or written or in signs or visible representations or in any 
other manner whatsoever, which is intended or is likely to 
cause disaffection among, or to prejudice, prevent or interfere 
with the discipline, health or training of, or the performance of
their duties by, members of His Majesty’s naval, military or air
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forces f or to indttce or influence any member of His Majesty’s 
naval, military or air forces to fail in the performance of his 
duties as such, or which is an incitement to the commission of a 
subversive act”. Anyone, without lawful authority or excuse, 
found in possession of documents containing subversive matter was 
liable to imprisonment for ten years and fine. Offences under 
Sections 121A (Conspiracy with a view to waging, or attempting 
to wage war or abetting waging of war, against the King), 122 . 
(Collecting men, arms and ammunition or otherwise preparing to wage 
war against the King), 123 (Conceding, with intent to facilitate, 
design to wage war against the King), and 131 (Abetting mutiny or 
attempting to seduce a soldier, sailor or airman from his duty) of 
the Indian Penal Code were declared capital offences by the Ordinance,
The War Injuries Ordinance, 1941? (VII of 1941)? empowered 
the Central Government to make schemes providing for grant of 
relief in respect of personal injuries sustained by gainfully 
occupied persons and other specified persons and in respect of war 
service injuries sustained by civil service volunteers during the 
continuance of hostilities by payments of temporary allowances 
and payments for the purchase of artificial limbs and surgical 
appliances.
The War Risks (Goods) Insurance Ordinance, 1940 (IX of 1940) 
provided for compulsory insurance of goods or agricultural products 
owned by persons carrying on business as sellers of goods in the
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course of such business* The War Hisks (Factories) Ordinance, 1942? 
(XII of 1942) made similar provision for factories in British India*
The Central Government was empowered to put into operation a scheme 
by which it would undertake in relation to factories the liabilities 
of insuring against war risks to the extent set out in the Ordinance* 
The Penalties (Enhancement) Ordinance, 1942, as amended by the 
Penalties (Enhancement) Amendment Ordinance, 1942, and the Penalties 
(Enhancement) Second .Amendment Ordinance, 1942, made offences 
punishable under Sections 326 (Voluntarily causing grievous hurt by 
dangerous weapons or means), 386 (Extortion by putting a person in 
fear of death or grievous hurt) 387 (Putting a person in fear of 
death or of grievous hurt, in order to commit extortion), 392 
(Bobbery), 393 (Attempt to commit robbery), 399 (Making preparation 
to commit dacoity), 435 (Mischief by fire or explosive substance 
with intent to cause damage to the amount of one—hundred rupees,
(5)or upwards or in case of agricultural produce, ten rupees or upwards J 
and 438 (Mischief by fire or explosive substance with intent to destroy 
dwelling house, place of worship or place for the custody of 
property) of the Indian Penal Code punishable with death or with 
whipping in addition to any punishment to which the offender was 
liable under the Code, and offences under Sections 147 (rioting),
148 (rioting armed with deadly weapon), and 186 (obstructing any
(4 ) that is, £7» 10s» —*
(5) that is, 15 shillings*
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public servant in the discharge of his public functions) of the 
Code were made punishable with whipping in addition to any punish­
ment to which the offender was liable under the Code, Offences 
under Sections 376 (rape), 380 (theft in buildings, tent or vessel 
vised either for human dwelling or for the custody of property),
382 (theft after preparation made for causing death, hurt or 
restraint in order to the commitbing of the theft), 394 (voluntarily 
causing hurt in committing robbery) and 395 (dacoity) were declared 
capital offences. Contravention of any of the provisions of Rule 
35 of the Defence of India Rules relating to sabotage and 
receiving sabotaged property was made punishable with death or 
with whipping or with whipping in addition to any punishment to 
which the offender was liable under the rule. Persons committing 
theft from premises damaged by war operations or left vacant for 
fear of enemy attack,it was provided, would be punished with death 
or with rigorous imprisonment for a term extending to ten years 
or with whipping in addition to such rigorous imprisonment,
Though many of the above-mentioned offences were declared capital 
offences, the courts which might have tried them if they were not 
so declared, were made competent to try them, The Provincial 
Governments were empowered to put the provisions of the Ordinance 
into effect throughout the Province or in any specified area.
The Collective Fines Ordinance, 1942 (XX of 1942), enabled 
the Provincial Government to impose a collective fine on the
—224-
inhabitants of any area if it appeared to the Government that 
the inhabitants were concerned in or abetting the commission of 
offences prejudicially affecting the defence of British India or 
the efficient prosecution of war, or were harbouring persons 
concerned in the commission of such offences, or were failing to 
render all the assistance in their power to discover or apprehend 
the offenders or were suppressing material evidence of the commission 
of such offences. The Government might exempt any person or class 
or section of the inhabitants from liability to pay any portion 
of such fine. The District Magistrate was required to apportion 
the fine among the inhabitants according to his judgement of their 
respective means,
( 6)In Emperor v. Ram Ranjan Sur  ^  ^it was held that a District 
Magistrate, when demanding fine from individual persons under the 
Ordinance acted as a court and that his orders were subject to 
revision in the High Court. In sending with the notice demanding 
the fine a threat to issue a warrant of attachment in default of 
payment, he had initiated proceedings for the recovery of the fine 
in a manner not provided for in the Code of Criminal Procedure,
This novel and illegal procedure was a cogent reason for inter­
ference* But when apportioning the collective fine among those 
liable to pay it under Section 3(3) of the Ordinance, the District
(6) Crim, Ref. Hos. 36 to 45 1947 dated 28-3-1947 in the
Calcutta High Court.
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Magistrate was not acting judicially and the order was not subject 
to revision under the Code of Criminal Procedure* Further, when 
the' imposition or collection of a particular fine was impugned by 
the subject the onus was on the Crown to establish and justify 
such imposition and the power and authority to recover such fine* 
The Criminal law Amendment Ordinance, 1943 (XXIX of 1943)* 
with the amendments made to it in the two following years, prov­
ided for the n more speedy trial11 by Special Tribunals of certain 
offences specified in a schedule* They included offences 
punishable under Sections 161 (Public servant taking illegal grat­
ification in respect of an official act) 165 ( Public servant 
obtaining valuable thing',, without consideration, from any person 
concerned in proceeding or business transacted by such public 
servant) of the Penal Code and also offences under Sections 406 
(criminal breach of trust), 408 (criminal breach of trust by clerk 
or servant) 409 (criminal breach of trust by public servant or by 
banker, merchant or agent) 411 (dishonestly receiving stolen 
property) and 4^4 (assisting in concealment of stolen property) 
of the Code where the property in respect of which the offence 
was committed was property entrusted by the Government of the 
United Kingdom or of any of His Majesty’s dominions, or the Central 
or Provincial Government or a local authority or a person acting 
on behalf of any such government o:r authority* The schedule 
also listed offences punishable under Section 417 (cheating) and
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Section 420 (Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property) 
where the person deceived was the Government in the United Kingdom 
or in any of His Majesty’s dominions, or the Central or a Provincial 
Government, or a local authority or a person acting on behalf of 
any such government or authority* Offences punishable under the 
Hoarding and Profiteering Prevention Ordinance, 1943? °r under any 
rule made or deemed to have been made under the Defence of India 
Act, 1939, were also included in the schedule* It was provided 
that any conspiracy to commit or any attempt to commit or any 
gbetment of any of the aforesaid offences was triable by the 
Special Tribunals*
The Ordinance contemplated the constitution of five Special 
Tribunals each consisting of three members* At least one of the 
members should be qualified for appointment as a. Judge of the High 
Court| another could be an officer of His Majesty’s forces 
provided he was also a barrister, or an Advocate of Scotland, of 
five years standing* The third should either be qualified for 
appointment to a. High Court or should have exercised for at least 
three years the powers of a Sessions Judge, Chief Presidency 
Magistrata or District Magistrate*
A Special Tribunal could take cognizance of offences without 
the accused being committed to it for trial and was required to 
follow the procedure prescribed for trials of warrant cases by 
Magistrates* Two members of the Tribunal in the temporary and
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unavoidable absence of the third could proceed with the trial 
provided the third member would be present when the prosecutor 
or the accused was addressing the Tribunal and when the judgement 
was delivered* The provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 
in so far as they were not inconsistent with the Ordinance, would 
generally apply to the proceedings of a Special Tribunal* It 
could pass any sentence authorised by law* Under Section 7 the 
High Court could exercise powers of appeal and revision, as if 
the Special Tribunal were a Court of Sessions trying cases writhout 
jury* Section 8 provided that "Ho Gourt shall have authority 
to transfer any case from a Special Tribunal or to make an order 
under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (V of 
1898), or save as provided in Section 7 have any jurisdiction 
of any kind in respect of any proceedings of a Special Tribunal11* 
Special rules of evidence were also laid down in the Ordinance* 
Section 9 (l) provided that when any person was charged with an 
offence specified in the schedule the fact that the person was 
in possession, for which he could not satisfactorily account, 
of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his 
known sources of income or that the person had, at or about 
the time of the offence, obtained an accretion to his pecuniary 
sources or property for which he could not satisfactorily account, 
might be proved and might be taken into consideration by the 
Special Tribunal as a relevant fact in deciding whether he was
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or was not guilty of the particular offence. Under Section 9(2) 
it was provided that in a trial for an offence punishable under 
Section 161 (Public servant taking illegal gratification in respect 
of an official act) or under Section I65 (Public servant obtaining 
valuable thing, without consideration, from any person concerned 
in any proceeding or business transacted by such public servant) of 
the Indian Penal Code if it was proved that an accused person had 
accepted or obtained or had agreed, to accept or attempted to obtain 
for himself or fox^  any other person, any gratification other than 
legal remuneration or any valuable thing from any person it would be 
presumed, unless the contrary was proved, that he had accepted or 
obtained or agreed to accept or attempted to obtain the gratification 
or valuable thing without consideration or for a consideration which 
he knew to be inadequate, or as a motive or reward for doing or 
forbearing to do any official act or for showing or forbearing to 
show, in the exercise of his official functions, favour or 
disfavour to any person, or for rendering or attempting to render, 
any service or disservice to any person with the Government or 
with any public servant.
A. Special Tribunal was required, notwithstanding anything 
contained in the Indian Penal Code, whether it imposed a sentence 
of imprisonment or not, to impose a fine which should not be less 
than the amount of money In value of the property found to have 
been procured by the offender by means of the offence.
In Shiv Kali Goswami v* Emperor. it was held that the
(7) A.I.E. I944 All. 257.
Criminal Lav/ .Amendment Ordinance, 1943? was intra vires the 
ordinance-making authority of the Government of India including 
the provision conferring* revisional powers on the High Court in 
excess of those conferred by the Letters Patent* The court 
observed that the revisions,! powers were undoubtedly wide, hut 
were discretionary and must he exercised not as a matter of course, 
hut only when it w$s demanded in the interests of public justice#
The Nagpur High Court held that a Special Tribunal was 
competent to try not only the offences mentioned in the Schedule 
to the Ordinance, hut also other offences with which an accused 
could he charged at the same trial under the provisions of the 
Code of Criminal Procedure
In Sn^ror yA ,J».„K..jfeg Plant ^ f a e t u r . ^  0 ^ ) the 
Bombay High Court held that the Governor-General could not constitute 
a tribunal to try any offence committed outside British India and 
that the allotment for trial of a case in respect of such offence 
to the Special Tribunal was therefore ultra vires# The Federal 
Court, confirming the judgement of the Bombay High Court on the 
point held that notification issued under the Ordinance alioting 
trial of offences to the Special Tribunal did not cease to operate 
after the end of the emergency^10)
(8) Sarangpani v# Emperor# A. I.R# 1946 Nagpur 374*
(9) A.l.H# I947 Bombay 361*
(10) J# IC. Gas Plant Manuf acturing Company v. Fmperor. (1947) F.C#R*141*
As communal disturbances and Communist activities were rife 
in the country, the Provincial Governments enacted, when the 
Defence of India Act and Pules expired, security laws lilce
The Assam Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1947 (April 2, 1947)
The Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1947 (March 16, 1947)
The Bombay Public Securities Measures Act., 1947 (March 23? 1947)
and
The United Provinces Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1947
(March 1, 1947)
These statutes included provisions generally adapted from 
the British Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1939? along with 
Regulation 18 B*^*^
In Bengal> "by the Bengal Ordinances Temporary Enactment Act, 
1947 (March 16, 1947) the life of the following Ordinances, namely, 
the Bengal Civic Guards and Collective Pines Continuance Ordinance, 
1947? the Bengal Special Powers Ordinance, 1947? the Dacca Area 
Security Ordinance, 1947? the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment 
Ordinance, 1947? the Bengal Civil Pioneer Porce Ordinance, 1947? 
among others, was extended "by six months with a grant of power to 
the Provincial Government to extend it to a further period of 
six months*
During the war years, that is, between 1939 an& 1945? n0 
less than 255 ordinances were promulgated by the Governor-General
(i d  As they all followed the same pattern, it is only necessary 
to deal with one, like the Bombay Public Security Measures 
Act, 1947? which will be discussed in detail in the next 
chapter*
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while the Acts of the Central Legislature during the same period 
numbered 203 only. It was a period when, to borrow Burke's 
phrase, the medicine of the constitution seemed to become its 
daily diet. But it can be argued that they were years of stress 
and strain and the body politic required large quantities of 
medicine# What is unfortunate is that this habit of drugging 
the body politic continued during subsequent periods of comparitive 
good health. Thus between 1946 and 1949 no less than 130 
ordinances were issued by the Governor-General. If during the 
war years on an average three ordinances a month were issued, 
during the four years after the war 2*7 ordinances a month were 
promulgated, exclusive of the ordinances issued by the Governors 
of Provinces* If the Government has to declare a state of emerg­
ency every tenth day, we probably live in a state of permanent 
emergency even in peace time*
A similar continuance of emergency provisions made during 
the war was effected in the United Kingdom also* Though 84 
including 18B, out of a total of 342 Defence Regulations then in 
force together with a large number of Regulations forming parts 
of Special Codes were revoked the day after the end of hostilities 
in Europe and a further large batch was revoked within five months, 
as it was recognised that certain Regulations could not be 
dispensed with until the reconversion of national economy to peace 
time conditions had made some progress, the Supplies and Services
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(Transitional Powers) Act, 1945* was passed in order to give auth­
ority for these Regulations to remain in force. The Act provided
(12)that certain Defence Regulations v ' might he continued in force 
by Order in Council, if it appeared to His Majesty that they were 
necessary or expedient for the purpose of maintaining, controlling 
and regulating supplies and services so as to facilitate the 
demobilisation and resettlement of persons, and the readjustment 
of industry and commerce to peace time requirements, or to secure 
a sufficiency of essential supplies or their equitable distribution
or to assist the relief of suffering at home or abroad. It did
not authorise the making of any new regulations, except for the 
purpose of price control, but merely authorised the continuance 
in force of some of the existing regulations after the expiration
of the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1939* The Act was to
remain in force for five years, that is, until December 10, 1950, 
with the provision that it might be continued thereafter for a year 
at a time by Order in Council if both Houses of Parliament 
presented an address to His Majesty praying that it should be 
continued. A similar Act called Emergency Laws (Transitional 
Provisions) Act, 1946,was passed with a view to extending until 
December 31* 1947? certain war time Acts and also some of the Defence
(12) Regulations in Part III and IV of the Defence (General)
Regulations, 1939* ^d certain separate codes of regulations 
specified in Schedule I to the Act.
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Regulations which were not covered by the Supplies and Services 
(Transitional Provisions) Act, 1945* This AGt also made permanent 
a few minor amendments to pre-war Acts which had been temporarily 
effected by Defence Regulations# In 1947 another Act called the 
Supplies and Services (Extended Purposes) Act, 1947? was passed 
to authorise Defence Regulations to be used for certain non-wartime 
purposes in addition to those authorised by the Supplies and 
Services (Transitional Powers) Act, 1945* If authorised any 
Defence Regulations already in force under the 1945 Act and any 
orders or other instruments in force thereunder to be applied to 
the following additional purposes, namelyi
(i) for promoting the productivity of industry, commerce 
and agriculture;;
(ii) for fostering and directing exports and reducing imports and
(iii) generally for issuing that the whole resources of the 
community are available for use, and are used, in a 
manner best calculated to serve the interests of the 
community#
These powers were so wide that they seemed to leave no room for any 
judicial control of their application in good faith* It would 
be almost impossible for a court to hold a regulation or order 
made under the Act to be ultra vires on the ground that its 
purpose was not one which would ensure the use of resources in a
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maimer best calculated to serve the interests of the community#
Then this is only one more instance of delegating wide and 
ill-defined legislative powers to the Executive* But what is novel 
and remarkable about the Act is that under it exceptional 
legislative powers, 7/hich had been originally conferred for the 
special and limited purpose of waging war and which had been kept 
alive at the end of the war for the transitional purposes of 
demobilisation and readjustment to peace time conditions, were 
being kept in operation for different purposes apparently quite 
unconnected with the conduct or termination of war*
It would seem that the Executive In India in promulgating, 
numerous ordinances providing for emergency measures after the 
termination of the war were only following in the footsteps of 
the Cabinet in England.
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CHAPTER V
EMERGENCY POWERS IN' THE DOMINION OP INDIA
1* Public Security Measures
The Indian Independence Act, 1947? passed by the United 
Kingdom Parliament received the royal assent on July 18, 1947? and 
by the 15th of the following month, the Indian subcontinent was 
divided into two Dominions, India and Pakistan. The mass 
movements of refugees, the communal disturbances in the wake of 
the partition and the Communist activities in the country necessitated 
special public security measures which the Provincial Governments 
promptly passed. Some of the Provincial Governments which had 
already enacted security laws of a temporary nature during the 
pre-Dominion period kept them alive by means of amending Acts.
These security laws included the following:
Bombay Public Security Measures Act, 1947•
Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1947*
Madras. Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1947*
Madras Suppression of Disturbances Act, 1948.
United Provinces. Communal Disturbances Prevention Act, 1947* 
West Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1947•
Central Provinces and Berar Public Safety Act, 1947*
Central Provinces and Berar Public Safety Act, 1948.
Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949*
Orissa Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1948*
Punjab Public Safety Act, 1947*
West Bengal Security Act, 1948*
Sind Maint©nance of Public Safety Act, 1948*
West Bengal Security Ordinance, 1949*
The Bombay Public Security Measures Act, 1947? which was 
passed as early as March 23, 1947 and kept alive until 1953 may be 
studied as an example of these security laws*
The Bombay Act was amended four times? in 1948? twice, in 
1949 and in 195^* The summary of the statute given below is of the 
law as it was administered in the dominion period, that is, before 
the amendment of 195 *^
The Statute was enacted to ’'consolidate and amend the law 
relating to public safety, maintenance of public order and the 
preservation of peace and tranquillity m  the Province of Bombay*
It was to remain in force for three^ rears. ^
Under Section 2(Al) any Police Officer not below the rank of
a Superintendent of Police in Greater Bombay or the Deputy
Sups rintendent of Police elsewhere, authorised in this behalf, if 
he was satisfied that epiy person was acting or was likely to act in 
a manner prejudicial to the public safety, the maintenance of public 
order or the tranquillity of the Province or any part thereof was 
empowered to arrest without warrant such person and keep him in
custody for fifteen days and report the fact of the arrest to the
Provincial Government.
Section 2(l) provided that the Provincial Government, if it 
was satisfied that any person "was acting, (2) is acting or is likely
J T ) By the amending Act of 195^ ? life was extended to six yeaabi*-
(2) These words were added by an amending Act in 1948.
See infrajHirji Shivram Vyas's case*
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to act" in the same prejudicial manner as in 2(Al), could make an
order directing that he he detained or that he should not he, or
should remain, in such area in the Province as might he specified,
or that he should notify his movements or report himself pe riodically
or do both* The Government could impose on him such restrictions
as might "Se specified in respect of his employment, business or
association or communication with other persons, or in respect of
his activities in relation to the dBsemination of news or
propagation of opinion. It could also prohibit or restrict the
possession or use by him of any specified articles.
Section 3 provided that when an order of detention was made
under Section 2(l) the Provincial Government "may upon application
(3)by the person affected by the order, communicate to him" the 
grounds on which the order had been made, without disclosing facts 
which it considered against the public interest to disclose and such 
particulars as were in its opinion sufficient to enable him to make 
a representation to the Provincial Government against the order and 
afford him the earliest opportunity of making such representation. 
Section 4 empowered the Provincial Government, on receipt of such 
representation, to annul, confirm or modify the order or malce any 
other order $under Section 2(l).
Section 5 provided for the control of essential services by 
enacting that the Provincial Government could by order direct that 
persons engaged in employments considered essential for the purpose
(3) These words were substituted by the amending Act (30 of 1948) 
for "shall, as soon as may be,; communicate to the person 
affected by the order"*
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of public safety, maintenance of public order or for maintaining 
supplies and services essential to the community should not depart 
out of such area, or areas as were specified in the order.
Section 6 empowered the Provincial Government to impose 
collective fines on inhabitants of any area if it was satisfied that 
they were concerned in certain specified activities*
Under Section 9? it was provided that persons contravening 
orders prohibiting the carrying of certain specified weapons of 
offence or corrosive substances or explosives would be punished with 
whipping in addition to any other punishment to which they might: 
be liable*
Section 9A provided for the control of publications for the 
purpose of preventing any activity prejudicial to the public safety, 
the maintenance of public order or the tranquillity of the Province. 
The. Provincial Government could, under the Section, prohibit by 
order the bringing of any book, periodical or document into the 
Province or prohibit the publication of any book, periodical or 
document in the Province* Xt could also require that any matter 
relating to particular subjects should be submitted for scrutiny 
before publication*
Section 9® empowered the Provincial Government to restrict the 
removal of any commodity from the Province*
The Act provided for the constitution of Special Criminal 
Courts* The Provincial Government could appoint as a Special Judge 
for Greater Bombay any person who was a Judge of the High Court and 
for any other area, any person who had been a Sessions Judge for two
years,* A. Special Judge, was required to try "such offences or class
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of offences or such cases or class of cases" as the Provincial 
Government might direct* He could take cognisance of offences 
without the accused being committed to his Court for trial* He was 
required, to record a memorandum only of the substance of the 
evidence given by witnesses* He could pass any sentence auf&ori&ed 
by law* The trial of offences before a. Special Judge, it was 
provided, was not to be by Jury or with the aid of Assessors* Any 
person convicted by a Special Judge could appeal to the High Court 
within fifteen days. The High Court could call for the record of 
the proceedings of any case tried by a Special Judge, and could 
exercise in respact of such case, its powers of revision and 
confirmation. Section 18(3) provided that "no court shall have 
jurisdiction to transfer any case from any Special Judge or to make 
any order under Section 491 of the Code (of Criminal Procedure) in 
respect of any person triable by a Special Judge or, save as herein 
otherwise provided, have jurisdiction of any kind in respect of 
proceedings of any Special Judge".
By Section 21 the Provincial Government was enabled to delegate 
its powers and duties under the Act to any officer or authority 
subordinate to it, not being below the rank of a Deputy' Commissioner 
of Police or a District Magistrate*
Section 22 empowered any police officer to arrest v/ithout 
warrant any person who was reasonably suspe cted of having committed 
an offence punishable under the Act*
Section 24 provided for indemnity for actions done in good
faith under the provisions of the Act*
-240-
By Section 25 the Provincial Government was empowered to make 
rules to carry out the purposes of the Act.
Section 27 empOTrered the. Provincial Government to declare 
unlawful any association which, in the opinion of the Government, 
was organised or equipped for the purpose of enabling the members of 
the association to be employed, or was organised or equipped in such 
manner as to arouse reasonable apprehension that the members might 
be employed, in usurping the functions of His Majesty *s forces or 
any police force, or for the use. or display of physical force in 
furtherance of the common object of the association.
The power of a District Magistrate to make; an order under 
Section 2, when such power was delegated to him under Section 21, 
was limited to his District not only as regards the whereabouts of 
the person against whom the order was made, but also in regard to 
the: place of detention* Thus where the District Magistrate of 
Shalapur passed an order detaining a person in the Yervada Jail in 
the Poona District, the order was held to have been made without 
jurisdiction.^
An order of detention made orally was held good*^^ The 
detention of a person without showing him the order for some days 
was. deprecated# ^
An order of detention for a collateral purpose was held illegal* 
Thus if the purpose of detaining a person was to deprive him of his:
(a) Basham Madar Korbu v* Emperor* A.I.E. 1949 Bom* 37*
(b) Anwari Begum v* Commissioner -of Police* A*I.E. 1949 Dorn*
TcH.26) 82* ~ ~  —
(c) Bashan. Madar Korbu v* Emperor, A.X.H. 1949 Bom* 37*
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rights and safeguards under the Criminal Procedure Code and to
carry on an investigation without the supervision of the Court while
(d)keeping him under detention, then the detention was mala fide*
in a prosecution for contravention of an order made under
Section 2(l), the burden was upon the prosecution to establish that
the detaining authority was satisfied before the order was made,
that the accused was acting in a. prejudicial manner* The detaining
authority must step into the witness box and make the statement on
oath that he was satisfied in order to enable the accused to
challenge that statement in his attempt to prove that the order was
made arbitrarily, capriciously or mala fide* ^
....(5)
In re Moinuddin Abdullamia Koreishi. while observing that 
if the Court was satisfied that the order had' been made bona fide* 
there would ordinarily be every reason to accept a statement of fact 
mentioned in the grounds when it was reinforced by the affidavit of 
the detaining authority, it was held that the Court would be 
entitled to interfere if an essential or significant fact was 
successfully falsified by the petitioner and the Court was inclined 
to consider that the satisfaction of the detaining authority was 
based on a fact found to be untenable, even though the authority 
was genuinely satisfied in terms of Section 2*
(6)Hir.ii Shivram Vyas v* The Commissioner of Police was a. case 
There the Commissioner of Police detained the detener exercising his
TdJ &Tedath BharVtan vVf?ommissi0ncybf Poliee, A*I* R * 19*50"3onu 202* -
(4) Emperor "v*1 Ab dul MajYd, l.L.R. (1949) Bom. 363*
Empe ror v» Bikhu Ramachandra* A. I.R. 1950 Bom. 330.
(5) A. I.R.- 1949 Bom* 86* - - ■
(6) A . I I& 1  (1948) Bom. 417*
special powers under the Public Security Measures Act, after an 
order for bail had been made in favour) of the detenfc*? by the Chief 
Presidency Magistrate* Desai, J*, observed that the Act which 
contained very special and wide powers did not contemplate that, 
there should be prosecution first for the purpose of securing a 
conviction and that after that long drawn out process was. over, the 
Police Commissionex' should have recourse to those special powers 
and direct the accused on those very grounds on which he should in 
the very first instance have been detained* He further observed:
"I do feel and feel strongly, that it is not permissible for the 
Commissioner of Police to lend himself to any course of action which 
suggests that he arrogates to himself the right to review the 
judgement of the Magistrate. He must respectfully abide by it. 
Where then a situation arises which lends itself to the construction 
that the action of the Police Commissioner is an attempt to 
supersede the order of the Magistrate, Courts of justice must be 
vigilant to see that justice is not brought into ridicule and 
rendered impotent and that a tendency towards autocracy does not 
prevail in the minds of the representatives of d e m o c r a c y " T h e  
court held that the words "is acting or is likely to act" in 
Section 2(l) restricted the scope of the Act to the present and 
future actions of the detener* There^upon the subsection was 
amended by inserting the words "was acting" before the words "is 
acting ox' is. likely to act"*
(7) la.. 42 1.
(8) Public Security Meastires (Second Amendment) Acts 1948*
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111 re Krishna.ii Gopal  ^^  Tthere the grounds communicated 
to the detener were that he was an active leader of a subversive 
organisation at Jbnalner, that he had been carrying on subversive 
propaganda among the people to prepare and use illegal and violent 
means and that he was thus acting in a manner prejudicial to the 
public safety and maintenance of public order and tranquillity in 
Amalner town, it was held that the communication purported to give 
grounds and not particulars^ that the grounds conveyed no precise 
information to the detener which would enable him to make, proper 
representation to the District Magistrate and thatthe notice under 
Section 3 was therefore bad*.
In re Panduran^ Gfovind Fha.tak^ ^  the detener was released 
because the place where he had been alleged to have engaged himself 
!fin objectionable and harmful activities” and incited people to 
violence, was mentioned neither in the order nor in the grounds 
communicated nor in the affidavit so that the court held that, in 
the circumstances it could not be said that the District Magistrate 
was satisfied that the detenes? was acting in a manner prejudicial 
to the maintenance of public order at any place within the area with 
referehca to his activities in which a valid order of detention, 
could be. made, against him* Sen, J*, observed that when under a 
statute enacted in peaceful and normal times an executive officer 
of the statue of a District Magistrate had been given the authority 
to interfere with the liberty of a subject, and he had been often
(9) A,I.E. (1948) Bom. 360.
(10) A.I.E. (I949) Bom. 84.
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proved to be careless, arbitrary and mechanical and even to act
mala fide or with an ulterior object in making use of the power of
detention conferred on him, the Court would not be justified in
relying on the principle omnia praesumuntur esse rite acta* "In
such circumstances”, he said, "it becomes our plain duty to
scrutinise the order made and the grounds given therefor with the
utmost care and anxiety and to make every legitimate inference, in.
(ll)favour of the subject.41* *
It was held in re Radadhar Kalu Patil(^) that the grounds 
furnished under Section 3 must be "clear, precise and accurate, 
otherwise they would fail to serve the purpose for which they were 
intended by the legislature* Fhe grounds must be such as to make 
it clear to the person detained what he is charged with and what 
has moved the Government to deprive him of his liberty".
Chagla, Ag* G.J., observed? "We are most, anxious that this 
safeguard afforded to the subject, which seems to be the only 
safeguard under this Act, should be maintained intact and should 
not be in any way whittled down* •. • * .Without encroaching upon the 
right of the Government to decide what particulars to furnish and 
what particulars not to furnish, it is necessary to state that the 
grounds must be given with sufficient particularity for them to serve 
the purpose they were intended to serve. In our opinion grounds 
which are vague and indefinite and which contain no particulars 
whatever are no grounds at all within the meaning of Section 3 of 
•the Acf'd13'
(11) id# page 86#
(12) A*I.E. 1948 Bom* 334-
(13) id* page 335*
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These judicial decisions proved irksome to the Executive 
authorities of the State, and they managed to get the statute 
amended so that the detaining authority, under the amended statute, 
was required to furnish the grounds of detention only "upon 
application11 hy the person affected by the order* The provision in 
the original Act that the authority should inform the detener of his 
right to make a representation was dropped from the statute*
It is noteworthy that instead of refraining from the arbitrary 
actions condemned by the judiciary, the executive hastened to change 
the law so as to restrict interference by the judiciary in similar 
circumstances in future.
This kind of executive action which had the appearance of 
"playing with the courts of law", as Me. Setalvad would put it, 
was repeated in other Provinces also. We shall notice in brief what 
happened in Bihar in regard to its public security measures*
The Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1947 j is of 
interest because of the posthumous vissicitudes which it underwent* 
Though its operation was extended after the expiry of its first 
year's existence by notification by the Governor of Bihar and the 
following year by an amending Act of the Provincial Legislature, 
the Federal Court found that it had ceased to be in existence after 
M%rch 15, 1948*
The Act came into force on March 16, 1947 and by Section 1(3)
(14) M* C# Setalvad, War and Civil, Liber ties, page 69*
Mr. Setalvad, the present Attorney General of India used the 
expression in 1946 in relation to the enactments and
amendments of various security measures in the pre-Dominion 
period*
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its operation was limited to one year from the date of its 
commencement. There was however a proviso to the effect that "the 
Provincial Government may, by notification, on a resolution passed 
by the Bihar Legislative Assembly and agreed to by the Bihar 
Legislative Council, direct that this Act shall remain in force for* 
a. further period of one year with such modifications, if any, as 
may be specified in the notification."
On March 11, 1948 after a resolution of both Houses, the 
Provincial Government issued a notification extending the life of 
the Act for one year from March 16, 1948 to March 15, 1949* By 
the Bihar Act V of 1949 which came into force on March 15, 19499 
were substituted in Section 1(3) of the Act of 1947j f o x  the words 
"for a period of one year from the date of its commencement" the 
words and figure "till the 31st March, 195°*t! As the Bihar Act 
of 1947 could not of its own force come into operation in Chhota. 
Hagpur ■vtfaich had been declared a "partially excluded area"' under 
Section 91 o f the Government of India Act, the Governor of Bihar 
issued a notification on March 16, 1947 directing that the Bibar 
Act should apply to the Chhota Eagpur Division. But when the life 
of the Act of 1947 was extended in 1948, it was not followed by 
fresh notification under Section 92 (l) of the Government of India 
Act, until March 7> 1949 when the Governor issued a validating 
notification that the Act stood extended by one year to Chhota 
Hagpur from March 16, 1948 aftd that it should be deemed that it 
always had application there. On March 12, 1949 & notification was
issued by the Governor directing that the Act of 1949 should apply
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to Chhota Eagpur. The appellants in Jatindra Hath Gupta v. The
(15) ' 'Province of Bihar who had been arrested in Chhota Dagpur on
various dates in December 1948 and January and February 1949? under
the Bihar Act as extended, applied under Section 491? Criminal
Procedure Code for their release on the ground that their arrest
and detention were unauthorised and illegal in as much as Section 1(3)
of the Act was ultra vires the powers of the Bihar Legislature and
as such there was no Act in existence after the expiry of the period
of one year fixed under the Act and even otherwise the Bihar Act
with its extended duration was not effectually brought into
operation in Chhota Uagpur. The Federal Court held that the power
to extend the operation of the Act for a further period of one year
with such modifications^if any, as might be specified was a
legislative power, that the proviso to Section 1(3) of Act V of
1947 which delegated such power to an authority other than the
Provincial Legislature was not conditional legislation but
delegation of legislative power, and that the proviso, and the
notification issued by the Governor of Bihar under the proviso
extending the operation of the Act were consequently ultra vires.
It further held that when the Act of 1949 was enacted, the Act of
1947 which it purported to amend was not in operation and the Act of
1949 was therefore inoperative and that the notification of the
Governor on March 12, 1949 could not improve the position in these
circumstances and the detention of the appellants was consequently
illegal*
(15) 1949 f.c.b. 595.
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Later in the year the Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act 
(ill of 1950) was passed "to provide for preventive detention, 
imposition of collective fines, control of meetings and processions, 
imposition of censorship, requisitioning of property and prevention 
of unlawful drilling and the wearing of unofficial uniforms and 
regulating the conduct of persons in a protected place in connexion 
with the public safety and maintenance of order in the Province of 
Bihar".
This Act too was declared ultra vires, but that was done after 
the new Constitution of India came into force* Meredith, C.J., has 
summed up the circumstances in which the decision was given* The 
detener in Brahmeswar Prarad v* State of Bihar, says the learned
Chief Justice, "was arrested on 3rd March 1949 under Section 151, 
Criminal Procedure Code and lodged in the Bhag’alpur Camp Jail where 
he has been in custody ever since. On 13th March there was a 
detention order under Act V of 1957* That Act having been declared 
ultra vires and having been replaced by an Ordinance, there was a 
fresh detention order under the Ordinance on 6th June. That 
Ordinance in turn was declared ultra vires by this Court, and was 
replaced by Ordinance iV of 1949? under v/hich a fresh order was 
made and served on 5th July* On 6th December the present 
application was preferred. A rule was issued and 16th January was 
fixed for hearing. It eventually came up on 18th January, this 
Court having in the meanwhile held that the provision in the 
Ordinance for reference to an Advisory Council and report by that
(16) A. I.R. 1950 Patna 265.
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Council, were mandatory, and non-compliance would make the 
detention illegal. The Government Advocate, however, stated that 
a. fresh detention order had been passed under subsection (l) (a) of 
Section 2, Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act (Bihar Act III of 
195°) which had x*eplaced the Ordinance on 4th January 195^•••••••
it has been established that in fact a fresh detention ordex* under 
Act IV of 1950 was passed on 15th January and was served on the 16^"* 
By the time the matter once more came up for hearing, the new 
Constitution had come into force and the Court held that the 
detention provision in the Act was completely inconsistent with the
(it)fundamental rights guaranteed under Artical 22(4) and (5) of
the Constitution of India and consequently when the Constitution
came into force on the midnight of January 25, 1950, those
provisions became void* The provisions of the impugned Act relating
(it) Article 22(4)* Ho law providing for preventive detention shall" 
authorise the detention of a person for a longer period than three 
months unless?
(a) an Advisory Board consisting of persons who are, or have been, 
or are qualified to be appointed as, Judges of a High Court has 
reported before the expiration of the said period of three months 
that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for such detention*
Provided that nothing in this sub clause shall authorise the 
detention of any person beyond the maximum period prescribed by any 
law made by Parliament under sub clause (b) of clause (7)5 or
(b) such person is detained in accordance with the provisions of 
any law made by Parliament trader subclauses (a) and fb) of clause (7)
Article 22(5) When any person is detained in patrsuance of au 
order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the. 
authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to 
such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall 
afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation 
against the order.
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to the duration of detention "being inextricably mixed up with the 
provisions of safeguards laid down therein the doctrine of 
severability could not apply and therefore the entire Act became 
void* Referring to the Preventive Retention (Extension of Duration) 
Order, 1950* made by the President under subclauses (a) and (b) of 
clause (7) o f Article 22^ ^  read with Article 373^*^* even 
before he took the oath of office, the court observed that the 
provisions relating to preventive detention in Act III of I95O 
having already become void as soon as the Constitution commenced, 
they could not be revived by any act of the President pin?porting to 
do so under Article 22(7) read with Article 373 of the Constitution^2^  
Fo order or law made under Article 22(7) could operate upon a law
(18) Article 22(7) Parliament may by law prescribe
(a) the circumstances under which, and the class or classes of 
cases in which, a person may be detained for a period longer than 
three months under any law providing for preventive detention 
without obtaining the opinion of an Advisory Board in accordance with 
the provisions of subclause (a) of clause (4)5
(b) the maximum period for which any person may in any class or 
classes of cases be detained under any lav/ providing for preventive 
detention.
(19) Article 373* Until provision is made by Parliament under 
clause (7) of Article 22, or until the expiration of one year from 
the commencement of this Constitution, whichever is earlier, the 
said article shall have effect as if for any reference to Parliament 
in clauses (4 ) and (7 ) thereof there were substituted a reference
to the President and for any reference to any law made by Parliament 
in those classes there were substituted a reference to an order 
made by the President*
(20) Three other High Courts also declared the order ultra*vires* 
Prahlad Jena v* State of Orissa? A. I.E. 195^ Orissa, 157*
Sunil Eumar Bose v» Chief Secretary to the Government of West Bengal, 
A* I.R* I95O Cal * 274| Showkat-un—nissa Begum v. State cf Hyderabad, 
A. I.E. 1950 Hyd* 20. Uagpur High Court in Trimbak Shivarudra v. 
State of M*P«, A.I.E. 195^ ? Hag* 203, held the order valid.
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(2 1 )which, had already become void under Article 13 (l)*
These measures suggest that civil liberties are not better
protected in free India than they were in British India® "The new
abrogation of civil rights"? it was said? "is a measure of the
present Government's exasperation"(22) y^th Communist activities®
"It is aXi^a-tic" wrote P* Menon? the former Secretary ofthe
(23)Ministry of State and Home Affairs? in another context? v 7 "that 
no nation can afford to be generous at the cost of its integrity 
and India has no reason to be afraid of her own shadow* ^  may
be soj but the fact remains that thelk public security measures and 
the Preventive Detention Act, 195^ in which these culminated? 
contained provision* "much lilce some of those acts and ordinances
(25)imposed against the nationalists during the struggle fca? freedom"*
The voice is Jacob's voice* but the hands are the hands of Ssau* (26)
(21) Article 13(l)* All laws in force in the territory of Lidia 
immediately before-the commencement of this Constitution? in so far 
as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Part? (Funda­
mental Eights) shall? to the extent of such inconsistency? be void.
(22) W* Dorman Brown? The United States and India and Palcistan® 
page 205*
^3) Y. P* Menon? The Integration of the Indian States® page 389*
24) In connexion with-the police ^ction in Hyderabad* -
25) W* Dorman Brown? op* cit* page 20^ *
[26) Genesis? XXVTI, 22*
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With the establishment of Pakistan and the exodus of large numbers 
of Muslims from India into Pakistan, the Hyderabad Muslims felt isolated 
and prepared to fight to retain control of a territory in which the 
majority of the population consisted of Hindus* The strongest Muslim 
organisation in the State was the Itteliad - ul - Muslemeen, which was 
dedicated to preserving the power of the ruling class. In 1947 its 
leader, Syed Quasim Razvi, organised a private army whose members were 
called Razakars. As parauiountcy had lapsed with the passing of the 
Indian Independence Act, 1947, the Nizam of Hyderabad, it seemed, wished 
to be an independent monarch and he was encouraged in his intransigeance 
by the Ittehad organisation from within and by Pakistan from outside.
In 1948 the Government of India discovered that Hyderabad had 
transferred £15,000,000 of Government of India Securities to Pakistan 
as a loan. Razvi assured his followers that the Hyderabad flag would 
soon fly from Delhi’s Red Port. The activities of the Razakars compelled 
the Government of India to ask the Nizam to ban the Razakars, a request 
repeated without effect throughout the summer of 1948. The Nizam’s 
government, in the meanwhile, was making attempts to bring in arms and 
ammunition for its troops, for the police and for the Rasakars. With 
a view to stopping this, India tightened up her blockade of the State.
In August the Government of Hyderabad informed the Indian Government 
that it had decided to take the dispute between them to the United Nations. 
On September 7, the Indian Premier announced that India had asked the 
Nizam for the last time to ban the Razakars and repeated a request to
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provide immediate facilities for the return of Indian troops to
Secunderabad from where they had been withdrawn after the Standstill
Agreement with the Nizam. ”A11 Hyderabad’s resources”, the Premier
declared, ”are being mobilised for war and no country in India’s
(l)position can tolerate such preparations*1.
On September 13, the Indian troops entered Hyderabad ”to restore 
peace and tranquillity inside the State and a sense of security in the 
adjoining Indian territory”. This military operation was officially 
called police a c t i o n . i t  was accompanied by a proclamation by 
the Governor-General of a state of grave emergency ’’whereby the security 
of India is threatened by internal disturbance”. On September 14, an 
Ordinance under Section 42 of the Government of India Act, 1935, was 
promulgated to provide for special measures to ensure the public safety 
and interest and prevent any grave menace to the security of India.
Ihe Indian troops met with no serious opposition. By the afternoon 
of September 17, the Nizam capitulated. He was made the Rajpramukh 
(Prince-Governor) of the State.
A Military Governor was appointed by the Government of India to 
administer the country until peace and order were finally restored.
It was decided that the Military Governor should be invested with full 
executive authority with powers to issue regulations having the force of
(2 )lav; *
TTT quoted by Andrew Me 11 or, India Since Partition, page 84 
(la) ’Military intervention1 was always the term used in Army HQ. ”lt was 
called ’Operation Polo1, for it was just a game for the Indian Army. 
Army Headquarters gave it that name”. (P.P. Kanaka, Fabulous Mogul. 
Nizam VI1 of Hyderabad0 page 116 )
(f) V. P. Menon, Ihe Integration of the Indian States« page 330
-254-
To this effect a firman (Ordinance) was issued by the Nizam* A civil
administrator was appointed to assist the Military Governor. The
administration under the Military Governor continued till December 1949
when an administration with a Civil Servant as Chief Minister was
installed. In 1950 four representatives of the Hyderabad State Congress
were taken into the administration as Ministers. This administration
continued till March 1952 when after the general elections a Congress
)
Ministry was formed in the Statef Thus the apparatus of a modern 
and free State was progressively set up, at first under the Military 
Governor and then under a Council of Ministers** • ^  ^
The Public Safety Ordinance, 1948, (XXIV of 1948) promulgated 
during the police action, followed the lines of the Defence of India 
Act, 1939* It extended to all Provinces of India and to every acceding 
State to the extent to which the Dominion legislature had power to make 
laws for that Sbate*
Section 3 (l) empowered the appropriate Governments to make such 
rules as appeared to them to be necessary or expedient for securing the 
public safety, the maintenance of public order, the maintenance of supplies 
and services essential to the life of the community, or for preventing 
any grave menace to the security of India* Subsection (2 ) provided that, 
without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by subsection
(l), rules might be made for thirty five enumerated matters which included 
publication of news and information and preventive detention of persons
"(3 ) ibid, page 382
(4 ) K. M. Munshij The ffnd of an Era* page 255.
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suspected of fthaving acted, acting, being about to act or being likely 
to actn in a prejudicial manner.
Section 4 stated that any rule made under Section 3 or any order 
made under such rule would have effect notwithstanding anything in­
consistent with it in any enactment other than the Essential Siipplies 
(Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, or this Ordinance or in any instrument 
having effect by virtue of any enactment other than the Act mentioned 
or this Ordinance.
Section 6 provided for enhanced penalties for certain specified 
offences. Under subsection 3 of Section 6 it was provided that for the 
purposes of this section any person who a^ttempts to contravene, or 
abets or attempts to abet or does any act preparatory to a contravention 
of, a provision of any law, rule or order, shall be deemed to have 
contravened that provision**.
No order made in exercise of any power conferred by or under the 
Ordinance was to be called in question in any Court. Section 10 gave 
immunity to any person for anything done in good faith or intended to be 
done under the Ordinance.
The Ordinance made provision for compulsory acquisition of immovable 
property in certain circumstances subject to payment of compensation.
The amount of compensation was to be fixed either by agreement or by 
award of an arbitrator. The arbitrator in fixing the amount was required 
to be guided by the provisions of the band Acquisition Act, 1894* This 
was a clear concession made in favour of the subject in deference to the 
decisionsof the High Courts in cases which arose out of Rule 81 of the
-256-
Defence of India Rules.
As the police action was eminently successful and the operation 
virtually ended in about hundred hours - it was referred to as a 
uhundred-hour war,f - the enforcement of the Ordinance was not found 
necessary.
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CHAPTER VI
..EMfiJtGrKNCY POWERS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OP INDIA
it General Features of the Constitution
The Constitution of India may be described as a palimpsest of
the Government of India Act, 1935* Both in language and substance it
derives in great measure from the Act of 1935* The language of the
Act has, in some places, been modified in consequence of the
interpretation put upon it by the courts* The provisions regarding
federalism, relations between the branches of the government, the
Ordinance-malting power of the head of the State, to name a few, are
all derived from the Act- The malting of the Constitution was like
’'writing the final chapter in a work which had occupied many years
(l)and over which much had been thought, said and written*1. The
(2)mark of the skilled hand of Sir Maurice Gwyer, outstreched 
caressingly, seems to spread over the whole Constitution.
The main departures from, the Constitution Act are the Preamble 
which envisages a sovereign democratic republic, the directive principles 
of State policy which, though not judicially enforceable, are intended 
to be guiding lights to the future legislator, and the fundamental rights 
which,in certain instances, are hedged in by justiciable 'reasonable 
restrictions'*
The Constitution contains 395 Articles and nine Schedules and is 
rated as the lengthiest Constitution in the world. This remarkable bulk
(1) A. Gledhill, Constitutional Crisis in Pakistan, page 1*
(2) the draftsman of the 1935 Act*
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too is a legacy of the Government of India Act, for like the Act it 
is not merely a Constitution hut a detailed code dealing with almost 
all major aspects of the constitutional and administrative system of 
the Union* It contains not only the Constitution of the Union hut 
also of the States comprising the Union. Apart from exhaustively 
dealing with the distribution of legislative powers between the Union 
and the States and their financial and administrative relations, it 
also treats of a number of miscellaneous matters such as the Public 
Service Commission, elections, languages, and minorities which 
could have been left to ordinary legislation* One might assume that 
the length and detail of the Constitution would give it unnecessary 
rigidity for changes of many unimportant matters can be effected only 
by amendment of the Constitution* But the process of amendment is not 
excessively difficult, since the Constitution came into force, whileF'
the Congress party has remained paramount, many amendments have been 
made*
The system of government established by the Constitution has been
described as fat most quasi—federal**. a unitary State with subsidiary
federal features rather than a federation with subsidiary unitary
(3)features1.' But it has to be borne in mind that there is no standard 
pattern of federalism to which all federations must conform. Ho two 
federations are alike in all respects and a certain variety can be noticed
(3) K* C* Wheare, India's Hew Constitution Analysed* 43 A.L.J* 21*
in the relationship between the central and regional governments in 
the different federations. The Constitution of India, has affected 
an adjustment in federal-state relations suited to the conditions 
of the country. While the Centre has been made strong, the constituent 
units enjoy in normal times Msubstantial and significant powers of 
legislation and administration11*
(5 )Under the Constitution the Indian Courts, observed Fasl Ali, 3,, 
are not committed to the American notion of separation of powers. In 
the directive principles of State policy, however, it is stated that 
the State shall take steps to separate the judiciary from the executive.^  
The founding fathers envisaged a Cabinet form of government for 
India. If the Snglish constitutional conventions with which India gained 
some familiarity during the British period continue to be followed, the 
Indian experiment in Parliamentary democracy may succeed., though 
wdemocracy in India is only a top-dressing on an Indian soil which is
»(7 )
essentially undemocratic, despite the fact that certain republican 
institutions existed in ancient India*
(i) T*> T. ICrishnamachari, C.A.D. XI, 953
(5 ) In re Delhi Lav/sAct * (l95l) 3*C#R. 747
(d) Article 50
(7) B. R. Ambedkar, C.A.D* Vlll, 38°
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The Constitution provides for three types of emergencies5
(i) an emergency arising from actual or threatened war or
(l)external aggression ot internal disturbance x
(ii) the failure of the constitutional machinery in any of the
(2)component States v '
(iii) any situation endangering the financial stability or credit 
of the Indian Union or of any part of the territory of the 
O»lon <3>
A. £>roclamation of emergency may be issued by the President 
if he is satisfied that there exists a grave menace to the 
security of India or any part of it by war, external aggression 
or internal disturbance*^^ The actual outbreak of war or external 
aggression or internal disturbance is not necessary to justify a 
proclamation of emergency* It is sufficient if the President is 
satisfied that there is imminent danger of such an outbreak*
A. proclamation of emergency must be laid before each House of 
Parliament and will cease to operate at the expiration of two 
months unless it is approved by resolution of both Houses within 
the period* If the House of the People has been dissolved either 
before the proclamation of emergency or within two months after it, 
the proclamation must be approved by the Council of States within 
two months and by the newly elected House within thirty days of
TI5 Article 352
(2) Article 356
(3) Article 360
(4} Article 352
(5) Article 352(3) This provision was introduced to remove the doubts
raised in Emperor v* Benoari Lai, A.I.B. (1943) Calcutta 285*
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its first sitting* A proclamation of emergency may be revoked by a
(6)sub se quent pr oclamati on *
While a proclamation of emergency is in operation, the Government 
of India is virtually transformed into a unitary government* Parliament 
is empowered during the emergency "to make laws for the whole or any 
part of the territory of India with respect to any of the matters in the
(y )State List"• Ihis does not mean that State laws existing at the
date of the Proclamation are repealed pro tanto by repugnant provisions
in Parliamentary laws passed on exclusive State subjects in exercise of
the emergency power nor does it mean that the State legislative power
cannot be exercised, but in case of repugnancy between provisions of
State legislation and provisions of Parliamentary law made in exercise
of the emergency power, the latter will prevail for so long as they
continue to have effect* laws made by Parliament outside its normal
legislative competency by virtue of the emergency provisions will cease
to have effect on the expiry of six months after the proclamation of
emergency has ceased to operate, except as regards things done or omitted
(9)
to be done before the expiry of this period*
Parliament has power to prolong its own life by law during the 
period of emergency by a year at a time* Such an extension cannot last 
beyond six months after the proclamation of emergency has ceased to 
operate*
While a proclamation of emergency is in force, the Union Government; 
may issue directions to the Government of any State as to the manner in
(V) Article 352 (2) ~~
(7) Article 25°
(8) Article 251 . x
(9) Article 250 (2)
(10) Article 83 (2)
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(ll)which its executive power is to he exercised* Parliament may
confer powers and Impose duties upon the Union Government or officers
or authorities subordinate to it even in respect of matters which do not
(l2)fall within the Parliament's normal legislative powers. The
President may, by order, suspend wholly or in part the provisions of the
Constitution under which the States are entitled to the proceeds of
certain taxes and a share in others levied by the Union, until the end
of the financial year in which the proclamation of emergency ceases to
operate. The order must be laid before each Housg of Parliament "as soon
(13)as may be after it is made".
While a proclamation of emergency is in operation there is an
automatic suspension, under the Constitution, of the seven freedoms,
freedom of speech, of assembly, of association, of movement, of residence,
freedom to deal with property and freedom to follow an avocation,
guaranteed under Article 19 and all legislative authorities of the State
will have the power to make any law curtailing those freedoms to any 
CX3& )extent. But any laws so made shall to the extent of the incompetency,
cease to have effect as soon as the proclamation ceases to operate, except
as respects things done or omitted to be done before the law so ceases to 
(14)have effect•
During the continuation of a proclamation of emergency the President 
may, by order, suspend over the entire Union or in any part of it for the
(11) Article 353
(12) ibid*
(13) Article 354 
(l3a) Article 358
(14) ibid,
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period of the emergency or for any shorter period as may be specified, 
the right of the citizen to move the courts for the enforcement of such 
of the rights conferred by Part 111 (Fundamental Rights) of the Constitut­
ion, including proceedings pending in any Court for the enforcement of 
such rights. Every such order must be laid before each House of
' 0$ (15^
Parliament as soon as may be' ' after it is made.
The words fIf the President is satisfied1 in Articles 352, 356 and 
36O make it clear that the President, on the advice of the Council of 
Ministers, alone need be satisfied as to the existence of an emergency 
and that the courts will have no power to question the validity of a 
proclamation made by the ’President on the ground that it is not justified 
by the existence of any of the facts mentioned as constituting an emergency.
These words were used to remove the doubts raised in regard to the
expression *in cases of emergency1 (The Governor-General may, in cases of 
emergency, make and promulgate an Ordinance) in Section 72 of the Govern­
ment of India Act, 1919, kept alive by the ninth schedule of the Constitution 
(l6)Act of 1935. It nay be recollected that the expression *in cases of
emergency1 was interpreted to mean that "the question whether an emergency
existed at the time when an ordinance is made and promulgated is a matter
(l7 )of which the Governor-General is the sole judge".
(is)
In Articles 123 and 213 which deal with the ordinance-making
(1$ that is, "as early as is reasonable in the circumstances of the 
particular case". Taraoada v. West Bengal. 1951 S.C.J. 233- 
(l5^ Article 359
(lb) Bhagat Singh v. The King Emperor (l93l) A.C. 169
The King ISnperor v . Benoari &al (1945) A.$. 14*
(17) The Emperor v. Benoari Lai (1945) A*C* 14,22..
(18) infra.
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powers of the President and the Governors respectively, the words, *if
satisfied1 are used, with a view to barring the jurisdiction of the courts
in regard to the satisfaction of the head of the state which necessitates
his promulgating an ordinance*
It would appear that the President can make a further proclamation
of emergency at or before the expiry of two months from the date of the
(l9) (20)first proclamation* In re Anukul Chandra it was held that an
Ordinance promulgated under Section 72 of the Government of India Act 
could be repeated* Mukherji, J., observed * ,!fhe same conditions which 
may at one time create an emergency, may, whether they continue or 
disappear, well be regarded as again creating an emergency* Whether at 
any particular moment there is a state of emergency or not is a matter
(a)entirely for the Governor-General to judge5 see Bhaaat Singh v. Emperor*
And there is nothing in Section 72,Government of India Act, which may be
construed as indicating that an Ordinance, which, under it, is to remain
(21)in force for six months, cannot be repeated11* 2?he same argument, it
is submitted, holds good in relation to the repetition of a proclamation of 
emergency under the present Constitution*
The second type of emergency arises from the fact that it is the 
duty of the Union Government not only to protect every donstituent State
(19) 0?he Ceylon Public Security Ordinance, 1947, makes express provision 
for such a further proclamation*
(20) A*I*R* 1933 Cal* 278,
( a) A.I.R. 1931 P.C.lll
(21) ^n re Anukul Chandra, A.I*R. 1933 Cal. 278, 279*
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from external aggression or internal disturbance but also to ensure 
that the government of every state is carried on in accordance with
(2 2)
the provisions of the Constitution. If the President is satisfied
on the report of the Governor or otherwise that the Government of a State
cannot be carried on in accordance with the terms of the Constitution,
he may by proclamation assume to himself all or any of the executive
functions of the State and declare the powers of the State legislature
(23)exercisable by or under the authority of the Parliament* He may
also make any necessary or desirable incidental and consequential changes 
in the provisions of the Constitution relating to any State authority to 
facilitate giving effect to the objects of the proclamation. But the 
President may not assume any of the functions of the High Courts or 
suspend the operation of any provision of the Constitution relating to 
them.
luring such an emergency due to the failure of Constitutional
machinery in a State, the Parliament may confer on the President the
powers exercisable by the State legislature and also authorise him to
(25)delegate such powers to subordinate authorities. (The President,
the Parliament or other authorities vested with power to make laws for 
the State during an emergency may confer powers and impose duties on the 
Union, its officers and authorities* If the House of the People is
(22) Article 355,
(23) Article 356(l)
(24) ibid
25) Article 357(l)
26) ibid
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not in session, the President may authorise expenditure from the
(2 7)Consolidated fund of the State pending parliamentary sanction*
Laws made by the Parliament, the President and other authorities which 
fall within the sphere of legislative powers of the States will cease 
to have effect, to the extent of their incompetency, a year after thelar 
proclamation under Article 356 has ceased to operate unless they have 
heen repealed earlier or re-enacted by the State Legislature*
A proclamation of emergency under Article 356 has to be laid before 
each House of Parliament and will cease to operate at the expiry of two 
months unless it is approved by resolutions by both Houses within the 
period* If the House of the People has been dissolved in the meanwhile 
the proclamation should be approved by the Council of States within two
months and by the newly elected House within thirty days of its first
<2*0
meeting. If approved by Parliament it remains in force for six months
and may be extended by Parliament for six months at a time by resolution
up to a maximum period of three years* The proclamation may be revoked
(30)
or varied by a subsequent proclamation*
The Union Government is empowered under Article 257 to give directions 
to a State as to the exercise of its executive power so as to prevent 
interference with the exercise of the Union executive power. The Union 
may also give directions regarding the Construction and maintenance of 
communications of national and military importance and regarding protection 
of railways. While a proclamation of emergency is in force, the Union
(27) ibid
(28) Article 357(2)
(29) Article 356(3)
(30) Article 356(4)
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Government 1s power to give directions under Article 353, is unlimited, 
and during the continuance of a proclamation of financial emergency,
Union government*s directions to the State may cover every aspect of
(31)the State*s financial business. Failure to give effect to any
direction of the kind indicated empowers the President under Article 
365 to suspend the State Constitution, fhe State has no right of 
recourse to any other authority, if it is not satisfied regarding the 
wisdom or expediency of an order issued by the Union and while it would 
not be true to say that the power has been abused, the possibility of 
abuse is palpable* If the validity of the direction is challenged in 
the Supreme Court, it would presumably hold that it could only consider 
the legality of such a direction and has no jurisdiction to question 
the expediency of the measure proposed by the Union* It is not for the 
Court, it would probably point out, to substitute its discretion for 
the' discretion of the Union executive* A state which continues to be 
recalcitrant may jeopardise its own existence, for disciplinary action 
taken against it can go to the extent of its extinction by an Act of 
Parliament under Article 3*
The power under Article 336 may also be exercised where there is
£
an abuse of the constitutional powers by a State government as, for 
instance, gross misgovernment, as distinguished from:* and more serious 
than, maladministration. States, it may be said, ffretain their autonomy
(3 2)during good behaviour1*.
(31) Article 36^
(32) A. Gledhill, The Republic of India, page 83*
The power under this Article was exercised when there was a
political breakdown in the sense that there was, in the opinion of the
Governor, a want of stable majority for a party or a coalition to
form a ministry. In such a situation the President’s rule under the
Article was set up. The first instance of such an application of the
Article was in the Pan jab in June 1951 when after the resignation of
Dr. Gopichand Bhargava's ministry, no alternative ministry could be
C33 ^formed. The President’s Order recited that he, having received
a report from the Governor of the State and having been satisfied that 
a situation had arisen in which the Government of the State could not 
be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution,
&e assumed to himself all functions of the Government of the State.
He declared that the powers of the legislature of the State would be 
exercisable by or under the authority of the Parliament. Under the 
power to make incidental and consequential provisions, he declared that 
it would be lawful for him to act to such extent as he thought fit 
through the Governor of the State; he suspended the operation of certain 
provisions of the Constitution in relation to the State such as the 
provisions regarding the laying of the reports of the Comptroller and 
Auditor-General of the State before the Legislature of the State by the 
Governor; stated that it was unnecessary to hold an election for the 
purpose of filling any casual vacancy in the Legislative Assembly of the 
State, and declared that any reference in the Constitution to the 
Governor in relation to the State of the Panjab should be construed as a
(33) S.H.O. 925, Gazette of India Extraordinary dated 20*6.51*
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reference to the President, that any reference to the Legislature in 
so far as it relates to its functions and powers should he construed 
as a reference to Parliament and that any reference to Acts or laws 
of the Legislature of the State should he construed as including a 
reference to Acts or laws made, in exercise of the power* of the 
Legislature of the State, by Parliament, or the President or other 
authority by virtue of the proclamation of emergency under Article 356.
(3 4)A second Order issued on the same day as the first provided 
that all the functions of the Government of the State of the Pan jab 
and all the powers vested in or exercisable by the Governor of that 
State under the Constitution or under any law in force in that State 
would be exercised by the Governor of the State, subject to the 
superintendence, direction and control of the President.
The next instance of a proclamation under Article 356 was in 
relation to PEPSU (Patiala and East Panjab States Union), in March 1953. 
PEPSU was a Part B State with a Rajpramu&h at its head before the 
reorganisation of the constituent States of the Union was effected by 
the Seventh Amendment of the Constitution in 1956. When the Congress 
Ministry lost its majority in the State Legislature in 1952 it was 
replaced by a coalition government. This coalition of opposition parties 
with the Akalis themselves divided into left and right wing groups, failed 
to maintain law and order. The government was, therefore, dissolved and 
a proclamation of emergency wee made. During the period of emergency,
(34) S.R.O. 926, Gazette of India Extraordinary dated 20.6.1951.
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the Rajpramukh who represented the President and carried on the 
powers and functions of the latter under the provisions of the 
Constitution, was assisted by an Adviser appointed by the President.
When general elections were held and the Congress came back to power, 
the proclamation was withdrawn and normal Cabinet government was set 
up*
A third instance occurred in the Andhra State in November 1954*
The Frakasam Ministry composed of the Congress party and a number of 
independents decided to implement the recommendations of the Ramamurthy 
Committee which favoured the issue of liquor permits without insisting 
on medical certificates* The Ministry was defeated on this question by 
a strange coalition consisting of forty Communists, eight members of the 
Krishikar Lok party, seven Praja Socialists, two dissident Congress men 
and ten independents who combined together, as would appear, to defend 
prohibition in the State* When the Ministry resigned, the Leader of the 
opposition approached the Governor seeking a mandate to form a new Ministry* 
As the Praja Socialists were unlikely to co-operate with the Communist 
Party and as new elections were expected to be held soon, the Governor 
asked the Frakasam Ministry to carry on as a care-taker government until 
the end of the elections* When the Ministry refused, the President >on the< 
report of the Governor, took over the administration by a proclamation of 
emergency* When the proclamation was approved by the House of the People 
by resolution it was declared that the action of the President was the 
drily proper Constitutional remedy for the crisis that arose on the 
resignation of the Frakasam Ministry*
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The proclamation in this case was criticised on the ground that
according to British Parliamentary conventions, it was the duty of the
Governor to have permitted the leader of the opposition to form a
Government and that a proclamation of emergency would have been
justified only if the formation of an alternative government was
impossible* The Central Government, however, defended the Presidential
action on the grounds that (i) there was no party in the State which
could claim majority (ii) no coalition between the Communist Party and
the Praja Socialist Party could be expected to form a stable government
as there was nothing common in the ideologies of the two parties and the
party alignment of the members in the Legislature was in a state of
constant flux and (iii) general elections were expected to take place
within three months and it was beneficial for all parties to have an
(35 )impartial administration during the period of the elections-
The latest instance took place in Travancare- Cochin, a Part B 
State, which by the Seventh Amendment was merged in the present Kerala 
State* In 1953 when the Congress governing nt of the State lost the 
confidence of the local Assembly, the President’s rule was not introduced, 
for the Congress Ministry decided to appeal to the electorate, staying on 
as a caretaker government till the elections were over- After the elections 
it had to resign in favour of thf& ©r^fa Socialist Party who formed" & 
government* In 1956 the new Ministry lost the support of the Assembly 
and resigned* The United Front of Leftists depending on the support of a
(3 5) Rajya SabhfiL Debates of November 29th, 1954*
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few Independents offered to form a Ministry* But, in the opinion of
the Rajpramukh, they were not in a position to form a stable Ministry.
Hence on the report of the Rajpramukh, the President proclaimed a state
of emergency under Article 356 and assumed to himself the government of
the State* An Adviser was appointed to assist the Rajpramukh who acted
as the Presidents representative during the emergency.
fhe President may make a proclamation of financial emergency if he
is 11 satisfied that a situation has arisen whereby the financial stability
or credit of India or of any part of the territory thereof is threatened*11^ ^
fhis proclamation like the others must be laid before each House of
Parliament and unless approved by resolutions by both Houses, it will cease
to operate at the expiry of two months. If the House of the People is
dissolved, it must be approved by the Council of States within the two months
and by the new House of the People within a month from the date of its
first meeting. She proclamation can be revoked by a Subsequent proclamatllS?
While a proclamation of financial emergency is in operation the
Union Executive &ay‘issue directions to any State to observe such canons of
financial propriety as may be specified in the directions and others which
(38)the President considers necessary for the purpose. Such directions
may require a State to reduce the salaries and allowances of all classes of 
public servants and to reserve all Money Bills for the consideration of the 
President after their passage in the Legislature of the State. Purther it 
will be competent for the President to give directions to reduce the
(36) Article 360 ~.........
(57) Article 560(2)
(58) Article 560(3)
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salaries and allowances of all classes of Union public servants, 
including the Judges of the Supreme Court and the High Courts, notwith­
standing the fact that the allowances of these judges are protected by
(39)the Constitution.
Apart from these provisions which are set out in Part XV111
(Emergency Provisions) of the Constitution, there is provision for the
promulgation of Ordinances by the President and the Governors of the
constituent States when the appropriate Legislature is not in session
and immediate action is deemed necessary. This ordaining power, as
Madame Sieghart would call it, may be considered an emergency
(4l)power, though a learned commentator has expressed the opinion that
the expression ’immediate action1 has no necessary connexion with any
emergency, The existence of an emergency'does not emerge clearly from
the circumstances surrounding every exercise of this power. Por example,
it would be difficult to point to one when provision was made for the use
of seals of common form and design by the High Courts in the States by an
(42)Ordinance promulgated by the President. There have been instances of
(39) Article 360(4 )
(4 0) M.A. Sieghart, Government by Decree, page 232
(4 1) D*D. Basu, Commentary on the Constitution of India. Vol.l* page 715
(4 2) The Hi$i Courts Seals Ordinance, 1950, requiring all High Courts to 
use a seal bearing a device or impressi.on of the As oka Capital within 
an exergue or label surrounding the same, with the following inscript­
ion ’The Seal of the IiL#i Court at (or of) followed by the name
of the State or seat, of the High Court and Satyameva Javate in 
Devanagari script*. In the Dominion period, a Central Nursing Council 
was constituted by an Ordinance. (Central Nursing Council Ordinance^, 
No. 13 of 194$).
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an ordinance being promulgated after the introduction in Parliament of 
a Bill in the same terms, for example the Sugar Crisis Inquiring 
Authority Ordinance, 195^ (25 of 1950) and the Administration of 
Evacuee Property Act (Amendment) Ordinance, 1950(27 of 1950).
In these cases the necessity for immediate action, if not an 
emergency, is obvious.
An Ordinance promulgated by the President has the same force and
effect as an Act of Parliament, but it must be laid before both Houses
of Parliament and it ceases to operate at the end of six. weeks from the
re-assembly of the Parliament unless resolutions disapproving it are
passed by. both Houses before the expiry of that period. If can be
withdrawn by the President at any time. When the Houses of Parliament
are summoned to reassemble on different -dates, the period of six weeks is
to be reckoned from the later of those dates. Any such Ordinance to the
extent to which it makes any provision which would be beyond the competance
(43) *of the Parliament to enact would be void* A President’s Ordinance must 
be restricted to the same subject matter as is within the legislative 
power of Parliament, as laid down in Articles 245 - 255 and the Legislative 
lists, and must comply with constitutional conditions for the exercise of 
that power, such as conformity to the fundamental rights but when owing 
to recourse to the emergency provisions, Parliament’s powers have been 
extended or trammels removed, the or di nance-making power of the President 
is correspondingly enhanced. This ordaining power of the President is an
(43) Article 123•
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extraordinary power, but it is expected to be exercised by him on the 
advice of the Ministry which is responsible to Parliament*
A similar power is given to the Governor of a State* If at any 
time except when the legislative A s s e m b l y  is in session or where there 
is a Legislative Council, except when both Houses of the Legislature 
are in session, the Governor is satisfied that circumstances exist which 
render it necessary for him to take immediate action, he may promulgate 
such Ordinances as circumstances appear to,him to require* But the 
Governor shall not, without instructions from the ^resident, promulgate 
any such Ordinance if (a) a Bill containing the same provisions would 
under the Constitution have required the previous sanction of the President 
for its introduction in the legislature, as for instance, a Bill imposing 
restrictions on freedom of trade within a State or an amendment providing 
for the imposition of such a restriction, or (b) he would have deemed it 
necessary to reserve a Bill containing the same provisions for the 
consideration of the President, as in the case of a Bill imposing a tax on 
water or electricity under the control of an authority like the Damodar 
Valley Corporation for developing an inter-State river or river valley, or 
a Bill which in the opinion of the Governor would'be repugnant to any 
provision of the Constitution or the constitutionality of which is doubtful 
or which would affect the powers of the Union, or would seriously conflict 
with Union policy or of the interests of the people of India as a whole, 
or (c) an Act of the State Legislature containing the same provisions 
would have been invalid unless, having been reserved for the consideration 
of the President, it had received the assent of the President, as for 
instance, a Bill which, in the opinion of the Governor, would so derogate
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from the powers of the High Cpurt as to endanger its position it is
(44)designed to fill under the Constitution* Such an Ordinance has
the same force and effect as an Act of the State Legislature* It must 
be laid before the Legislative Assembly of the State or where there is 
a Legislative Council, before both the Houses, and it oeases to operate 
at the end of six weeks from the reassembly of the Legislature unless a 
resolution disapproving it is passed by the House or both Houses before 
the expiry of that period* It may be withdrawn at any time by the 
Governor* Where the Houses of the State Legislature are summoned to 
reassemble on different dates, the period of six weeks is to be reckoned 
from the later of those dates* Any such Ordinance to the extent to which 
it makes any provision which would be beyond the competence of the State 
Legislature to enact is void* An Ordinance promulgated by the Governor 
in pursuance of instructions from the President with respect to a matter 
in the Concurrent List, if it is repugnant to an Act of Parliament or an 
existing law with respect to such matter, shall be deemed to be an Act of 
the State Legislature which has been reserved for the consideration of the 
President and assented to by him*^^ While under Article 254(2 ) assent 
of the President is required after the Act is passed, this provision 
validates an Ordinance if it has been made by the Governor in pursuance 
of instructions received from the President* A Governor*s Ordinance in 
respect of a matter in the concurrent field made without such instructions 
will be void; to- the; extent:of .the .re.pugnaiicy^ Lf there is an existing
(4 4) Article 200. 2nd proviso*
(4 5) Article 215(3 ) proviso*
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law or Act of Parliament to which any provision of the Ordinance is 
(46 )repugnant* In the absence of such law or Act of Parliament, the
Ordinance would be valid without previous instructions from the President* 
When an Ordinance is promulgated in pursuance of such instructions, 
further reservation of the Ordinance under Article 254(2) would not be 
necessary*
An Ordinance promulgated by the President under Article 125 or
by a Governor under Article 213 will be void, if it is promulgated before
(47)the order proroguing;: the relevant legislature is made and notified.
As in a bicameral legislature, neither house sitting alone is competent to 
legislate, the ordinance-making power of the Head of the State may be 
exercised as soon as either House is prorogued*
fhe Head of the State is not bound to give reasons for promulgating
(4 8)an Ordinance? nor need they be proved affirmatively in a Court of law.
He is the sole judge of the existence of circumstances which calls for
(49)the exercise of the ordinance-making power* fhe existence of such 
necessity is not a justiciable issue which the Courts of law could
(50)determine by applying an objective test. For the expression *if
satisfied* in the Articles clearly indicates that the satisfaction referred 
to is that of the Head of the State* Even when he states the reasons 
which satisfied him in regard to the necessity of immediate action, the
(46) Bhutnath v. Province of Bihar D*L*R* (1949) Patna 201
(47/ Bidva v. Province of Bihar A.1*R* 1950 Pat. 18
(4 8) Lakshminaravam v» Province of Bihar (1950) S*C.J. 32
(49) Ibid
(50) Ibid
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Courts cannot question the hona fide of his action# In Jnan Prosanna v.
(51)Province of West Bengal, the West Bengal Security Act (Amendment) 
Ordinance, 1946 (Vlll of 1948) promulgated by the Governor of West 
Bengal in order to prevent the High Court from pronouncing a decision
(•52 )
which would be unwelcome to the Provincial Government was held to
be valid by the Pell Bench of the Calcutta High Court on the ground
that the Court was not competent to inquire into the circumstances
justifying the promulgation of the Ordinance# Ihough this was an
Ordinance made tinder the power in Section 88 of the Government of India
Act, 1935, the language is the same as that in Articles 123 and 213 of
the Constitution and the ratio set out above applies to Ordinances mad§
under the Constitution*
Ihe conduct of the President or a Governor in proroguing the
legislature for the express purpose of exercising the ordinance-making
power cannot be impugned as illegal, fraudulent or mala fide ^
As the ordaining power is thus legally unfettered, Parliament has
endeavoured to ensure that the power is not abused by the Executive* $0
prevent resort to the ordaining power when the introduction of a Bill in
Parliament might meet with oppositiony Rule 89 of the Rules of the 
(51T  A.I.R. 1949 cal. 1.
(52) She Ordinance purported to take away the jurisdiction of the Court
to consider the validity of orders previously made upon the ground 
that there existed no reasonable grounds upon which such orders 
could be founded, by deleting the words *on reasonable grounds1 
from Section 16 of the Security Act (nIhe Provincial Government if 
satisfied on reasonable grounds11) and by giving retrospective 
operation to this amendment*
(53) Ih re Veerabhadra, A.I.R* 195^, Mad. 243*
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House of the People now provides (1) that whenever a Bill seeking to 
replace an Ordinance with or without modification is introduced in the 
House, there shall he placed before the House along with the Bill a 
statement explaining the circumstances which necessitated immediate 
legislation by Ordinance and (2) that whenever an Ordinance, which 
embodies wholly or partly or with modifications the provisions of a 
Bill pending before a House, is promulgated a statement explaining 
the circumstances which necessitated immediate legislation by Ordinance 
shall be laid on the table at the commencement of the session 
following the promulgation of the Ordinance.
But it is doubtful whether Rule 89 has been effective in 
achieving the object with which it was made. Por instance* the Benares 
Hindu University (Amendment) Ordinance, 1958, (IV of 1958) amending 
certain provisions of the University Act in relation to details of 
administration could have been postponed till the Parliament was able 
to debate its provisions and pass an Act in the ordinary way. When 
once the whole necessary administrative machinery had been set up and 
decisions had been taken in accordance with the Ordinance, Parliament 
was presented with a fait accompli which it felt unwise or inexpedient 
to undo, whereas, had the provisions of the Ordinance been first 
presented to Parliament in the form of a Bill, it is highly probable 
that, in the course of the debate, some changes in the provisions 
would have beem made. When a Bill is introduced to replace an 
Ordinance, it is difficult for the members of the majority party to 
suggest modifications which would substantially affect the arrangements 
already made and normally if such modifications are suggested by the
Opposition, they will be defeated.
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No fixed period has been laid down for the duration of an Ordinance*
As mentioned above, in the case of an Ordinance made by the President it
may last until six weeks after the re-assembly of the Parliament or if
the two Houses re-assemble on different dates, six weeks from the later
date* Though Parliament is summoned and prorogued from time to time by
the President, not more than six months must intervene between its last
(54a)sitting, in one session and its first sitting in the next; there
must be a budget session in each year* Similar provisions regarding
the State Legislature prevents Governor^ Ordinances having unlimited
 ^ *• (54b)duration.
The ordaining power is one that can be easily abused* If a 
Cabinet, doubtful of its hold over the Legislature advises the President 
to resort to this power and if he accedes, the Legislature may be 
prorogued for a period of about six months, the maximum period of recess 
under Article 85 (l) and government by decree may be carried on during 
the period* As has been already pointed out, in certain cases, it would 
be impracticable for the Legislature to reverse the action taken under 
an Ordinance, even if the Legislature disapproves of it* Por instance, 
Allianz t»nd Stuttgarter Life Insurance (Transfer) Ordinance, 1950 
(XXIV of 1950), provided for the transfer of the business of the Company 
to the United India Idfe Insurance Company* When once the transfer has 
been effected and the former Company wound up, it would be difficult for 
the Parliament, say, after about six months, to reverse the action taken,
(54a) Article 85 
(54b) Article 174
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even if it disapproved of the Ordinance*
The power of the President to legislate by Ordinance during a
recess of Parliament is co-extensive with the power of the Parliament
itself* He may enact hy Ordinance what Parliament might have enacted,
hut he cannot enact what Parliament could not; for instance, a law
violating the Fundamental Rights* Mutatis mutandis* the same is true of
Governor's Ordinances. As the President cannot enact what Parliament
could not, he cannot possibly make a provision in his Ordinance that the
validity of its provisions shall not be open to challenge in a Court of
law on the ground of their being ultra vires his legislative powers.
Since a legislature can amend or repeal its own laws, the President
or Governor may, by Ordinance, amend or repeal laws passed by the
appropriate Legislature, subject to the provisions as to the duration of
(55)
the Ordinance mentioned above* As a law passed by a Legislature can
be retrospective in operation, an Ordinance too can be made retrospective
etroi
(57)
in effect. An Ordinance can even be given r spective operation
from a date when the Legislature was in session*
Further, though the duration of an Ordinance is limited, there is 
nothing to prevent an Ordinance from defining a new criminal offence and 
providing a punishment for its commission, or extending indemnity to 
specified acts. In such cases the sentences imposed and the indemnity 
given will continue in effect after the expiry of the Ordinance, for, as
(5 5) Burner or v. Benoari Lai. (l945) F*L.J.I.
(5 6) United Provinces v. AntrUpua■> (1942) F.C.R.110.
(5 7) Jhian PrasanngL v* State of Bengal. A*I*R* 1949 Oal*l.
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with other legislation, the expiry of an Ordinance does not affect
rights accrued or liabilities incurred while it was in force*
An Ordinance may he withdrawn by an order of the President or the
Governor who promulgated it* It is not necessary to enact a repealing
Ordinance; but he may, if he so chooses repeal or amend one Ordinance
(59)by another* But he cannot extend the life of one Ordinance by
(60)another Ordinance- This situation will, however, rarely arise,
because an Ordinance will only remain in operation until the expiry of 
six weeks after the re-assembly of the Legislature, if it has not already 
been disapproved by resolutions of the Legislature* When once it is 
disapproved it cannot, of course, be extended for two reasons* In the 
first place, as the Ordinance is already dead, there is nothing in 
existence susceptible of being continued* In the second place, neither 
the President, nor the Governor can exercise the drdinance-making power 
during a session of the Legislature. It would, however, seem that there 
is nothing, except the possibility of the Cabinetfs losing the confidence 
of the Legislature, to prevent the President or Governor from making, 
on ministerial advice, during the next recess of the Legislature an 
Ordinance containing the same or substantially the same provisions as 
the one that has been disapproved. The possibility of losing the 
confidence of the House may be regarded as remote, if the question 
involved in the Ordinance does not involve some essential principle or is
(58) Tabarak v* Province of Bihar- B.L.R* 1950 Patna 66
(59) id.
(60) id.
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not of fundamental Importance in as much as, in all other circumstances, 
members are unlikely to indulge in such persistent opposition, as will 
result, in the dissolution of the chamber, . and the trouble and expense 
of a premature election* Moreover, in most cases, the Ministry would 
be in sl position to show that the circumstances which originally called
(gl ^
for immediate legislation had recurred*
Another emergency power is the common law power of administering
martial law which, thou^i not expressly stated in the Constitution, is
implied in Article 54 read with Artcle 572(l)* Article 54 states that,
notwithstanding the provisions guaranteeing fundamental rights and the
right to move the Supreme Court for their enforcement, Parliament may
by law indemnify any public servant or any other person in respect of
any act done by him in connexion with the maintenance or restoration of
order in any area within the territory of India where martial law was in
force and validate any sentence passed, punishment inflicted or forfeiture
ordered, or other act done under martial law in such area. Article 372(l)
provides that all the law in force in the territory of India immediately
before the commencement of the Constitution and not repugnant to it shall
continue in force. Bengal Regulation X of 1804 which has been already 
(62)referred to, was part of the law of the.land when the Constitution 
came into force* Further, the common law power of proclaiming martial 
law as part of the law of India has been recognised by Indian Courts.
(61) Cf. In re Anukul Chandra, op. cit*
(62) Supra. Chapter XX
(63) Ohannatroa v. Emp. A.I.E. (l93l) Bom.57 • Supra. Chap-fcer XIX.
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fI(awf in Article 372(l) presumably includes unwritten law*
«l/V*
The Constitution does not specify by whom and what circumstances 
martial law may be proclaimed* It may be presumed that it will be 
proclaimed by the executive without reference to the legislature, for, 
as Cromwell is reported to have said, **If nothing should be done but 
what is according to law, the throat of the Nation might be cut while
(64)
we send for someone to make a law,T. But that need not preclude
judicial review* Though the power of the courts to decide whether a
proclamation, or administration without proclamation, of martial law
is justified or not is recognised in India, the exercise of this power
would usually prove illusory, for an Indemnity Ordinance or a provision
for indemnity in the Ordinance proclaiming martial law would be a
complete answer to ch&Hges made against those responsible for
administering the law, even if the Courts find that the circumstances
(65)of the case did not justify the proclamation of martial law* More­
over the Courts do not get around to a redress of executive action until
(66) _
it is over* Even parliamentary Correctives usually come along after
the event* It would therefore seem desirable for Parliament by law to 
lay down by whom and in what circumstances martial law should be 
proclaimed or administered, without being discouraged by the fact that 
previous attempts at martial law legislation have been unsuccessful* As 
*the old order changeth yielding place to new1, it would be worth making
(6 4) quoted in re Special Reference by the Grovemor-Ceneral of Pakistan 
P.I/.R. (1956-> W.F *598. I»aw here means legislative enactment^ *
(6 5) Channanpa v* Emperor* A*I*K. (l93l) Bom, 57*
(66) ex oarte Milligan* (1866) 4 Wall.2*
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a further attempt at martial law legislation, as otherwise amid the 
clash of arms, the voice of law may remain muffled, if not silent*
In this connexion it is of interest to note how emergency powers 
are exercised in other States, especially to notice what provisions are 
made for the effective control of the executive by the legislature during 
an emergency*
In the United Kingdom, the Emergency Powers Aot, 1920 was enacted 
to confer special powers on the Executive for the purpose of meeting 
any domestic crisis* It empowers the Crown to declare by proclamation 
a state of emergency whenever **it appears to Ms Majesty that any action 
has been taken or is immediately threatened by any person or body of 
persons of such a nature and on so extensive a scale as to be calculated, 
by interfering with the supply and distribution of food, water, fuel or 
light or with the means of locomotion, to deprive the Community or any 
substantial portion of the Community of the essentials of life1** When 
such an emergency has been declared, the Crown is authorised to issue 
regulations having the force of law (*as if enacted in this Act1) **for 
securing the essentials of life to the Community** and to delegate these 
powers to Government departments and other competent persons* These wide 
powers are limited by the provision that certain kinds of regulations are 
not authorised by the Act, namely (i) regulations imposing any form of 
compulsory military service or industrial conscription (ii) regulations 
making it an offence to take part in a strike or persuading other people 
peacefully to take part in a strike and (iii) regulations altering 
existing procedure in criminal cases, or conferring any right to punish
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by fine or imprisonment without trial*
A proclamation of emergency may remain in force for not more than 
a month, but without prejudice to the issue of another proclamation at 
or before the end of that period* In 1926 when there was a general strike, 
the Act was brought into operation first by a proclamation on April 30, 
and successive proclamations were made each month until November 20, 
inclusive•
Parliamentary control is safeguarded in two ways under the Act*
(i) Under Section 1 (2 ) the occasion for making a proclamation must be 
communicated to Parliament forthwith, and if Parliament is 
adjourned or prorogued for a period which will not expire within 
five days, then Parliament must be convened to meet within five 
days*
(ii) Any regulations made under the Act, it is provided, must be laid 
before Parliament a« soon as may be after they are made and shall 
not continue in force after the expiry of seven days from the time 
when they are so laid unless a resolution is passed by both Houses
providing for their continuance? that is to say, an affirmative
resolution is required*
This Act is an instance of a well-drawn-up emergency law which while 
conferring wide powers on the executive does not jeopardise constitutional 
safeguards* It defines with sufficient precision the purpose for which the 
powers are conferred and imposes limits to the extent of such powers* It 
also sets a time limit to the operation of the proclamation and the
regulations which may be made under ifc* It provides for ample and immediate
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Par li amentary control* If the words, 'as if enacted in this Act1, are 
given the restrictive interpretation which seems to have been put upon , 
them in another context by the House of lords in R. v* Minister of Health
(67)
ex parte Yaffe there is provision for judicial control also* Though 
the House of lords did not give a clear exposition of the meaning of the 
words, their lordships seemed to suggest that the expression did not 
prevent the Courts from ascertaining whether a regulation made under it 
conflicted with the parent statute and declaring it ultra vires if it did.
The one uncertain point which may go against the citizen is in the wording 
'if it appears to His Majesty*. This, like the expression, "if satisfied" 
in the corresponding Indian provision, may suggest that the decision as to 
whether an emergency has arisen cannot be questioned in a Court of law*
This Act is a constitution innovation in that, unlike the Defence
of the Realm Act, 1914, it is a permanent s t a t u t e a n d  is not limited
to a particular emergency. In its character of permanency and its purpose, 
it is akin to the provision for a declaration of state of siege in Prance.
The main purpose of declaring a state of siege in Prance is to maintain 
public order. When the country is at war it is necessary in Prance, as in 
England, for special powers to be conferred on the Executive by Parliament *
(67) (1931) A.C. 494 . The case turned upon the meaning of subsection 5 of
Section 40 of the Housing Act, 1925, which was that "the order on the 
Minister when made shall have effect as if enacted in this Act". The
House of lords while holding a housing scheme made by the Minister of
Health intra vires observed that 'if one can find that the scheme is 
inconsistent with the provisions of the Act which authorises the scheme, 
the scheme will be bad and that can only be gone into by way of 
proceedings by certiorari *.
(68) The Emergency laws (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1953, like the Act of 
1920, is permanent legislation.
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As will shortly he explained, power to declare a state of siege is 
subject to Parliamentary control* Further, though it involves the 
temporary and partial transfer of powers from the civil to the military 
authorities, the powers of the military remain limited by law*^*^
The law of August 9, 1849 supplemented and amended by the laws of 
April 3, 1878 and April 27, 1916 forms the basis of 'state of siege1 in 
France* Under the law of 1849 the declaration of an etat de siege would 
have the following consequences *
(i) For all general police duties militaxy authorities will replace 
civil authorities and it is for the former to decide which of these 
duties they will take over and which they will leave to the civil 
authorities.
(ii) The civil authorities will have special police powers to make house 
searches by night and day, to remove persons who have no domicile 
in the area under siege from that area, to order the surrender of 
arms and ammunition, to search for and remove them and to prohibit 
publications and meetings which, in their view, might endanger 
public order.
(iii) Military tribunals will assume jurisdiction over civilians who 
have committed crimes against public safety or public order. This 
provision was limited in its application by the law of April 27, 
1916.
A state of siege may be declared by Parliament in the event of imminent
(69) Hood Phillips, Constitutional Law. 945
(70) Duguit, Traite de Droit Constitutionnel, referred to in Hood Phillips, 
op* cit*~~page 545*
danger of war or of internal armed disturbance, fhe President of the 
Republic can declare a state of siege if the Parliament is not in session 
and if such a measure is proposed to him by the Ministry, but in that case. 
Parliament meets within two days in its own right, that is, without being 
summoned by the President, and decides whether the state of siege is to be 
continued or not* If there is a disagreement between the two Houses, the 
state of siege comes to an end.
A declaration of state of siege, it is provided, must give a 
description of the area to which it applies and must specify a definite 
time - limit at the end of which the state of siege expires, if not 
extended by a new law* fhe provisions of the law governing a state of 
siege were primarily adapted to suit conditions which prevailed in cities 
under siege or in territories overrun by the enemy. $hat is why there are 
provisions which submit the civilian population to military law and suspend, 
for the period of the emergency, some of the Constitutional guarantees of 
individual rights. In modern times state of siege has been given a much 
wider range* On August 2, 1914 a State of Siege was declared all over 
Prance and Algeria by a Presidential decree* Ihis declaration which did
not specify any time limit was confirmed by the law of August 5, 1914*
v »
Under the Constitution of the Dominican Republic it is provided that- -
in the event of national soverignty being exposed to serious or imminent 
danger, Congress may declare that a state <a>f national emergency (as 
distinguished from a state of siege which is declared *in case of a 
disturbance of the public peace1) exists and suspend the individual rights 
guaranteed by the Constitution. If Congress is not in session these steps
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may be taken by the President of the Republic but he must at the same
time summon Congress to meet within the next ten days, in order to decide
upon the maintenance or revocation of the state of national emergency. If
he does not or if Congress does not assemble, the state of national emergency
(71)automatically ceases-
If Parliamentary control of the power to proclaim an emergency is to 
be effective in India, there should be provision!for the assembly of the 
Houses of Parliament immediately after the proclamation is made. Under 
the present provisions it may be nearly six months before the Parliament 
can review a proclamation of emergency and executive action taken under it*
A provision like that in Prance or that in the Dominican Republic as to 
the meeting of the Chambers after a declaration of a state of siege or 
national emergency would prove helpful in controlling executive discretion* 
Professor Alan Cledhill has presented the picture of an Indian 
President who without violating the Constitution establishes an 
authoritarian government. He asks us to imagine a situation in which one 
fourth of the Members of a House of Parliament, suddenly aware of the 
personal ambition of the President, have given notice to impeach him, but 
before a resolution can be moved after the expiry of fourteen days from 
the date of the notice, he dissolves the Parliament. A newly elected House 
of the People need not meet for six months; meanwhile the ^resident 
appoints Ministers of his own choice who need not be members of the 
Parliament for six months. The President governs by decree by issuing 
Ordinances which will be as valid as Acts of the Parliament for six months.
(71) Article 35 (8) of the Co^stTtution of the Dominican Republic.
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Then he makes a proclamation of emergency and suspends the fundamental 
ri^its and the remedies for their breach# He issues directives to States 
of a kind calculated to provoke disobedience and then takes over their 
governments# He proclaims a financial emergency* By means of Ordinances 
he gives himself extensive powers of preventive detention . With all his 
political opponents under preventive detention^ and with the help of the 
armed forces in support of the civil power, a general election to the 
House of the People is held# He has now under his control a House of 
People full of his ardent supporters* JSven if he has some imprudent 
opponents in the Council of States, it would not be necessary to imprison 
them under the preventive detention Ordinance, as the House of the People 
with double the number of members in the Council of State will ensure a 
majority for the President at a joint sitting.
,!This may seem a ni^rtmare*1, says Professor Oledhill, !,but it is not
(72)dissimilar to the way in which the Weimer Constitution was destroyed11*
(73)He believes that ^possibly the danger is averted by recognising it’1.
HO further remarks that the vast Indian electorate will have to develop
a proper regard for the sanctity of the Constitution before its stability 
(74)can be assured#
The Indian Pounding Fathers were of the view that democratic 
government would on occasions need for its preservation the exercise of 
almost dictatorial powers. A temporary suspension of Constitutional 
government im an emergency may well be the only means of ultimately
(72) A. G-ledhill, The Republic of India,* page 108#
(73) id, page 109-
(74) ibid.
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(75)preserving it- Abraham Idncoln in partial defence of his suspending
the writ of habeas corpus without Congressional authorisation said, ”Are
all laws but one to go unexecuted, and Government itself go to pieoes lest
that one be violated? Even in such a case would not the official oath be
broken if the Government should be overthrown when it was believed that
(7 6)
disregarding the single law would tend to preserve it?tt*
As against this view, it may be observed that Hthd experience of
history has not yet shown us how Constitutional democratic institutions
can be preserved in the presence and under the control of ever increasing
(77 )administrative discretion”. Their preservation is bound to bristle
with difficulties in India as the Indian way of life is essentially 
undemocratic. The traditional Indian concept of society is hierarchical 
with a monarch at the top. The doctrine of karma (the inexorable law of 
moral consequences), the concept of mava (the belief that the world is an 
illusion) and the spirit of renunciation, characteristic of the Indian 
habit of thinking, coupled with the absence of democratic traditions, 
except at the village level, may tend to give a permanent character to 
temporary suspension of Constitutional government, if eternal vigilance 
by Parliament is not jealously maintained.
Recent trends in corsbituti on-making would seem to favour the 
conferment of wide powers on the head of the State during an emergency. 
For instance, the Constitution of the Fifth Republic in France confers
upon the President wide emergency powers Mwhen the Institutions of the
(75) B.R. Ambedkar, C.A.D. Vol.IX, 177. ’
(76) quoted in Corwin, The President. Office and Powers, page 7*
(77) E. Blythe Stason, Introduction to Corwin’s Total War and the 
Constitution, page viii.
Republic, the independence of the nation, the integrity of its territoiy 
or the execution of its commitments are gravely and immediately threatened 
and the regular functioning of the Constitutional public authorities is 
interrupted” • ^
These changing trends can also be seen from the following judicial 
opinions delivered in U.S.A. In 1866 Davis, J.,said, ”The Constitution 
of the United States is a law for rulers and people equally in war and in 
peace and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men at all 
times and under all circumstances* No doctrine involving more pernicious 
consequences was ever invented by the wit of man than that any of its 
provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of
(79)government. Such a doctrine leads directly to anarchy or despotism”.
A little over half a century later, in 1919, Holmes, J.;had something
very different to say about uivil liberties during war. ”When a nation is
at war”, he said, ”many things that might be said in a time of peace are
such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured
so long as men fight and no Court could regard them as protected by any
( 80 )
Constitutional right” •
The Indian Pounding Pathers were no doubt moving with the times 
when they provided for vesting wide powers in the executive during an 
emergency. If the administrators in India do not move with the dictatorial 
trends in some of the States of South and South East Asia, India may 
cpntinue to be safe for democracy* The IidLan Premier is optimistic in his 
belief that the contagion of democracy will spread from India to other Asian 
TtsI Article 16.
(79} Ex parte Milligan. (1866) 4 Wall. 2, 121.
(So) Schenck v. U.S. (1919) 2 4 9 ^ - 4 7
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countries. "If he fails, the Parliamentary system of government
(81)throughout the World will he grievously weakened” •
(81) Douglas Houghton, Asian Parliaments in Parliamentary Affairs. XI, 
No* 2, 210.
CHAPTER VII
EMER&ENCY POWERS IK THE DOMINION OP PAKISTAN
1, Public Security Measures
"Pakistan is a child of the strife that has arisen from the
impact of Islam upon Hinduism• It is nearly a thousand years since
Islam began to establish itself in India as a whole, and more than
twelve hundred years since it gained its first footing in Sind and
Multan* Yet the pace of the psyche*s self-adjustment is so slow
that in A.D. 1947* the Muslim community in the Indian Sub-continent
decided that there was still not enough common ground between Muslims
and Hindus to enable the two communities to remain united under s
*’ (1)single government.' *
As Pakistan is the child of encounter end strife its infancy was 
marred by strife* With the passing of the Indian Independence Act, 
1947, and the partition of the subcontinent into two Dominions,
India and Pakistan, the lack of common ground between the Hindus and 
the Muslims found expression more than ever before in communal 
disturbances and mass movements of refugees from both the Dominions 
and culminated in mass massacres of an unprecedented scale.
To counteract these disturbances and to maintain peace and public 
order, public safety measures passed in the pre-Dominion period in 
the Provinces were continued and kept alive by subsequent enactments 
in Pakistan as was done in India. In some Provinces, new measures
(1) A. J* Toynbees Pakistan as a Historian Sees her, in *Crescent 
and Green*, pages 1 and 2. " ““
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were passed* They generally followed the lines of the Bombay Public 
Security Measures Act, which was discussed above.
The Panjab Public Safety Act, 1947* is an instance of an Act 
passed during the pre-Bominion period, whose provisions were kept 
alive by subsequent amendments and ordinances relating to it.
Similary the (East) Bengal Ordinance Temporary Re-enactment Act, 1950 
(IV of 1950), sought to re-enact the Bengal Special Powers Ordinance, 
1946* On the other hand, the Sind Maintenance of Public Safety Act, 
1948 (XV of 194®)* an Act passed in the Dominion period* The
Baluchistan Public Safety Regulation, 1947* under Section 95(5) of 
the Government of India Act, 1955* as modified and adapted by the 
Pakistan (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947* was also issued in 
the Dominion period. As these security measures followed similar 
lines, only one of them, the Panjab Public Safety Act, 1947* is 
noticed below.
This Act was enacted by the Governor of the Pan jab under
(2 )
Section 95 of the Government of India Act, 1955* and received 
the assent of the Governor-General on March 20, 1947*
The Act, which is similar to the Bombay Public Security Measures 
Act, 1947* dealt with in detail in Chapter V;will be briefly 
summarised. It contains six chapters and forty-six sections. The 
first chapter relates to preliminary matters. The Second Chapter 
deals with Emergency Powers. Sections 3 and 4 of the Act relate to 
arrest, detention and control of suspected persons if the Provincial
(2) Supra, Chapter IV.
government or officers authorised by it in this behalf are satisfied 
that it is necessary to arrest or detain a person with the object of 
preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the public 
safety, or the maintenance of public order* Under Section 3 the 
Provincial Government may by order in wrj^i&(5 commit any person 
arrested by it or on its direction to such oustody as the Provincial 
Government may deem fit (Subsection 3)* but no person shall, unless 
the Provincial Government by special order otherwise directs, be 
detained in custody for more than a month (Subsection 4) &&d no person 
may be detained in custody for more than six months (Subsection 5)* 
Sections 5* 6, and 7 empower the authorities to control educational 
institutions, publications and the entry of newspapers in the Panjab, 
while Sections 8 and 9 designed to control the supply of 
commodities of general use, water and electric supply. Sections 10 
and 11 confer power to prohibit and regulate the use of vehicles or 
animals and drilling. Sections 12 and 13 empower the authorities to 
prohibit meetings and proceedings and to get reports about them.
Sections 14 io 18 deal with the service of orders, give power to 
issue search warrants and make searches, and provide for the execution 
of such orders. Chapter III deals with offences and penalties.
Section 21 is designed to prevent the dissemination of rumours. The 
other Sections of the Chapter provide penalties for the boycott of 
public servants, participation in mock funeral ceremonies, molestation, 
membership of quasi-military organisations, tampering with public 
servants, and sabotage. Chapters IV, V and VI relate to procedure.
The West Pan jab Public Safety (Amendment) Ordinance, (IV of 194$)*
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(3)made under Section 88 of the Government of India Act, 1935*
promulgated by the Governor of the West Punjab on December 10, 1948*
\
substituted the following subsection for Subsection 5 of Section 3 of 
the Aet of 1947*
,f(5) No order made by the Provincial Government under the 
provisions of Subsection (3) shall remain in force for a period of 
more than six months, but the Provincial Government may before the 
expiry of such period, renew such order and thereafter such order 
shall remain in force for a further period not exceeding six months 
unless before the expiry of that period it is similarly renewed or 
cancelled”•
The Act of 1947 expired on August 15, 1949* The Governor had
in the meanwhile assumed to himself all the powers vested in and
exercisable by the Provincial Legislature in pursuance of a Proclamation 
made by the Governor-General of Pakistan under Section 92A of the 
Government of India Act, 1935* &n& he enacted the West Panjab Public
Safety Act, 1949 (XVIII of 1949)* The Act was declared to have come
into force immediately on the expiry of the Act of 1947* The Act of
1947 out above was incorporated in the Act of 1949 which was in 
effect a re-enactment and continuation of the Act of 1947*
Maulana Abdul Aala Maududi who had been arrested and detained 
for one month to start with was kept in custody by renewed orders under 
the enactments until April 3* 1950* On the 2nd of April another
order of renewal was made purporting to detain him until October 3* 1950#
(3) Supra, Chapter IV,
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(4)In Muhammad All f. The Drown re Maul ana Mau&udi»v / it was
contended on he half of the detenu that his detention was illegal in
that not being competent to legislate with respect to public safety,
hut with respect to public order only as referred to in entry flb*l of
the Provincial Legislative List in the Seventh Schedule of the
Government of India Act, 1955* the Act was ultra vires the Provincial
legislative authority, in this case the Governor of the Pan jab who
had passed it* Adopting the pith and substance rule in interpretation,
the Federal Court held that the Act was intra vires, I he court
observed that public safety might Hbe endangered by an internal
commotion or disturbance as well as by various other causes too numerous
to enumerate, which may have nothing whatsoever to do with any act of
external aggression and may have no relation to any *reasonsj>f State
connected with defence, external affairs or the discharge of the
( 5 )functions of the Crown in its relation with Indian States* *N 7 
Moreover, public safety in our way of reading, was merely a result 
which was meant to be achieved and it would depend on the circumstances 
existing at the time whether it was being disturbed or was in danger 
of being disturbed by any act of external aggression or by internal 
commotion* If it was being endangered by an act of external aggression, 
the matter would fall within the ambit of entry 1 of List I of the 
Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, but if it was 
endangered by any internal commotion or on account of violation of 
public order, it would fall within the category of the subjects
(4) P.L.D. (1950) F.C. 1.
(5) In entry Ho.2 of the Federal Legislative List. (List I).
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referred to in entry No. I of List II. It may possibly be that at 
any given time both such causes may exist simultaneously.... In such 
a case, it would fall both within List I and List II and while the 
Federal Legislature would be competent to legislate with regard to 
preventive detention for reasons of State connected with defence or 
external affairs, it would be open to a Provincial Legislature to 
pass a similar legislation but for reasons connected with the
maintenance of public order It is true that the words with a view
to preventing him from * acting in any manner prejudicial to public 
safetyf precede the words fthe maintenance of public order1 , in 
Section 30) Act but that was either with the object of
emphasising the important result which was intended to be achieved or 
used in that sequence on account of the name given to the Act. We do 
not, however, attach any importance to the order in which the two 
expressions have been used in the Section, for it seems to be quite 
clear that the prevention of a person fro m acting in a manner 
prejudicial to the public safety was one of the main objects of the 
maintenance of 1 public order1 and could not in the context be taken to 
refer to public safety endangered by other c a u s e s . T h e  court 
further saidt "Relying on the principles enunciated by their Lordships
(7)
in Prafulla Kumar Mukherjeers case. 7 we would hold that in pith and 
substance the true nature and character of the Act was to provide for
(81subjects enumerated generally in List II or in some cases in List III . *
(6} In re Maulana Maududi P.L.L. (1950) F.C* 1, 6-7*
(7) Prafulla Kumar Mukherjee v. Bank of Commerce. Limited. Khulna 
(1947) P.C.H. 28.
(8) In re Maulana Maududi. P.L.D. (1950) F.C. 1,8.
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The Act of 1947 had provided that in disturbed areas all Sessions 
cases were to be tried without the aid of assessors and subject to the
procedure laid down in the Code of Criminal Procedure for trial of
*
summons cases* The Public Safety Act of 1949 which replaced the Act 
of 1947 adopted the same policy and by Section 30 the legislative 
authority confirmed the policy which had been adopted in the first 
Public Safety Act, although its applicability like that of its 
predecessor in regard to an area other than dangerously disturbed area 
was made to depend on a notification* Being a matter relating to 
procedure, a proviso was added to Section 36 that all cases pending or 
instituted before the expiry of the earlier Act would have to be tried 
in accordance with the provisions of Section 35 of the earlier Act, 
that is, the Act of 1947. Section 35 of the Act of 1947 provided 
that "all offences under this Act or under any other law for the time 
being in force in a dangerously disturbed area and in any other area 
all offences under this Act and any other offence under any other law 
which the Provincial Government may certify to be triable under this 
Act" should be tried according to the procedure prescribed by the Code 
provided that in all cases the procedure prescribed for the trial of 
summons oases by the Code should be adopted, except in the case of 
summary trials. In the Crown v. Shams~ua~Din ^  the Lahore High 
Court held that the Act of 1949 while prescribing the procedure of a 
summons case in the trial of a sessions case did not prescribe that the 
commitment proceedings or the choosing of the assessors should be
(9) P.L.D* 1950 Lahore 93
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dispensed with. The legislative authority took notice of the decision 
and enacted a remedial measure, the Pan jab Public Safety (Amendment) 
Act, 1950, (Act XV of 1950)* Sections 2 and 3 of that Act were to 
the effect that in spite of the decision in Shamsuddin^s Case all cases 
instituted in the Court of Sessions before August 15f 1949# should be 
tried as summons cases and without the aid of assessors. These 
sections could not have been applicable to cases which had been 
decided between the dates on which Act XVIII of 1949 and the amending 
Act IV of 1950 came into force. Another Act, the Pan jab Public 
Safety (Second Amendment) Act, 1950, (XXIX of 1950) was therefore 
passed. This Act repealed the first Amendment Act (Act IV of 1950) 
and unequivocally indicated the intention of the legislative authority 
as to how all cases instituted before August 15# 1949# in a Court of 
Sessions and tried without the aid of assessors should be dealt with 
on appeal or revision. Section 2 of the Amending Act provided, inter 
alia, that where in a case instituted before August 15# 1949#
"(i) a Court of Sessions has tried any accused person without the 
aid of assessors, or by the procedure provided for Courts of 
Sessions by the Code and with the aid of assessors; or
(ii) a Magistrate or a Bench of Magistrates has tried any accused 
person by the procedure applicable to the trial of warrant 
cases; or
(iii) the case has been committed to a Court of Session by the
procedure laid down in Chapter XVIII of the Code, no finding, 
sentence or order passed by such Court, Magistrate or Bench 
of Magistrates shall be reversed or altered on appeal or
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revision or tinder Chapter XXVII of the Code, by reason only 
of there having been any irregularity in the procedure under 
which the case was tried, or as the case may be, committed
for trial, unless such irregularity has in fact occasioned
a failure of justicefl*
In Muhammad Haroon v* Crown* it was contended on behalf of
the petitioners that the trial of the accused was invalid in as much
as two of the assessors had not been chosen by the Sessions Judge from
out of the list prepared or revised as required by the provisions of
the Code and the trial could not, therefore, be held to have taken 
place with the aid of assessors as required by Section 268 of the Code* 
This objection was for the first time taken in the Federal Court.
The majority of the court (Rashid, C.J., dissenting) held that the 
Sessions Judge should be deemed to have tried the cave without the aid 
of assessors. Rahman, J., observed* flThe intention of the legislative
authority is, in my way of thinking, quite clear and it is our
obvious duty to give effect to this legislation and to prevent the 
mischief which it was designed to suppress.... It might be pointed out 
that this Aot at least characterises the mistake in the procedure as 
to the trial of cases without the aid of assessors, when they should 
have been tried with their aid, as an irregularity and not an 
illegality. And this was done in spite of the catena of decisions 
holding a defect of this nature to be an Illegality of which the 
legislative authority must be deemed to have been fully aware* Calling
(10) P.L.D. (1951) F.C. 118.
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this defect to he an irregularity may not he conclusive, hut having 
regard to the history of the legislation on this subject since 1947 
the legislative authorityfs description may not he wholly irrelevant. 
Anyhow, even if it were an illegality, it could not he so regarded 
in the presence of several measures taken by the Provincial Government 
culminating in the Panjab Act XXIX of 1950, when it was fully 
competent to do away with the procedure for trial of sessions cases with 
the aid of assessors and substitute it by trials without their aid".^^ 
He further observed* "In my view, there is no real distinction 
in principle between a trial without the aid of assessors and a trial 
without the minimum required by law* In the one case all the assessors 
are physically absent, while in the other only some of them are so, 
not to take notice of those whose names were not in the list and who 
could not, therefore, be correctly described as assessors at all.
And once the requisite number of assessors is found not to be present 
when the trial commenced, the assessors must, as a body, be deemed 
to be absent or, perhaps it would be more correct to say, non-existent 
in the eye of the law* The legal effect in both the cases is the same 
and in both cases the trial must be held to have taken place without the 
aid of assessors*
Abdul Rashid, C*J., in his dissenting judgement observed that to 
hold a trial with the aid of assessors who were not qualified as 
assossors was an illegality and not a mere irregularity. It could not, 
in his view, amount merely to an irregularity simply because
(11) Muhammad Haroon v. Crown* P.L.D. (1951) P*C* 118, 136*
(12) id, 136-137.
-305-
Section 2(3) of the Act described it as an irregularity. The learned 
Chief Justice further observed* "If has been said that there is no 
real distinction in principle between a trial without the aid of 
assessors and without the minimum required by law. With all respect,
I cannot assent to this proposition* The procedure that will be 
followed when two competent assessors assist the Sessions Judge in the 
trial would be materially different from the procedure which a Sessions 
Judge will adopt when there are no assessors at all. This fact alone 
completely distinguishes a trial without the aid of assessors from a 
trial held with the aid of two assessors. If, at the commencement 
of the trial, only two competent assessors are present, it cannot be 
held that the assessors are non-existent in the eye of law. In such 
a case all that can be said is that as the mandatory provisions of 
Section 284 of the Code of Criminal Procedure have not been complied 
with, the whole trial has been vitiated. The legal effect of the 
complete absence of assessors and of the presence of only two assessors 
may be the same in the sense that in both cases the trial will be held 
to be illegal. But this reason alone is not sufficient for holding 
that there is no distinction in principle between a trial without the 
aid of assessors and a trial with a deficient number of assessors".
He was of the opinion that the words "without the aid of assessors* 
in the Act must be given its plain grammatical meaning, that the trial 
in question was wholly illegal as two persons who were not qualified to 
act as assessors, were made to set as assessors and that the tribunal
(13) id*, 127-28*
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which tried the petitioners was not properly constituted*
Akrsm, J., who was with the majority of the court in upholding 
the legality of the trial tried to meet this point raised by the 
learned Chief Justice by observing that as the Act was a remedial 
measure the object of which was to legalise those trials which were 
held in contravention of the provisions of the law and to obviate the 
need for a retrial, its provisions should be construed liberally so 
as to give them a meaning to their fullest extent and capacity and 
thereby cover all those cases which fell within the mischief which the 
statute sought to remedy. Statutes of this nature could not always be 
so worded as to provide for every contingency that might possibly 
arise; regard was to be paid, therefore, to the policy which 
dictated it, as also to the words used* He was accordingly "inclined 
to give the words •’without the aid of assessors1, a wide meaning so as 
to comprehend within its scope cases not only of physical absence of 
assessors, but also other cases, in which persons pruporting to act 
as assessors could not be regarded as such for some reason of law and 
thus $6 give effect to the spirit of law, though not perhaps to the 
Ie,tter of it".
Unfortunately, since Pakistan came into existence, the judiciary 
have again and again been obliged to choose between producing 
administrative chaos or findiiig some justification for official acts*
To a lawyer trained in the common law it seems somewhat strange to 
call in aid the spirit of the law to circumvent the letter of the law,
(14) ibid, page 159
-307-
especially* when the result is prejudicial to the liberty of the subject.
Apart from these Provincial measures, an ordinance called the 
Pakistan Public Safety Ordinance, 1949# was issued by the Governor- 
General under Section 42 of the Government of India Act. It extended 
to all the Provinces and to the capital of the Federation and to every 
acceding state to the extent to which, the Central Legislature had 
power to make laws for that State as regards public safety and public 
order. The duration of the Ordinance which was to come into force at 
once was fixed as one year, with the provision that the Central 
Government could from time to time extend its life by notification.
Section 3 provided that the Central Government, if satisfied 
with respect to any person, that, with a view to preventing him from 
acting in any manner prejudicial to public safety or the maintenance
of public order it was necessary so to do, might make an order^
(a) directing such person to remove himself from Pakistan, provided 
that he was not ordinarily resident in Pakistan,
(b) directing that he be detained,
(c) directing that he should not be in any such area or place as 
might be specified in the order,
(d) requiring him to reside or remain in such place or within such 
area in Pakistan as might be specified,
(e) requiring him to notify his movements or to report himself or 
to do both to a specified authority,
(f) requiring him to conduct himself in such manner, abstain from
such acts, or take such order with any property in his
possession or under his control as might be specified.
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If any person contravened any order under this Section, he would 
he punishable with imprisonment for three years or with fine or with 
both* An order would remain in force for such period as might be 
specified in the order or if no period was specified until revoked by 
the authority making the order. Such revocation would not prevent the 
making of a fresh order to the same effect as the order revoked.
Section 4 provided for the winding up of associations which the
Central Government considered would act in a prejudicial manner. When
an association was directed to be wound up, the Central or Provincial
Government might, authorise any officer to take possession of any land,
buildings, any other property or documents belonging to,or|in the
custody of the association for a specified period. It was further
provided that powers exercisable under certain provisions of the
(15)Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908, ' by the Provincial Government in
relation to unlawful assemblies could be exercised by the Central 
Government also in relation to assemblies contemplated under this 
Section.
Under Section 5 it was provided that the Central Government, if 
satisfied with respect to any particular person, association or 
establishment that it was necessary or expedient to do so, might 
direct such person, association or establishment to abstain from:
(i) spreading or publishing any news, report or information,
(u) exhibiting any film or slides,
(iii) holding any meeting.or fair or procession or
(15) Supra* Chapter III.
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(iv) using any uniform or flag or insignia*
Section 6 sought to control documents containing information 
which, in the opinion of the Central Government, was likely to 
endanger public safety or the maintenance of public order. The 
Central Government was empowered to require the editor, printer, 
publisher or any person in possession of such documents to inform any 
specified authority of the name and address of the person who supplied 
the information, and to deliver the documents to him, to prohibit 
any further publication of them and to declare such documents forfeit 
to the government.
Section 7 authorised the Central Government or any authority 
empowered by it to require by order that all matters relating to a 
particular subject or class of subjects, should, before being 
published, be submitted for scrutiny to a specified authority. It 
also enabled the same authorities to prohibit or regulate the making 
or publishing of any document, and to prohibit either absolutely or 
for a specified period the publication of any newspaper or periodical. 
Section 8 provided for deposit of security by editors, printers and 
publishers as under the Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931*^^ In 
certain oases of contravention of prohibitions in the Ordinance, the 
Central Government could declare the deposit forfeit.
Only on the report in writing by public servants was a court 
to take cogniaance of offences under the Ordinance. Such offences 
could be tried by a Magistrate of the First Class in accordance with
(16) Supra. Chapter III,
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the procedure prescribed for the trial of summons cases in the Code 
of Criminal Procedure.
Offences under the Ordinance were declared cognizable. They 
were also to be deemed non-bailable except when the prosecution was 
given an opportunity to oppose the application for bail and when, even 
after such opposition by the prosecution, the Court was satisfied 
that there were reasonable grounds for believing that the accused 
person was not guilty of the offence.
Section 14 provided that no order, direction or proceeding 
under the Ordinance would be called in question in any court and no 
legal proceeding would lie against any person for anything done or in 
good faith intended to be done under the Ordinance or for any loss or 
damage caused to any property taken possession of in pursuance of the 
provisions of the Ordinance.
The Pakistan Public Safety Ordinance, 1952 (VI of 1952) continued 
in force the provisions of the Public Safety Ordinance of 1949 an *^ 
added provisions relating to rule-making and delegation of powers by 
the Central Government, Section 16 provided that the Central 
Government might, by order, direct that any power which was conferred 
by the Ordinance on the Central Government could be exercised in 
respect of Karachi by the Administrator of Karachi or by any officer 
under him, not being below the rank of District Magistrate, as he 
might direct. Tinder Section 17 it was provided that the Central 
Government could make rules, not inconsistent with the provisions of 
the Ordinance, to carry into effect its purposes. All rules made 
were required to be laid before the Central Legislature as soon as
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possible after they were made.
The Ordinance which under Section 1 was deemed to have taken 
effect on March 3# 1952, though published in the Gazette on March 5» 
was replaced by the Security of Pakistan Act, 1952# which was 
assented to by the Governor-General on May 5# 1952*
The Security of Pakistan Act, 1952, intended to provide for 
special measures to deal with persons acting in a manner prejudicial 
to the defence, external affairs and security of Pakistan or the 
maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community, or 
the maintenance of public order, incorporated in it the provisions of 
the Pakistan Public Safety Ordinance, 1952, and also made certain 
additional provisions. The grounds for imposing restrictions on the 
movements of suspected persons and providing for their detention were 
extended to cover probable prejudicial acts in relation to defence, 
external affairs, the security of Pakistan or any part thereof, the 
maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community or the 
maintenance of public order.
The same extension of grounds was made in respect of provisions 
regarding control of subversive activities and dissemination of news 
and information.
The most important difference between the Act of 1952 an& the 
Ordinance it replaced was in relation to the constitution of Advisory 
Boards. It was provided under Section 5 that the Central Government 
could for the purposes of the Act constitute one or more Advisory 
Boards, each consisting of two persons who were qualified to be Judges 
of a High Court. Under Section 6 the authority making an order of
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preventive detention was required to communicate to the detenu, within 
a month of the date of detention, the grounds on which the order had 
been made to enable him to make a representation in writing against 
the order. It was the duty of the authority to inform the detenu of 
his right to make such representation and to afford him the earliest 
opportunity of doing so* The authority, however, was not required 
to disclose facts which it considered to be against public policy to 
disclose.
Section 7 provided that in every case where a detention order had 
been made or where an order had been passed under Section 10 (Control 
of Subversive associations) 11 (Control of news and information) or 
12 (Prohibiting and regulating the printing or publication of certain 
matters), the authority making the order should, within three months 
from the date of the issue of the order, place before the Advisory
Board the grounds on which the order had been made and the representation
if any, made by the person affected by the order. The Advisory 
Board was required under Section 8 to submit a report to the Central 
Government after considering the materials placed before it and, if 
necessary, after calling for such further information from the 
Government or from any person concerned or affected. The person 
affected by the order was not permitted to attend personally or appear 
by any legal representative before the Advisory Board; nor was he 
allowed to produce witnesses before the Board* The report should 
specify in a separate part the opinion of the Board as to whether
there was sufficient cause for the passing of the order* The report
except the separate part in which the Board1 s opinion was given would
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be confidential* On receipt of the report the Central Government 
should consider it and pass such order as appeared to it just and 
proper. The Central Government was also required to review all such 
orders every six months from the date of the order unless revoked
earlier and, in the case of an original order of detention, inform
the detenu of the result of the review.
Another important addition made in the Act was the special 
provision made for detention in certain cases. It was provided under 
Section 9 that any person detained with a view to preventing him from 
acting in any manner prejudicial to the defence or external affairs 
or the security of Pakistan or any part thereof might be detained 
without obtaining the opinion of an Advisory Board for one year from 
the date of his detention*
These were the only substantial departure*from the Ordinance
effected in the Security of Pakistan Act.
(17)In Hassan Basir v. The Crown v ' the applicant was detained under
the Security of Pakistan Act in pursuance of an order made by the
Central Government. The grounds of detention furnished to the detenu 
disclosed that "the Government of Pakistan are satisfied that you 
worked and were trained by a reputed Communist and were appointed as 
Secretary of the Karachi Communist Party. You were further engaged 
in directing the activities of the Communist Party under different 
assumed names and remained underground to escape notice. The 
Government of Pakistan were and are satisfied that your activities were
(17) P.L.D. 1953 Sind 37.
and are prejudicial to the security of Pakistan"* Following the
decisions in Nek Muhammad and others v, The Province of Bihar and
Abdul Khaliq Agad v. The Crown the Sind Ohief Court held, that
mere membership of a party, whether Communist, Muslim National Guard
or R, S. S* could not furnish a valid ground for detention unless acts
calculated to endanger the security of the State were ascribed to the
detenu in question".^2*^ It also held that the grounds furnished
must he such as would enable a detenu to make adequate representation.
"The object of providing grounds," Lari, J., observed, "is to enable
the detenu to make representation with a view to assure the detaining
authority that lie was not likely to act in a manner contemplated by
the Act* The effect and the requisites of a similar section in various
enactments in India have been considered by courts in that country and
they have invariably come to the conclusion that the grounds furnished
must be such as to enable a detenu to make adequate representation.
The very section says that the grounds have to be furnished so as to
"enable him to make if he wishes a representation in writing against
the order". The detenu is not entitled to appear in person, and
therefore the only method of meeting the alleged accusations against
the detenu is to make a representation and no effective representation
can be made unless he is aware of such particulars as are the basis of
(21)
conclusions reached by the detaining authority".' y
(18) A.I.R. 1949 Patna 1.
(19) decided on August 28, 1951 by the Sind Chief Court, referred
to in P.L.D. 1953 Sind 37, 39.
(20) Hasan Nazir v. The Crown. P.L.D* 1953, Sind, page 37, 39.
(21) id. pages 39-40*
wj 1
(22)
In Sibte Hasan v« Crown. 7 the adequacy of the grounds of
detention to he furnished by the detenu was further considered by the
court* The grounds in this case disclosed that "the Government of
Pakistan are satisfied that you were engaged, in conspiracy with other
Communist leaders, in planning to overthrow the Government by law
established in Pakistan. They were and are therefore staisfied that
your activities were and are prejudicial to the security of Pakistan*"
In dismissing a habeas corpus petition on behalf of the detenu, the
Lahore High Court held, following and quoting from, the judgement in
(23)
Purgadas v. Kexv 7, that "what information should be conveyed to the
detenu which would be sufficient to enable him to make a proper
representation would depend in each case upon the circumstances of
that case and upon the grounds that had satisfied the detaining
authority of the necessity for such detention. It is difficult to lay
down any hard and fast rule about it".^2^
"I find myself in respectful agreement with that view", observed
Bahman, J., in Sibte Hasan *s case. "It was recognised in that case
that the grounds for satisfaction of the authority concerned may be
the past activities of the detenu, or information about his future
intentions, or his association with others who had been acting in a
prejudicial manner. The test, therefore, is whether in any particular
case the grounds supplied to the person affected by the order of
22) P.L.P. (1954) Lahore 142.
25) A.I.E. 1949 Allahabad 148.
24) Purgadas v. Bex. A.I.E. 1949 Allahabad 148*
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detention were in fact such as would enable him to make an effective 
representation against his detention, to Government or not,1 
It was further held that when the grounds furnished left him in no 
doubt as to what the accusation against him was, they should be 
considered adequate to enable the detenu to make his representation 
to the Advisory Board,
It was contended on behalf of the detenu who had been already 
in custody for over four months under the Bengal State Prisoners 
Regulation, 1818, when an order of detention under the Pakistan Public 
Safety Ordinance, 1949* was made against him that action under the 
Security Act was intended to be preventive rather than punitive and 
an order of detention could not have been passed in respect of a person 
who was already under detention and therefore could not from the very 
nature of the case have engaged in any subversive activity prejudicial 
to the security of Pakistan* Rahman, J., was, however, of the 
opinion that it would be open to the Government to consider the 
,fantecedent of the petitioner to decide whether he was in their opinion 
a person likejjtto act in a manner prejudicial to the safety or security 
of Pakistan*
(25) Sibte Hasan v* The Crown* P.L.D. 1954 Lahore 142,
(26) id., 149*
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ii. Martial Law in the Panjab
Martial law had to be proclaimed in Lahore in March 1955 when 
orthodox Muslims resorted to direct action against Ahmadiyas 
(or Mirzais), a Muslim sect following, the teachings of Mirza Ghulam 
Abmad (d. 1908), who claimed to be a prophet as well as to be the 
promised Messiah. Orthodox Muslims regard this claim as heretical 
and do not consider Ahmadiyas to be Muslims. This minority sect is 
reputed to have about 200,000 members in Pakistan and includes among 
its followers some distinguished men, like Sir Muhammad Zafrullah Khan 
who was the Foreign Minister of the country in 1953.
The objects of the anti-Ahmadiya agitation were to have the
Ahmadiyas declared a non-Muslim minority, the dismissal of Zafrullah
Khan and the barring from high public office of all members of the 
(1)sect. y The methods employed for the purpose were the holding of 
public meetings, processions and the passing of impassioned re so lutic&is 
At a meeting sponsored by the leaders of the agitation in January 1955 
resolutions were passed to the effect that since Khwaja Nazimuddin, 
the Prime Minister, was not inclined to accept the demands of the All 
Muslim Parties Convention in respect of the Ahmadiyas, direct action 
had become inevitable to secure acceptance of the demands and that 
since the demand for the removal of Zafrullah Khan had not yet been
(1) Report of the Court of Inquiry into the Panjab Disturbances of 
1955 (Munir Report) page 127.
(2) HIn default of effective democracy this (indulgence in such 
activities) has been the participation of the common man in 
polities”, writes a student of Pakistan polities. (K. Callard, 
Pakistan, page 55)
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conceded, the Convention demanded the resignation of Khwaja Fazimuddin, 
’’so that the Muslims of Pakistan should he ahle to follow and preserve 
their religious beliefs and Islamic traditions’’^ ^. Daultana, the 
Chief Minister of the Panjab, instead of nipping the agitation in the 
hud, indulged in the clever political move of making it known that, 
though he personally accepted the view that Ahmadiyas were non-Muslims, 
he was unable to act in the matter, which ' was within the 
competence of the Constituent Assembly and the Federal Government*
The Panjab Muslim League also supported the forces of disorder* 
According to the list prepared by the police 377 members of the League 
Hook part in processions, leading violent mobs, violating orders
promulgated under Section 144 &nd collecting funds with a view to
financing the movement«<4>* The Central Government's policy as regards
( 5 }the movement was one of ’’indecision, hesitancy and vacillation”* 7*
It was an awkward moment for the government* The public at large,
the religious leaders and many politicians regarded the Ahmadiya
doctrine as heretical* Nazimuddin himself was a deeply religious man*
Further the Constituent Assembly had decided that Pakistan should be
an Islamic State. In these circumstances it was not easy for the
government to declare that religious sentiment must be held in check
(6)so that the principles of cabinet government might be followed* y 
’The situation was allowed to drift until the agitators faced the
(3) Munir Report, pages 131-132.
(4) id* page 266.
(5; i&* 283*
(6; K. Oallard, Pakistan, page 306*
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government with the choice of abdication or resistance1. '
The Central Council of Action,set up by a resolution of the 
meeting held in January,had couched their demands in the form of an 
ultimatum which would expire on the 22nd of February. Direct action 
was planned to begin on the 27th. Hearing of alarming reports like
the enrolment of 55*000 volunteers for the campaign, the Central
o’cUclc
Cabinet met at 2 in the morning of the 27th and decided to arrest
the leaders of the agitation and to ban certain inflammatory newspapers.
But by this time the agitators were ready to go into action. Mass
demonstrations interrupted normal life in Lahore and other towns in
the Fanjab. By March 4th certain areas of the walled city of Lahore
had been taken over by the agitators and police lost all control of
the situation* By 6th, communications were disrupted and the supply
of electricity was partly cut. Civil government for all practical
purposes ceased to exist and Daultana, on the verge of capitulation,
made a desperate appeal to the people to help him in the maintenance
of law and order, assuring them that their demands would be placed
before the Central Government with a recommendation for their 
(9}acceptance* A few hours later, the local military Commander,
Major-General Muhammad Assam Khan, with the approval of the Central 
Government, proclaimed martial law and the military forces restored 
order in a matter of six hours*
(7) ibid.
Munir Report, pages 1i44~l45* 
9) id* page 167*
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v The military Commander constituted himself Ghief Martial Law 
Administrator and conferred on himself authority to issue martial law* 
regulations and orders and to appoint special courts for the trial 
and punishment of persons contravening such regulations and orders*
He appointed the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Fanjab as 
the Deputy Chief Administrator and six senior military officers, of 
whom two were Brigadiers and four Lieutenant Colonels, as Administrator! 
with authority to them to appoint their sub-administrators. He issued 
a series of martial law regulations and orders* By Regulation Ho*1 
the martial law area was divided into sectors and an administrator 
was put in charge of each of the sectors. By Regulation 1(a) he 
constituted special courts of two kinds*
(i) Special military courts
(ii) Summary military courts and their respective jurisdiction was 
clearly defined. The procedure to be followed by them and their 
power to pass sentences were similarly defined. By Regulation 2 
ordinary criminal courts were permitted to exercise jurisdiction in 
respect of offences other than those created by the regulations or 
connected with the disturbances. By Regulation 8 certain offences 
were declared to be punishable by death, transportation for life or 
imprisonment which could extend to fourteen years*
On May 9, 1955* the Governor-General, acting under Section 42 
of the Constitution Act, promulgated the Martial Law (indemnity) 
Ordinance, 1955 (11 of 1955) indemnifying servants of the Crown and 
other persons in respect of acts done by them in good faith under 
martial law and validating sentences passed by military courts*
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Section 2(2) defined the martial law period as "the period 
beginning on the 6th day of March 1953 and ending on such day as the 
Central Government may by notification in the official Gazette declare1 
Section 3 enacted that no suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding 
would lie in any court against any servant of the Crown for or on 
account of or in respect of any act ordered or done by him or 
purporting to have been ordered or done by him in the martial law area 
during the martial law period for the purpose of maintaining or 
restoring order or of carrying into effect any regulation, order or 
direction issued by any authority responsible for the administration 
of martial law to which he was subordinate provided that the act was 
done in good faith and in a reasonable belief that it was necessary 
for the purpose intended to be served thereby* The same indemnity 
was granted to any other person in respect of any act done or 
purporting to have been done by him under any order of a servant of 
the Crown given for any of the purposes mentioned above.
Section 5 of the Ordinance rendered lawful the seizure, 
confiscation, or destruction of or damage to property tinder the 
direction of a servant of the Crown and made claims for restoration 
or compensation in respect of any such property inadmissible.
Section 6 provided that all sentences passed during the martial law 
period by a court or other authority constituted or appointed under 
martial law and acting in a judicial capacity would be deemed to have 
been lawfully passed and all sentences executed according to the tenor 
thereof would be deemed to have been lawfully executed*
It waa provided under Section 7 that "every person confined
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under and by virtue of a sentence passed by a court or other authority 
constituted or appointed under martial law and acting in a judicial 
capacity shall continue liable to confinement until the sentence, 
reduced by remissions, if any, earned under the rules applicable 
to the serving of such sentence, is served, or until he is released 
by order of the Central Government11*
Section 8 made Sections 6 and 7 applicable to sentences passed 
fear offences which might have been committed before the beginning of 
the martial law period*
In Muhammad TJmar Khan v* Crown re Maulana Abdusattar Khan
(10)Hiagj * ' a habeas corpus petition praying that Maulana Nlazi
whose detention was allegedly illegal be set at liberty, it was 
contended that the introduction of martial law and the constitution 
of the special military court which sentenced the Maulana were illegal, 
that the court did not act in a judicial capacity and in the procedure 
adopted by it, it did not conform to the ordinary form of criminal 
trials, that the necessity of martial law if ever it existed, had 
ceased on March 23, (the day on which the martial law administrator 
publicly admitted that the first phase of martial law which was to 
restore law and order was over and that the second phase, the object 
of which was a constructive one, had begun) and thereafter the 
continuation of the martial law regime and the functioning of special 
military courts were illegal and that the Indemnity Ordinance in as 
much as it gave to the Central Government the power to determine the
(10) P.L.L. (1953) Lahore 528.
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martial law period and purported to validate sentences which were 
essentially in the nature of advice tendered by special military courts 
to the Martial Law Administrator was ultra vires.
In dismissing the petition, the court held that when the 
legislative authority passed the Indemnity Ordinance it must have 
known in what manner and on what principles the martial law 
administration had been carried on and that the validating legislation 
must have been passed keeping in view the manner and principle of such 
administration, and that the legislature must be presumed to have 
approved the various regulations and orders by which courts were 
appointed, their powers and procedure defined and the law administered 
by them duly notified. If the legislature had passed an Act 
recognising or defining the principle on which martial law was in fact 
administered, no objection to it could have been taken on the ground 
that it did not contain the principle or policy of the legislation 
and that it delegated uncontrolled and unfettered legislative functions 
to the military Commander. What had been done could originally have 
been permitted to be done and no objection to such ex post facto 
legislation could be taken on the ground of retroactivity* Ho 
exception could be taken to the Indemnity Ordinance on the ground that 
it amounted to delegated legislation*
As regards the contention that the necessity for martial law, 
if it ever existed, ceased on March 23, the court observed that 
Major General Muhammad Azam Khan was not to be taken literally when 
he said that the first phase of martial law had been over. f,He did 
not say that there was no necessity thereafter for the martial law to
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continue or that there was no possibility of the recrudescence of 
disorders."^1 ^
The judgement delivered by Muhammad Munir, C*J*, is probably 
of more interest for the illuminating discussion on martial law made 
by the learned Chief Justice than for the ratio* The meaning and 
scope of martial law were set forth with admirable lucidity in the 
course of the judgement* The following extracts from the decision, 
it is hoped, will present in a concise form the statement of law in 
regard to the true character of martial law*
"In constitutional jurisprudence", observed Muhammad Munir, C*J*, 
'‘martial law is used at least in four different senses. In the first 
sense, it is used with reference to the law relating to discipline in 
the armed foroes of the State which is administered by tribunals, 
called courts martial. These courts are constituted for the purpose 
of regulating the government of the military and their jurisdiction 
in no circumstances extends to the civilians* In our country, 
martial law in this sense means the law administered by Courts Martial 
constituted under the Army Act, the Naval Discipline Act, and the 
Air Force Act*
"In the second sense, the word (sic) *martial law* means 
*military government in occupied territory* and is used to describe 
the powers of a military commander in times of war in the enemy 
territory* In this sense, martial law is recognised by Public 
International Law as a part of the jus belli. The Duke of Wellington
(1 1 ) i d ,  page 548
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had this kind of martial law in mind when in a debate in the House 
of Lords he said*
'partial law is neither more nor less than the will of the 
general who commands the army. In fact martial law means no law at 
all'*.
HIn the third sense in which it is a part of English
Constitutional Law, martial law means the rights and obligations
of the military under the common and statute law of the country to
repel force by force while assisting the civil authorities to suppress
riots, insurrections or other disorders in the land. In American
Constitutional Law, martial law in this sense is a form of the
police power of the State and means the law which has application
when the military arm does not supersede civil authority but is
merely called upon to aid such authority in the execution of its
civil functions. This form of martial law is well recognised by the
law of England and there are several ancient statutes which make it
incumbent not only on the citizens but also Crown servants, including
the army, to assist civil authorities in suppressing disorders in
(12)
the land. Cases illustrative of this law are Rex v. Kenneth v * 
and Rex v. Finney
After quoting a passage from Tindal, C.J.*s charge to the Bristol 
Grand Jury, the Chief Justice further observed*
“It.will be noticed that the justification of this form of
martial law, if it can at all be so called is the common law of
f I2J 5 C&r and P. 282.
( .13) 5 Car and P. 254*
(14) (1832) 1?2 B.R. 966.
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England and several statutes which create rights in and impose
obligations on citizens and servants of the Crown in the matter of
suppression of riots*,..*. The Privy Council...... observed in
(1 *5}Marais v. G. 0. C. bines of Communicationsv y that where war prevails 
the ordinary courts have no jurisdiction over the action of the Military 
but that it is for the Civil Courts to decide whether a state of war 
exists or not.
nIn seeking to discover the source and reason of martial law, 
the best course to adopt is to find an answer to a few simple questions. 
In case of war or invasion do the military have a right to act suo 
mo to? If so, do they have the same right where there is a riot, 
insurrection, revolt or rebellion which, if not suppressed 
immediately, may become a successful revolution? If the answer to 
both these questions be in the affirmative, a third question, . and 
that is the most important question, immediately presents itself, 
namely, what are the powers of the military when called upon to act 
in any such contingency? Can they for the purpose of suppressing 
the riot or rebellion, make their own Rules and Regulations, set up 
their own courts to enforce such Rules and Regulations and thus 
infringe the right of freedom of person and of enjoyment of property 
to which citizens are entitled under the ordinary law in peace time?
If constitutional jurisprudence furnishes an answer to these questions, 
that is martial law sui generis11.^  *
(15) 1902 A.C. 109*
(16; Muhammad Umar Khan v. Crown. P.LJ). (1913) Lahore 536, 539*
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As to the limits within which martial law is available as a 
defence in the ordinary civil courts, the Chief Justice stated*
'^ ([ost constitutional writers affirm that when civil power is 
deposed, suspended or paralysed by domestic disturbances, the 
military are entitled to step in to fill up the void but these writers 
are equally clear in their opinion that while so acting the legality 
or exeusability of any action taken by the military will be judged by 
"necessity" and that such judgement will be with the civil courts 
ex post facto. Thus martial law is the law of military necessity, 
actual or presumed in good faith, Whether where the defence of 
necessity and good faith cannot be founded on civil law, e*g, right 
of private defence or the use of force to disperse unlawful assemblies 
and there is no indemnity bill, it will be recognised by civil courts, 
is an open question though observations occur in several cases 
clearly indicating that such necessity will be recognised as a good 
defence (Phillips v# Eyre and Tilonko v. Attorney General of
JTatal^^.) If martial law is law and its limits are prescribed by 
necessity, then*
(1) Not only the Crown has the prerogative to proclaim martial 
law but without any such proclamation the military can take 
over when by war, insurrection, rebellion or tumult civil 
authority is deposed, suspended or paralysed;
17) 1870 Q.B* 1.
18) 1907 A*C* 93.
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(2) all acts done by the military which are either justified by 
the civil law or were dictated by necessity and done in good 
faith will be protected even if there be no bill of indemnity?
(3) while preventive action for the duration of the martial law 
will be valid, punitive action will generally be invalid;
(4 ) martial law will cease ipso facto with the cessation of the 
necessity for it; and
(5) sentences of confinement by military courts will expire with
(19)the expiry of the martial law*"' '
If any or all of the above consequences that would ordinarily
ensue upon the expiry of the period of martial law are to be prevented 
from taking effect, it is for the Legislature to pass an Act of 
Indemnity and make suitable provisions defining the extent to which 
the consequences emanating from the enforcement of martial law, after 
the expiry of the period of its enforcement, should not be given 
judicial effect by the ordinary civil courts.
Martial law, fourthly and finally, as a concept of international 
law assumes an aspect of jus belli* In this sense, it is*incidental 
to the state of solemn war and appertains to the law of the nations1. 
The municipal laws have nothing to do with if and cannot provide for 
martial law as understood in this context. It is for international 
.law to determine the implications of this term when used in this sense.
Abdus Sattar Khan Niazi who in the meanwhile had been sentenced 
to death on a charge of sedition and whose capital sentence was later
(19) P.iuD. (1953) Lahore 559, 540.
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commuted to rigorous imprisonment for fourteen years presented a 
/ \
petition' ' to the Federal Court praying for special leave to appeal
from the judgement of the Lahore High Court, contending?
(i) that on 23rd March, 1953* Major General Muhammad Azam IChan 
having made a declaration to the effect that the first phase 
of restoring peace and order having been achieved, the second 
phase of reconstruction had been begun, any action on the part 
of the military after March 23, was clearly beyond the scope 
of their legitimate function and contrary to the principles of 
constitutional law;,:
(ii) that the Martial Law (indemnity) Act, 1953 (XXXII of 1953) which 
superseded the Martial Law (indemnity) Ordinance, 1953* was 
ultra vires the Federal Legislature as it amounted to a delegatio] 
of its own powers to the military personnel by giving them a 
free hand in the civil administration during the martial law 
period;
(iii) that while Section 6 of the Martial Law (indemnity) Act which 
validated "all sentences passed during the martial law period 
by a court or other authority constituted or appointed under 
martial law and acting in a judicial capacity", implied the 
application of a judicial procedure, as usually followed in courts 
of justice, contrary to this provision, some of the defence 
witnesses who were absent had not been re-summoned by the court 
martial for their reexamination.
(2°) AMus Sattar Khan Niazl v. The Crown, P.L.D. (1954) fl.C. 187.
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As to the first contention the court held that it was not for 
the military authorities, hut for the executive to determine when 
it could resume administrative functions with safety and without risk, 
since it was the executive which called the military to its aid*
As to the second contention, Akram, J*, observed that the 
Federal Legislature was a legislative body possessing sovereign powers 
and no question therefore of ultra vires with regard to its legislative 
enactments could arise* The powers which the Federal Legislature 
exercised were as large and ample as those of the British Parliament 
itself* The Martial Law (indemnity) Act was an Act of the Federal 
Legislature and no question of a delegation of its powers to anyone 
arose*
According to Cornelius, J*, the powers of the Federal Legislature 
were derived from and were circumscribed by, the express provisions 
of the Government of India Act, 1935* adopted in Pakistan* He 
was therefore of the opinion that the powers of the Federal Legislature 
(as distinguished from the Legislature of the Dominion under Section 
6(2) of the Independence Act) were not, in the then existing 
circumstances, as wide as those possessed by the British Parliament.
In regard to the vires of the Indemnity Act, he observed? "The 
contravention of constitutional provisions in relation to the 
administration of the martial law area during the material period was 
brought directly before the Federal Legislature when it was asked to 
enact the Martial Law (indemnity) Act,, 1953, &&d it was open to the
Legislature in dealing with the Bill, to take such action as it 
thought fit, in relation to the executive authorities which were
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responsible. Such action need not have involved any act of
legislation, and consequently no question of abdication of
legislative functions is involved in that aspect of the matter*"
Assuming that the Federal Legislature expressed no disapproval of the>
action of the executive authorities appointed under the Constitution
that would indeed amount to ratification of that action, but again,
for the reason mentioned immediately above, such ratification would
(21)
not involve the legislative functions of the Federal Legislature.' '
As to the third contention, it was held that the expression
1 acting in a judicial capacity* .meant mainly to emphasise the duty of
adjudication as distinguished from administration and meeting the
requiiements of military exigencies. **Phe word lcapacityt here,
said Akram, J*, is not without significance; one may be vested with
various capacities for exercising various kinds of functions,
•judicial capacity* describes only the character in which the work
(22)is to be performed,,s In any event the calling or not calling of
witnesses by the court martial or other authority constituted under 
martial law was no ground for an order of release under habeas corpus 
proceedings.
According to Cornelius, J., the words •acting in a judicial
capacity* were not merely words of indication but, were intended to
be, and were, in fact, words of limitation. So much appeared to
him to follow from giving to each word in the phrase its full and
plain grammatical meaning, but he based this conclusion also upon
(21) id* pages 195* I96.
(22) id. page 190*
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the consideration that when the Federal Legislature was considering 
the question of the extent to which the acts performed by 'self- 
appointed authorities' during the fextra constitutional regime1 
represented by the martial law period could be maintained in their 
effect, it might well have considered that the saving should be 
confined to those particular acts, purporting to be acts performed 
in the administration of justice, which were in fact performed in 
compliance with the minimum requirements of the dispensation of 
justice. It was observed that acts of indemnity did not usually 
include this qualification as regards 1 acting in a judicial capacity' 
and it was therefore reasonable to suppose, said Cornelius, J*, that 
the words had been intentionally employed in the Act in question with 
e, view to creating a salutary effect of limitation.
He was of the view that the minimum requirements of justice were 
satisfied in the procedure adopted in Niazi's case - "In respect of 
the presentation of his case in defence", remarked His Lordship, wthe 
minimum requirements of justice are that an accused person should be 
allowed to present his plea, as well as a reasonable opportunity to 
support it, and to rebut the evidence led against him, by producing 
defence witnesses. The procedure actually followed would seem to 
satisfy these requirements"'1 •
The petition for leave to appeal was therefore dismissed* 
Cockburn, C.J., in Phillips v. Eyre^2^  made certain 
observations about the legal import and character of Indemnity Act,
(23) id, page 193*
(24) (1869) 4 Q.B. 225
-333-
which would seem to be pertinent in this context.
"There can be no doubt", said the Chief Justice, "that every
so called Indemnity Act involves a manifest violation of justice, in
as much as it deprives those who have suffered wrongs of their vested
right to the redress which the law would otherwise afford them and
gives immunity to those who have inflicted those wrongs, not at the
expense of the community for whose alleged advantage the wrongful acts
were done, but at the expense of individuals who, innocent possibly
of all offence, have been subjected to injury and outrage often of
the most outrageous character* It is equally true, as was forcibly
urged on us, that such legislation may be used to cover acts of most
tyrannical, arbitrary and merciless character, acts not capable of
being justified or palliated even by the plea of necessity, but
prompted by local passions, prejudices or fears - acts not done with
the temper and judgement which those in authority are bound to bring
to the exercise of so fearful a power, but characterised by reckless
indifference to human suffering and an utter disregard of the dictates
of common humanity. On the other hand, however, it must not be
forgotten that against any abuse1 of local legislative authority in
such a case protection is provided by the necessity of the assent of
the Sovereign, acting under the advice of Ministers, themselves
responsible to Parliament. We may rest assured that no such enactment
would receive the royal assent unless it were confined to acts
honestly done in the suppression of existing rebellion, and under the
(25)
pressure of the most urgent necessity. The present indemnity
(25) The Act of Indemnity passed by the legislature of Jamaica after 
the rebellion of 1865*
-334-
is confined to acts done in order to suppress the insurrection and 
rebellion, and the plea contains consequently the necessary 
averments that the grievances complained of were committed during 
the continuance of the rebellion, and were used for its suppression, 
and were reasonably and in good faith considered by the defendant to 
be necessary for the purpose; and it will therefore, be incumbent 
on the defendant to make good these averments in order to support 
his plea".
Referring to the troublous days of the civil war which 
followed the assassination of Caesar, Cassius remarked,
"In such a time as this it is not meet 
That every nice offence should bear his comment
(26) William Shakespeare, Julius Caesar, IV, iii, 7-8*
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iii. Constitutional Crisis to 1954-55
TJnder Section 8(2) of the Indian Independence Act, 1947* the
power of the Governor-General or any Governor to act in his discretion
or to exercise his individual judgement lapsed as from August 15,
(1)1947# The whole field of governmental activity was brought under
the control of the Cabinet and the Cabinet responsible to the 
legislature was the real executive. The Governor-General was 
presumed to act on the advice of the ministers. Though there was 
little of discretionary power left to the Governor-General under the 
Government of India Act, 1935* &s adapted in Pakistan, he, in fact, 
continued to enjoy wide and substantial powers, for the ministers 
were chosen by him and they held office during his pleasure* A 
minister could remain in office for ten months without being a member 
of the legislature. While retaining the power to proclaim an 
emergency under the Government of India Act, 1935* the Governor-General 
was empowered by the Government of India (Second Amendment) Act, 1948* 
to proclaim a state of emergency on a threat to the security or 
economic life of any part of the country arising from the likelihood 
of war, internal disturbance or mass movements of population. The 
Governor-General could legislate by ordinance in emergencies, 
irrespective of the fact whether the legislature was sitting or not,
(1) Section 3(2) o f the Pakistan Provisional Constitutional Order, 
1947* promulgated by the Viceroy on August 14, 1947* also 
provided that the Governor-General and the Provincial Governors 
shohHlose their powers of acting independently of their 
ministers*
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and there was no time limit fixed for the validity of such ordinances' 
The exercise of substantial powers was also due to the personality of 
the holders of the post during the early years of the Dominion.
Mr. Jinnah who was the first Governor-General was far more than 
Governor-General. He was the founder of Pakistan? he v/as the 
President of the Constituent Assembly and the ultimate authority in 
the Muslim League at a time when Muslim League and Pakistan were almost 
synonymous. Xt may be mentioned that his appointment as Governor- 
General, partly compelled by his own refusal to accept Lord 
Mountb at ten as the Governor-General of both the new Dominions, was 
not in keeping with the longstanding British tradition that the 
Governor-General of a Dominion should be a ceremonial head of the 
State far above local and party politics*
After Jinnah* s death Liaguat Ali Khan, who wielded real power 
at the time, elected to remain Prime Minister, an action calculated 
to make government by a parliamentary executive as effective as 
elsewhere in the Commonwealth. Khwaja Nazimuddin, who became the 
second Governor-General, appeared to be willing to discharge his 
duties as constitutional head of the State in the manner customary 
in the Commonwealth without wielding the real power which his 
predecessor had exercised. At Liaguat All's death, the erstwhile 
Governor-General chose to become the Prime Minister, as real power
(2) It was only in 1950 that the Governor-General's power to
lesgislate by Ordinances was brought within the control of the 
Federal Legislature by the Government of India (Second Amendment) 
Act, 1950.
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lay in the Prime Minister's hands. But Nazimuddin did not prove a
strong leader. When factions developed within the Cabinet, Ghulam
Mohammad, the third Governor-General, took advantage of the
situation and dismissed from the office of the Prime Minister
Nazimuddin who still retained the confidence of the Legislature.
The Governor-General was able to do this because a group within the
Cabinet was in league with him. This dismissal "caused bewilderment
(3)in all constitutional quarters". ' This was the only instance up 
to the time of the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly in 1954 
when the Governor-General acted except on the advice of the Cabinet. 
With the appointment of Muhammad Ali as Prime Minister, it seemed 
that the Cabinet would be subservient to the Governor-General. But 
the new Prime Minster soon secured the confidence and support of the 
Constituent Assembly and was able to exercise the powers normally 
attached to his office in the Commonwealth. The Assembly which was 
growing impatient of the Governor-General1s continued exercise of 
substantial powers amended Sections 9* 10, 10A, 10B of the Government 
of India Act, 1935* as adapted in Pakistan, so as to make it 
obligatory on the Governor-General to act on the advice of his 
ministers, to appoint as Prime Minister the member of the Federal 
Legislature who enjoyed the confidence of the majority and as other 
ministers the nominees of the Prime Minister. The legislature could 
also compel a resignation of the Cabinet by a no-confidence resolution.
(3) G. W. Choudhury, Parliamentary Government in Pakistan, 
Parliamentary Affairs Vol. XI, No. 1, page 85.
The Governor-General was divested of his powers to dismiss the 
ministry* The ministers would no longer hold office during the 
pleasure of the Governor-General, hut would now he individually and 
collectively responsible to the Federal Legislature. This 
constitutional coup which these amendments envisaged was effected in 
somewhat dramatic circumstances. Ghulam Muhammad was away on tour; 
when the Amendment Bill was introduced and passed in great haste with 
practically no discussion; it was passed immediately after the repeal 
of the Public and Representative Offices (Disqualification) Act, 1949, 
when proceedings under it were pending against some members of the 
legislature. Ghulam Muhammad retaliated by dissolving the Constituent 
Assembly, asserting by proclamation that "the constitutional machinery 
has broken down". He declared a state of emergency and claimed that 
v'the Constituent Assembly as at present constituted has lost the 
confidence of the people and can no longer function". He directed 
the Prime Minister to reform the Cabinet "with a view to giving the 
country a vigorous and stable administration". He also announced his 
intention of summoning a new Assembly as soon as possible.
Though the Constituent Assembly had not carried out its function 
of preparing a constitution for Pakistan during the seven years of 
its deliberations, when it was dissolved on October 24, a draft 
constitution was expected to be ready for signature on October 25, 
and would have been reported to the Assembly on October 27*^^
(4) Ivor Jennings, Constitutional Problems in Pakistan, page 3*
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The President of the Constituent Assembly, Moulvi Tamizuddin 
Khan denied that the Governor-General had power to dissolve the 
Assembly. He petitioned the Chief Court of Sind for a writ of 
mandamus under Section 223A of the Government of India Act, 1935, 
which had been inserted by the Government of India (Amendment) Act 
1954* to restrain the Federal Government from giving effect to the 
dissolution of the Assembly and also for a writ of quo warranto under 
the same section against some of the new Ministers on the ground that 
they were not qualified to be ministers under Section 10 of the 
Government of India Act as substituted by the Government of India 
(Fifth Amendment) Act, 1954*
The Advocate General for Pakistan contended on behalf of the 
Federation that the Government of India (Amendment) Act, 1954, and 
the Government of India (Fifth Amendment) Act, 1954, were invalid 
because they had not received the Governor-General1s assent and that 
the Governor-General as representative of the Queen had power to 
dissolve the Assembly. A full bench of the Chief Court found for 
Tamizuddin Khan on the mandamus and so far as Ministers appointed on 
or after the dissolution of the Assembly was concerned on the quo 
warranto also* v ' The Chief Court held that Section 6(3) of the 
Indian Independence Act, 1947, which laid down that "the Governor-
General shall have full power' to assent .to any law of the
Legislature of that Dominion and so much of any Act as relates to the 
disallowance of laws by His Majesty or the reservation of laws for the
(5) Tamizuddin Khan v. Federation of Pakistan. P.L.D. (1955) Sind,96*
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signification of His Majesty's pleasure thereon shall not apply to 
laws of the Legislature of either of the new Dominions %  did not mean 
that assent was essential to the validity of the laws, hut merely 
provided that if assent was necessary the Governor-General's power to 
give or withhold assent was not to he controlled by any external 
authority. It further held that the power to dissolve the Assembly 
could not be claimed as a prerogative power of the Grown which the 
Governor-General could exercise as the Queen's representative, 
especially because the Crown's power had not been exercised for two 
and a half centuries and the right of the Head of any Dominion to 
dissolve the Dominion Legislature was laid down in statutes. So if 
there was power to dissolve, it should be found in the Constitution 
Act. Seotion 5 of the Independence Act which stated that "there shall 
be a Governor-General who shall be appointed by His Majesty for the 
purposes of the government of the new Dominion......" could mean only
that the Governor-General represented the Crown for governing the 
Dominion in accordance with the adapted Act of 1935, and not for all 
purposes. He had only such powers as were granted to him under the 
Constitution or under his commission. The Independence Act had made 
no provision as to the duration of the Constituent Assembly. The 
Governor's power to dissolve the Provincial Assembly had been retained 
in Section 62 of the adapted Act of 1935, but no such power for the 
Governor-General was kept alive. As the prerogative of dissolution 
is covered by the Independence Act and as the prerogative could not 
be exercised concurrently with the statutory power, the Governor- 
General could not be deemed to have been empowered to dissolve the
-341-
Constituent Assembly.
The Federation of Pakistan and the Ministers appealed to the 
Federal Court which held (Cornelius, J., dissenting) that the assent 
of the Governor-General was essential to the validity of the 
legislation of the Constituent Assembly, and that therefore the Sind 
Chief Court had acted without jurisdiction in that Section 223A not 
having received such assent was not part of the law of Pakistan. 
Muhammad Munir, C.J., who delivered the principal judgement maintained 
that Pakistan being a Dominion its laws required the assent of the 
Crown or its representative* The Crown's prerogatives continued to 
exist, except in so far as they were covered by the Independence Act 
and the fact that the power of veto had not been used for a long time 
did not imply that assent was not essential* The Crown is still an 
integral part of the Dominion Legislature. No distinction could be 
made between Constitution Acts which expressly declared that the 
Crown was an integral part of the Legislature and the provisional 
Constitution of Pakistan under which the legislative power was 
exercised by the Constituent Assembly. Under Section 8 of the 
Independence Act the provisional Constitution could be amended only 
by a law of the Constituent Assembly and Section 6(3) gave the 
Governor-General full power to assent to a law of the Legislature of 
the Dominion* If under Subsection (1) of Section 8 the Legislature 
of the Dominion was the Constituent Assembly, under Subsection (2) 
it was the Federal Legislature when exercising legislative power under 
the Act of 1935 as adapted in Pakistan*'Legislature of the Dominion1 
in Section 6, could not be restricted to the Federal Legislature,
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because Legislature of the Dominion could, under the Act, enact laws 
outside the competence of the Federal Legislature, The power of 
assent could not be held to derogate from the independence of the 
Dominion, as the Governor-General is appointed on the advice of the 
ministry of the Dominion. Further the power is normally exercised on 
ministerial advice.
The United Kingdom Parliament, it was pointed out, was unlikely t 
have envisaged a situation in which assent should be deemed necessary 
for laws passed by the Constituent Assembly when acting in one 
capacity and unnecessary, for laws passed when it was acting in another 
capacity. If this position were admitted, it would be possible for 
the Constituent Assembly to eliminate assent altogether by passing laws 
within its powers as Federal Legislature while acting as a constitution- 
making body.
The expression 'government of the Dominion1 in Section 5 (There 
shall be a Governor-General...... for the purpose of the government
of the Dominion) could not be restricted to government under the Act 
of 1935 as adapted. Government should include not only the execution 
of constitutional law^, but also the making of them. Section 5 would 
therefore vest in the Governor-General the power to exercise royal 
prerogatives subject to any statutory provision to the contrary.
Cornelius, J., in his dissenting judgement pointed out, among 
other things, that as all the organs of the State had hitherto acted 
upon the belief that for constitutional laws assent was unnecessary, 
the established constitutional practice was to be upheld* He referred 
to three cases, two of them decided by the Federal Court itself in
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v-rhich the decision implied that the Governor-General1 s assent was not 
essential for the validity of constitutional laws. In M* A* Khuhro v* 
The Federation  ^^  the appellant challenged the Public and 
Representative Offices (Disqualification) Act, 1949, as invalid on the 
ground that it had not received the assent of the Governor-General*
On behalf of the Federation it was asserted that no such assent was 
necessary because the Act was passed by the Constituent Assembly 
sitting as a Constitution-making body and not as Federal Legislature. 
The Sind Chief Court held that no assent was necessary, interpreting 
Section 6(3) of the Independence Act to mean that "in cases where the 
assent of His Majesty may be necessary, it shall be given in His 
Majesty*s name"*
( 7 )Txi Khan Iftakhar Hussain v. The Crown v 7 the validity of the 
same Act was questioned before the Federal Court on the ground that 
it should have been passed by the Federal Legislature and should, 
therefore, have received the assent of the Governor-General. The 
court accepted in full the argument of the Federation that the Act was 
constitutional law and therefore fell within the purview of the words 
*for the purpose of making provision as to the Constitution of the 
Dominion* (Section 8(1) of the Independence Act) and the appeal by 
the Khan of Mamdot was accordingly dismissed,
(8)In a third case, Akbar Khan v* The Crown v ' it was contended 
by the appellants that the Rawalpindi Conspiracy (Special Trials) Act,
(6) P.X..D. (1950) Sind. 49.
(7)P.L.D. (1951) P.O. 51.
(8) F.L.D. (1954) P.O. 87.
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1951 > was a law within the federal sphere of legislation and that as 
it had not received the assent of the Governor-General it was invalid. 
The Federal Court again held that it was constitutional law. The 
implication in the two last mentioned cases was clearly that for
(9)constitutional law assent of the Governor-General was not necessary,
The decision of the Federal Court in Tamizuddin’s case implied
that all Acts passed by the Constituent Assembly otherwise than in
exercise of powers as the Federal Legislature were invalid because
none of them had received the assent of the Governor-General,
including an Act of 1950 by which the Assembly had purported to amend
its own composition by adding six members to it} and because its
composition thus amended was invalid, its Acts as Federal legislature
since 1950 should also be regarded as invalid. In this situation
the Governor-General issued a proclamation of emergency under Section
102 of the Government of India Act, 1955* and an Emergency Powers
Ordinance under Section 42 of the same Act and ’all other powers in
that behalf’, purporting to validate thirtyfive out of the fortyfour
Acts deemed to have been invalidated by the decision in Tamizuddin’s
case. The validity of the Ordinance was challenged in the Lahore
High Court in Akbar Khan v. The Crown, b u t  before the argument
(1 1)in the case was concluded another case Hsif Patel v. The Crownv ' came 
up before the Federal Court in which it was held that the Governor- 
General had no power to give retrospective validation to constitutional
(9) Federation of Pakistan v. Tamizuddin Khan, P.L.R. (195&) W,P,506#
(10) referred to in Jennings, Constitutional Problems in Pakistan, p*5*
(11) P.L.D. 1955 F*C. 587*
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legislation and that the Oi’dinance was therefore invalid. The court 
pointed out that under Section 42 the Governor-General could not 
validate laws on a subject matter over which neither he nor the Federal 
Legislature was empowered to legislate.
The Governor-General thereupon assented to the thirtyfive Acts 
scheduled to the Emergency Powers Ordinance, 1955» appreciating fully 
well that this assent would not have retroactive effect. He issued 
a proclamation summoning a Constitutional Convention to exercise 
constitution-making powers. He issued another proclamation assuming 
to himself such powers as were necessary to validate and enforce the 
laws that were needed to avoid a breakdown in the constitutional and 
administrative machinery of the country and to preserve the State and 
maintain the Government of the country in its existing condition and 
in the exercioe of those powers retrospectively validated and declared 
enforceable the laws mentioned in the Schedule to the Emergency Powers 
Ordinance, 1955* These powers were exercised subject to the opinion 
of the Federal Court in its advisory jurisdiction on a reference to it 
made under Section 215 of the Constitution Act of 1955* Two questions 
were referred to the court.
(i) What are the powers and responsibilities of the Governor-
General before the new Constituent Convention passes the 
necessary legislation?
(ii) Is there any provision in the Constitution or any rule of law
by which the Governor-General can validate legislation and
acts done under it, where their invalidation endangers the 
state, until,the question of their validation is determined 
by the new Constituent Convention?
* •346* *
Subsequently as suggested by the Federal Court in an interim 
order two further questions were referred*
(i) Whether the Constituent Assembly was rightly dissolved?
(ii) Whether the Constituent Convention will be competent to 
exercise the powers of the Constituent Assembly?
On May 10, 1955 * the Federal Court gave its opinion that the 
dissolution of the Constituent Assembly was valid and that if a new 
Constituent Assembly (not a Constituent Convention) could be summoned 
with the same composition and powers as the old one, the Invalid Acts 
might be revalidated as an interim measure until the approval of the 
new Constituent Assembly could be obtained for them. The court 
observed in regard to the dissolved Assembly that although it had 
functioned for more than seven years it had failed to frame a 
constitution, that it had in course of time ceased to be a 
representative body, that it had for all practical purposes assumed 
the form of a perpetual legislature and that it had throughout asserted 
contrary to law that the constitutional laws made by it were valid 
without the assent of the Governor-General*
The Independence Act envisaged a representative Constituent 
Assembly for the Dominion. Periodic accountability of representatives 
to electors is a basic principle of democratic constitutions. If the 
Constituent Assembly lost its representative character by lhpsi: of 
time, it could no longer function as the Constituent Assembly set up 
under the Independence Act* When it assumed the position that the 
assent of the Governor-General was unnecessary for the constitutional 
laws passed by it, it was functioning outside the Constitution. Its
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composition itself was tainted with illegality when it added six
(12}
members to its personnel by an Act ' ' passed without the required
assent. In such a situation as this where the Constituent Assembly 
had failed to perform its function, the Governor-General might 
exercise the prerogative of dissolution.
In regard to the validation of laws, opinions differed.
Muhammad Munir, C.J., who delivered the opinion of the majority of the
court observed that the power claimed under the validating proclamation
was for a temporary period and with a view to preventing the State
from dissolution and the constitutional and administrative machinery
from breaking down. (Phis distinguished the issue from that in Usif
Patel*s case in which the Governor-General had claimed a permanent
power of validation* The situation presented by the reference was
governed by rules which were part of the common law of all civilised
states and which every written constitution of a civilised people
took for granted* This branch of the law was, the law of civil or
state necessity. In the proceedings against George Stratton and 
(13)others, * lord Mansfield observed that an otherwise illegal aot 
would be justified if there was imminent danger to the government and 
individuals, if the mischief were extreme and such as would not admit 
a possibility of waiting for a legal remedy provided that the act did 
not go further than what the necessity obliged. There were times of 
tumult when for the sake of legality itself the rules of law might
(12^ The Increase and Re—distribution of Seats Act, 1949*
\  i  10)l\ R o w e ll's  s ta te  T r ia ls ,  1040.
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have to he broken, placing reliance upon an Act of Indemnity. The 
court therefore held that as an interim measure the Governor-General 
might retrospectively validate the invalid measures under the common 
law of civil or state necessity.
Two members of the court (Cornelius and Sharif, J.J.) dissented 
on the question of validation of the legislation. Both of them held 
the view that on constitutional matters the Governor-General was not 
competent to legislate and could not therefore by his own act make 
valid laws which he himself could not enact. The power in respect of 
political initiative vested exclusively in the Constituent Assembly 
and the Governor-General could not claim any share in the positive 
exercise of that power* The Governor-General, according to 
Cornelius, J., could stay proceedings which challenged the invalid 
measures in all courts except the Federal Court, pending their 
validation by the new Constituent Assembly. Sharif, J., observed in 
relation to the doctrine of state necessity that maxims like salus 
populi supreme lex and rnecessity makes lawful what is otherwise 
unlawful1 had sometimes been invoked in times of war or other national 
disaster, but they had never been extended to embrace changes in 
constitutional law under the stress of circumstances created by some 
particular interpretation of law. It might lead to dangerous 
consequences if the constitutional structure could be tampered with 
in any real or supposed emergency of which the head of the state alone 
must be the judge. nIt has a sanctity of its own which is not to be 
violated".'14^
(14) Special Reference Ro. 1 of 1955* R.IuR. 0956) W.P* 598*
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In October 1955 the new Constituent Assembly passed the 
Validation of Laws Act, 1955» validating thirtynine laws deemed to 
have been held invalid by the decision of the Federal Court in 
Tami2iuddints case. It then seriously devoted itself to the task of 
drafting the new Constitution which was introduced into the Assembly 
on January 9» 1956, and passed on February 29. The new Constitution 
came into force on March 23, 1956 ushering in the Islamic Republic 
of Pakistan*
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iv* Governor^ Buie in the Provinces
As we have seen, powers existed under Section 93 of the 
Government of India Act, 1935* for a provincial Governor, on "behalf 
of the Federal Government, to take over the administration of a 
province if it was found that the normal constitutional machinery had 
broken down. Section 93 was repealed hy the Pakistan Provisional 
Constitution Order, 1947* Hr, Jinnah, who wielded unquestioned 
authority, acting under the extraordinary powers granted to the 
Governor-General by Section 9 of the Independence Act which empowered 
him, inter alia, to make such provisions as appeared to him to be 
necessary or expedient for making omissions from, and additions to, 
and adaptations and modifications of, the Government of India Act, 
1935* inserted by order Section 9 2 k  into the Act,
The Section reads as follows* 
fl92A(1)* If at any time the Governor-General is satisfied that 
a grave emergency exists whereby the peace and security of Pakistan 
or any part thereof is threatened, or that a situation has arisen 
in which the Government of a Province cannot be carried on in 
accordance with the provisions of this Act, he may by proclamation 
direct the Governor of a Province to assume on behalf of the Governor- 
General all or any of the powers vested in or exercisable by any 
provincial body or authority $ any such proclamation may contain such 
incidental and consequential provisions as may appear to the Governor- 
General to be necessary or desirable for giving effect to the objects 
of the proclamation including provisions for suspending in whole or 
in part the operation of any provisions of this Act relating to any
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provincial body or authority, provided that nothing in this Subsection 
shall authorise the Governor-General to direct the suspension of any 
of the powers vested in or exercisable by, a High Court, or to 
suspend either in whole or in part the operation of any provisions of 
this Act relating to High Courts,
(2) Any such proclamation may be revoked or varied by a 
subse quent proclamation",
The original Section 93 had been unsparingly used during the 
war in consequence of the resignation, on the orders of the Congress 
High Command, of the Congress ministers in the Provinces where 
Congress had secured overwhelming majorities in the legislatures*
Rule under Section 93 was not therefore kindly looked upon by 
politically conscious persons in India who regarded the Section as 
devised to deal with cases where a provincial ministry was unwilling 
to accept the implications of British rule* Section 92A, on the 
other hand, could be represented as a normal part of the working of 
federal politice.1 relations between the Centre and the Provinces*
It is noteworthy that whereas Section 93 vested the power of 
suspension of the provincial constitution in the Governor, under 
Section 92A it was exercised by the Governor-General*
*|he Section was first brought into operation in Pan jab in 1949* 
The first Chief Minister of the Province was the Khan of Mamdot who 
was dismissed in 1949 and subjected to a judicial inquiry under the
(OPublic and Representative Offices (Disqualification) Act, 1949*
(1) See In the matter of Khan Iftikhan Hussain Khan of Mamdot* 
P.XuD. 1950 Lahore 12*
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whioh empowered the Governor-General and the Provincial Governors to 
disqualify from public office persons found guilty of maladministration 
after judicial inquiry. With the existing provincial Assembly it 
seemed impossible to find a stable ministry* The Governor-General 
therefore vested the executive power of the Province in the Governor 
who continued to rule as delegate of the Centre until the elections 
were held in 1951 • After the elections Daultana became Chief Minister 
but was compelled to resign after the disturbances of 1953. He was 
siicceeded by Firoz Khan Noon who had been Governor of Fast Bengal, 
Though he was not popular with the Assembly, he retained his position 
as long as he remained persona grata with the Centrsl Government, 
which needed his support for the policy of integrating the provinces 
of West Pakistan into a single unit, Eventually he lost favour with 
the Central Government and with the Provincial Governor over the 
election of members to the second Constituent Assembly, He was in 
his turn dismissed and his place was taken up by H, K* Basti.
Governor*s rule under Section 92A was imposed on Sind from 
December 1951 to May 1953. Mr, Khuhro, the Chief Minister was 
accused of maladministration and corruption and was dismissed in 194®. 
As a result of judicial inquiry under the Public and Representative 
Offices (Disqualification) Act, 1949» He was disqualified from holding 
public office for three years. His successor Pir Ilahi Bakhsh was 
deposed and disqualified as a consequence of the findings of an 
election tribunal which had conducted an investigation into his part 
in the election of 1946. Two more Chief Ministers assumed office 
befox^ e Khuhro succeeded in having his disqualification set aside on the
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ground that the tribunal which had enquired into his case and 
recommended his disqualification was not constituted as required by 
the Public and Representative Offices (Disqualification) Act, and 
became Chief Minister a second time. He was again removed by the 
Governor; an investigation was again conducted and he was again 
disqualified from public office along with Fazlullah who had, under 
pressure, yielded his Chief Ministership to him. As there was no 
likelihood of a stable government being formed, the Governor-General 
under Section 9 2 k  directed the Governor to exercise discx^etionary 
powers and the Provincial Assembly was dissolved prepax^atory to new 
elections,
The length of the period of Governor *s rule in the Pan jab and 
also in Sind was ascribed to the need to prepare for the first 
experiment in elections based on adult franchise, but it also 
^provided a period of political manoevre in which to influence the 
composition of the future legislature
In March 1954 the provincial constitution was suspended under 
Section $ 2 A  in Fast Bengal for a period of two weeks. This, it 
would appear^was not a political manoevre. The term of the old 
legislature had expired and it seemed desirable to have Governor*s 
rule during the period of elections and the installation of a new 
government. However, it proved necessary again to have recourse 
to Section 92A and from May 1954 to June 1955 Governor!s rule 
obtained in East Bengal, A coalition composed of two major and
(2) Khuhro 'v,' Fe'dVration of Pakistan, P,L*D. 1950 Sind 49,
(3) Callard, It* Pakistan, page 160,
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several minor parties called the United Front, held together hy a
common desire for autonomy for Fast Bengal and a shared determination
to defeat the Muslim League, emerged as the victor in the elections.
The Governor had no choice but to call on Fazlul Huq, the leader of
the United Front, to form a Cabinet, According to one observer,
Hug. “immediately began to demand freedom from domination and
exploitation by Karachi,. He first called for provincial autonomy,
with responsibility for only defence, currency, and foreign affairs
to be vested in the Center? but later he spoke of undoing partition
altogether and of a return to union with India, It was reported that
he also went to the extreme of establishing a provincial foreign
(5)affairs ministry.,lv ' When there was a serious breakdown of law and
order in the paper mills in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, the Central
Government took advantage of the situation and Fazlul 1-Iuq. was dismissed
from office on the ground that his government was no longer able to
maintain law and order. Not only was the Cabinet dismissed,but the
Assembly was not allowed to meet. The Huq ministry was replaced by
Governors rule under General Iskander Mirza, who had been until that
time the Secretax’y of the Ministry of Defence. ‘Martial law was
(6)
declared and troop reinforcements poured into Fast Pakistan1'. '
The United Front had defeated the Muslim League at the provincial 
elections mainly by the appeal to the desire of Fast Bengal to achieve 
greater freedom fron control from Karachi. Though some of the
(4) S. Maron, The Problem of East Pakistan, Pacific Affairs,
Volume XXXVIII, No. 2, page 134*
(5) ibid*
(6) id, 136,
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belligerant statements attributed to Huq were foolish and disloyal 
it is submitted that by suspending the provincial constitution and 
introducing discretionary rule so soon after the elections, the 
opportunity was lost of testing an essential of democratic rule in 
a federation, the continuance of government, notwithstanding that 
different political parties were in control of the Central and 
Provincial Governments. "A democracy is not necessarily a form of 
government that is administered efficiently by men who know what is
(*7\
best for the citizens".' y
The Prime Minister made a statement on May 3o, 1954* that the 
Governor*s rule under Section 92A would “remain in force for the 
minimum time necessary to restore law and order and public confidence
/0 N
so that Parliamentary government can function successfully'* ' But
six months later, the then Minister of the Interior said* “One thing
is certain - the Centre will never allow this province to again incur
the danger of disintegration* The well-being and happiness of the
masses, as always, will be the paramount consideration. There are
many schemes to be completed and I am convinced that the 9 2 L
Administration can still do more solid work for the people and further
(9)tone up the basic administration."' '
By the middle of March 1955 Prime Minister Muhammad Ali went on 
an official mission to Fast Bengal with the authorisation of the 
Cabinet, it was reported, to select any eligible candidate for the
(7) id, 137.
(8) Broadcast, May 30, 1954.
(9) Dawn, November 18, 1954.
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Chief Ministership of the province except Fazlul Huq, who, according 
to the Prime Minister, was a ,!self confessed traitor to Fakistan**^^ 
Muhammad Ali had long conferences with the principal political leaders 
of the province and came to the unhappy conclusion that only Fazlul 
Hug. would he ahle to gather sufficient support to establish a stable 
government* As there was a split over the Premier^ proposal to 
re-instate Hug., with General Iskander Mirza, who by this time had 
been transferred from Governor^oj? East Bengal to Ministl^ of the 
Interior at the Centre, strongly opposing the suggestion, the 
reestablishment of Parliamentary government in the Province was 
postponed.
In June 1955* however, Abu Hussain Sarkar, a United Front
member of the Central Cabinet, with Cabinet approval, moved to
East Bengal to head a new ministry*
It would appear that it was not always on the report of the
Governor that action under Section 9^A was taken.
During the proceedings under the Public and Representative
Offices (Disqualification) Act, instituted against Mr. Hameedul Huq
Chowdhury, Minister of Finance and Commerce in East Pakistan, the
Chief Secretary revealed in September 1950 that under instructions
from the Central Government he had effectively stopped the export of
(1 1)
steel drums to India which had been ordered by Mr. Chowdhury*x '
Since then it was often asserted by members of the East Bengal
Oo* Broadcast on June 1, 1954*
(11) Dawn* Karachi, September 20, 1950.
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( 12)Legislative Assembly' 1 as also by members of the Constituent
(13)Assembly' / that the Chief Secretary used to send fortnightly reports
on the activities of provincial Ministers to the Central Government*
Though it could be said that when Liaqu&t Ali Khan was Prime
Minister, the Central Government was controlled by the Muslim League
politicians, under Ghulam Muhammad as Governor-General the power of
the Muslim League politicians declined steadily mainly owing to the
indecisiveness and inept policies of Khwaja JTasimuddin, th6 Prime
Minister, with the result that it looked as if the civil servants
led by the Governor-General and supported by the army officers had
extended their influence over the Central Government itself
The Muslim League Govemmentt of Khwaja Hasimuddin at the Centre
was declared by the Munir Report to be jointly responsible along with
the West Panjab Muslim League Government of Laultana for the religious
riots in West Panjab* If there had been an alternative political
party, it would appear, the politicians would have retained power.
fIBut the Muslim League, by taking credit for the establishment of
Pakistan, took care that no alternative party arose to challenge
(15)their position11. * The Governor-General*s summary dismissal of 
the Prime Minister in April 1953 clearly indicated who exercised 
effective political power.
(12) id, March 2, 1951.
(13) Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, Volume I. Ho, 68 
February 9» 1956, page 2778,
(14) K. B, Sayeed, The Political Hole of Pakistan*s Civil Service, 
Pacific Affairs. Volume XXX1, No.2, page. 133.
(15) ibid.
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When Ghulam Muhammad in October 1954 dissolved the Constituent 
Assembly, a year and a half after the summary dismissal of Nazimuddin 
from Premiership^ and chose his "cabinet of talents %  it could be said 
that the Viceroy1s Executive Council was reincarnated and real power 
came to be exercised by the permanent civil service of the country. 
Expounding the political philosophy of the hew government, 
Iskander Mirza, who was then the Minister of the Interior, of States 
and Frontier Regions, declared^
"Some undeveloped countries have to learn democracy, and until 
they do so they have to be controlled. With so many illiterate 
people, politicians could make a mess of things. There was nothing 
undemocratic in declaring the state of emergency, because 95 per cent 
of the people welcomed it.
The people wanted an honest government and they would get it. 
They would also get law and order, and prompt justice* There was 
no point in having the fine British administrative system with good 
traditions that Pakistan had inherited unless it was run in the 
British way.11
When once Ghulam Muhammad decided to integrate the three
provinces and a number of other political units of West Pakistan into
a united West Pakistan Province, he ensured, by a repeated recourse
to Section 92A, the elimination of all those Chief Ministers who
(1?)opposed integration.' ' The Chief Ministers of Sind, Bahawalpur,
the North West Frontier Province and West Panjab fell from office in
(16) The Times (London) October 30, 1954*
(17) K. B. Sayeed, op. cit. page 134*
(10)quick succession,' '
Ghulam Muhammad who had been in indifferent health ever since
he assumed office in 1951 k&d "by the middle of 1955 exhausted his
energies j In July 1955 Major General Iskander Mirsa whose views on
'’controlled1' democracy have been quoted above, assumed office in an
officiating capacity. In October he became Governor-General and on
March 23, 1956* with the inauguration of the new Constitution he
became the President of the Islamic Republic,
The Times, (London) remarked about the turn of events in Pakistan®
"It draws attention to the recurrent conflict in Pakistan between
those who want the ablest leaders to exercise supreme power,
irrespective of popular support and those who think it more important
that the Chief Minister should be supported as widely as possible by
(19^the dominant party", * The comments made by the Observer were more
pointed and as it turned out, even prophetic* It said, 'The political
complexion of Pakistan in the future will be largely determined by the
extent to which these British-trained senior administrators and army
officers consider that they are the only ones qualified to control the
evolution of the country1s institutions". ' Dawn (Karachi)
commented caustically* "If you play about with eugenics, freak
offsprings often result; similarly if Power tries artificial
insemination vd-th democracy, democratic institutions can become
(21)
freaks. Such is what our disgusted people now behold."' ' *
(18) ibid,
(191 The Times. April 26, 1956*=
(20; The Observer (London) September 4* 1955*
(21) Pawn (Editorial, 'This Madhouse") May 24, 1956,
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The implications of democi'acy in Pakistan were well brought out
( 22)in the Constituent Assembly in September 1955 hy Mr. Suhrawardy ' 7
who described the position of the Prime Minister as follows® "So, Sir, 
to be the Prime Minister of Pakistan which has been held by certain 
honourable gentlemen who have been turned out, taken by the ears and 
thrown out as it suited the ruling coterie is not a matter of very 
great honour1
(22) Later Prime Minister of Pakistan (September 1956 to October
1957)
(23) Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, September 10, 1955j 
Volume X Ho. 21, page 652.
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CHAPTER VIII 
MSRGEUCY POWERS IK THE REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN
i* Emergency Provisions in the Constitution
The Constitution of Pakistan, 1956, like the Constitution of
India, formed a logical continuation of the scheme of government
envisaged in the Government of India Act, 1935* Many of the terms
and even whole clauses of the Act were transferred to the new
constitutional instrument* Whereas the Constitution Act of 1935 was
a grant of powers hy the United Kingdom Parliament, the Preamble to
the Pakistan Constitution of 1956 predicated that it was a grant of
powers by the people to whom the Almighty had entrusted authority to
be exercised within prescribed limits* Furthermore the Islamic
Provisions (in Part XII) inter alia, made it obligatory that no law
in the statute book should be repugnant to the injunctions of Islam
(1 )as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah,' * otherwise the 
Constitution was ah adaptation, modelled to a large extent on the 
Constitution of India, of the Constitution Aot of 1935, deemed 
suitable to conditions in Pakistan* Hot a few of the provisions were 
verbatim or near reproductions of the Articles of the Indian 
Constitution* A clear instance of such reproduction, with 
occasional and slight alterations, was the emergency provisions of 
the Constitution. As the provisions in the Indian Constitution have 
been already dealt with, it is only necessary to point out the
(1) Article 19©.
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differences between these documents with regard to these provisions.
Like the Indian Constitution, the Pakistan Constitution 
provided for three types of emergencies* But the first type of 
emergency which may be referred to as a, general emergenoy could be 
proclaimed in Pakistan in slightly different circumstances* While the 
Indian Constitution contemplates"threat to the security of India or 
any part thereof by war or external aggression or internal disturbance, 
the Pakistan Constitution provided threat to the secuxdty or
r -
economic life of Pakistan or any part thereof by war or external
aggression or internal disturbance beyond the power of a Provincial
( 2)Government to control*' ' Thus in Pakistan, a threat to economic 
life would justify a proclamation of grave emergency. It is arguable, 
however, that 1 security* in Article 352 of the Indian Constitution 
connotes and includes economic security also. If that interpretation 
is accepted, the distinction is without a difference. A similar 
argument may be urged as to the other distinction made in regard to 
internal disturban*e, If the internal disturbance is one that can be 
put down by the unit concerned, it need not be considered a grave 
emergency in either country* The difference in the phraseology of 
the Pakistan provision may therefore be regarded as arising ex 
abundanti cautela*
While in India a proclamation of grave emergency will entitle 
the Union executive to give directions to any state as to the manner 
in which the executive power of the latter is to be exercised, in 
Pakistan, in like circumstances the President could also by Order
(2) Article 191 (1)
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assume to himself or direct the Governor of a Province to assume on
behalf of the President the functions of the Government of the Province
and the powers exercisable by any authority in the Province and make
incidental and consequential provisions for giving effect to the
object of the Proclamation, including provisions for suspending the
operation of any provisions of the Const itution relating to any
(3)authority in the Province, except the High Court,' '
It would appear that Parliamentary control of a proclamation of 
emergency was sought to be more effective under the Pakistan 
Constitution, It was provided that a proclamation was to be laid 
before the Rational Assembly "as soon as conditions make it practicable 
for the President to sximmon that Assembly" and if approved by the 
Assembly it would remain in force until revoked and if disapproved, 
would cease to operate from the date of d isapproval*^^ Y/hether 
conditions existed which made it practicable to summon the Assembly 
would not be a justiciable issue, but a matter to be decided by the 
President? so this safeguard might not prove effective. Further, 
while in the Indian Constitution it is provided that the proclamation 
will cettse to operate at the expiry of two months unless before the 
expiry of that period it has been approved by resolution of both 
Houses, it would be possible in Pakistan for a proclamation to remain 
in force for nearly six months before Parliament could have the 
opportunity of disapproving it, for the Constitution provided that a 
period of six months was not to intervene between the last sitting of
(3) Article 191 (2) (c)
(4) Article 191 (6)
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(5the Assembly in one session and its first sitting in the next session.
Under the Indian Constitution, even when the House of the People has
been dissolved, the Constitution provides some measure of Parliamentar
control of this power, for the proclamation cannot remain in force
longer than two months unless approved by the Council of States* But
in similar circumstances in Pakistan, no Parliamentary control could
be exercised when the unicameral legislature stood dissolved* Though
the President could be impeached not only for violating the
Constitution, but also for "gross misconduct", a non-existent
Assembly would not be able to prefer a charge against him* Thus the
failure to provide for a time-limit to the operation of the
proclamation in the absence of Parliamentary approval would tend to
tilt the balance in favour of the dictatorship of the executive.
Differing from the position in India, under the Pakistan
Constitution, there was no automatic suspension of the fundamental
rights on the proclamation of an emergency. The President could,
however, declare, by order, that the right to move any court for
the enforcement of such of the fundamental rights as might be specified
in the Order and all proceedings pending in any court for the
enforcement of the rights so specified, would remain suspended for
(6)the period of the emergency*' ' This is similar to the provision in 
Article 359 of the Indian Constitution*
Article 195 which made provision for the failure of constitutions 
machinery in a Province had, adopted, almost verbatim. Article 356
of the Indian Constitution, "though in a somewhat milder form"^^*
X3) Article 5 1 ~  “ "  “ * “  "
(6) Article 192(1)
(7) Newman, K*J., Essays on the Constitution of Pakistan, page 193*
Under the Pakistan Constitution, if the National Assembly extended 
the operation of the proclamation, it could do so only for another 
four months after the expiry of the first two months during which the 
pro cl am at 5.o n would be effective if not earlier disappi’oved by the 
Assembly* Thus whereas in India such a proclamation can remain in 
force for a maximum period of three years, in Pakistan it could remain 
so only for six months altogether* "Six months would seem a somewhat
/qN
short period" ' } to rectify the more obvious effects of 
misgovernment, to arrange fresh elect5,ons if that was necessary and to 
restore parliamentary government as soon as possible*
Another difference from the Indian provision was that in Pakistan 
action under the Article would be taken if the President was satisfied, 
"on receipt of a report of a Governor of a Province", that the 
provincial government could not be carried on in accordance with the 
Constitution, whereas in India a report from the Governor is not 
essential and suspension of the State Constitution may be made as a 
result of the failure of the State government to comply with a 
direction g'iven by the Union* Hence a wider power for tjie Centre is 
contemplated in the Indian Constitution.
Article 193 was brought into operation for the first time i&
May 1956 after the Speaker of the East Pakistan Assembly had ruled on 
procedural grounds that the budget might not be presented. An 
emergency under Article 193 was therefore proclaimed and the Central 
Government provided an interim budget for two months* After a week
(8 )  A . G le d h i l l ,  P a k is ta n , page 96*
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the Cabinet was restored. It was employed again from August 31
to September 6, 19 56* after the Sarkar ministry had re signed * ^ ^
In West Pakistan it was employed for political reasons in March
1957* A nominated Chief Minister continued in power nby intrigue and
manipulation” till the budget session of 1957 when he was compelled to
(1 1 )
resign*' ' But the Opposition party was not allowed to form a 
Cabinet* The emergency provision under Article 193 was brought into 
operation and the democratic process was suspended. nWhen it was 
restored, the same party (the Republicans) were put into power through 
back doors
Article 195 was employed again in East Pakistan when, on March
31, 1958, the Awami League Cabinet advised the Governor to prorogue
the Assembly because it fotmd that it was losing support and was
likely to be defeated. The Governor declined to accept this advice
and dismissed the ministry. The Central Government, v/hich was
anxious to keep the Awami League in power to ensure its support at the
Centre, thereupon dismissed the Governor and appointed a new Governor,
who, within a few minutes after his assumption of office, dismissed
(13)the Cabinet which had been appointed by his predecessor in office*' ' 
When the Assembly met in June, the Awami League ministry was 
defeated in the House. Mr* Sarkar, the leader of the Opposition, 
who had been dismissed earlier, was invited to form a Cabinet, but
(9) Pakistan Observer* May 23, 27 and June 2 $ 1956*
(10) Dawn* September 1 and 7, 1956*
(11; G. W* Choudhury, Failure of Parliamentary Democracy in Pakistan, 
in Parliamentary Affairs, Volume XII, Mo*1. page 6 5.
(12) ibid*
(13) ibid.
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his Cabinet did not last more than three days* In less than a week, 
two Gabinets were overthrown by the Assembly* f$his was mainly due 
to the activities and policies of a leftist party, the National
these circumstances it was thought desirable to proclaim Presidents
rule under the emergency provisions of the Constitution, which was
ended after a few weeks* When Parliamentary government was restored
in August, political bickerings between the contending parties had
developed to such an extent that open fighting ensued in the Assembly
Hall resulting in the beating of the Speaker, in the death of the
Deputy Speaker and in severe injuries to some other members.
In addition to the provisions relating to a general emergency,
and to the breakdown of the constitutional machinery in a province,
(15)there was another provision' f in the Constitution intended to 
safeguard the State against threats to its financial stability or 
credit. This provision also differed from the corresponding Indian 
provisions in two points.
(1) Whereas in India the President can make a proclamation of 
financial emergency if he is satisfied that the financial 
stability or credit of India or any part thereof is threatened, 
in Pakistan, a similar action on the part of the President 
necessitated, in addition to his satisfaction, on ministerial 
advice, prior '’consultation with the Governors of the Provinces 
or with the Governor of the Province concerned, as the case
Awami Party, whose aim was to create chaos and c o n f u s i o n I n
T4) ibid, page 66
15) A r t ic le  194.
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•u hOO may be, v *
(ii) In India, a proclamation of financial emergency, if approved 
by Parliament, would continue in operation until revoked. But 
in Pakistan the maximum duration for the operation of a similar 
proclamation was limited to six months, as there the 
proclamation required the same parliamentary approval and 
operated for the same maximum per iod as a proclamation 
suspending the provincial constitution, '^ here again one may 
doubt whether the maximum period (was) adequate11' .
Article 196 of the Pakistan Constitution which provided for 
indemnity enactments by the Parliament in relation to acts done in 
connexion with martial law administration was in all essentials a 
reproduction of the Indian provision under Article 34* ihe
Pakistan Constitution, it would seem, this provision was placed in 
a more logical position under Emergency Provisions* than in the 
Indian instrument where this Article px’oviding for indemnity for 
temporary negation of fundamental rights has been placed in the part 
dealing with these rights.
As indemnity was provided for, the Constitution must be deemed 
to have recognised the administration of martial law as part of the 
law of the Eepublic of Pakistan.
The validity of any proclamation issued or order made under the 
emergency provisions could not be questioned in any court.0®)
(16) Article 194 (1)
(17) A. Gledhill, Pakistan, page 97*
(18) Article 195(2)
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In this connexion, the observations ma.de by Kayani, J., in
(19}Akram Shah v. The Crown,' f are of interest though made before the
promulgation of the Constitution* r*Phat the emergency must be real
and not a supposed emergency is an assumption without which we cannot
proceed and which is based on common intelligence* The observations
in Usif Patel1 s case^ ^  that every kind of power should not be
invoked in the name of emergency and that *a more incongruous position
in a democratic constitution is difficult to conceive1 still hold the
field* If the law of civil necessity is a part of the law of every
civilised country, the democratic character of such law should be
unquestionable and nothing is democratic which tends to absolutism..
And you may take it that what does not permit of judicial scrutiny
( 21}
at any stage will tend to absolutism H.v J
“In all the Safety and Security Acts*', he further observed, 
‘'there is a provision that where a certain authority is satisfied that 
with a view to preventing a person from acting in a manner prejudicial 
to public safety or order, it is necessary to do so, he may arrest 
and detain that person. It is now settled law that the satisfaction 
should be that of the arresting authority, not of the court, but it 
is equally settled that the court can examine attendant circumstances 
to see that the arresting authority is in good rfihith satisfied. 
Whether the judgement of that authority is defective is a different 
matter, but if the judgement itself is based on bad faith, the court
(19) P.L.L.(1955) Lahore 464.
(20) P.L.L. (1955) P.O. 387.
(21) Akram Shah v. The Crown. P.L.L. (1955) 4^4» 478.
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will not be satisfied, Bow let me make it dear that when these 
Safety Acts were first enacted, it was not the intention of the 
draftsmen or the Government, so far as intention can be gathered from 
words, that the court should be allowed to fight with the satisfaction 
of the arresting authority. The courts, nevertheless, held that if 
*satisfaction* was prostituted by bad faith, a fraud will have been 
committed on the statute, and to defraud a statute is to do a very 
despicable thing, We stifle fraud wherever we §eet it, and we stifle 
it twice when it is committed on the law of the land itself. That is 
because such a fraud!~in the case of the “satisfaction1 of the arresting 
authority, for instance « betrays the infinite confidence which the 
statute, as an expression of the legislative fiat of the country, 
reposes in the arresting authority. In the case of a head of a State 
who finds it necessary to act in an emergency without having time, to 
consult the accredited representatives of the people, the precaution 
is ever so much more necessary. The least, therefore, that could 
be said is that the good faith of ‘civil necessity1 is a justiciable 
issue
His lordship illustrated the position taken by him by an example, 
Said His LordfaMp, 'The line between necessity and its good faith is, 
in my opinion, very thin. To take an intelligible and extreme 
example, if the head of a democratic State declared an emergency and 
decided to continue in office beyond his appointed term, evidence led 
to prove want of necessity would really be evidence to prove bad faith
(22) Ibid, 479.
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I am inclined to hold, however, that subject to certain mental
As a proclamation of emergency is assumed to be induced by 
necessity, these observations of the learned Judge may be considered 
pertinent to the interpretation of the expression *if the President is 
satisfied* in 'the Articles 191* 195 and 194 of the Constitution,
It would therefore appear that the validity of a proclamation 
of emergency could be challenged only on the ground of the mala fide 
exercise of the power to make such proclamation5 “but the proof of 
circumstances on which the mala fides of Government could be exhibited 
is necessarily a difficult mat ter
The P r e s i d e n t a n d  the Provincial Governor^2^  in Pakistan had 
powers similar to those of their counterparts in India to promulgate 
ordinances when the legislature was not in session and immediate action 
was considered necessary. The provision as to the control by 
legislature of such ordinances was the same as under the Indian 
Constitution, The Pakistan Constitution specifically stated that at 
any time when the National Assembly stood dissolved the President
might, if he was satisfied that circumstances existed which rendered
such action necessary, make and promulgate an ordinance authorising 
expenditure from the Federal Consolidated Fund, whether the 
expend!ture was charged upon that fund by the Constitution or not, 
pending compliance with the reqiiirements of the Constitution in regard
(23} ibid, 482.
124) A, K* Brohi, Fundamental Law of Pakistan, page 282,
(25) Article 69,
(26) Article 102,
reservations, necessity is a justiciable
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to laying the annual financial statement before the National Assembly
and the procedure relating to such statement and to Appropriation Bill.
(27)
v 7 After the date of the reconstitution of the National Assembly, 
any ordinance promulgated under this provision was to be laid before 
the Assembly as soon as might be. And within six weeks of the 
reconstitution the provisions relating to annual financial statement 
and Appropriation Bill were to be complied with. A similar power to 
promulgate an ordinance authorising expenditure from the Provincial 
Consolidated Fund was vested in the Provincial Governor. Expenditure 
charged on the Provincial Consolidated Fund included the emoluments 
and pensions of the Governor, the judges of the High Court, the 
members of the Provincial Public Service Commission, the Speaker and
Deputy Speaker of the Provincial Assembly as well as the
administrative expenses of the High Court, the Public Service Commis­
sion, debt charges, and money necessary to satisfy decrees and
(28}awards against the Province. 7 The Provincial Governor*s powers of
legislation by ordinance was coextensive with the powers of the
Provincial Legislature with the result that the powers were subject 
to the restriction that he could not, without the President*s previous 
instructions, promulgate an ordinance containing provisions which 
would be invalid, if contained in an Act of the Provincial
(29}
Legislature which had not received the President’s assent, 7 For 
instance, an ordinance restricting movement of goods into and out of
(27) Article 6 9(3)
(28) Article 97.
(29) Article 102.
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a province or an ordinance on a subject in the concurrent list with
provisions repugnant to a Federal Act on the same subject could not
be promulgated without previous instructions from the President,
The ordaining power of the Head of the State in Pakistan has an
unhappy history. The power vested in the Governor-General under
Section 43 of the Government of India Act, 1955, to legislate by
ordinance even when the Legislature was in session was continued for
quite a long time in Pakistan. Further an ordinance occasionally
sought to confer on the Governor-General unlimited constituent power.
The Emergency Powers Ordinance, 1955 (IX of 1955) is an instance in
point. It was promulgated when the Constituent Assembly stood
dissolved; hence there was no ’dominion legislature1; nor was there
any provision made to bring one into existence. The Legislature of
East Bengal was not permitted to meet; and by amalgamating the
provinces of West Pakistan under the powers granted by the Ordinance,
the Governor-General was to terminate the existence of the provincial
legislatures in West P a k i s t a n . T h u s  having contemplated what
may be called a state of constitutional and legal chaos because of
the non-existence of the legislative bodies and the invalidation of
forty-four Acts as a result of the decision of the Federal Court in
(31)Tamizuddin Khan’s case' 7, the Emergency Powers Ordinance 
promulgated by the Governor-General conferred upon him power to make
(30) The Governor-General may by order make such provision as appears 
to him to be necessary or expedient (a) for constituting the 
Province of West Pakistan (Section 6 amending Section 46 of the 
Government of India Act, 1935).
(31) Federation of Pakistan v. Tamizuddin Khan, P.L.R. (195&) W.P. 
306.
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provision for a future Constitution, Section 10 of the Ordinance 
read as follows*
“10• Provision for future Constitution*- The Governor-General 
shall by order make such provision as appears to him to be 
necessary or expedient for the purpose of making provision as to 
the Constitution of Pakistan and for purposes connected therewith, 
and any such order may contain such incidental and consequential 
provisions as the Governor-General may deem necessary or expedient*1 
It is difficult to see how executive authority could be carried 
further.
An instance of the exercise of the ordaining povrer by the 
President under the Constitution may also be given. The Security of 
Pakistan Act, 1952, was passed on May 5* 1952. It was to remain in 
force for three years. It was extended by the Security of Pakistan 
(Amendment) Ordinance, 1955 (XV of 1955) and thereafter by the 
Security of Pakistan (Amendment) Act, 195^» which received the assent 
of the President on April 16, 1956, This Act amended the Security 
of Pakistan Act, 1952, so as to extend the life of the latter Act up 
to April 30, 1957* Before the expiry of the Act 011 April 30, 1957, 
the Security of Pakistan (Amendment) Ordinance, 1957 (ill of 1957) was 
passed by the President, whereby the Security of Pakistan Act, 1952, 
was amended so as to extend the life of the Act up to April 30, 1958* 
The National Assembly met 6n August 22, 1957, and was prorogued on 
August 31 , 1957. ^he Ordinance was not laid before the National 
Assembly. However, another Ordinance, the Security of Pakistan
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(Second Amendment) Ordinance, 1957 (XI of 1957) > was promulgated by
the President before the expiry of six weeks from the meeting of the
Assembly. According to this Ordinance, the Security of Pakistan
Act was extended tip to April 30, 1958* 3?he National Assembly met on
January 8 , 1958, and passed the Security of Pakistan (Amendment) Act,
1958, which extended the life of the Security Act up to June 30, 1958#
(32)In Momina Khatoon v. The Government of Pakistan. ' ' it was
contended on behalf of the detenu S. M. Hasan, who had been detained 
under an order passed after the Act of 1958 had received the assent of 
the President, that the National Assembly having met after the 
President had promulgated the first amending Ordinance of 19579 the 
President had no power to promulgate the second amending Ordinance. 
When the President had passed an Ordinance and the National Assembly 
met thereafter and the Ordinance was not laid before the National 
Assembly, the Ordinance ceased to operate after the expiry of six 
weeks from the meeting of the National Assembly. The first Ordinance, 
it was contended, ceased to be operative after the midnight of 
October 2, 1957# It was further contended that the Act having 
expired on October 2, 1957, it could not be amended as there was no 
existing Aot to amend. It was argued that the Act of 1958 could 
not therefore be said to be in operation when the order of detention
t
was made and hence any action taken under it would be illegal.
Inamullah, J., in his judgement observed that if it were held 
that the Act of 1958 wasjvalid and in operation, it would not be
(32) P.L.D. (1958) Karachi 530
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necessary to consider the question whether the President could legally 
promulgate the second Ordinance. As the legislature had full power 
to re-enact and revive an Act which had expired, the question turned 
on whether the Security of Pakistan (Amendment) Act, 1958, purported 
to re-enact the Security of Pakistan Act, 1952. His Lordship said 
that on a perusal of the Act of 1958, he had no doubt that the 
Legislature intended to re-enact the Security of Pakistan Act, 1952. 
Quoting Section 2 of the Act of 1958 which amended Section 1 of the 
Act of 1952 in the following terms* "For Subsection (3) of Section 1
of the Security of Pakistan Act, 1952   the following shall be
and shall be deemed always to have been substituted, namely*
(3) It shall come into force at once and shall remain in force 
until the thirteenth day of June, 1958," the learned Judge observed* 
,*Ihe words 1 shall be and shall be deemed always to have been 
substituted 1 are very significant. To my mind the Legislature 
intended, while introducing these words, to re-enact the Security 
of Pakistan Act, 1952. The effect of these words is that the 
Security of Pakistan Act, 1952, was brought to life from the of 
May, 1952, when it came into operation and was to continue till the
30th June, 1958.  a question may arise as to why the Legislature
called Act XIII of 1958 an Amendment Act. The reason, to my mind, 
is clear. If once an expired Act is revived, it would be deemed to 
have been revived as a whole, and then, if any change is to be 
effected therein, it could only be done by an amendment. Act XIII 
of 1958, after reviving Act XXXV of 1952 brought about a number of 
changes therein. Moreover, Act XIII of 1958 v/ould not be illegal
—3 77ip*
merely because it is called an Amending Act, if it was otherwise 
valid".
As the Act of 1958 was held to be a valid enactment, it was 
not necessary to go into the question of the validity of the second 
Amendment Ordinance of 1957*
(33}In Emperor v. Benoari Lalx * their Lordships of the Privy 
Council held with respect to the scope of the ordinance-making power 
of the Governor-General under Section 72 of the Government of India 
Act that the Governor-General was the sole judge of the existence of 
emergency and "assuming that he acts bona fide and in accordance with 
the statutory power, it cannot rest with the courts to challenge 
the view that emergency exists". This would imply that mala fide 
exercise of the ordinance-making power could be subject to judicial 
review.
,1The increasing crush of legislative efforts and the convenience 
to the executive of a refuge to the device of Orders-in-Council would 
increase (the grave constitutional and public danger lurking in a 
transition to arbitrary government) tenfold were the judiciary to 
approach any such action of the Government in a spirit of compliance 
rather than of independent scrutiny. That way also would lie public 
unrest and public peril
(33) A.I.R. 1945 P.O. 48#
(34) per Lord Shaw in Rex v. Halliday (1917) A.C. 260)
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ii. Military Dictatorship and Martial Law
Late at night on October 7, 1950, President Iskander Mirza 
proclaimed martial lav; throughout Pakistan and abrogated the 
Constitution of 1956* He appointed the Commander-in-Chief of the 
Pakistan Army, General Muhammad Ayub Khan, as Chief Martial Lav; 
Administrator and placed all the armed forces of Pakistan under his 
command.
In the proclamation he issued on the action he had taken he 
stated that he had been watching "with the deepest anxiety the ruthless 
struggle for power, corruption, the shameful exploitation of our 
simple, honest, patriotic and industrious masses, the lack of 
decorum and the prostitution of Islam for political ends". These 
despicable activities, he said, had led to a dictatorship of the 
lowest order* He expressed the view that the mentality of the 
political parties had sunk so low that elections would not improve 
the chaotic internal situation and enable the country to form a stable 
and strong government. 'tyhe same group of people", he said, "who 
have brought Pakistan to the verge of ruination will rig the elections 
for their own ends. They will come back more revengeful because I 
am «rure that the elections will be contested mainly on personal, 
regional and sectarian bases. When they return they v/ill use the 
same methods which have made a tragic farce of democracy and are the 
main cause of the present widespread frustration in the country."
"However much the Administration may try", he continued, "I am
convinced, judging by the shifting loyalties and the ceaseless and
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unscrupulous scramble for office, that elections will neither be free 
nor fair. They will not solve our difficulties. On the contrary 
they are likely to create greater unhappiness and disappointment 
leading ultimately to a really bloody revolution".
He deplored the fact that the country1 s foreign policy was 
subjected to "unintelligent and irresponsible criticism" not for 
patriotic motives but from selfish view points, often by the very 
people who were responsible for it. Against India, for instance, 
they screamed for war, knowing full well that they would be nov/here 
near the firing line.
For the past three years, he said, he had been doing his 
iitmost to work the Constitution in a democratic way. For that 
purpose he had laboured to bring about coalition after coalition, 
hoping that it would stabilise the administration and that the affairs 
of the country wotild be run in the interests of the masses. His 
appraise,! of the internal situation, he said, had led him to believe 
that a vast majority of the people no longer had any confidence in 
the present system of government and were getting more and more 
disillusioned and disappointed and were becoming dangerously 
resentful of the manner in which they were exploited.
f^The Constitution", he declared, "which was brought into 
being on March 23, 195^, after so many tribulations, is unworkable. 
It is so full of dangerous compromises that Pakistan will soon 
disintegrate internally if the inherent malaise is not removed."
f|To rectify them the country must first be taken to sanity by 
a peaceful revolution. Then it is my intention to collect a number
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of patriotic persons to examine out problems in the political field 
and devise a Constitution more suitable to the genius of the Muslim 
people. When it is ready and at the appropriate time, it will be 
submitted to the referendum of the people".
In these circumstances, "to save Pakistan from complete 
disruption", the President decided thats-
(i) the Constitution of March 2 3, 1956, would be abrogated,
(ii) the Central and Provincial Governments would be dismissed
with immediate effect,
(iii) the National Parliament and Provincial Assemblies would be 
dissolved,
(iv) all political parties would be abolished,
(v) until alternative arrangements were made, Pakistan would
come under martial law.^^
Soon after martial law was declared, army personnel occupied 
all offices of the Central Government, the Municipal Corporation, 
the railway station building and Radio Pakistan* Troops also took 
over the Karachi Port and all key buildings, including the Central 
Telegraph Office and ths General Post Office.
On October 10, 1958, General Ayub Khan told the correspondent 
of the (London) Daily Mail; "we have a 16 per cent literacy and you 
Gan*t have a we stern type of deomcracy. They have a 98 per cent 
literacy rate. Democracy without education is hypoci’isy without 
limitation".
(1) P.L.D. (1958) Central Statutes, page 577 “ 579*
(2) quoted in The Asian Recorder, October 25-31, 1958, Page 2310.
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At a press conference held on the same day he said that it was
the constitutional responsibility of the President to call a halt to
the state of affairs which prevailed in Pakistan before the
proclamation of martial law. If he had not done this, then it
would have become the responsibility of the army to save the country
in an emergency,. The task of the armed forces was to "restore sanity"
(3)and make Pakistan a better place for law-abiding citizens to live in; *
About the future form of government, he said that the country
did not have sufficient man power to run a federal form of government.
(4)Personally, he would prefer a unitary form of government. '
On October 8, 1958, the President constituted an Advisory 
Council consisting of the Chief Secretary to the Central Government 
and the Secretaries of the Ministries of Defence, Interior, Finance, 
Industry, Commerce, Economic Affairs and Works, Irrigation and 
Power* The Advisory Council would meet periodically under the 
chairmanship of the President or the Chief Martial Lav/ Administrator.
At a meeting of the Secretaries to the Government of Pakistan 
held on the same day under the chairmanship of the Chief Martial Law 
Administrator, it was decided that the administrative organisation 
of the Chief Martial Law Administrator would consist of a civil wing 
and a military wing. In running the administration in accordance 
with the military regulations issued from time to time, the civil 
agencies would be utilized to the maximum extent possible.
(5) id, page 2311*
(4) ibid.
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The Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958* promulgated by 
Iskander Miraa (who still styled himself President after having 
abrogated the Constitution of which the President formed a part) 
provided that, notwithstanding the abrogation of the Constitution, 
and subject to any order of the President, or Regulation made by the 
Chief Martial Law Administrator, Pakistan would be "governed as 
nearly as may be in accoi’dance with the late Constitution". The Order 
declared that all courts in existence immediately before the 
Proclamation of October 7 would continue in being, that the law 
declared by the Supreme Court would be binding on all courts in 
Pakistan and that the Supreme Court and the High Courts would have 
pov/er to issue the writs of habeas corpus, mandamus. prohibition, 
quo warranto and certiorari. Ho writs, however, could be issued 
against the Chief Martial Lay* Administrator, or his Deputy or any 
person exercising powers or jurisdiction under the authority of either. 
Further, no courts nor any person could call, or be permitted to 
call, in question the Presidential proclamation, any order made in 
pursuance of this proclamation, any martial law order or regulation 
or any finding, judgement or order of a military court. The Order 
also continued in force all laws and regulations which were valid 
under the late Constitution, "so far as applicable and with such 
necessary adaptations as the President may see fit to make"* Ho 
court was to call in\ question any such adaptation made by the 
President.
The powers of a Provincial Governor, it was provided, would 
be those which he would have had. the President directed him to
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assume on behalf of the President all the functions of the Provincial 
Government under Article 193 of the late Constitution. The Governors 
power of promulgating ordinances was also continued. But he was to 
act subject to any directions given to him by the President or by the 
Chief Martial Law Administrator or by the latter’s delegate. In case 
of repugnancy between an ordinance promulgated by a Governor and a 
regulation or order issued by the Chief Martial Law Administrator or 
by any person authorised by him, the latter would prevail.
All persons who were in the service of the State before the 
Proclamation could continue to be in service on the same terms and 
conditions.
The Order also stated that any provision in any lav; providing 
for the reference of a detention order to an Advisory Board would be 
of no effect.
The name of the ♦Republic1 was changed to ’Pakistan1 dropping
the adjective ’Islamic’ adopted in the late Constitution.
By October 10 the offices of all political parties were sealed
and the Government passed orders freezing the funds in banks of all 
( 5 )those parties *
Between October 7th and 17th thirtynine martial law regulations 
and nine martial law orders were issued by the Chief Martial Lavf 
Administrator. Some of the regulations had a filial affinity to 
those issued in 1953 in connexion with the Panjab Disturbances*
Under the Martial Law Regulations, the whole of Pakistan would 
be considered a martial law area, divided into three zones,
(5) Asian Recorder, op. cit. page 2515*
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(i) Karachi Federal area including Malir,
(ii) West Pakistan excluding Karachi and Malir and
(iii) East Pakistan, each under a Martial Law Administrator, 
Regulation 1-A provides for the constitution of Special Courts
of criminal jurisdiction of the following two classes*
(i) Special military courts and
(ii) Summary military courts.
Special Military and Summary Military Courts as well as ordinary 
criminal courts are given power under the Regulation to try and punish 
any person for contravention of martial law regulations or orders or 
for offences under the ordinary law.
An Administrator of Martial Law is empowered to convene Special
Military Courts in his area of aministration for the trial of any
offence committed in any area to which the Regulations extend. A 
Special Military Court is to he constituted in the same manner and is 
to exercise the same powers and follov/ the same procedure as a Field 
General Court Martial convened under the Army Act,'1  ^ save, that a 
Magistrate of the first class or a Sessions Judge may he appointed a 
member of the court. While the court is empowered to pass any
(6) A Field General Court Martial is normally convened by the
Commander-in-Chief or any other officer empowered by Government.
It consists of not less than three officers, each of whom as well 
as the Judge Advocate takes the oath to try fairly. The accused 
may object to being tried by any member. The Evidence Act 
applies. All findings are by a majority* if the members are 
evenly divided, the decision is In the accused’s favour, but,
In matters other than challenge, finding and sentence, the 
President has a casting vote, and a two-thirds majority is 
necessary for a death sentence.
sentence authorised by law or by Martial Law Regulations, all 
sentences of death have to be reserved for confirmation by an 
Administrator of Martial Law. A regular summary of evidence is 'not 
required to be recorded* an abstract of evidence in lieu of summary 
of evidence will be sufficient. It is further provided that any 
Army, Raval, or Air Force Officer, a Public Prosecutor, a Police 
Prosecutor, a Police Official or a civilian Lawyer may be appointed 
as a prosecutor.
A Martial Law Administrator may empower any Magistrate of the
first class or any military, naval or air force officer to hold, in
his area of administration for the trial of any offence committed in
that area, a Summary Military Court which is to follow the same
procedure and exercise the same powers as a Summary Court Martial held
(7)under the Army Act,' ' except that no other officer shall be required 
to attend such proceedings, that the court shall not be required 
to record more than a memorandum of the evidence or to frame a formal 
charge, that the court may try any offence without reference to 
superior authority, that the court may pass any sentence except 
death, transportation, or imprisonment exceeding one year or 
whipping exceeding fifteen stripes, and that the proceedings of the 
court shall be forwarded for review to the Martial Law Administrator
(7) A Summary Court Martial is convened by a Commanding Officer,
and consists of the officer directed to hold it, but the Army 
Act requires two other officers to attend.
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in the area in which the trial was held.
A Martial Ijaw Administrator may give directions as to the 
distribution among the Summary Military Courts of cases to be tried 
by them.
Regulation 2 specifically states that the ordinary criminal 
courts will continue to exercise jurisdiction over persons accused 
of all offences committed under the ordinary law and also under 
these regulations.
Regulation 5 which in the main deals with scales of punishment, 
like death, transportation for life, also defines the word 
♦recalcitrant* in the Regulation as including any external enemy of 
Pakistan and mutineers or rebels or rioters and any enemy agent.
Regulation 4 imposes precensorship of publication of any matter 
touching martial law and a contravention of the Regulation entails a 
maximum punishment of seven years rigorous imprisonment.
On October 8, the Chief Martial Law Administrator ordered all
newspapers not to make any comments on the imposition of Martial Law
or on orders issued by the President until further notice. Despite
the order, after a hesitant twentyfour hours, almost the entire
Press of Pakistan began commenting in glowing terms on the Martial
Law Administration and the two prime movers of the "peaceful
(8)revolution". Ho action was taken against the Press.' y
Press censorship was lifted on October 15* A Press Rote 
issued by the Ministry of Information said that the Press was no 
longer required to submit material for pre-censorship. It added,
(8) Asian Recorder» op cit. page 2515*
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however, that "this does not mean that other relevant provisions 
of the Martial Law Regulations or of any laws of the country for the 
time being in force do not apply, or that the Press is now free to 
contravene them. There is no objection to factual reporting". '
Under Regulation 5 if is provided that any person who attempts 
to contravene, or abets the contravention of any of the Regulations 
will be punished as if he had contravened that Regulation.
Regulation 6 provides that if any person with intent to help 
the "recalcitrants" does any act which is designed or is likely to 
give assistance to the operations of the "recalcitrants" or to imped© 
operations of Pakistan forces, he will suffer death and no less 
punishment. The same punishment, under Regulation 7> visits any 
person who joins or attempts to join the "recalcitrants".
Regulation 8 provides maximum death penalty for an offence 
involving wilful damage to public property or property which is 
employed for the maintenance of public services or of supplies to 
Pakistan forces or'to the civil population. The same maximum penalty 
is provided for looting which is defined in Regulation 9 as committing 
"theft (a) when public order is disturbed by actual or apprehended 
recalcitrant attack, or by panic or rioting, or (b) during a black­
out or a period during which lighting has been reduced or controlled 
or (c) in respect of any property left, exposed or unprotected in 
consequence of war conditions or (d) in any premises damaged by war 
operations or destroyed or vacated for military reasons."
( 9 ) Asian Recorder, November 15 -21 , 1958, page 2351*
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Death is the maximum penalty provided for dacoity. The same 
penalty may he inflicted on any person who assist* or harbours any 
"recalcitrant" by giving him information, necessaries of life, 
weapons or means of conveyance or who assists such person in any way 
to evade apprehension.
Regulation 12 prohibits the actual or constructive possession
of any firearm, ammunition, explosive or sword without a bona fide
licence except by Commissioned Officers of Armed Forces and by those
(10
persons who are exempted under law to possess them without licence. 
The Administrator may, however, ban the carrying or possession of 
any weapon (including those with licence) except by special permits 
issued by him. All such articles not covered by such permit are to 
be handed over as directed by the Administrators. Contravention of 
this Regulation entails a maximum punishment of fourteen years 
rigorous imprisonment.
Death as maximum punishment may be imposed upon any person 
t'who attacks, resists, or injures, or causes to be attacked, 
resisted, or injured" any member of the forces or any civil official. 
Any damage done to or interference with the working of any public 
means of communication or any other government property may entail 
the same penalty*
Transportation for life is the maximum punishment provided for 
wilful failure on the part of any person to give full information if 
he sees or comes in contact with the "recalcitrant^1 or who has
(10) This exemption was provided by Regulation 35 issued on 
October 13#
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knowledge of the movements or whereabouts of the "recalcitrant*".
Disobedience or neglect to abey any martial law order, or 
obstruction to or interference vnLth. may person who is acting in the 
execution of his duty under martial law, or making false statements 
to obtain a pass or permit under martial law is made punishable with 
a maximum of fourteen years rigorous imprisonment.
The maximum penalty of death may be imposed on any person who 
gives false evidence or who refuses to give evidence in any 
investigation or trial held under the Martial Law Regulations.
Regulation 20 provides that "no person shall commit any act or 
be guilty of an omission or make a speech*
(a) which is to the prejudice of good order or the public safety? 
or
oo which is calculated to mislead or hamper movements of, or
imperil the success of, or tamper with the loyalty of forces 
under my command".
Contravention of the Regulation is punishable by ten years rigorous 
imprisonment.
Death is the maximum punishment for hoarding food grains in 
violation of existing orders while a sentence of fourteen years 
rigorous imprisonment may be passed against any person for wilful 
adulteration of any kind of food. Imprisonment for the same term 
may be imposed for hoarding, wilful indulgence in unwarranted 
dilution or mixing, or unauthorised manufacture} of medicines*
Spreading reports calculated to create alarm d3? despondency
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amongst the public or calculated to create dissatisfaction towards the
armed forces or the police or any member thereof is punishable by
imprisonment for the same term. The same punishment may visit a
person who hoards any article of public necessity or refuses to declare
his stock of commercial commodities when required to dp so by any
military or civil:authority or fails to put on sale goods meant for
public purchase.
tBlack marketing1 is also declared punishable by rigorous
imprisonment for fourteen years.
Regulation 27 prohibited smuggling of all kinds. It declares
that any one caught in the act of smuggling or found in possession of
(11)smuggled goods knowing them to be suchv ' or found helping a smuggler 
or who withholds information about smugglers or fails to pass on such 
information to military and civil authorities will be punishable , 
death being the maximum penalty. The same maximum punishment is 
provided for child lifting and abduction of women.
Rigorous imprisonment for ten years may be given to a person who 
strikes, or helps to bring about a strike or propagates a strike in 
educational institutions and public utility works and installations.
Regulations 30, 3^  and 32 are designed to prevent corruption
among public officers. A maximum punishment of fourteen years 
imprisonment may visit a person who offers or attempts to offer a 
bribe or illegal gratification or who accepts such bribe or illegal 
gratification. A person who uses his official position to bestow
(11) The underlined words were inserted by Regulation 40 of October
20, 1958*
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patronage or favours to the disadvantage of the State or by any act 
of nepotism deprives any person of his legitimate rights may be 
subjected to the same punishment. The same will be the position of 
a person who misuses or attempts to misuse facilities provided by the 
State for official use or who commits other malpractices.
Regulation 34 prohibits the spreading of "news, .rumotirs or 
reports on provincial, sectarian and linguistic basis calculated 
towards territorial or administrative dismemberment of Pakistan" (sic) 
under a penalty which may extend to fourteen years rigorous 
imprisonment.
Regulation 36 provides for the imposition of a maximum penalty 
of fourteen years rigorous imprisonment on "whoever by word of mouth 
or in writing or otherwises -
(a) brings into hatred or contempt the Armed Forces or any part 
or member thereof; or . 
oo causes disaffection among, or prejudices, prevents or
interferes with the discipline of, or the performance of 
their duties by, members of the Armed Forces; or
(c) promotes feelings of enmity or hatred between members of the 
Armed Forces; or
(d) seduces any member of the Armed Forces from his allegiance 
or his duty".
Regulation 38 makes impersonation and attempt at impersonation 
of any member of the Armed Forces or of any government official an 
offence punishable with ten years rigorous imprisonment.
Under Regulation 39 the maximum punishment of fourteen years
rigorous imprisonment is provided for the commission, attempt or 
abetment of the commission of theft in respect of any arms or 
ammunition belonging to the government and for exchange, attempt or 
abetment to exchange of such arms or ammunition with non-Govemment 
pattern arms and ammunition and also for unauthorised possession of 
such Government arms or ammunition.
Martial Law Orders issued by the Chief Martial Law Administrator
on October 11, provide that offences for which the sentence of death
is prescribed should not be tried by a Magistrate below the rank of a
first class Magistrate specially empowered under Section 30 of the
(12)Code of Criminal Procedure * / All sentences of death awarded under
the Martial Law Regulations both by ordinary criminal courts and by 
Special Military Courts are to be reserved for confirmation by the 
Chief Martial Law Administrator. All proceedings of Special Military 
Courts are to be sent to the Judge Advocate General, General Head­
quarters, Rawalpindi, for final review.
Criminal Courts while trying offenders under the Martial Law 
Regulations are to follow the procedure prescribed for the trial of 
summons cases under the ordinary law. They are empowered while trying 
such offenders to award the punishments prescribed under the 
Regulations irrespective of their power of punishmeht as laid down 
under the ordinary law.
All offenders sentenced under Martial Law Regulations to rigorous 
imprisonment are to be treated as ordinary criminals irrespective of
(12) Supra, Chapter III, iv, footnote (28)
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their status or position.
Sub-Administrators are empowered to convene Special Military 
Courts and Summary Military Courts, While power to issue Regulations 
are vested in the Chief Martial Law Administrator and Martial Law 
Administrators, Sub-Administrators are empowered to issue necessary 
orders and delegate powers of issuing orders to any officer in their 
own areas as they deem fit. The Regulations and Orders issued by 
Administrators and orders by Sub-Administrators are not to be in 
conflict, but to conform, with the Regulations and Orders passed by 
the Chief Martial Law Administrator.
Major General Umrao Khan, Martial Law Administrator in Bast 
Pakistan on October 9* issued fortyeight Martial Law Regulations and 
several Martial Law Orders. The first Regulation divided the Province 
into five sectors, namely Jessore, Rajshahi, Dacca, Comila, and 
Chittagong. The commanders of the military forces in these sectors 
were appointed Sub-Administrators of Martial Law in their respective 
Sectors.
Under the first Order issued by the Administrator, maximum 
punishment of ten years imprisonment is provided for the publication of 
any printed literature which contains any news or comments other than 
the communiques issued by the Martial Law authorities without prior 
authorisation by the Gensor Officer at Martial Law Headquarters.
The second Order provides the same punishment for the publication 
or possession of any literature calculated to promote or attempts to 
promote feelings of enmity or hatred against the Government or between 
different classes or sects* Any person who knows or has reason to
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believe the existence of such literature is to report it, under pain 
of the same penalty, to the Sector Commander*
The previous day the Administrator had told a news conference 
that the Martial Law Administration would not affect the noimal life 
of the people in any manner. Honest and law-abiding people had 
nothing to fear; for such people martial law would be a boon, he 
said.^^
On October 9* in a broadcast over Dacca Radio the Administrator
said that the object before the Martial Law Administration was the
welfare of the people. To achieve this end it was necessary that
smuggling, blackmarketing, profiteering, and all kinds of corruption
must stop. The Martial Law Administration was not going to show any
mercy to the human sharks who feed themselves and prosper on the
people !s sufferings
In spite of military dictatorship now in evidence in Pakistan,
it would seem that the ideal of democracy is not abandoned there.
In the broadcast already referred to of October 8, General Ayub Khan
declareds JJlet me announce in unequivocal terms that our ultimate
aim is to restore democracy but of the type that people can understand
and work". On October 10, in an interview with foreign
correspondents he re-iterated this assurance.... '‘Pakistan is not
forsaking democracy on a permanent basis. We have got to go back to
(15)democracy. We must make it work".' * He disclosed that he was
(13) Asian Recorder, op. cit. page 2313.
(14) ibid*
(15) G• W. Choudhury, Failure of Parliamentary Deomocracy in 
Pakistan, in Parliamentai?y Affairs. Volume XII, Ho*l. page TO*
“ 395-
thinking in terms of an electoral college where five hundred or 
perhaps even five thousand people might elect a person who in turn 
would choose an official. That, he said, was one way to achieve 
the spread of democracy.
(16)In the State v. Basso' ' the question arose whether writs 
issued by the High Court under the provisions of the last Constitution 
had abated under the provisions of the Laws Continuance in Force Order, 
1958. The Supreme Court held that they had, as the late Constitution 
itself had now disappeared.
In a learned discussion on the subject of Victorious revolution* 
Muhammad Munir, C.J., maintained that such a revolution or a 
successful coup d*etat is an internationally recognised legal method 
of changing a Constitution. "If the attempt to break the Constitution 
fails," observed the Chief Justice, "those who sponsor ©reorganise 
it are judged by the existing Constitution as guilty of the crime 
of treason. But if the revolution is victorious in the sense that 
the persons assuming power under the change can successfully require 
the inhabitants of the country to conform to the new regime, then 
the revolution itself becomes a law-creating fact because thereafter 
its own legality is judged not by reference to the annulled Constitution
but by reference to its own success........  the essential condition
to determine whether a Constitution has been annulled is the efficacy 
of the change...... If the territory and the people remain
substantially the same, there is, under the modern juristic doctrine,
(1 6 ) P.L.D. (1958) S .C . (Pak.) 533.
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no change in the corpus or international entity of the State and the
revolutionary government and the new Constitution are, according to
International Law, the legitimate government and the valid
Constitution of the State. Thus a victorious revolution or a
successful coup d*etat is an internationally recognised legal method
of changing a Constitution.
"After a change of the character I have mentioned has taken
place, the national legal order for its validity depend* upon the new
law-creating organ. Even courts lose their existing jurisdictions,
and can function only to the extent and in the manner determined by
(17)the new Constitution".' J
In support of his view the learned Chief Justice quoted Hans 
Kelsen, who said, in part;
"From a juristic point of view, the decisive criterion of a
revolution is that the order in force is overthrown and replaced by
a new order in a way which the former had not itself anticipated. 
Usually the new men whom a revolution brings to power annul only the 
Constitution and certain laws of paramount political significance, 
putting other norms in their place. A great part of the old legal
order remains valid also within the frame of the new order. But the
phrase 1 remains valid* does not give an adequate description of the 
phenomenon. It is only the contents of these norms that remain the 
same, not the reason of their validity. They are no longer valid by 
virtue of having been created in the way the old Constitution
(17) ibid, page 539*
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prescribed. That Constitution is no longer in foxxse? it is 
replaced by a new Constitution which is not the result of a 
constitutional alteration of the former. If laws which are 
introduced xmder the old Constitution continue to be valid under the 
new Constitution, this is possible only because validity has been 
expressly or tacitly been vested in them by the new Constitution......
The laws which, in the ordinary inaccurate parlance, continue to be 
valid are, from a juristic view point, new laws whose import 
coincides with that df the old laws. They are not identical with the 
old laws, because the reason for their validity is different. The 
reason for their validity is the new, not the old, Constitution, 
and between the two continuity holds neither from the point of view of 
the one nor from that of the other* Thus it is never the Constitvition 
merely but always the entire legal order that is changed by a 
revolution.
'*This shows that all norms of the old order have been deprived 
of their validity by revolution and not according to the principle of 
legitimacy* And they have been so deprived not only de facto but 
also de jure."^^
The learned Chief Justice continued to observes "If what I have 
already stated is correct, then the revolution having been successful 
it satisfied the test of efficacy and becomes a basic law-creating 
fact. On that assumption the Laws Continuance in Force Order, however 
transitory and imperfect it may be, is a new legal order and it is
(TaT Hans Kelson, General Theory of Law and S tate , pages 117-118 [
quoted in State v. Passo^ •
in accordance with that Order that the validity of the laws and the
correctness of the judicial decisions have to he determined”*
Commenting on this judgement, the Indian Premier said that
presumably so far as "Pakistan courts are concerned, factual success
of a military government is enough law.'1^ 2^
It is submitted that while the comity of nations demands that
international law should pl^ce it outside the power of any other state
to concern itself with the means whereby a country changes its
constitution, it is to misrepresent the scope of international law to
argue that this rule extends to prohibiting a Pakistan citizen from
complaining in a Pakistan court that the constitution has been changed
otherwise than by the procedure provided in the Constitution.
It is not clear how martial lav/ in any of the senses in which
it is understood, as explained by Muhammad Munir, G.J., in Muhammad
(21 )tfmar Khan v. ffhe Crown, ' when he was the Chief Justice of the 
Lahore High Court, could be justified in Pakistan. Its administration 
in Pakistan oannot be regarded as part of military law or international 
law; if it is to be considered municipal law forming part of common 
law which Pakistan inherited along with India, then it is not 
administered there to repel force by force, for there is no rebellion 
or any similar civil disturbance there. Pre sum ably a new law-
creating fact which lays down new juridical norms can also alter the 
connotation of well established legal terminology. It is probable
(19) State v. Lasso, P.L.P. (1958) S.C. (Pak.) 555> 540.
(20) Aslan Recorder, November 22-28, 1958, page 2367.
(21) P.L.D. 1953 Lahore 528; supra.
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tha*k a military dictatorship which has as its hasis the will of the 
military commander Yfith the support of the military arm behind him is 
euphemistically called 'martial law*, though* as Premier Nehru 
remarked, there is nothing veiled about the "naked military 
dictatorship in Pakistan".
The day this judgement was delivered, (October 27) there was 
another instance of the operation of the newly propounded x*ule of 
public law in Pakistan that "he may take who has the power and he 
may keep who can". General Ayub Khan vfho had been sworn in during 
the forenoon as the Prime Minister of Pakistan removed without 
ceremony the President who had appointed him, assumed plenary powers 
and declared himself President. Iskander Mirza, the former 
President had no ground for complaint. When he abrogated the 
Constitution oh October 7* he must be deemed to have deprived himself 
of the office of President, for the office of President was created 
by the Constitution*
President Ayub Khan announced that he was setting up a 
Presidential form of government; but a Presidential form of 
government itself presupposed election of the President by the people.
He appointed a Presidential Cabinet of twelve persons, 
consisting mostly of non-politicians. The newly appointed Law 
Minister declared that the new constitution would have to be made 
after careful thought so that it might not also be abrogated.
(22) Asian Recorder, November 22-28, 1958* page 2$66m
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After assumption of office as President f General Ayub Khan
issued a few more Martial Lav; Regulations and Martial Law Orders$
(23)
Under one of the Orders, v ' General Muhammad Musa, who had been 
previously made Commander-in-C hie f of the Pakistan Army, Tice-Admiral 
Siddiq, Chaudri| Commander-in- Chief, Pakistan Havy, and Air Vice- 
Marshal Asghar Khan, Commander-in-Chief, Pakistan Air Force, were 
appointed Deputy Chief Martial Law Administrators.
The Martial Law Regulations issued between October 30 and 
November 8 , dealt, in the main, with the control of prices of food 
grains and other commodities, income tax l’eturns, surrender of 
foreign exchange and similar welfare measures* It may be recalled 
that as early as October 17> General Ayub Khan had declared that 
martial law would not be lifted until the political, social, 
economic and administrative mess in the country had been cleared.
He saids |jThere seems to be a fear in the minds of the people that if 
Martial Law is lifted soon the old order will return with its 
attendant weaknesses and evils and all the good that has been done will 
be lost. Let me assure everyone that whereas Martial Law will not 
be x’etained a minute longer than is necessary, it will not be lifted 
a minute earlier than the purpose for which it has been imposed has 
been fulfilled, That purpose is the clearance of the political, 
social, economic and administrative mess that has been created in the 
past"/24)
(23) Ho. 11 of October 28, 1958.
(24) Asian Recorder. November 15-21, page 2349*
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It was to facilitate this "clearance" that further Martial Law 
Regulations were issued*
Regulation 4^ provides that the Central Government will control 
the prices of imported goods, goods manufactured within Pakistan and 
selected food grains. For a number of goods including textiles, 
sugar, tea and shaving blades, the prices will be fixed by the 
Central Government, No person, it is provided, shall sell or 
re-sell any goods at a price higher than the maximum price determined 
under the Regulation*
Regulation 43 permitted any person who had filed an incorrect 
return of his income under the Income Tax Act for the assessment year 
1954—55 or any year thereafter to file a revised return of his true 
income by December 15* 195$* No action would then be taken against 
him for the original submission of an incorrect return.
Regulation 46 provides, inter alia that any person being 
assessable to any tax xinder the provision of the Income Tax Act, the 
Business Profits Act, the Sales Tax Act, or the Estate Duty Act, 
makes any statement in writing required to be made by him under the 
provisions of any of these Acts, which is false, will be punished 
with rigorous imprisonment for seven years and with fine, unless he 
can show that at the time of making it he believed it to be true. 
Martial Law Foreign Exchange (Surrender and Declarations) 
Regulation, 1958. (No,45) declares that any person who holds any 
foreign exchange in any country other than Pakistan and who has reason 
to believe that such holding is not lawful, may surrender it to any 
authorised dealer or declare to the State BaP& of Pakistan before
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December 1 , 1958 , in the case of persons who are in Pakistan on the
date of the Regulation^ and within thirty days from the day of their
entry into Pakistan in the case of those who are outside Pakistan on
the date of the Regulation. He would then escape the penalty of
seven years iraprisonment provided for persons in illegal possession
of foreign exchange.
Regulation 46 provides for the imposition of a maximum
punishment of ten yeai's1 rigorous imprisonment on any person v/ho makes
any mis-declaration or mis-statement in regard to kind, quality,
qiiantity or value of goods imported or exported,
M* A. Khuhro, the former Defence Minister of Pakistan was
accused of selling a car in the blank market, an offence punishable
by a maximum sentence of fourteen years rigorous imprisonment under
Martial Law Regulations. On October 28, the District and Sessions
Judge of Karachi rejecting a bail application said that bail should
not be granted to Mr, Khuhro and to the two others arrested along with
him and added* "The maximum sentence that can be inflicted on them,
if they are convicted under Martial Law Regulations is fourteen years,
( 25)which puts it at par with transportation for life sentence,MV“
On October 31 » the Karachi Bench of the West Pakistan High 
Court also refused bail to Mr. Khuhro. Rejecting the bail 
application, Abdul Hamid IChan, J., said that a study of the facts 
revealed a prima facie case against the accused*
The same day, the police filed charges of forgery and cheating
(25) Asian Recorder, November 1 5-21 * 1958, page 2352.
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the Government against Mr. Khuhro, alleging that he had bought four 
motor cars on false permits during the past three years.
On November 11, the Government of Pakistan announced its 
decision to withdraw with immediate effect all troops assisting the 
civil authorities and y;ind up military courts in the centrally 
administered area of Karachi* However, official announcements made 
from Lahore, Dacca and Karachi on November 26 said that military 
courts had been revived throughout Pakistan. The announcement made 
by the West Pakistan Martial Law Administi*ator from Lahore said that 
the revival of the military courts was ordex’ed with immediate effect 
to deal effectively and promptly with offences of smuggling.^^
Speaking to Ke^men in Quetta on December 2, 1958? President 
Ayub Khan reiterated his preference for a Presidential form of 
government. He said that Pakistan would not copy the Constitution 
of any country. It would have a Constitution entirely of its own, 
in keeping with the social and economic conditions of the country.
He saids "Once we have solved vital problems such as the resettlement 
of refugees, land reforms and modifications of the educational 
and legal systems, we will consult the best brains and ascertain the 
feelings of the people to draw up a Constitution. The people should 
be given the right to elect a President either on the basis of 
universal suffrage or through electoral colleges. Once elected he 
should be given fairly wide powers to run the affairs of the country 
so that there is no legpulling (sic) by legislatures every day," On 
the role of the legislatures, he expressed the view that they should
(26) Asian Recorder. December 20-31? 1958? page 2419*
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only frame the laws and not interfere in the administration. The 
parliamentary system could he worked only if politicians strictly 
followed the spirit of the Constitution and the electorate was 
educated enough to compel its representatives to do the right thing£2^  
In the meantime, although martial law continues to he in 
operation, the army has heen withdrawn from the administration and 
the military courts set up under martial law have heen wound up.^2^  
However, on April 19> the freedom of the press in Pakistan 
suffered a further hlow under military dictatorship when four 
newspapers were taken over hy the Government under an Ordinance issued 
that day. The Ordinance which amends the Security of Pakistan Act, 
1952, is intended to provide for the banning of publication and 
distribution of newspapers containing fImatters likely to endanger the 
defence.-, external affairs or security of Pakistan". It gives wide 
powers to the Government including authority to change the 
management of a newspaper and remove the owner, director, or any 
other person in a newspaper establishment from control or management. 
Giving reasons for the promulgation of the Ordinance, §n 
official announcement stated that it had been known to the Government 
for some time that there "exist printing and publishing organisations 
in the country which are foreign directed and foreign subsidized and 
which seek to promote an ideology subversive to the best interests 
of Pakistan".
(27) Asian Kecorder, December 21-50, 195$j page 2419*
(28) G. W. Choudhury, Failure of Parliamentary Democracy in 
Pakistan, op. cit. page 70*
(29) The Times. April 20, 1959.
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Within minutes of issuing the Ordinance, Progressive Papers, 
Limited, of Lahore was served with a notice dissolving its hoard of 
directors. Progressive Papers, Limited, owned four newspapers, the 
English daily Pakistan Times of Lahore, generally considered pro-left, 
two Urdu dailies - Imroze, of Karachi and Imroz© , of Lahore - and 
an Urdu weekly at Lahore. An administrator was appointed to run
Progressive Papers, Limited.
Speaking in the Town Hall, Hew York, on May 8, 1950, Liaquat
Ali IChan, the then Prime Minister of Pakistan had declared what he 
meant by the Islamic way of life, for the safe preservation of which 
Pakistan had been demanded and formed. He said, ,(We believe in 
democi’acy, that is, in fundamental human rights, including the 
right of private ownership and the right of the people to be governed 
by their own freely chosen representatives. We believe in equal 
citizenship for all whether Muslims or non-Muslims, equality of 
opportunity, equality before lav/. We believe that each individual 
man or woman, has the right to the fruit of his own labours. Lastly 
we believe that the fortunate amongst us whether in wealth or 
knowledge or physical fitness, have amoral responsibility towards 
those who have been unfortunate. These principles we call the 
Islamic way of life."
Again on May 15, 195^  » University of Kansas City, he
said, "We believed then and we believe now that the demand of the 
Muslims in British India to have a separate state of their own was,
(50) ibid.
(31) Liaquat Ali Khan, Pakistan, page 53*
»»40 6—
both on human and geopolitical grounds, a very reasonable demand*
To millions of Muslims it meant the only opportunity for genuine
(32}freedom and genuine self-government1 . '
If military dictatorship continues with its consequential 
negation of fundamental human rights and if "the genuine freedom and 
genuine self-government1 of its founders1 dreams vanish into thin 
air, the raison detre of Pakistan ceases to be obvious.
As Pakistan, in spite of the military dictatorship that 
reigns supreme there, is still a member of the Commonwealth, it 
would be of interest to notice what two Prime Ministers of 
Commonwealth countries thought of the recent developments in Pakistan.
Premier Nehru in a written statement to the Indian Parliament 
on November 20, 195© * reviewed the situation in Pakistan and 
declared that Pakistan had "ceased to be, even in name or form, a 
free country, in the democratic sense". President Mirza*s
proclamation of October 7 abrogating the Constitution, he commented, 
put an end to any kind of free or representative government in 
Pakistan. "It is true," he said, "that Parliamentary institutions 
in Pakistan had been deprived of much content because of the failure 
to hold elections ever since independence came eleven years ago. 
Nevertheless, there was the form of such institutions. The 
proclamation of martial law ended this. Por the first time 
dictatorial rule was established in a member country of the
( 32) ib id ,  page 57*
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Commonwealth* The very basis of the Commonwealth has "been democratic 
institutions and the parliamentary form of government* Both these 
were suddenly ended by the coup dfetat of President Mirsa.
In fact, not only was the Constitution of Pakistan abrogated,
but all its laws, judiciary and economic structure could only
function within the limitations imposed by the martial law authorities. 
The old sanctions ceased to exist; the new sanction was the will of 
the President or the martial law administrator*1
After reviewing the events of October 2 7, he continueds 
“Whatever reasons there might be for these repeated and far-reaching 
changes, the fact emerges that a dictatorial regime with military 
control, which is normally not approved of by those who believe in 
free institutions and democracy, was established in Pakistan*M
It was for the people of Pakistan, he said, to choose their 
own form of government, and India had never desired to interfere in
any way; bvit they could not help regretting a development “which from
all normal standards was a set back both politically and economic allyu
(33)
Mr* Biefenbaker, Prime Minster of Canada, it would appear, 
held a different view of tto situation in Pakistan* On November 9> 
he declared in Delhi that he believed the new Pakistan leaders were 
sincerely concerned for the betterment of conditions and would revive 
democratic institutions as soon as possible *^4)
33) The Times, London, November 21, 1958*
34) ibid.
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One hopes that Mr, DiefenbakerT s optimism Td.ll he justified by
the event, though one inclines to agree with Sir Percival Griffiths
who does “not expect to see in the near future any kind of return to
(35)the full parliamentary system1* ' In the meanwhile it may be said
that if any one in the present day world could confidently declare 
nLfHtat5 c’est moi“, it is President Ayub Khan of Pakistan,
tMt^miH.Wmi'MMriirfllrtH.HttilWa.11^1 I II IIBIBI ■■WHIM * "
(35) Sir Percival Griffiths, Democracy under Strain in South Asia, 
Asian Review, April 1959 j P&ge 88, “When some return is 
made I imagine it will be partial return11, says Sir Percival, 
tfI donrt think we shall see in the foreseeable future the 
resumption of parliamentary institutions as they were in 
Pakistan before the change took place? nor am 1 at all certain 
that it is desirable that we should,“ (ibid)
M P M '  IX
EMERGENCY P O M S  IN CEYLON 
1* Ceylon rs Legral System
Xf ,rthe. British Empire in India was the unexpected and on 
the whole unwanted result of the loss of the spice trade”, W  
Ceylon was acquired in what has been called a fit of absence of 
mind* This other “precious stone set in the silver sea” was 
acquired by Britain to deny its use to the French. In August 1795 
Trincomalee was attacked to prevent its being used by the French 
as a base for military operations, and it fell after a brief siege* 
In September Jaffna was captured* In February 1796 Colombo 
surrendered to the British on generous terms. The Maritime 
Provinces of the Island were taken by right of conquest, and ceded 
by the Treaty of Amiens, 1802.
In February 18X5 Governor Brownrigg, after his successful 
invasion of Kandy, issued a proclamation announcing the annexation 
of the Four Korales in the Kandyan Provinces. On March 2, 1815 
was proclaimed the Kandyan Convention by which the chiefs (2 ) on 
behalf of the inhabitants ceded to ”tha Sovereign of the British 
Empire” ”the dominion of the Kandyan Provinces” including those 
already annexed. Thus these Provinces were ceded to the British, 
though at first taken by right of conquest*
(1) L. A. Mils, Britain and Ceylon* page 11.
(2) In Summut v. Strickland. 1930 A.C* 678 it was held that cession 
by the people of a territory has the same effect as cession by 
a sovereign.
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Ceylon was therefore a conquered or ceded Colony and the rule
(3)in Campbell y » HallN ' would apply to the Island* Accordingly, 
Roman-Butch law as administered by the Butch continued in operation 
in.the Maritime Provinces* It was Roman-Butch law as expounded 
by the jurists but modified by local customs which included Muslim 
law, Mukkuva. law and Theaavalamal and by the statutes of Batavia 
and local legislation* ^  The Kandyan law remained in operation in 
the Kandyan Provinces subject to certain exceptions like the 
abolition of torture and mutilation, in accordance with the 
provisions of the Convention of 1J15*
When Lord Horth was appointed Governor in 179&* the Letter 
Patent conferred legislative power on him, while reserving a right 
of legislation to the King* By the Instructions simultaneously 
given to the Governor, the King declared it to be his will and 
pleasure that for the present, and during his will and pleasure, 
the temporary administration of justice and police should, as 
nearly as circumstances would permit, be exercised by the Governor 
in conformity to the laws and institutions that subsisted under 
the ancient government of the United Provinces, subject to such 
deviations in consequence of sudden and unforeseen emergencies or 
to such expedients and useful alterations, as might render a 
departure therefrom, either absolutely necessary or unavoidable, 
or evidently beneficial and desirable*
(3) (1774) Cow^ p.age 204* MThe laws of a conquered country
continue in force until they are altered by the conqueror11*
(4) Ivor Jennings and H* W. ttambiah, The Bominion of Ceylon, 
page 197*
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The Butch law, as has "been said before, remained in 
operation until Lord Horth, acting under his Instructions, 
modified it in certain respects by proclamations* He required 
that legal proceedings must be in public and in open court, 
abolished the practice of torture of suspected persons for procuring 
confession, provided that persons convicted of capital offences 
were to be hanged, abolished mutilation, breaking on the wheel and 
other barbarous modes of punishment, established a single criminal 
court, extended the jurisdiction of certain civil courts, 
re-established the Land Raads,created a Court of Appeal 
consisting of the Governor, the Military Commander, and the 
Secretary to Government and allowed liberty of conscience and the 
free exercise of religious worship to all persons "who quietly and 
peacefully enjoy the same without offence or scandal to the 
Government11* He enacted that persons who were slaves by the. 
existing laws of the Island would continue to be the property of 
those to whom they belonged and might be transferred according to 
Butch law, but were, not to be sold away out of the Island and no 
slaves were to be imported*^
The Charter of Justice issued in 1801 established a Supreme 
Court for the Island, prescribed its jurisdiction and laid down 
rules, which approximated to those of English law, for its 
procedure* Bespite the procedure adopted, it was provided that in
(5) Land Courts*
(6) Legislative Acts of the Ceylon Government, 1796~i833> I* page 4*
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matters of inheritance and succession, contract and dealings
between party and party, Sinhalese, Tamil or Islamic law was to be
applied where the parties were Sinhalese, Tamils or Muslims, and
that the defendant*s law was to be applied if the parties were of
different communities* Thus Thesavalamai was applied to the Tamils,
(?)Islamic law to the Muslims and Roman—Butch law to the Sinhalese*
The Court was given an equitable jurisdiction to administer justice 
in a summary manner, "according to the law now established in the 
said settlements in the Island of Ceylon and in point of form, as 
nearly as may be, according to the rules and proceedings of our 
High Court of Chancery in Great Britain*"
The Charter of 1810 introduced trial by jury in criminal cases* 
It was when English legal conceptions were thus seeping into 
the variegated legal system of the Island that the revolt of 1817—18 
broke out and martial law was declared under the Common Law rule as 
a state necessity*
(7) During the Portuguese and Butch occupation, Sinhalese law 
had almost disappeared, except in Kandy, though Sinhalese 
law of land tenure and the institution of ra.iakar.va (forced 
labour) were recognised by the Butch*
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ii. Martial Law in Ceylon
The chiefs in the Kandyan Provinces did not like the new
administrative arrangements made by the Government as they found
that they were losing statue though they were allowed to continue in
power and retain their special rights and privileges* Though there
was no interference with their religion the Buddhist priests were
suspicious of the new regime for it was a Christian and foreign 
(1)regime* The common people had suffered oppression owing mainly
■fc0 ra.jakarva (forced labour) but they were used to such oppression* 
The chiefs as well as, the common people were attached to the
institution of monarchy and wanted a King whom they could see and
(o')
from whom they could obtain summary justice*' ' They did not like 
innovations, even innovations like the British system of justice 
which tended to view everyone as equal under the law*
In these circumstances it was easy for a pretender to the 
throne to get popular support when he established himself in the 
jungle and secured the assistance of the Buddhist priests to incite 
the Province to revolt* When any district rose in revolt one or 
two military posts were established in it and martial law proclaimed* 
It was first proclaimed in October 1817* Though the revolt was 
apparently quelled by the end of December 1817 martial law continued 
to be in operation until October 1818* Two of the rebel leaders 
were tried by Court Martial and beheaded* The Courts Martial 
appointed by the Governor were composed of five members of whom at
(1) 0. Collins, Public Administration in Ceylon, pages 47-48*
(2) L* A. Mils, Ceylon under British Rule, 'page 160*
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least, one was a field officer* in experienced civil servant or 
military officer was appointed as Judge Advocate to each, court* 
Sentences of death were confirmed by the Governor*
In I848 another rebellion broke out in the ICandyan Provinces 
mainly because of ,fthe growing lawlessness of the Kandyans, the 
inefficiency of the Civil Service, the alienation and declining 
influence of the ICandyan nobles and the partial demoralisation of 
■kk® raiyats due to the development of the coffee industry11^ ) * *To 
crush the rebellion at its outset* and to prevent it from spreading, 
martial law was proclaimed on July 29 j in the District of Kandy and 
on July 31 in the Seven ICorales# Several prisoners were tried by 
Court Martial and shot, including one of the pretenders to the 
throne. Even after the suppression of the revolt, Lord forrington, 
the Governor, approved the retention of martial law to prevent the 
people from persevering in rebellious tendencies and to serve as fa 
check upon the evil propensities* of the priests and nobles who had 
undoubtedly sponsored the revolt. On September 21 another pretender 
was captured and on October 10 martial law was withdrawn* An Act 
of Indemnity was unanimously passed by the Legislative Council on 
October 23*
. Torrington*s opponents in Ceylon contended that the revolt was 
caused by the new taxes he imposed and the Road Ordinance he 
promulgated requiring every inhabitant of Ceylon to work six days 
annually in the repair or construction of public roads or else to 
pay a commutation tax. of three shillings. They also maintained that
(3) L. A. Mills, Ceylon under British Rule, pa^e 196.
(4) L. A. Mills, Ceylon under British Rule, page 176.
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the revolt was little more than a series of riots, that the 
proclamation of martial lav/' and its continuance for ten weeks were 
unwarranted and that the sequestration of property and the severe 
sentences imposed by the courts martial were absolutely criminal. 
Though Lord Grey, the Secretary of State, entirely approved of 
Torrington*s actions, the Governorfs opponents eventually managed 
to have a Committee of Inquiry of the House of Commons appointed to 
inquire into the conduct of the Governor* The Committee included 
among its members Disraeli, Peel, Gladstone, Hume and Baillie*
The Inquiry made by the Committee is of interest for the 
opinions on martial law expressed by the Judge Advocate General.
The majority of the witnesses were members of the Ceylon 
Civil Service, most of whom defended Torrington*s measures. In 
his favour it was said by Major Skinner that his stern measures were 
lfdecided by the course of mercy, as in forty-eight hours the revolt
(pj)
would have spread rap idly!t.
The Chief Justice of Ceylon was of the opinion that the Civil
Servants who advised the Governor greatly exaggerated a futile and
contemptible attempt at rebellion and that the proclamation of
martial law was unnecessary since the civil power could have subdued
(6)the outbreak with the assistance of the troops.v '
Sir David Dundas, the Judge Advocate General, said in the 
course of his evidence that while military law was strictly defined 
and limited by statutes, martial law was vague, undefined and not
(5) Parliamentary Papers, H.C. 106 of I85O. Vol. XII, 298.
(6) Parliamentary Papers, H.C. 36 of I85I. Vol. VIII, 607.
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governed by regulations. Under martial law there were no definite 
rules determining the composition or procedure of the court? the
right of the accused to a fair trial depended entirely on the wisdom 
and sense of justice of the presiding officer. Martial law was 
unwritten? it followed no precedents. ,fI know of no rule except 
the rule of common sense and humanity" said the Judge Advocate 
General. The Government was entitled to proclaim martial law in 
cases of paramount necessity* and if it were administered honestly, 
rigorously and vigorously with as much humanity as the case will.
(7)permit* Parliament could and should pass an Act of Indemnity. v ‘ *
General Fitzroy Somerset, the Secretary to the Commander-in- 
Chief at the time, stated that there were no written instructions 
that he could find in any quarter for the administration of martial
i (8)law.
As martial law was proclaimed under the common law it is of 
interest to know what English jurists and constitutional lawyers in 
and near about the middle of the last century thought of martial law* 
"The only principle on which the law of England tolerates martial law1* 
said the lav/ officers of the Crown in 1838, "is necessity? its 
introduction can be justified only by necessity? its continuation 
requires precisely the same justification of necessity, and if it, 
survives the necessity on which alone it rests for a single minute,
(9)it becomes instantly a mere exercise of lawless v i o l e n c e . T o
(7) Parliamentary Papers H.C. 106 of I85O. Vol.XII. 176-87.
(8) Parliamentary Papers H.C. 36 of 1851. Vol.VIII. 1. 718*
(9) Quoted in R. O'Sullivan, Military Law and the Supremacy of the
Civil Courts, - page 24*
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Forsyth it meant not a code of rules but a state of society in which
absolute power was assumed by the military authorities who were
temporarily placed above the ordinary law and beyond the
jurisdiction of the ordinary courts, for the purpose of suppressing
(10)an insurrection or resisting an invasion*
(ll)In Retina v* Eyre / it was held that if a state of war
existed inside the country, martial lav/ was justified and legal
without the necessity for a proclamation! if a state of war did not
exist, a proclamation could not make martial law legal* Martial
lav/, like the right of self-defence, is justified by necessity and
by nothing else*
Sir James Stephen, writing in 1883, stated that the views
expressed by Sir David Dundas appeared to him to be "substantially
correct"* Sir James paraphrased them sayings "According to them
the words 'martial lav/1 as used in the expression 'proclaiming martial
law* might be defined as the assumption for a certain time, by the
officers of the Grown, of absolute power, exercised by military
force, for the purpose of suppressing an insurrection or resisting
an invasion* The 'proclamation1 of martial lav/, in this sense,
would only be a notice to all whom it might concern that such a
(12)course was about to be taken".v '
Professor Hood Phillips sums up the position when he says,
"What on rare occasions has been called martial law since 1628 by 
British Constitutional writers has been a state of affairs outside
(10) Forsyth, Gases and Opinions on Constitutional Law, (l86$>) p*559*
(11) (1868) Finlanson's Report, 74*
(12) A History of the Criminal Lav/ of England. I, page 214*
Great Britain, in which owing to civil commotion, the ordinary
courts were unable to function and it was therefore necessary to
establish military tribunals* It is merely an extended application
of the principle   that the Executive have such powers as are
necessary for the preservation of public order"*(^ 3)
Martial law was again proclaimed in Gey Ion on June 2, 1915 an(3-
continued to be in operation until withdrawn by an Order in Council
on August 30, 1915* li was proclaimed in consequence of street
fights in Kandy and the spread of the riotous spirit to Colombo
following the attack on a procession of Buddhists who were
celebrating the birthday of the Lord Buddha in Kandy Town*^*^
(1r)
The Hambaya Muslims who attacked the Buddhists insisted that
Buddhist processions should pass in silence in front of their mosques. 
The Buddhist priests claimed the right, under the Kandyan Convention 
of 1815, to conduct their religious ceremonies in the customary 
manner with singing and beat of drums*
These disturbances occurred during a period in which, owing 
to the outbreak of war between Great Britain and Germany, the 
Imperial Order in Council of October 26, 1896 was in operation in 
the Island. The effect of that Order in Council was to make all 
persons for the time being within the limits of the Colony subject 
to military law, as if they were persons actually accompanying His 
Majesty's troops. When martial law waw proclaimed, the. General
(13) Hood Phillips, Constitutional Law.p*546*
(1 4) P. Ramanathan, Riots and Martial Law in Ceylon, page 58.
(15) Muslim immigrants from the east coast of India*
Officer Commanding the Troops was placed in charge of the 
maintenance of order and the defence of life and property in the 
provinces to which the proclamation applied and he was authorised to 
take all steps of whatever nature that he might deem necessary for 
those purposes. The General Officer Commanding the Troops by an 
order dated June 3, 1915 provided that no persons except officers, 
soldiers, police, postmen and telegraph messengers in uniform and 
special constables should be permitted to be in the public streets 
or roads between the hours of 6p.m. and 6a.nw without special passes. 
The prohibited period was altered to 7p*m. to 5a*m* hy a subsequent 
order dated 9th June*
In a case^*^ which arose out of the breach of the second 
order* it was held that a breach of the order was an offence under 
Section 185 o f  the Penal Code which provided punishment for 
disobedience of an order issued by a. public servant, lawfully 
empowered on that behalf*
It was contended on behalf of the appellant that whenever an 
offence was created by martial law it was triable by court martial 
alone by virtue of a proviso to Clause III of the Order in Council 
of October 26, 1896 which reads as follows;- "Provided that a person 
who- is by virtue of this Order subject to martial law shall, unless, 
the Governor directs otherwise, be tried by a competent civil court, 
and not by a court martial, for any offence with which he would be 
triable if he were not subject to martial law". Construing the
(16) Sub-Inspector of Police v. James Sinno, (1915) H.L.R. 283,
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proviso, Wood Renton, C.J., observed* lf......a person subject to
the application of the Order in Council who is alleged to have 
committed an offence under martial law, shall be tried by a 
competent civil court, unless the Governor' gives direction to the 
contrary. But it does not follow - the proviso certainly does not 
say - that where an offence amounting to a breach of military law 
is also an offence under the Penal Code, he must be tried by courts 
martial alone. It would certainly in many cases not be in the 
interest of the subject that the proviso should be construed in this 
sense. For, as we are all aware, the procedure before courts 
martial is far more summary than that which the Municipal law 
recognises, and it may be added that the sentences for which martial 
law provides are frequently more severe than those embodied in the 
Penal Code''.^ 1^
In an Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus for the 
production of the Body of V/. A. De S i l v a the applicant was 
arrested and detained in military custody by the General Officer 
Commanding the Troops who justified the arrest and the detention on 
the grounds that he was acting in the exercise of his powers under 
martial law* While refusing the application on the ground that the 
acts of the military authorities in the exercise of their martial lav/ 
powers were not justiciable by the municipal courts, Wood Renton,C.J., 
observed* "(The municipal courts) have the right to inquire, and
(17) Ibid, page 285*
(18) (1915) ff.L.R. 277.
the duty of inquiring* into the question of fact* whether an
’’actual state of wax'" exists or not* But when that question has
heen answered in the affirmative, the acts of the military
authorities in the exercise of their martial law powers are no
(19)longer justiciable by the municipal courts"*
Dealing with the contention that as the civil courts had heen 
sitting all along, martial law had ceased to exist, the learned 
Chief Justice observed: "The question whether an actual state of
war. * • * exists or not is purely one of fact. The circumstance that 
the ordinary courts are open may constitute evidence, and material 
evidence, against the existence of such a state of war* But it is 
not conclusive. It is least of all conclusive where a country is 
in a state of unsettlement at a time Y/hen actual acts of violence 
may for the moment have ceased. The authorities when they have to 
deal with such circumstances as these may well regard the keeping 
open of the municipal tribunals as being itself a part of the healing 
process which it must be their endeavour to induce.... Ho authority
was cited to me......and I am aware of none which prevents the
continuance of the exercise of the pcwers compendiously described as 
existing under ’martial law* during such a period of unse it dement*" 
Referring to the proclamation of martial law, His Lordship 
stated that such a proclamation "is in no way necessary to give 
martial law its efficacy and validity, any more than it would 
constitute an ultimate justification for acts in excess of what
(19) Ibid.
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the needs of the hour require. It is merely, what it purports 
in terms to he, a declaration to the whole community of the 
assumption hy the Executive Government of powers which it already 
possesses'*.
In Application for a Writ of Prohibition to be directed to the
Members of a Field General Court Martial in the matter of Edmund
(21) . . . . . . . . .
Hewavilratnav ' the Supreme Court held that it had no power to
issue a mandate in the nature of a writ of prohibition to a court
martial, as its powers were strictly defined and limited by the
Courts Ordinance, 1889* Section 46 of the Ordinance enabled the
Supreme Court to grant, inter alia, a mandate in the nature of a
writ of prohibition, ,fagainst any District Judge, Commissioner,
Magistrate or other person or tribunal". It was contended on
behalf of the applicant that the expression "or other person or
tribunal" included courts martial. In reply De Sampayo, A.J.,
observed: "it is clear to my mind that it refers to persons and
tribunals e.iusdem generis with District Judges, Commissioners and
Magistrates and that the Courts here contemplated qtq the Courts
established in the Island....*. "for the ordinary administration of
justice", and not courts martial, which exercise not an ordinary
but an extraordinary jurisdiction under circumstances of paramount
(22)necessity of state".
(20) ibid, 280. In Tilanko v. Advocate.-General of Datal*, it was 
observed that."a proclamation of martial law is usually issued 
in order to give due notice and to call attention to the state 
of war, but in itself the proclamation has no effect"
(1907) A.C. 93.
(21) (1915) U.L.R. 334.
(22) Ibid. 339.
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During the period of martial law instructions were given by 
the Officer Commanding the Troops to the Superintendent of Police, 
Central Police, to instruct his men in the drill prescribed for 
street blocking. In Wiokramasinghe v. Coore- the facts were
that the appellant, an Inspector in charge of about fifty 
constables, was engaged in carrying out the prescribed drill at a 
spot- where it was expected that trouble might occur, and for the 
purpose of the manoeuvre two police officers crossed the drain on to 
the respondent s compound and one of them stood close against the 
verandah of the respondents house. The respondent ordered them 
off, but they refused to go. A. struggle ensued. The respondent 
was arrested an& taken to the police station and subsequently charged 
with obstructing the police in the discharge of their duty, but was 
aquitted. He thereupon brought, an action for damages for false 
imprisonment and malicious prosecution. The Court held that the 
police were Justified in entering the respondents compound by the 
direction of the military authorities and were not trespassers and 
the respondent had no right to eject them and that the act of 
obstruction of the police in the execution of their duty Justified 
immediate arrest without warrant and entitled the appellant to 
prosecute the respondent before the i&gistrate.
It was contended on behalf of the respondent that neither- the 
proclamation o£ martial law nor the 'actual state of war1 existing 
in the Island at the time would Justify acts in excess, of what the 
necessity of the situation required, and that the direction to drill
(23) (1916) H.L.fi. 97
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in a. manner involving the necessity of trespass on private property, 
and in particular the actual drill undertaken by the appellant and 
his men, involving as it did an entry on the respondent's compound, 
were unnecessary and in excess of the needs of the occasion*
Kef erring to these contentions, Shaw, D.C.J., in the course 
of his judgement, observeds
"So far as the first part of this proposition is concerned it 
is perfectly correct, and an excessive and unnecessary interference 
with the persons or property of individuals would be illegal and 
justiciable by the tribunals of the country after martial law had 
been removed, unless the. acts came within the protection of the 
proclamation or Act of Indemnity then issued or passed* I am quite 
unable, however, to accept the contention that the orders of the 
Officer Commanding as to the drills to be. undertaken, or the. conduct 
of the police in carrying them out as they did in this particular 
instance were unnecessary or in excess of the requirements of the 
c ircumstanc e s"V
"The directions were thought to be necessary by the officer to 
whom had been entrusted the safety of the Province, and it would 
certainly appear to me to be a most reasonable and proper precaution 
to prepare the police force to cope with the anticipated disturbance 
before it actually occurred, even if doing so involved a slight 
trespass on private property"'.
Pedris v. The Manufacturers Life Insurance Company Limited.
(24) ibid, 100*
(25) (1917) n.l.r. 321*
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raised "questions of great public interest and importance" .
The administrator of the estate of one Pedris brought an action to 
recover- from the defendant company a sum of Rupees 25*000 due upon 
a policy of life insurance* The undertaking to pay in the event of 
death was a general one and not limited to death in any particular 
manner* Pedris was convicted by a Field General Court Jiflartial of 
four charges including treason and sentenced to death* The sentence 
having been confirmed by the General Officer Commanding the Troops, 
he was shot in jail on July 7* 1915* On August 30* 1915 *fche Ceylon 
Indemnity Order in Council was. promulgated* Section 4 of the Order 
provided that "the several sentences and orders pronounced by 
Military Courts held in the Colony during the continuance, of martial 
law are hereby confirmed, and all persons tried by such courts and
confined in any prisons *shall continue to be confined there.*.*
and such sentences shall be deemed to be sentences passed by duly 
and legally constituted courts of the Colony.*.*"
It was held that Section 4 of the Order in Council prevented 
any question being raised for any purpose as to the jurisdiction 
of the Court by which the sentence was pronounced either over the 
charges on which the trial proceeded or over the person tried*
The Order in Council did not amount to a declaration by statute that 
Pedris was guilty of the offences of which he was convicted* It 
was open to the plaintiff to lead evidence to prove that Pedris was 
not in fact guilty of the offences, though the record of the 
conviction was prima facie evidence of his guilt* The mere fact
(26) ibid, 321. (per Wood Renton, C.J.)
that Pedris died at the hands of justice did not* thfc^  Court held,
prevent, his administrator from recovering on the polioyv
Referring to the Indemnity Order in Council, Wood Renton, C.J.,
observed that it was an enactment which was not merely retrospective
in character, hut was brought into operation after the right sought
to be asserted in the present action had accrued* ,f3h the law
administered by military courts”, His lordship observed, l!an express
distinction is drawn between the *findings * of these tribunals and
the sentences passed by them. If the framers of the Order in
Council had intended to validate the former as well as the latter.
nothing would have been easier than for them to have said so..*...
Applying to the enactment in ctuestion the well established rule of
law as to the interpretation of legislation of this character-, I am
not prepared to hold that there is anything in it which, precludes
Pedris*s administrator from challenging the propriety of his
(27)conviction on the merits”.
The learned Chief Justice dealing with the argument ab 
inconvenienti which might arise from his decision, stated:
nIf the guilt of Pedris has not been conclusively established
by the Ceylon Indemnity Order in Council, 193-5? Is ^  s0
established by the production of the record of his conviction? An
v
^rgument ab convenienti arises., in this connexion, in favour alike 
of the defendants and of the administrator* A, ps rson accused of
murder is tried by a Judge of the Supreme Court with a jury at
Criminal Sessions, is convicted, and sentenced to death* On a
(27) ibid, 324.
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case reserved on certain points of law, the propriety of this 
conviction is affirmed hy the Supreme Court. If the contention of 
the administrator in this case is upheld, the legal representative 
of the convict may reopen the whole question of his guilt or 
innocence and have the charge of murder incidentally retried in an 
action on an insurance policy. On the other hand, human Justice 
is fallible* Let us suppose that, after the execution of a person 
convicted of murder, conclusive proof is forthcoming that he was 
not the murderer. Is there any rule of public policy which makes 
it necessary to debar his relatives from proving his innocence for 
the purpose of recovering a sum of money for which his life had been j
insured? If we must choose between the inconvenience of reopening jS I
j
a criminal trial as a collateral issue in civil proceedings, and |
the injustice of preventing the relatives of a person, who has been
wrongfully condemned and executed, from proving that fact in such an 
action as this, I prefer to incur the risk involved in the former 
alternative11 *
Shaw, J., agreed with the learned Chief Justice stating the 
law as follows:
.there is no reason to suppose that the object of the 
enactment (The Ceylon Indemnity Order in Council) was to give to 
the findings of the military courts any greater effect than those
of the civil courts of the Colony, which were sitting and trying
very similar cases at the same time, and I am unable to see that 
any principle of public policy requires the finding of a Military
(2.8) ibid, 324-5*
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Court not to be open to challenge in subsequent civil proceedings 
in cases where such challenge would he permissible had the finding
(pc}
been one of a Civil Court"*
The case was sent back to the District Court for further 
inquiry and adjudication*
If in re De Silva.^^  the Supreme Court decided, in line
  ( v r )
with Irish and South African authorities,w  ' that it was for the
court to say whether such a state of necessity existed that martial
law could be put into operation, in Pedris *s case, the Court
followed a. hitherto untrodden path, guided by the light of the
general rule of common law that a conviction for felony is of itself
"no evidence in any civil proceeding that the person convicted has
(32)committed the felony", in that it applied the rule to a court
martial, giving a strict interpretation to the Indemnity Ordinance 
in favour of the subject*
(29) iwa, 329.
(30) (1915) N.L.R. 277.
(31) Hex Vi Alien. (1921) I.R. 241.
Rex-v. -Strickland. (1921) I.E. 317*
Ex parte Marais..(1902) A.C. IO9.
(32) Leymep v. Latimer. (1878)' L.R. 3 Ex.D.352.
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iii. Defence Legislation during the Second World War.
After- the outbreak of the war in Europe, the British Emergency 
(Defence) Acts, 1939 an& 1940 > were applied to Ceylon by an 
Imperial Order in Council, The Ceylon Defence (Miscellaneous) 
Regulations, on the lines of the British Defence Regulations were 
framed under the Acts, A few of them which were litigated upon in 
the courts are noticed below.
Regulation id) of the Defence (Miscellaneous Ro«3) Regulations, 
1940j provided for preventive detention. It enacted that "if the 
Governor has reasonable cause to believe any person to be of hostile 
origin or associations or to have been recently concerned in acts 
prejudicial to the public safety or the defence of the Island or in 
the preparation or instigation of such acts and that by reason 
thereof it is necessary to exercise control over him, he may make 
an order against that person that he may be detained".
In a case in which the validity of an order of detention which 
did not set out the grounds for the Governorfs belief to make the 
order was challenged, the Supreme Court held that it was not 
essential to set them out in the order * Don Philip Gunawardena, a 
member of the State Council, who was detained in pursuance of an 
ox*der made by the Governor under this Regulation, escaped from 
custody. In Gunawardena v. ICandy Police^  it was contended on 
his behalf that the custody from which he escaped was not lawful on 
the ground that the order of detention, on the face of it, was
(1) 1944 N.L.R, 399.
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invalid in that it did not set out the conditions precedent to the
making of such an order, that is to say, that the Governor had
reasonable cause to believe that a certain state of things existed
and that by reason thereof it was necessary to exercise control over
the appellant* The court held that it was not essential to the
validity of the order that it should set out the conditions precedent
to the making of the order* Following obiter dicta in Hex v, Brixton
(2}Prison ex parte Fitt-Eivers  ^ , Moseley, J*, observed that it would
be desirable to include in the order the Governor1s belief on
reasonable grounds as to the category into which the detainee fell,
but 1 am quite unable to say that the omission of such a statement is
( 3}fatal to the validity of the order1* *
In Ti vienne Go one war dene v» Wijeyasuriya» on a report by
an officer of the Criminal Investigation Department to the Magistrate 
of Colombo that the Governor, under Regulation 1(9) had made an order 
against Mrs* Goonawardene, “which was deemed to be a warrant for her 
arrestM and that she had absconded or was concealing herself so that
the warrant could not be executed, the Magistrate published a
proclamation requiring Mrs* Goonewardene to appear at a specified 
place and time and also issued an order for the attachment of her 
property* The attorney of Mrs* Goonewardene filed an affidavit in 
the Magistrate^ Court to the effect that Mrs* Goonewardene had told 
him five months prior to the Governor*s order that she was leaving
(2) 1942 A*3S«R* Yolume I, 207.
v3; Gunawardena v* Kandy Police* 1944 R.L.Ro 399 at 402*
(4) 1942 H.L.R. 487.
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Ceylon immediately and that he had not seen or heard from her since 
that date* He believed that he carried out her intention and moved 
the court to cancel the order of attachment. The Supreme Court 
dismissed the application in revision holding that the attorney had 
no status to move the court to rescind the order, as Mrs. Goonewardene 
must be deemed to be in contempt till she came forward in response 
to the proclamation.
Regulation 14 provided, inter alia* that no person should have 
in his possession “any document or any record whatsoever containing 
information of any matter which v/ould or might, directly or 
indirectly, be useful to the e n e m y T h e  proviso to the Regulation 
stated that no person would be adjudged guilty of an offence against 
the? Regulation if he shoved that the possession by him of the 
document or record in respect of which a charge had been made was not 
likely to prejudice the defence of the Island or the efficient 
prosecution of the war*
Ruder the proviso, it would be a defence if it could be proved
that the information in the possession of the accused was not likely
(5)to be communicated to the enemy. In Sinniah v. Tnncomalee Police 
the accused was charged with attempting to obtain information relating 
to the conveyance of secret dispatches which would or might be 
directly or indirectly useful to the enemy in breach of 
Regulation 14(1 )eo. The defence was that the questions put by the 
accused to a member of the Royal Artillery while travelling by train
(5 )  1943 H.L.E. 501.
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as to whether the latter was carrying despatches for the Army or 
the Havy and where he dropped and picked up despatches on the line 
and whether he was returning to Colombo the next day were not likely 
to prejudice the defence of the Island or the efficient prosecution 
of the war* It was held that as evidence was led to prove that the 
accused was not likely to disclose confidential information to anyone 
much less to the enemy, the failure of the Magistrate to apply the 
proviso to the regulation to the defence of the accused was a serious 
misdirection which vitiated the conviction. The conviction was 
thex'efore set aside.
Regulation 19 prohibited the printing and publication of 
documents likely to cause disaffection among His Majesty’s subjects 
and Regulation 20 prohibited publications which might prove 
prejudicial to public safety, the maintenance of public order or
(6)the efficient prosecution of the war* In King v. Wickrema Singhex 
the accused was charged inter alia, with endeavouring to “cause 
disaffection among His Majesty’s subjects in Ceylon by causing to be 
printed and published Ma certain article in the Sinhalese newspaper 
’Jana Saktiya1 in contravention of Regulation 19(1) (a) and with 
endeavouring to influence public opinion, by the printing and 
publishing of the article, in a manner likely to be prejudicial to 
public safety, the defence of the Island, the maintenance of public 
order or the efficient prosecution of tjae war in contravention of 
Regulation 20(l)(a). The prosecution in establishing that the
(6) 1941 H.L.R. 313.
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accused was in fact the publisher, editor, and manager of the 
newspaper proved certain facts which invested the accused with such 
a degree of suspicion as to demand an explanation from him. It was 
held that in the absence of an explanation the court was entitled to 
form the opinion that the accused was directly responsible for the 
printing and publication of the articles.
It was further held that the statement in the article to the - 
effect that ’the Government of Ceylon does not hesitate to do any Yfrong, 
whether it is to kill people in cold blood or to disseminate falsehoods 
in order to bring about race-hatred'1 amounted to an endeavour to 
cause disaffection among His Majesty’s subjects in Ceylon. It was 
also held that the statement to the effect, "we remember 1915 Martial 
Law.....They (the Government) want to repeat the 1915 incidents in a 
greater measure.,... This police power should be checked by the 
people" was prejudicial to the public safety and to the maintenance 
of public order.
Regulation 20A prohibited the publication of any report or 
statement relating to matters connected with the war which was likely 
to cause alarm or despondency. The proviso to the Regulation stated 
that "a person shall not be convicted of an offence against this 
Regulation if he provess
(a) that he had reasonable cause to believe that the report or 
statement was true; and
(b) that the publication thereof was not malicious and ought 
fairly to be excused".
The accused in Attorney General v. Gunaratne (?) was charged
T _  1942 553<
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with publishing, in contravention of this Regulation, an article 
entitled ’The fatal blow that Raja Rata would receive* in a Sinhalese 
newspaper, ’Sinhala Ba.udhaya** The article contained the 
following sentencess
“A rumour has spread throughout the Anuradhapura District that 
our Ceylon Government has fixed dynamite at the sluices of 
tanks which contain water sufficient for the production of adequate 
foddstuffs for the whole of the Uorth-Central Province* There is a 
feeling among the people that, in the event of there being any danger 
from the enemy, the dynamite would be caused to explode and that the 
water would be made to flow out. Then the water in all these tanks 
would, like a sea flowing over the land, carry the whole of 
Anuradhapura with the people into the ocean". It was held that the
article was likely to cause alarm and despondency within the meaning
of the Section* The publication of a rumour, though it was
expressly stated to be a rumour, was penalised by the Section, It
was further held that mens re a was not an essential ingredient of 
the offence, ICeuneman, J., observing, that in this Regulation,
"no mental state is made an ingredient of the offence, but instead 
we find a proviso, which exempts the accused person from conviction, 
if he proves two things contained in provisos (a) and (b). I think 
it is not possible to resist the conclusion that the words "knowingly" 
or "intentionally" were deliberately omitted, and the burden 
definitely placed on the accused to prove the matters mentioned in
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(q)
the proviso in order to escape conviction11^ ' *
(9}huveneris v* Yandriesen indicates to what extent the court 
felt the need to curtail freedom of expression in a period of crisis* 
The appellant in the case was charged with contravention of 
Regulation 20 A for having gone to another person*s house and said in 
the hearing of the members of that person*s family words in Sinhalese 
to the effect "Your English and your English Government will he ruined 
when the Japanese come", "That statement which was made a few weeks 
after the raid in April was likely to cause alarm or despondency as 
found by the learned Magistrate ?,! observed Wijeywardene 3 J, The 
court held that "the Regulation does not reqiiire any proof by evidence 
that certain ?/itnesses thought that the statement would have that 
effect or that certain persons were in fact alarmed or made despondent* 
It is for the court to examine the statement and decide whether the 
statement is likely to have that effect"*
Though the civil rights of the subjects were thus curtailed 
during the war 9 it is remarkable that the Gommander-in-Chief who 
was given control of the civil government did not arrogate to himself 
all the powers of the governments but pe rmitted. the civil government 
to be carried on by the Governor and the Board of Ministers*
Inivlafciu1942» Admiral Sir Geoffrey Layton was appointed 
Commander-in-Chief of Ceylon* As it was of paramount importance 
that there should be unified command during the emergency, in order
( Q) ibid page 358#
(9) 1943 N.L.R. 235*
(10) idem* page 236*
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to ensure that military and civil defence measures were properly
co-ordinated , the Commander-In-Chief was given control over the
civil government. Admiral Layton, however, held his powers in
(1 1)
reservev ' and left the civil administration in the hands of the 
Governor and his Ministers. To facilitate close co-operation 
between the civil and military authorities, a war council consisting 
of the Commander-in-Chief, the Governor, the Ministers and the 
rej>resentatives of the Iffavy, the Army and the Air Force was set up* 
Thus, though there was some control of civil affairs, for the more 
efficient prosecution of the war, the civil administration was not 
taken over by the military authorities.
(11) "When he (Admiral Layton) attempted to act as though the Board 
of Ministers' could be ignored in the matter of taking Important 
decisions, D. S. Senanayake (the Prime Minister) was roused to 
protest and to say that the Ministers might as well resign and 
leave everything to the Commander-in-Chief. A stormy seen©
nearly developed; but after some discussion Senanayake and the 
Admiral emerged from the Conference the best of friends*"
(John Kotelawala, An Asian Prime Minister1s Storya page 57)
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iv. Reserve Powers of the Governor
After a brief period of unsuccessful rule of its territories in 
the island by the Governor-General of India as part of its South Indian 
dominions, the British Government in 1802 decided to administer the 
territories as a separate unit with the status of a Crown colony, 
legislative, executive and judicial powers being vested in the Governor..
To assist him in the exercise of these powers he had a council consisting 
of not more than five officials whose advice he was not obliged to 
follow. During the first years of its existence the members of the 
Council were the Chief Justice, the Officer Commanding the Troops, 
the Principal Secretary to the Government and two other officials 
nominated by the Governor. The Governor had the power to suspend or 
dismiss a member, while a member who disagreed with the Governor on any 
matter under discussion had the right to enter a protest in the minutes 
of the Council.
As a result of the recommendation of the Colbroolce Commission a 
change in the system was effected in 1833 by constituting a government 
by the Governor and Executive and Legislative Councils in place of the 
rule of the Governor and his Advisory Council. The Executive Council 
consisted of some of the principal officials in the country while 
Legislative Council had as its members nine officials and six non-officials, 
all the non-officials being nominated by the Governor. All lav/s and 
financial measures required the consent of the Legislative Council.
Before Bills were submitted to the Council they were discussed by the 
Executive Council, but until I860 the Governorfs permission was required
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before any Bill or subject for debate could be introduced- The 
Governor had the power to veto any Bill* In the beginning it was 
not certain whether the Governor could require the official members 
to vote for measures which he considered essential- On occasions he 
complained that he was "powerless and yet responsible", because official 
members at times declined to support his policy while the non-officials 
opposed it* It was later decided that the officials who were members of 
both Councils must support in the Legislative Council the policy which 
had already been decided upon in the Executive Council. The officials 
who were members of the Legislative Council only continued to insist 
that they should be free to vote against measures recommended by the 
Governor. But by the end of the 19th Century their freedom in this 
matter was curtailed, the Colonial Office laying down the rule that they 
must support the Governor when required to do so or else resign from 
the Legislative Council though not necessarily from the Civil Service- 
The Colonial Office expressed the opinion that the Governorfs control 
of the official vote was "the essence of a Crown. Colony"* The purpose 
of the Legislative Council, it was pointed out, v/as merely to enable 
the Governor to learn the point of view of the public- It v/as purely 
an advisory body and the sole responsibility for all decisions v/as with 
the Governor. He could not possibly be held responsible for results if 
he v/as compelled to accept decisions of which he disapproved.
Both the Councils were purely advisory bodies; the Governor had 
the right to overrule their decision and adopt his own course of action.
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He was responsible only to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.
In fact, the Interpretation Ordinance, 1901 stated that "the Government 
shall mean the Governor", (l)
The Governor’s powers remained through the years virtually 
unaffected though the membership of the non - officials in the 
Legislative Council was increased from time to time- In 1920 when 
the Ceylon (legislative Council) Order in Council, 1920, creating a 
Legislative Council containing official majority was brought
into operation, the Governor was empowered to stop the • proceedings 
in relation to any measure if he certified that it would affect the 
safety and tranquillity of the Island* The Order in Council provided 
that if the Governor declared that the passing of any measure was of 
paramount importance to the public interest, only the votes of the 
official members would be recorded in such a case and if a majority 
of such members voted in favour, the measure would be deemed to have 
been passed by the Legislative Council.
The Governor was required under the Royal Instructions issued to 
him in 1920 not to give his assent, except under very limited circum­
stances, to certain classes of Bills* They included Bills
(i) for the divorce of persons joined together in holy matrimony/
(ii) whereby any grant of land or money, or other donation or 
gratuity may be made to himself;
(l) In strict legal theory, this position continued up to the end of 
1947, but during the period of Donoughmore Constitution, this 
definition was virtually an anachronism.
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(iii) affecting the currency of the island or relating to the 
issue of hank notes,
(iv) establishing any banking association or amending or 
altering the constitution,powers or privileges of any banking associationt
■ (v) imposing differential duties,
(vi) the provisions of which would appear inconsistent with
obligations imposed upon His Majesty by treaty,
(vii) interfering with the discipline or control of His Majesty’s
forces by land, sea or air?
(viii) of any extraordinary nature and importance, whereby the 
royal prerogative, or the right* and property of British subject* not 
residing in the island, or the trade and shipping of the United Kingdom 
and its Dependencies might be prejudiced,
(ix) AsajNBa&l whereby persons not of European birth might be 
subjected or made liable to any disabilities or retrictions to which 
persons of European birth or descent were not also subjected or made; 
liable 7
(x) containing provisions to which the royal assent had been
once refused, or which had been disallowed by His Majesty (subject to 
certain reservations).
Certain minor changes in the provision for certification of bills 
were effected by the Ceylon (Legislative Council) Order in Council, 1923- 
The Governor could now exercise the powers of certification himself or 
through an ex-officio member of the Council authorised in this behalf 
by making a declaration either before or after the votes were taken 
that the Bill, amendment or resolution was of paramount importance
to the public interest- Further, while stipulating that the votes of 
the official members only were to be taken into consideration, it did 
not prohibit the non-official members from exercising their vote or 
their votes being recorded.
The 1923 Order in Council as amended, in 1924 set up a Constitution 
which the Donoughmore Commission described as "an unqualified failure".
V/ith reference to the power of certification, the Commission 
ob served;
"While remaining responsible to the Secretary of State, and
ultimately to Parliament, for the good government of the country, he
(the Governor) has been deprived of the power to enforce his policy
except in legislative matters of "paramount importance". The value of
this safeguard, if standing alone, is unquestionably small........
The Governor*s powers of certification have never been used in Ceylon,
(2 )
and so far as we are aware have only once been threatened".
Under the Constitution created by the Ceylon (state Council)
Order in Council, 1931 on the recommendations of the Donoughmore 
Commission, the Governor’s powers were increased on the principle, 
enunciated by the Commission, that every increase of self government 
must be accompanied by an increase in the Governor’s reserve powers.** 
Article 49 vested in him powers to act in emergencies. The article 
reads as follows;
(2 ) Ceylon; Report of the Special Commission on the Constitution,
1928, page 24*
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*49(1). Notwithstanding anything contained in this Order, whenever
the Governor shall consider that a state of emergency has arisen or
or is imminent, ; whether from the danger of enemy action or of civil
disorder, or from any grave cause, he may hy proclamation assume
control of any Government department and issue such orders to that
department as he may see fit, provided that, in every such case, he
shall make a full report immediately to the Secretary of State, and
provided, further, that if the Governor with the advice and consent
of the Council shall make provision by law to the satisfaction of
the Secretary of State for the exercise by the Governor of such
emergency powers, the Secretary of State may declare that this clause
of this Article shall cease to have effect and on the publication of
such declaration in the Government^ Gazette, this clause of this
Article shall cease to have effect accordingly*
(2) The Governor shall not consent to any Bill repealing or
amending any such law as aforesaid unless he shall have previously
n
obtained His Majesty*s instructions through the Secretary of Stater*- 
The power under this Article does not appear to have been exercised 
during the period when the Donoughmore Constitution was in operation*
Under Article 22 the power of certification of bills was increased 
to cover a wider variety of circumstances* Previously this power 
could be exercised in matters which in the Governorfs opinion were of 
paramount importance* Now in addition^such circumstances it could be 
exercised if the Governor considered that the Bill, resolution or vote 
in question was ^essential to give effect to the provisions of this 
Order11. Further it was provided that the Governor or an official
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authorised in this behalf might declare by message addressed to the 
Speaker either before or after the votes of the members were taken 
that a Bill was of paramount importance or was essential to give 
effect to the provisions of the Order in Council, and 11 thereupon 
such Bill.** shall have effect as if it had been passed by the 
Council11*
Mr. Bandaranaike, (3 ) comparing this provision with the provision 
in the 1924 Order-in-Council said, ,!Under the previous Ordei* in 
Council by which the legislative Council of 1924 was inaugurated 
the power was exercised after full discussion in the House and it 
was exercised in this method. Some official on behalf of the 
Government was entitled to declare that the matter was of paramount 
importance, whereupon the only effect was that the votes, only of the 
official members were counted. The result was a foregone conclusion. 
But that provision has been done away with under the present Article 22 
of the Order in Council, and now at any stage an officer of State is 
entitled on behalf of His Excellency the Governor to declare a matter 
of paramount importance without the necessity of talcing a vote at all* 
That means that the ri^it is exercised before a full discussion takes 
place I and a full discussion of a measure with a view to airing out 
for what they are worth the opinions and views of the majority of the 
House is not permitted. (4)
(3) Prime Minister of Ceylon from 1956•
(4) Quoted in S. Namasivayamj The legislatures; of Ceylon» page 42.
As the provision proved defective in working, the Ceylon 
(State Council) Amendment Order in Council, 1937 v/as passed to 
enable the Governor to exercise wider and more effective powers 
of legislation. Under the amended Order it was provided that if the 
Governor considered that it was necessary in the interests of public 
order, public health, or other essentials of good government or to 
give effect to any of the provisions of the Order, that provision 
should be made by legislation, he might, by message to the State 
Council addressed to the Clerk of the State Council explain the 
circumstances which in his opinion rendered legislation necessary and 
either
(a) enact forthwith as a Governorfs Ordinance, a Bill containing 
such provisiorsas he might consider necessary or
(b) attach to his message a draft of the Bill which he considered 
necessary* If the Governor adopted the second alternative^ he 
might at any time after a period of one month from the date of 
his message, enact as a Governor^ Ordinance, the Bill proposed 
by him either in the form of the draft attached to his message 
or with such amendments as he might deem necessary after having 
considered any address which might have been presented to him 
within the period by the State Council with reference to the Bill.
Thus the amending Order enlarged the scope of the circumstances 
in which the power of certification could be exercised; more important 
still, it altered the method of its exercise*
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From 1937 certification could be effected independently of 
the Council. The proposed Bill need not be read or declared in 
the Council as before, a mere message addressed to the Cleric of 
the Council, irrespective of the fact whether the Council was in 
session or not, was sufficient to effect the certification of a 
Bill* This change was the result of a series of actions by the 
Council to prevent the exercise of the power of certification by 
the Governor by resorting to a technical use of its procedure.
On three occasions in 1937 it prevented certification of a Bill 
relating to increased salaries for certain police officers by 
moving motions of adjournment. Thus under Article 22 of the 1931 
Order, it was in a position to have certification indefinitely 
postponed, by a member moving an adjournment motion as soon as the 
declaration relating to certification was to b© made and thus 
shelving the matter for the time being.
Though the power of certification was widened and streng­
thened, it was not often used. It was exercised in 1932 for the 
enactment of certain provisions of the Income Tax (Amendment) 
Bill, 1932 and for the passing of the temporary levy on salaries 
of the Public Servants Enabling Bill, 1932 and for certain 
supplementary estimates relating to passages,holiday warrants 
and salaries of some European officers.
Under Royal Xnstructions issued to the Governor in 1931 
he was required to exercise his ve>to in relation to a few new
classes of Bills.
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They were Bills
(i) whereby the rights and privileges of public servants might 
be prejudiced,
(ii) whereby in the opinion of the Governor the financial 
stability of the island might be endangered,
(iii) relating to questions of defence or public security, or any
matter affecting naval, military, or air forces or volunteer
corps or the control of aerial navigation or aircraft or the 
transport or means of communication of naval, military or 
air forces,
(iv) relating to or affecting trade outside the island, or doclcs,
harbours, shipping, or any lands, buildings or other matters
of naval, military or aerial interest or imperial concern,
(v) whereby persons of any particular community or religion were 
made liable to any disabilities or restrictions to which 
persons of other communities or religions were not also 
subjected or made liable, or were granted advantages not 
extended to persons of other communities or religions,
(vi) the principle of which had evoked serious opposition by any 
racial, religious , or other minority, and which in the 
opinion of the Governor was likely to involve oppression or 
unfairness to any such minority,
(vii) relating to or affecting the administration of justice in the 
island.
One class of Bills, (that is, Bills whereby persons not of European 
birth or descent might be subjected to or made liable to any disabilities
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or restrictions to which persons of European birth or descent 
were not also subjected or made liable) to which the Governors 
veto was attached under the Royal Instructions of 1920 was omitted 
in the Instructions of 1931* All the other classes along with the 
new classes mentioned above were listed in paragraph IV of the 
Royal Instructions dated April 22? 1931*
As under earlier Orders in Council the Governor was given
power to reserve Bills fox* the signification of His Majesty*s 
(5 )pleasure. He was also empowered to attach to his assent to a
law the condition that it be witheld from operation for a period
(6)not exceeding six months* He could refer back to the Council 
for further consideration any Bill* with amendments proposed by 
him? and also could require that any bill which in his view involved 
an important question of principle should not be presented to M m  
for Ms assent until it was passed by a two thirds majority of all 
the members of the Councils excluding the officers of the State and
(7 )the Speaker or other presiding member^ * v
fhe Donoughmore Constitution wMch in many respects !,resembled
an English Borough Council* with ideas borrowed from the League of
(s )Nations system of committees provided for ratification by the
(3 ) Article 77
(6) Article 78
(7 ) Article 80
(8) L. A. Mills9 Britain and Ceylon0 page 40
Governor of certain decisions of an Executive Committee under a 
Minister before any direction regarding that decision could be 
given to a Government department* Article 45(l) provided that 
Hwhen the decision of an Executive Committee requires that any 
direction shall be given to any Government department concerned 
with subjects or functions in the CommitteeTs charge* every such 
direction shall be conveyed to the head of such department by the 
Minister* or in writing by the Clerk to the Committee by the 
direction of the Minister but no such direction shall
be given until the approval of such decision by the Council and 
the ratification of the same by the Governor shall have been
received by the Minister o’**
In 1940 this reserve power of the Governor led to what many 
considered a constitutional crisis in the island* It arose out of 
what was popularly called the Mooloya Incident in which a policeman 
who had gone with some other members of the police force to an estate 
to suppress certain disturbances* shot an Indian labourer. This led 
to a number of prosecutions in the Kandy Police Court* fhe State 
Council in the meanwhile had appointed a Commission to make a 
comprehensive inquiry into the incident. As it was thought advisable 
that the cases should not be decided during the inquiry* the Minister 
for Home Affairs directed the Inspector-General of Police to instruct
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the Police Officers in charge of the prosecution not to oppose 
any applications for the adjournment of these cases. The Inspector 
General refused to carry out the direction on the ground that the 
Ministerrs decision had neither been authorised by the Executive 
Committee for Home Affairs nor been ratified by the Governor as 
required by Article 43• Governor upheld the conduct of the
Inspector General and questioned the constitutional propriety of the 
procedure adopted by the Home Minister with the result that the 
entire Board of Ministers resigned. The Ministers and the Governor 
differed in their view regarding the application of the Article*
The Governor *s view at first was that if an order and nofe a mere 
request* was given to a departmental head* a strict observance of the 
provisions of the Article was required especially if the order related 
to the administration of justice or to the execution of statutory 
duties bjr public officers* The ministerial view was that it had 
become almost a convention for ministers to give orders to 
departmental heads without seeking authorisation from the Executive 
Committee or ratification from the Governor* The Ministers urged 
in support of their view the fact that under paragraphs 3 and 4 o f  
Article 45 action had never been taken for the purpose of specifying 
the decisions for which prior approval and ratification were
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necessary and those for which such approval and ratification 
were unnecessary. (9)
The crisis was resolved by the Governor agreeing not to 
interfere with the issuing of instructions to heads of depart­
ments until a Select Committee had reported on the class of 
decisions and instructions of Executive Committees that needed 
reference to the State Council and to the Governor.(10)
The Governor was given power to dissolve the State Council 
at any time by proclamation. He was required to dissolve it at 
the expiration of four years from the completion of the last 
preceding general election if it had not been sooner dissolved.
He was also required to dissolve it, if it rejected the whole 
of any appropriation bill, or if, in his opinion, by reason of 
the decision of the Council on any financial measure or on any 
motion expressly directed to test the confidence of the Council 
in the Board of Ministers, it was evident that the Board no 
longer retained the confidence of the House.
v' The most striking constitutional development in the 
Governorfs position was the great decrease of his executive
(9) Sir Baron Joyatilake, the leader of the State Council said,
11 In actual practice, to a very large extent we have reduced 
Article 45 to a dead letter of the law. I have issued instruct 
-ions on behalf of my Ministry thousands of times without any 
reference to the Council, without getting the prior ratificat­
ion of the Governor. I beleive it is the same case with my 
fellow ex~MinistersM. (Debates in the State Council, 1940,
Vol. 1. page 491)•
(lO' John Kotelawala, An Asian Prime Minister^ Story. page 51
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powers. This diminution naturally gave rise to certain
compensatory safeguards, such as the increase in the classes of
Bills to v/hich the Governor's veto could he applied and the
strengthening of his powers of certification, hut these safeguards
were intended only to he used very occasionally when some
(ll)fundamental issue was at stake". /
Under the Constitution set up by the Ceylon (Constitution)
Order in Council, 1946, which followed in the main the 
recommendations of the Soulbury Commission, no legislative powers 
were vested in the Governor-General, who replaced the Governor, 
but he was required to reserve for the signification of His JMajesty's 
pleasure Bills dealing with
(i) Defence,
(ii) Orders in Council relating to defence and external affairs,
(iii) External affairs,
(iv) Currency and bank notes,
(v) The Royal prerogative,
(vi) Minorities,
(vii) Constitutional Amendments.
The Soulbury Constitution was fully in operation for a few months 
only, as the Ceylon Independence Act was passed by the United 
Kingdom Parliament in December 1947 and by February, 1948, the 
Dominion of Ceylon with "fully responsible status" came into being. 
Under the Dominion Constitution the Governor-General was to
(ll) S* Hamasivayam, The Legislatures of Ceylon, 48-49*
act, in the exercise of his powers and functions, "in accordance 
with the constitutional conventions applicable to the exercise of 
similar powers, authorities and functions in the United Kingdom 
by His Majesty".
(12) Section 4 (2) Ceylon (Constitution) Order in Council, 1946.
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v. Emergency, 1958 - 1959.
The Public Security Ordinance, 1947, (Ho* 25 of 1947) like
the (British) Emergency Provisions Acts of 1920 and 1953, is a
permanent statute intended to provide for the enactment of emergency
regulations in the interest of public security, the preservation of
public order and for the maintenance of supplies and services
essential to the life of the community. The Ordinance was amended
(1 ^by Public Security (Amendment) Acts of 1949 and 1953* The 
summary given below is of the amended enactment as it was during the 
period of emergency in 1958-5 9*
Part I of the Ordinance deals with general provisions in regard 
to proclamation of emergency and Part II treats of emergency 
regulations which may be passed during the period y/hen such 
proclamation is in operation.
Section 2 provides that where in view of the existence or 
imminence of a state of public emergency, the Governor-General is 
of opinion that it is expedient so to do in the interests of public 
safety and the preservation of public order or for the maintenance 
of supplies and services essential to the life of the community, he
may by proclamation declare that the provision of Part II of the 
Ordinance shall come into operation forthvfith or on such dttte as may
be specified. The provisions thus brought into operation will 
continue to be in operation for one month, but without prejudice to
(1) It was further amended in 1959 Dy the Public Security 
(Amendment) Act (No*8 of 1959* See below)*
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the earlier revocation of the proclamation or to the making of a 
further proclamation at or before the end of that period. When a 
proclamation is made , the occasion for it should forthv/ith be 
communicated to Parliament and if Parliament is then separated by 
any such adjournment or prorogation as will not expire within ten 
days, it is required that a proclamation should be issued for the 
meeting of Parliament within ten days. The fact that the occasion 
of tlie making of a proclamation cannot be communicated to Parliament 
by reason that either House or both Houses does not or do not meet 
when summoned to meet, will not in any way affect the validity or 
operation of the proclamation or of the provisions of Part IX or 
anything done under that Part, provided that Parliament is again 
summoned to meet as early as possible*
Under Section 5 the fact of the existence or imminence of a 
state of public emergency cannot be called in question in any court* 
Section 4 provides that the revoca tion or expiry of a 
proclamation will not affect the past operation of anything duly done 
or any offence committed, any right or liberty, acquired or penalty 
incurred, or the institution of any action, or enforcement of any 
remedy under the Regulations while Part II was in operation*
Part II (Emergency Regulations) begins with Section 5(1) which 
empowers the Governor-General, on the recommendation of the Prime 
Minister or any other Minister authorised by the Prime Minister to 
act on his behalf in case of the latter*s temporary absence or 
incapacity, to make such emergency regulations as appear to him to 
be necessary or expedient in the interests of public security, and
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the preservation of public order and the suppression of mutiny, riot 
or civil commotion or for the maintenance of supplies and services 
essential to the life of the community.
Section 5(2) specifies, without prejudice to the generality 
of the powers conferred by the preceding Subsection, matters on 
which regulation*may be made* It enacts that emergency regulations 
mays -
(a) authorise and provide for the detention of persons,
(b) authorise the taking of possession or control, by 
government, of any property or undertaking and the 
acquisition by government, of any property other than land,
(c) authorise the entering and search of any premises,
(d) provide for amending any law, for suspending the operation 
of any law or for applying any law with or without 
modification,
(e) provide for charging fees for permits, licences and other 
documents issued under the provisions of the Regulations,
(f) provide for payment of compensation and remuneration to 
persons affected by the Regulation), and
(g) make provision for the apprehension and punishment of 
offenders and for their trial by such courts other than 
courts martial and in accordance with such procedure as may 
be provided for by the Regulations and for appeals from the 
orders or decisions of such courts and the hearing and 
disposal of such appeals.
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Section 5(5) enacts that any Emergency Regulation may be added 
to, altered or revoked by resolution of the Houss of Representatives 
or by Regulation made by the Governor-General under the preceding 
provisions of the present Section*
Section 6 provides for delegation of powers to authorities or 
persons specified in the Regulations to make orders and rules for 
the purposes for which the Regulations are authorised to be made*
It is provided that Emergency Regulations may also contain such 
incidental or supplementary provisions as appear to the Governor- 
General to be necessary or expedient for the purposes of the Regulations 
By Section 7 it is provided that Emergency Regulations and 
orders and rules made under the Regulations will have effect 
110twithstanding anything inconsistent with them in any other law so 
long as such Regulation, order or rule remain* in force*
Under Section 8 no Emergency Regulation, and no order, rule 
or direction made or given thereunder is to be called in question in 
any court*
Section 9 provides for indemnity from legal proceedings for 
the government, officers and other persons for anything done in 
good faith in pursuance or supposed pursuance of any Regulation or 
order or rule made or direction given under the Regulation*
Under Section 11 every emergency Regulation is to come into 
force forthwith upon its being made and shall be deemed to be as 
valid and effective as though it were enacted in the Ordinance,
The provision for preventive detention under Section 5(2) has 
had a strange history* In the Ordinance of 1947 it appeared in the
w^ .57
Subsection as ,!(a) make provision for the detention of persons'1.
By the amending Act of 1949 this paragraph (a) was repealed. But by 
the amending Act of 1953 it reappeared in a slightly different form as 
"(a) authorise and provide for the detention of persons",
Under the Ordinance of 1947 the Head of the State was empowered 
to make emergency regulations on the recommendation of the "appropriate 
Minister" who was defined as the "Chairman of the Executive Committee 
which, or the officer of State who, by or under the Ceylon (State 
Council) Order in Council, 1931> is given charge of the subject or 
function to which the proposed regulation relates", The substitution 
of the words "the Prime Minister or any other Minister authorised by 
the Prime Minister to act on his behalf under this Section in case of 
his temporary absence of incapacity" Y/as necessitated by the change in 
the constitutional setup. But this amendment as well as the 
reintroduction of the provision for preventive detention was given 
retrospective effect by Section 5(2) of the amending Act of 1953 to 
validate action taken to suppress the general strike in Ceylon which 
began on August 12, 1953* Section 5(2) of the AGt of 1953 declared 
that these two amendments would be "deemed for all purposes to have 
come into force on August 11 , 1953» and any regulation made or act 
or thing done on or after that date under or by virtue of Part II n 
of the principal enactment would" be deemed to be and to have been 
as valid and effectual" as though the amendment had on that date 
been made.
The general strike of August 12, 1953* was intended to he a 
protest against Government*s decision to increase the price of 
rationed rice* A fortnight before the strike the Prime Minister 
gave an assurance in the Parliament that his Government would not 
fail to see that law and order were maintained and that the people of 
the country would be able to go about their normal business peacefully 
in spite of threatened strikes. He said that hooligans would not be 
allowed to get the better of the right thinking and honourable 
citizens of the country. The Government had not, however, foreseen 
and was not prepared to meet the emergency caused by the complete 
standstill of public transport on August 12. There were sporadic 
outbreaks of violence and considerable damage to property, which 
made it necessary to take drastic action to prevent further violence.
A state of emergency was declared. "A curfew was imposed and 
rigorously enforced* Some people thought that the Government*s
(1Acountermeasures were too severe.'* “ writes Sir John Kotelawala, who 
was then Minister fox' Transport.
The amending Act of 1953 which was assented to by the Governor* 
General on August 19 bad to be given retroactive operation to validate 
the counter-measures taken by the Government.
The communal riots of 195^ and 1958 might have had their
inspiration in the * Sinhalese only1 campaign which helped Mr,
Bandaranaike1 s ministry win the last election. Politicians avid for
power often forget that it is easier to create communal tension than 
TW~ J* Kotelawala, An Asian Prime Minister*s Story, page 90*
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to restore public tranquillity. About two months after 
Mr. Bandaranaike became Prime Minister, communal disturbances between 
the Sinhalese and the Tamils broke out in the Eastern Province, 
particularly in the Gal Oya Development area, and some one-hundred- 
and-fifty people were reported to have been slaughtered by mobs*
But this did not impel him to call an emergency. According to one 
observer, he survived that conflict because the police had acted 
firmly, ”even against Government party politicians who were inciting 
people to riot,n^^
A Commission of Inquiry appointed to inquire into the outbreaks 
of civil disturbance in the Eastern Province between January 1 and 
September 30, submitted an interim report on December 22, 195&® The 
Commission was of the opinion that Hboth the Sinhalese and the Tamil 
communities appear to be living harmoniously and peacefully and the 
people seem anxious to forget the unfortunate events that occurred so 
suddenlynw/ The Commission felt that na probe now into the 
unfortunate events that occurred so long ago , might have the tendency 
of not only raking up events \?hich people generally desire to be 
forgotten and opening up wounds v/hich are fast healing, thereby 
exacerbating their feelings? but may even have the possibility of 
stirring up communal discord again”. The Commission came to the
conclusion that it would not be in the national interest to pursue 
the inquiry into particular incidents at that stage.
(2^  T, Vittachi, Emex^encyj 1958 9 page 4 6*
(3) The Interim Report of the Commission, Sessional Paper III - 1957* 
page 2*
(4) ibid pages 2-3*
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In May 1958 communal conflicts again broke out. On May 23 the
Federal Party Convention of the Tamils met, and while it was in
session hooliganism spread. The first train derailment took place
that day* Though law and order were set at nought and people were
murdered in the public streets, no effective preventive action was
taken? no state of emergency was declared. The Governor-General,
it is reported, defying convention, paid a personal visit to the
Prime Minister at his home in Rosemead Palace to impress upon him the
(*0need for firm, urgent action, J He hoped to persuade him to 
advise the Governor-General to proclaim a state of emergency, but
the Prime Minister, it would appear, was confident that he would 
survive the period of disorder with a little luck and some judicious 
* tide-watching1, a phrase current in Ceylon, which is explained as 
na common political game , perfected in newly-freed Asian countries 
where expediency takes the place of principle, and politicians spend 
their time watching, like surfboard riders, for the tide which is 
likely to carry them furthest*.  ^ Mr* Bandaranaike, who remembered 
that the proclamation of emergency in 1955 Had been the death knell 
of Dudley Senanayake*s Premiership, could not possibly take the 
recommended course, which he feared would render him unpopular with 
the people who voted him to power.
By May 26 communal bitterness in the provinces spread to 
Golombo “where cars were overturned and set on fire, and men were 
dragged out of buses, trolley buses and cars and beaten and robbed
(3) T. Vittachi, Emergency 1958» page 54*
(6) T. Vittachi, op. cit. page 4 6.
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(l)in broad daylight in full view of hundreds * * / Armed police parties
were rushing from one trouble spot to another trying to quell the :
rioting. But the mob too went from place to place beating and
i
robbing*
In the afternoon of May 27 the Governor-General declared a 
state of emergency under the Public Security Ordinance throughout the 
island and called out the armed forces to maintain law and order.
‘The Tamil Federal Party and the Jatika Yimukta Pe rum an a , a party 
formed by Sinhalese to preserve the Sinhalese language, were banned* 
The whole island was put under curfew from 6 p*m. to 6 a.m* and a 
Press censorship was imposed,
It was necessary to take this step, announced the Prime Minister,,
"in the interests of the whole country and the effective maintenance of
one i
(9)
/q\
peace 5 and law and order",' ' He appealed to all Ceyl se to
assist the Government to maintain peace, law and order*
"The declaration of a state of emergency" wrote the Times 
Correspondent on June 29, 1958* "came a day or two too late. Had 
it come earlier fewer lives would have been lost and a considerable 
amount of property would have been saved from fire and looting"*^^ 
The Correspondent was inclined to believe that the riots were 
engineered by a we 11-organised body of persons, "There has 
undeniably been a pattern," wrote he, "in the events that took place 
in Ceylon in the last week of May that suggests that a well-organised
(?) ffhe Times, (London), May 27, 1958*
(8) Announcement on May 27, 1958; Asian Recorder. May 24*30, 1958 
page 20 6 5*
(9) The Times* May 28, 1958.
(10) The Times, June 30, 1958.
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body of persons, with money to spend, contributed to the acts of
violence which were committed in various parts of the island. In
Colombo, for instance, arson, looting and assault, in one area
were invariably committed by hooligans whose normal haunts were other
areas. In many instances they were transported to and from their
scenes of crime in lorries, vans or cars. They made no mistake
about whose houses they were to burn or whose shops they were to loot.
Sometimes they acted with such expedition and despatch that it
appeared that they had rehearsed their crimes beforehand This
is not to say that this organisation - whatever it was - instigated
and started all the violence which was committed between May 25 and
May 27* The seeds of discontent had already been sown by the
language controversy, and the organisation merely made the most of
(11)
existing bitterness". f
Violence was so widespread on May 25, May 26, and May 27
that on these days the language issue was ignored; people were
conditioned by mob feeling, and the situation had so deteriorated
that it was impossible to maintain law and order. The proclamation
of the state of emergency and the calling out of troops on May 27
(12)immediately changed the situation for the btter* /
By June 29 Eeylon newspapers were permitted to print "comment 
and articles" on the emergency without censorship. The Prime 
Minister told a group of pressmen that day that they should decide 
what should be kept out of their newspapers if any matter was likely
(11) The Times, June 30, 1958*
(12) ibid.
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to rekindle friction between Tamils and Sinhalese, Restrictions on 
news reports and Parliamentary debates were to continue until the 
tension ceased,' '
Commenting on the press censorship one critic remarked? *It 
is difficult to find a parallel for the harshness of the censorship 
imposed on the national press of Ceylon, Even during the Battle of 
Britain, when the British people, almost overpowered by a well- 
prepared and well-equipped Luftwaffe, were fighting back with their 
knees and their knuckles for their very existence, the press had 
never been gagged as tightly, News which was likely to create * alarm 
and despondency1 was left out and reports of troops, naval and air 
force movements were necessarily censored, . But comment was always 
free. The British press and the reading public were still free to 
comment on and criticise the conduct of the war by the Government,
The same critic, however, admits how beneficial it was to 
have kept the destruction of the Buddha image in the Nagadipa Vihare 
by the Tamils a secret* nIf its destruction had not been kept a 
tight secret, all the vigilance and the guns of the armed forces 
would not have prevented a wholesale massacre of the Tamils,11'
As under the Ceylon Constitution British conventions have to be 
followed, it is not easy to understand why the Prime Minister by a 
sheer self-effacement made the Governor-General the virtual ruler of 
the island during the emergency. During the war the King in the
■ ■ — — — i m  111 m i l l  m  1 1* I— ™
(1 3 ) The T im es, June 30 , 1950*
(1 4 ) V i t t a c h i ,  Emergency, 1958* page 72 ,
(1'5) ibid, page 63*
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United Kingdom declared a state of war on the advice of the Prime
Minister who was authorised to carry on the war, Thus Sir Winston
Churchill, the Premier, was in full control of the conduct of the
war. In Ceylon, on the other hand, the picture presented was
different. It was the Governor-General who was more in evidence in
dealing with the situation. Two reasons are usually suggested for
this. "The first and obvious reason was that Mr. Bandaranaike felt
inadequate to deal with a situation which could not be tackled with
words, however polished and eloquent they might be. The time for
decision and action had arrived11 $^^The varied experience of Sir
Oliver Goonetilleke, the Governor-General, as a public servant,
Minister, diplomat, negotiator, war councillor and Civil Defence
Commissioner during the Second World War had fitted him exceedingly
well to deal Yfith an island-wide emergency,
(17)At least one critic thinks v ' that "there was also a keener 
and more subtle reason for Mr. Bandaranaike1 s uncharacteristic 
self-effacement. His experience of tide-watching has given him a 
sharp prescience about the force and direction of the next wave of 
popular emotion. He realised that the administration of the 
Emergency Regulations, and the military activity necessary to bring 
the extremists under control, while giving a sense of temporary 
relief throughout the country, would inevitably cause a strong 
reaction among the people - both Sinhalese and Tamils. As most of 
the disorders were in the predominantly Sinhalese districts and since
(16) Vittachi, op. cit. 76,
(17) id. page 77*
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more Sinhalese were likely to he jailed, beaten up or killed by 
the armed services, the reaction from the Sinhalese against the
Government was bound to be powerful..... The Prime Minister had
decided to allow the Governor-General to take the spotlight so that 
he could also take the rap."
If there is anything to be learnt from the experience of Ceylon 
in handling the situation, especially from the delay in proclaming 
a state of emergency and the general attitude of Mr. Bandaranaike^ 
government, it is that a proclamation of emergency should not be left 
to political parties in South Asia whatever be their number in the 
legislature, for political parties in South Asian countries are 
for the most part not parties founded to further political principles; 
some are little more than factions supporting the ambitions of a 
particular leader, but the object of most of them is to advance 
racial, religious, or linguistic interests* Administration of 
emergency powers with its consequent suspension of fundamental rights 
can only be left to the political party which commands a majority in 
the Legislature, if the political parties in the country are agreed 
on maintaining the Constitution and on other basic principles such 
as the necessity of immediate effective action to maintain the public 
tranquillity, and the use of the minimum necessary force for the 
purpose•
The Prime Ministers "uncharacteristic self-effacement11, it 
would seem, was resolved when the Public Security (Amendment) Bill, 
sponsored by the government was sought to be passed. Soon after 
giving his assent to the Bill as passed by the Legislature, the
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Governor-General, on March 13, 1959, issued a proclamation lifting
the state of emergency which had "been continued for nearly ten months. 
The Public Security (Amendment) Act, 1959 (8 of 1959) empowered the 
Prime Minister to call out the armed forces for the maintenance of 
public order, where circumstances endangering the public security 
in any area have -arisen or are imminent and the Prime Minister is of 
the opinion that the police are inadequate to deal with such situation 
in the area.
The Act of 1959 amended the long title of the Public Security 
Ordinance of 1947 by substituting for the words "enactment of 
Emergency Regulations", the words "enactment of Emergency Regulations 
or the adoption of other measures."
As it was thought that any proclamation of emergency under 
Section 2 of the principal enactment would of necessity apply to the 
whole of the island, the Section was amended to specify that the 
proclamation would "come into operation throughout Ceylon or in such 
part or parts of Ceylon as may be so specified".
Section 4 of the amending Act seeks to enhance the immunities 
given to persons exercising powers under emergency regulations or 
oi'ders* The Section repeals Section 9 of the principal enactment 
and substitutes the followings
"No prosecution or other criminal proceeding against any person 
for any act purporting to be done under any provision of any emergency 
regulation or of any ox’der or direction made or given thereunder
(18) Section 3 of the Amendment Act.
shall he instituted in any court except by, or with the written 
sanction of, the Attorney General; and no suit, prosecution or 
other proceeding, civil or criminal, shal^ li© against any person 
for any act in good faith done in pursuance or supposed pursuance of 
any such provision.1'
The amending Act adds to the principal enactment a new Bart 
(Fart III) which confers special powers on the Prime Minister. As 
has been noted above, undex* Section 12(1) it is provided that "where 
circumstances endangering the public security in any area have arisen 
or are imminent and the Prime Minister is of the opinion that the 
police are inadequate to deal with such situation in that area, he 
may, by order published in the Gazette, call out all or any of the 
members of all or any of the armed forces for the maintenance of 
public order in that area".
Section 13 authorises any police officer or any member of the 
armed forces who is called out by order made under Section 12 to 
seize and remove any gun or explosive in the possession of any person 
and, for the purpose of such seizing and removing, enter any 
premises or pleice and search such premises or place or any person 
present therein, if a written authorisation to do so is issued to 
the police officer or member of the armed force by the Prime Minister 
or by any person appointed by the Prime Minister to act on behalf of 
the Prime Minister under the Section,
Under Section 16 the Prime Minister is empowered to make curfew 
orders in any specified area* Contravention of a curfew order will
be punishable by rigorous imprisonment for a month or a fine of 
one hundred rupees or both.
It is provided by Section 17 that the Prime Minister may 
declare by order any service to be an essential service where he 
considers it necessary in the public interest to do so* Where a 
service is declared an essential service, any strike or incitement 
to strike will be an offence, except when any cessation of work 
occurs in consequence of a strike commenced by a registered Trade 
Union solely in pursuance of an industrial dispute. A person found 
guilty of an offence under this Section after summary trial before 
a Magistrate is liable to rigorous imprisonment for a term not less 
than three months and not exceeding five years or to a fine not less 
than five hundred rupees and not exceeding five thousand rupees or 
to both such imprisonment and fine.
Section 18 provides for arrest, without warrant, of offenders 
and suspected offenders under Sections 16 and 17*
It is provided by Section 21 that an order made under Section 12, 
Section 16 or Section 17 will be in operation for a month from the 
date of its publication in the Gazette, but without prejudice to the 
earlier recission of the order or to the making of a further order at 
or before the end of that period. When an order is made under the 
above sections, the occasion for making it should forthwith be 
communicated to the Parliament in the same way as a proclamation of 
emergency by the Governor-General is required to be communicated 
under Section 2(3) of the Public Security Ordinance. If Parliament 
is then not in session, on account of an adjournment or prorogation
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whioh will not expire within ten days, it is necessary that a 
proclamation should "be issued for the meeting of Parliament within 
ten days. The fact that the occasion of the making of an order 
under the above sections cannot be communicated to Parliament by 
reason that either House or both Houses does not or do not meet when 
summoned to meet, will not in any way affect the validity or 
operation of the order or of the provisions of Part III or anything 
done under that Part, provided that Parliament is again summoned to 
meet as early as possible.
Subsection 3 enacts that an order made under Section 12 or 
Section 16 or Section 17> or the circumstances necessitating the 
making of such order shall not be called in question in any court.
An order made under any of these Sections may be amended or 
rescinded by resolution of the House of Representatives or by another 
order made under that Section.
Section 22 is specially remarkable in that it provides that 
Hhe provisions of this Part and of any order made under Section 12, 
Section 16 or Section 17 shall have effect notwithstanding anything 
inconsistent therewith or contrary thereto contained in any other law".
Section 23 confers that same protection as under Section 9 o n  
any person for any act purporting to be done under any provision of 
this Part or any order made thereunder and for any act in good faith 
done in pursuance or supposed pursuance of any such provision.
Though the powers of the Governor-General to bring into 
operation, on the advice of the Cabinet, the provisions of Part II 
are still retained, the new Part confers very wide and effective
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powers on the Prime Minister. He is empowered to call out the armed
forces for the maintenance of public order in any area; he or his
delegate can order the seizure and removal of any gun or explosive
from any person and, for the purpose of such seizure and removal,
order the entry by the police and the military of any place or
premises and the search of any place, premises or person; he can
issue curfew orders in any area; he can declare any service an
essential service and prohibit cessation of work in the service; he
can issue orders repugnant to any existing law and they cannot be
called in- • question in any court. Recalling the fact that it was
the Sinhalese Only* campaign which brought the present Prime Minister
to power at the last elections, the minorities in Ceylon are
apprehensive that the provisions of the new Part were intended to be
used against them. It may be observed that the final phase of the
last emergency centred mainly on religious differences rather than
on linguistic divisions. The fears of the minorities are therefore
probably justified. Anyway it is doubtful whether the assertion
that "Ceylon affords an excellent illustration of the successful
application of British forms of government to a country with an alien 
(19)culture" ' can any longer go unchallenged. For democracy in 
Britain and in other democratic countries of the west is not merely 
the rule of the majority, but the rule of the majority with adequate 
safeguards for the rights of the minority, whether these safeguards
(19) S. Namasivayam, Aspects of Ceylonese Parliamentary Government, 
in Pacific Affairs, March 1953* page 76.
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are enshrined in a Bill of Rights, or in an innate sense of justice 
permeating the public conscience* Freedom from fear is one of the 
fundamental rights to which minorities are entitled. It would 
appear that democracy in the sense in which it is understood in the 
west is on the wane in the "utmost Indian isle Taprobane
(20) Milton, Paradise Regained, iv, 75*
CONCLUSION
In the preceeding chapters an attempt has been made to present 
a picture of the development of emergency powers, their variety and 
scope, the ways in which they are provided for and exercised and 
the controls which the Legislature and the courts seek to exercise 
over them. As these powers principally affe.ct the civil liberties 
of the subject vis-a-vis the administration, some comments have 
been offered on the relationship between the executive and the 
citizen; how in the name of public order or efficiency, these 
liberties have been given scant regard by the executive. It remains
to consider how emergency powers may be exercised efficiently and well 
without unduly interfering with civil liberties and tending to create 
in the subjects a habit of helotage which in the long or short run 
will culminate in the subversion of all democratic principles.
But before suggestions about improving emergency provisions 
are attempted, it is necessary to make a few further observations. 
Democracy in the South Asian countries is a top-dressing on a soil 
that is essentially undemocratic. The society there is hierarchical 
and the average man is not particularly unhappy about it. There has 
been no democratic tradition; the republics of ancient India, it 
would appear, were more oligarchic than democratic in character, 
notwithstanding the assertions of a few publicists who argue to the 
contrary* The average man in India is not obsessed with the notion 
that government is his business. He is apt to endorse Dope!s
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couplet , if a slight emendation is adopted,
For forms of government, let dons contest,
What e*er is best administered is best.
What he wants is not so much democratic government as good government
which will help to provide him with the necessaries of life and
possibly a few comforts too. It would be no great exaggeration to
say that if Mahatma Gandhi in India or Quaid-*i-Azam Jinnah in
Pakistan desired to establish a dynasty of his own, there would have
been no serious opposition to it except fi'om some newspapermen, a
few lawyers and a fewer university teachers, who would have failed
to gain popular support for their views. If, after about a dozen
(1)years of democracy, it is suggested that Rajiv Gandhi' ' should be
declared Mr, Nehru* s heir apparent in the Premierrs gadi, it requires
no wild imagination to assume that, though there would be some
(2)
opposition, it would be unlikely to prove effective.' / As could 
be judged from recent events, a threatened resignation from 
Mr, Nehru would be sufficient to put an end to all serious opposition 
for the time being.
When the average Indian is thus indifferent to forms of 
government, the typical (and possibly unemployed) university
1) Premier Nehru *'s grandson. j
2) Consider the election of Srimati Indira Gandhi, the Premier*s j
daughter, to the presidentship of the Indian National Congress, J
If a Nehru dynasty is not sought to be set up, it would appear, j
it is more due to the good sense of the Prime Minister than to
the democratic sense of the Indian populace. I
“474"
graduate who, almost invariably, gives political leadership to the 
masses looks wistfully at the progress made by Russia and China in 
recent years and declarest
What is best industrialised is best.
Congress leadership too seems to turn a deferential ear to
expressions of this view, either because it believes in it or
because it is inclined to adopt it as a vote-winning device.
Congress, like the religion of the majority of its adherents, has
a sponge-like quality of absorption. By use of the technique
whereby Hinduism caused Buddhism practically to disappear from the
land of its birth, Congress has stolen the thunder from the
socialist parties by enunciating the ideal of a socialist pattern
of society; it may not be long before Congress absorbs Communism
into itself .Mr Nehru once said, ,lIn India when we want to kill
(3)something, we deify it first.n' ; It would not be surprising if 
India added Marx to its already huge, pantheon. As has been observed, 
uthe Marxists might end by wearing special caste marks This
trend is evident in the recent draft issued by the Congress party’s 
economic sub-committee. It was prepared by some Congress Ministers, 
the former President of the Congress and some others, and was 
discussed with Mr. Nehru. It contains some explosive material.
The central theme of the draft is that planning cannot be effective 
so long as private enterprise is there to disrupt it. Everything
(3) quoted in Alexander Campbell, The Heart of India, page 216.
(4) ibid.
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therefor© must he nationalised or managed as a co-operative. "The 
only private sector left shall be the self-employed. The State 
should control the co-operatives and the self-employed alike.
Nobody except the State should be allowed to hire or fire unless 
the State expressly gave permission and even the self-employed 
would not be allowed to spend their savings on acquiring more of 
the means of production * '
Apart from the average Indian1s indifference to forms of 
government, the economic condition of the masses also tends to tilt 
the balance against a democratic v/ay of life. "From Aristotle down 
to the present, men have argued that only in a wealthy society in 
which relatively few citizens lived in real poverty could a situation 
exist in which the mass of the population could intelligently 
participate in politics and could develop the self-restraint 
necessary to avoid succumbing to the appeals of irresponsible 
demogogues. } A society divided between a large impoverished 
mass and a small favoured elite would result either in oligarchy or
(j)
in tyranny. ' "It is possible that Max Weber Yras right when he 
suggested that modern democracy in its clearest forms can only occur
(b )under the unique conditions of capitalist industrialisation".s 1 
In this context, it may be mentioned that the optimism
(5) Taya Zinkin, The Manchester Guardian, May 15* 1959 s page 11*
(6) S. M. Lipset, Some Social Requisites of Democracy, The 
American Political Science Review. March 1959s page 69*
(7) ibid.
(8) ibid.
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entertained by some enthusiastic democrats in the west about the 
Indian experiment in Parliamentary government, because India has not 
gone the way of Pakistan and Burma, does not appear to be well<- 
founded. This optimism which may have a tonic effect on the western 
democratic spirit owes more to v/ishful thinking than to an accurate 
assessment of the realities of the Indian situation.
The situation in Pakistan and Ceylon is not entirely dissimilar. 
If Marxist tendencies are less prominent in Pakistan there has been 
far more enthusiasm for autocratic rule than for parliamentary 
democracy. Pakistan, it would seem, abhors a dictatorial vacuum,
and only General Ayub Khan could fill the gap created by the loss of
Jinnah and Liaquat Ali. The complacent attitude of the Pakistani 
population to the military dictatorship is proof enough that it is 
not specially wedded to the ideal of democracy.
In Ceylon, the facile acceptance of the monarchic principle 
by the common people may be illustrated from an intriguing practice 
which v/as followed in the Queen1 s House, the residence of the 
Governor-General. Until very recently the servants there referred 
to the Governor-General as Ra,i,juruwo (The King). ’This grated so 
much on the supra-sensible ears of the Secretary ...... that he
issued a general order laying down a new form of addresss Utumano 
(the Uoble One)”.^^ Mr. D. S. Senanayake, the then Prime Minister
of Ceylon, is reputed to have informed the Conference of
Commonwealth Prime Ministers in April, 1949* had Kings of Ceylon
(9) T. Yittachi, Hhnergency. 1958. page 70*
' ' * J C —  I 1 I ■! ■ ■ V mtW .Mil I ■ J.H* M i n  ■ *
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long before there were Kings of E n g l a n d a n d  the Ceylonese
probably see no reason why they should change a tradition which may
have begun as early as 483 B.C. and which has continued through the
Kings of Kandy and the British Crown for over 2,400 years#
The influence of the Marxists in Mr# Bandaranaike *s coalition
ministry is also a factor that should not be lost sight of# Thus
dictatorship whether of the right wing or of the left is likely to
be in the offing and this trend has been recently fortified by the '
Public Security (Amendment) Act, 1959> which vested extraordinary
powers in the Prime Minister.
It may be that the divinity which once hedged a King in South
Asia has vanished, but the pomp attached to the Kingly office has
passed to the person in whom the reality of executive power is vested#
One occasionally hears a session of the Indian Parliament described
as a ^nrbar held by Mr# Nehru and it would appear that there is
(11)unfortunately some substratum of truth in it.N ' India*s ideal
IS! quoted in Jennings and Tambiah, The Dominion of Ceylon# page 71 ♦ The fact that a few members of Parliament, including some 
members of the Congress Party, persistently interrogate 
ministei’s does not substantially affect the position taken up 
here. Sir Percival Griffiths seems to believe that they are 
"determined not to let their own government get away with 
anything" (Democracy under Strain in South Asia, Asian 
Review, April 1959, page 94). But the unpleasant truth is 
that the government does get away with almost anything it wants 
and the inquisitors cannot prevent it. The passing of the 
Hindu Code legislation, 1955-56, ra&y ^  cited as a typical 
example, for it is impossible to believe that a majority of 
the elected Hindu members of Parliament could have any 
sentiment other than misgivings for such revolutionary 
legislation, profoundly disturbing their private lives#
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ruler, in popular imagination, is the enlightened despot and not
the plebian democrat. It may he that the Asoka Chakra, symbolises
(12)the attitude of the majority of Indians* *
It is in the context of the complex situation in South Asia, 
in which a few dream of parliamentary democracy, and more gase on 
the Marxist vision of the future, while the majority are politically 
inactive, beyond having a sentimental leaning towards enlightened 
despotism, that the provisions for, and the exercise of, emergency 
powers are to be reviewed. For the boundary between the curtailment 
of civil liberties during a crisis in accordance with a constitutional 
provision and their abrogation by a dictator relying only on his 
political power is easily crossed. That a victorious revolution or 
a successful coup d!etat is a legitimate method of amending a 
Constitution now appears to be a rule of constitutional law in 
Pakistan.
It is sometimes said that a democracy cannot act with the same 
speed and effectiveness in an emergency as can a totalitarian or 
dictatorial government. This allegation seems to be groundless 
when one looks back upon the efficiency of the British democracy 
during the Second World War or of the American democracy in the 
Spring of 1933 or the Winter of 1941-42. It may be that in a
(12) Asoka Chakra (Asokafs Wheel), seen on the Indian flag and the 
Indian coins, probably foreshadows Indiafs wheel of fortune. 
It may not be long before the wheel makes a full circle, 
ushering in a beatific millennium of the enlightened despot.
(15) State v. Posso, P.LeD. (1958) S.C* 533*
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democracy only a real emergency will justify the suspension of 
constitutional limitations on the activities of the State and produce 
prompt and effective action. A fabricated emergency there ?;ould die 
a natural death. It may, however, be conceded that in a country 
where democratic institutions are not firmly established, and kept 
alive by the living breath of public opinion,^) it may be 
necessary, as has happened more than once in British overseas 
possessions^to preserve democratic institutions by their temporary 
suspension.
It has been already observed that the interests of democracy 
are not best served by entrusting emergency powers to the majority 
party in the legislature in the special circumstances of the South 
Asian countries, v/here political parties are not necessarily 
composed of persons agreed on a programme of strictly political 
activities, but, Y/hen not mere factions, are usually formed to 
foster racial, communal, religious or linguistic interests* As 
democracy presupposes the guarantee of their rights to minorities, 
if a State is to continue to remain safe for democracy during a period 
of crisis, the emergency powers should not be exercised by a party 
prone to disregard the rights of minorities; the powers should be 
vested in a person or body of persons who are regarded as impartial
(14) It has been said that "British democracy,.... .is a reality not 
so much because of careful observance of democratic forms and 
parliamentary usage, as because of the great potential 
influence of public opinion which is the keystone of the
Constitution " (Lord Stamp in his Preface to Jennings,
The British Constitution, page ix).
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and above party affiliations. In the Constitution of India, these
powers are formally vested in the President. "If the President is
satisfied that a grave emergency exists he may, by
(15)
Proclamation, make a declaration to that effect,nv f It is 
commonly held that the President being a constitutional head is 
expected to make such a proclamation on the advice of the Council of 
Ministers, because, when India adopted the British Parliamentary 
form of government, it a-dopted the British constitutional conventions 
too. Furthermore a constitutional provision has to be viewed in its 
historical setting, and interpreted Y/ith its historical background 
in mind. Thus it was the British system of responsible government 
in which the Cabinet has the powers of ultimate decision, that was 
sought to be introduced into India by instalments during the British 
period and it was that system with which the Founding Fathers of 
India were familiar when they set about their task of making the 
present Constitution* In a democracy the popularly elected leader 
of the majority party is the real ruler of the country, in normal 
times as well as in times of crisis.
On the other hand, it may be argued that in a Constitution 
which makes provision for all conceivable eventualities * the 
omission to mention the advice of the Council of Ministers as a
(15) Article 552#
(16) e.g. Article 220 which provides that no person who has been a 
permanent Judge of a High Court shall practise as a lawyer in 
any court except the Supreme Court and the other High Courts.
prerequisite for a proclamation of emergency may not be due to 
(17)oversightv If historical background is taken into account, it
may be pointed out that the Founding Fathers were familiar with the 
exercise of the emergency powers by the Governor-General in his 
discretion and there is 110 clear evidence that they expected the 
President to exercise these powers otherwise than in the same manner 
and on the same considerations as they were used by the British 
Governor-General, Lastly it is arguable that the President, though 
indirectly elected, is no less a leader and representative of the 
people than the Prime Minister* He is bound to preserve the 
Constitution and may be impeached for its violation, while the 
Ministers are protected under Article 74(2) which provides that what 
advice was tendered by the Ministers to the President will not be 
inquired into in any court. It would seem that the Founding Fathers 
who invested the president with certain express powers and made him 
responsible for his actions, could not have intended him to be a 
mere figurehead or rubber-stamp, even though he was not meant to be 
a President of the American type. A literal interpretation of the
(17) If is doubtful whether the general provision under Article 70
that there shall be a Council of Ministers to aid and advise the 
President in the exercise of his functions will cover a 
situation of emergency in which the President may make a 
Proclamation if he is satisfied that an emergency exists 
(Articles 352 and 360) or on receipt of a report from a Governor 
of a State or otherwise, that the constitutional machinery in 
the State has failed (Article 356). If* for instance, the 
President on receipt of a report from the Governor of a State is 
satisfied that the constitutional machinery in the State has 
failed, and if his Ministers who may be inclined to maintain in 
power the political party favoured by them, advises against a 
proclamation, is he bound by the advice, in viev/ of his oath 
of office "to preserve, protect and defend the Constitution" 
and the unambiguous language employed in Article 3567
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Indian Constitution would undoubtedly favour the view that the
,18n
President exercises this power in his discretion^ .
Thus even if it be held, contrary to the common view, that
the President makes a proclamation of emergency in his discretion, it
would seem, that it is neither wise nor safe to leave the exercise
of emergency powers entirely in his hand. For as has been pointed 
(19)out before,v 7 he may prove ambitious and entrench himself as a 
virtual dictator in the constitutional set-up. It may also happen 
that a well-meaning President will believe and act upon the belief 
that rithe people have no right to do wrong"^^* When Mr. Iskander 
Mirza, the former President of Pakistan, spoke of Controlled 
democracy1 and President Sukarno of Indonesia of 1 guided democracy1, 
they were only endorsing the view expressed by the President of Eire* 
,rIt is a characteristic of almost every anti-democratic philosophy 
that it purports to serve the welfare of the people but refuses to 
trust the judgement of the people on questions affecting their 
welfaren^ “ .
If it is imprudent to entrust the Head of the State with
emergency powers and if in the peculiar circumstances of the South
(18) The' Supreme Court, it would seem,’ Interprets the Constitution 
more like a statute than an organic document* For instance, 
it observed through Das, J*, delivering the majority opinion in 
Keshav Hadhava Menon v* The State of Bombay (1951) S.C.R, 228 
at 252) na court of law has to gather the spirit of the 
Constitution from the language of the Constitution* What one 
may believe or think to be the spirit of the Constitution 
cannot prevail if the language of the Constitution does not 
support that view* It is therefore quite clear that the court 
should construe the language......according to the established
rules of interpretation and arrive at its true meaning 
uninfluenced by any assumed spirit of the Constitution".
(19) A. Gledhill, Republic of India* pages 107*109* See Chapter VI.
(20) De. Valera, quoted in Sean 0*Faolin, De Valera* page 115.
(21) H. S. Commager, Majority Rules and Minority Rights, page 57*
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Asian countries, it is unsafe to leave them in the hands of the 
Prime Minister, who is to exercise these extraordinary powers in a 
period of crisis? One solution that suggests itself is the setting 
up of a Constitutional Council which may be empowered to declare a 
state of emergency and when once the declaration is made, the Cabinet 
can carry on the governmental powers including those prescribed by 
the Constitution to be exercised in an emergency. It may be suggested 
in the alternative that the President who is deemed to be above party 
politics may be granted the power to make a proclamation of emergency 
in his discretion, but the proclamation must be subject to 
confirmation by the Constitutional Council within, say, three days. 
Even if he is to make a proclamation on the advice of the Council of 
Ministers, confirmation by the Constitutional Council should be 
provided for.
The Constitutional Council might consist of the Vice-President, 
the Speaker of the House of the People, the President of the Rational 
Institute, former Presidents of the Republic and three members 
selected by the members already designated, not being members of 
Parliament or a State Legislature, or a Civil.Service , or the armed 
forces| one of whom being an economist of outstanding reputation, 
another a former Chief Justice of a High Court and third, a 
scientist of recognised ability and integrity.
The Constitutional Council should be empowered not only to 
confirm a proclamation, but also to advise the President to make a 
proclamation and the President should be obliged to accept the advice.
—484"
In addition to this control of emergency powers by the
Constitutional Council, it is necessary to provide for immediate and
effective Parliamentary control. It is suggested that the
Constitution should be amended ao as to provide that Parliament
should re-assemble within fifteen days of the issue of a proclamation
of emergency, and that the House of the People should not be subject
to dissolution while such a proclamation is in force*
The measures taken to meet the emergency, including the
suspension of fundamental rights, should be adopted in consultation
with the Constitutional Cotmcil*
In cases of proclamation of emergency due to failure of the
constitutional machinery in a State, though confirmation by the
Constitutional Council should be provided foi’, it may not be
necessary to amend the present provision for Parliamentary control,
envisaged under Article 356* There is no good reason why the House 
/
of the People should not be dissolved while a State constitution is 
suspended.
It would be desirable to set up Standing Committees of the 
House of the People and of the various State Legislatures, (of the 
Lower House where there are two Chambers) which may be empowered to 
review and confirm or reject certain emergency measures taken by the 
appropriate governments. These Committees might consist of members 
of all parties in the Legislature in proportion to their number in 
that body, and would be obliged to reside at the capital of the State 
throughout the year; if a member was unavoidably absent, the leader 
of the political party to which he belonged might be empowered to
—  48 5*
appoint a substitute*
A declaration of martial law should be made subject to approval
by the appropriate Committee. The practice of granting a general
indemnity in a Martial Law Ordinance tends to create a number of
little local sovereigns. These Dogberrys "clothed in a little brief
authority" need protection, but it should be provided by the
Legislature by ordinary legislation and not by Presidential or
gubernatorial Ordinance. If the Legislatures are vigilant and refuse
to grant immunity for acts done by way of misapplication of power
(detournement de pouvoir), the public officers clothed with
extraordinary powers under Martial Law Regulations would be less
(22)reckless in the exercise of their powers.v 7 The practice of
couching the immunity provision in such wide terms as to cover any
act in good faith done or purported to have been "done in pursuance
(23)
or supposed pursuance"v 7 of any provision of a martial law 
regulation or other emergency provision is to be deprecated.
The power to make ordinances which though made by an individual 
or by the Cabinet, have the same force as an Act made aftei' full 
debate by a legislature, should, in addition to being subject to 
parliamentary control as at present, be submitted to the Standing
(22) As administered at present, martial law may even remind one 
of Shakespeare^ lines?
"Like flies to wanton boys, are we to the gods;
They kill us for their sport," (King Lear. IV, i, 38-37) 
with the difference that the place of the celestial god is taken 
by the common soldier* The British soldier soon found a place 
in Indian demonology; to-day the mere mention of martial law 
causes a contraction of the Ceylonese heart.
(23) These words appear in the (Ceylon) Public Security Amendment 
Act, 1959* Sections 9 and 23. (emphasis added).
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Committee for approval before promulgation. The Standing Committee 
could be required to communicate their approval or disapproval 
within twentyfour hours. The present practice of presenting the 
legislature with a fait accompli made under an ordinance, when it 
is often impossible for the legislature to do anything but acquiesce, 
tends to deprive the legislature of a most important function. The 
Standing Committee, consisting of the members of all parties in 
proportion to their membership in the Legislature would be the 
legislature in minature and its approval, subject to the further 
approval of the Legislature at a later date, would ensxire genuine 
parliamentary control, A convention would probably develop that 
an ordinance approved by the Standing Committee before promulgation, 
should not be thrown out by the Legislature, with the result that 
the time required for a detailed discussion of the ordinance in the 
Legislature would be saved.
Delegated legislation during a period of emergency presents 
special difficulties, as time may be an important factor to be 
reckoned with. But at least some of the safeguards suggested by 
Sir Cecil Carr could be adopted even during a crisis,
"The delegation should be a trustworthy authority commanding 
the national confidence," If it is intended that the authority to 
whom a delegation is made should be authorised to make a further 
delegation of its powers, the Legislature should specify the
(24) Concerning English Administrative Law, pages 49 ff*
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subordinate authorities to whom such sub-dele gat ion may be made, 
making sure that they are authorities in whom trust can be reposed.
It would be desirable in appropriate cases to impose certain 
conditions to the exercise of the delegated powers by the authority 
to whom the delegation is made. ’The limits within which the 
delegated power is to be exercised ought to be definitely laid down." 
These limits instead of hampering the authority, it is submitted, 
would enable it to act freely and easily within the well defined 
ambit.
Sir Gecilrs recommendation regarding *the prior consultation
of interests specially concerned* may not in all cases be practicable
in times of emergency. But it is desirable to consult them, when
possible, as they could often put forward facts and circumstances
which a public authority would be glad to take into account when
drafting a statutory instrument.
The justification for delegation of legislative power is the
waste of time , and the insxiperable difficulties involved in making
conprehensive laws dealing in detail with complex matters and
changing circumstances. The Legislature should lay down the broad
principles leaving the details to be worked out by the authority to
whom delegation is made. Hence legislation empowering delegation
must not grant powers to legislate on matters of principle. In some
delegated legislation, the delegated authority has been empowered
(25)
to legislate so as to by-pass existing legislation. 7 
(25) e.g. Section"1 22 of the (Ceylon)Hpy.blic Sec/urity"X^en^ en1:;T Act, 
1959* which enacts that certain orders made under the Act 
"shall have effect notwithstending anything inconsistent 
therewith or contrary thereto contained in any other law”.
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When the Mother of Parliaments tends to remove Henry VIII clause 
from the statute hook, her young daughters seem inclined to emulate 
the foibles of her youth.
In the absence of a Select Committee on Statutory Instruments 
as set up in the United Kingdom by an Act of Parliament, it would 
be desirable to submit all statutory regulations and orders, 
including (to borrow Sir Cecil*s descriptive p h r a s e " t h e  grand­
children of the Act" to the scrutiny of the Standing Committee of the 
appropriate Legislature. If the Committee disapproves any 
regulation or oder, it may be withdrawn; or in the alternative it 
may be amended and resubmitted to the Committee.
Further, the statutory instruments may be laid before the 
Legislature with the recommendations of the Standing Committee,
The suggestions made above as applicable to India may mutatis 
mutandis be applied to Pakistan, if and when a democratic 
constitution is adopted in that country. In Ceylon, it would be 
desirable to enact a Bill of Rights in addition to adopting the 
suggestions given above. It may also be provided that the Bill of 
Rights should never be suspended except with the prior approval of 
the Constitutional Council. In the special circumstances of Ceylon, 
it is particularly necessary that a body which is above party and 
faction, and in whom the minorities have confidence, should be 
empowered to maintain a constitutional balance of power.
(26) Concerning English Administrative Law, page 88.
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In Ceylon, it would be feasible to provide that Parliament
should meet within five days, after the issue of a proclamation of
emergency, but only after the Constitutional Council has approved
(27)of the proclamation*' 7 For it is not difficult in the small island
for all the members of the Parliament to meet within a short period.
The provision suggested above, if adopted, may prevent the
democratic principle in South Asia from being lost in a wilderness
of arbitrary emergency proclamations, regulations, rules and orders,
though it has been said that "laws and constitutions are but the paper
( 28 )safeguards of liberty. A people must have a will to be free." 7
But democracy is not achieved by acts of will alones men!s wills,
through action, can shape institutions and events in directions
that would reduce or increase the chances for the development and
(29)survival of democracy.' 7 As observed by Mr. Justice Felix 
Frankfurters 'The liberties that are defined in our Bill of Rights 
are, on the whole, more living realities in the daily lives of 
Englishmen without any formal constitution because they are in the 
marrow of the bone of the people. Such habits become a national 
tradition through constant renewal in thought and deedM. ^ ^
(27) In the event of disaxoproval, the proclamation would cease 
to have effect,
(28) Garr, op. cit. 92.
(29) Lipset, op. cit. 103*
(30) Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the Supreme Court, 
page 63 (emphasis added).
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